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A b stract
This thesis asks what role is played by institutionalised dehumanisation in genocide and 
genocidal killing. In answering this question, I construct a model of genocidal 
dehumanisation according to its functions, and its manifest types. I argue that genocidal 
dehumanisation should be considered a unitary, but internally differentiated, phenomenon; 
and that it is best conceptualised as one extreme of a continuum of dehumanisation. The 
different manifestations of institutionalised dehumanisation have a stable and predictable 
relationship to psychological dispositions, and to practices which enact oppression and 
destruction. Genocidal dehumanisation exists at the locus of individual psychology, group 
psychology, culture, and the social. It must therefore be conceptualised through a 
framework which incorporates insights from each of these fields of inquiry. Hence, the 
work takes a multidisciplinary approach, employing the concepts of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ 
to suggest that genocidal dehumanisation is a functional, purposive, and internally 
differentiated discursive strategy. Within the context of the discursive and social structures 
of the modern era, dehumanisation becomes a necessity in genocide and genocidal killing. I 
argue that genocidal dehumanisation can serve two purposes in such episodes: legitimisation, 
and motivation. However, in its legitimatory aspect, dehumanisation is universally present, 
whereas in its motivatory aspect it is present only in some cases. Having dealt with 
questions of function, I propose a three-part typology of the construction of Othered 
outgroups in genocide and genocidal killing: as disease organisms, animals or subhumans, and 
as bureaucratic-euphemistic reifications. Each of these types is a product of the intersection 
of specific modern discourses. While all three legitimise the elimination of the target group, 
the first type, médicalisation, is always motivatory, the second, animalisation, is sometimes 
motivatory, and the third, bureaucratic-euphemistic reification, is not motivatory. Finally, I 
suggest the way in which this conceptual model, which covers functionality, type, and the
relationship between the two, can be used both as a means of historical analysis and as a
iii
predictive tool.
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C h a p te r I.
Introduction
The capability of humans to perpetrate extreme cruelty upon their fellows is a fact which is 
often met, in the public arena, with sheer incomprehension, un-nuanced condemnation, or 
prejudice against some group to which perpetrators belong. In the scholarly realm, a great 
deal of ink has been spilt examining various aspects of this question, leading to many different 
conclusions regarding the answer to the seemingly eternal question, ‘how could they do it?’
In this thesis, I examine the most extreme cases of mass mistreatment and destruction of 
life: genocide and genocidal killing. I take as my subject an aspect of this process which, I 
believe, has not thus far been accorded the attention it deserves as a vital, but complex, 
factor: dehumanisation. Dehumanisation occurs when a collectivity as a collectivity is 
defined as unworthy of the moral consideration afforded to members of the ingroup.1
‘Ethnic cleansing,’ ‘Sonderbehandlung,’ Tutsi cockroaches,’ ‘Jewish vermin’: these and similar 
phrases will be all too familiar to the scholar of genocide. But what do they signify, and what 
work do they perform? I begin with this relatively simple question: what role does 
dehumanising discourse which names an outgroup as lesser humans, less than human, or 
nonhuman play in the elimination of that outgroup? What becomes possible for one human 
to do to another, when that other is named as less than human or as non-human, as an 
animal, a virus or as an inanimate unit of material? And why should it be so? While many 
works on genocide mention dehumanisation, only a small body of scholarly work has thus far 
considered dehumanisation to be a concept worthy in itself of meaningful theoretical
1 The development and justification of this definition will be outlined in Chapter Four of the thesis.
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investigation as a primary subject.2 With a few exceptions (which will be explored in 
Chapter Four), there has been little question of why dehumanisation manifests in cases of 
genocide and mass killing; of how it functions (that is, what ends it serves and how this takes 
place); and of whether it is necessarily present in all such cases. Nor has there been much 
serious investigation of whether, in fact, in the study of genocide the deployment of 
‘dehumanisation’ as a meaningful or useful ontological category can be justified. Rather, both 
in general, and in specific analyses, the raison d’etre and the function of dehumanisation have 
too often been considered to be self-evident.
The question as to whether ‘dehumanisation’ is a useful concept in scholarship on genocide 
therefore remains open. If investigation into the subject concludes, as this thesis does, that 
it is indeed a meaningful and useful concept, then it surely deserves attention as a primary 
subject of investigation. This thesis is, firstly, an attempt to answer some basic questions 
about genocidal dehumanisation: what are its features as a phenomenon, and what its 
presence in particular, differentiated forms can tell us about a given situation. The second 
purpose of this thesis, which emerges in pursuit of the first, is to engage in a comparative 
examination of why dehumanisation has become a necessary accompaniment to genocide 
(that is, the theory of dehumanisation); and, given this, of how it functions in genocide (the 
practice). In the course of this examination, I formulate a general definition of 
dehumanisation, and a typology of genocidal dehumanisation. On the basis of my research, I 
conclude that if the concept of ‘dehumanisation’ is to be employed usefully in scholarship on 
genocide, it should be conceived in a nuanced way, as a unitary phenomenon, but one which 
is internally differentiated both by type and by function.
2 Scholars who have made significant contributions to research on this topic include Helen Fein, James Waller, 
Albert Bandura, Daniel Bar-Tal, Emanuele Castano, Israel W . Charny, Stanley Cohen, Herbert Hirsch, Susan 
Opotow, Ervin Staub, and Christian Tileaga.
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I argue that dehumanisation, which should be understood as a discursive strategy, is a 
necessary precondition for genocide and genocidal killing because it legitimises the 
destruction of the victim group.3 It may also be present, but is not universally so, as a 
motivation for genocide and genocidal killing. The model of dehumanisation that I present 
may be used, firstly, to provide a new understanding of the particular role of dehumanisation 
in given historical episodes of genocide and mass killing; and secondly, to reveal a stable 
connection between particular kinds of dehumanisation and particular types of action toward 
the object, making the existence and nature of certain types of rhetoric a more exact tool of 
both historical and predictive analysis.
In introducing this subject, I first consider issues around conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical approaches to the subject of genocidal dehumanisation. I go on to introduce the 
multidisciplinary form this inquiry will take, and explain why I have chosen this form. The 
major issues and areas of inquiry which the thesis will address having been outlined, I go on 
to delineate the development of my argument over the course of the thesis in light of the 
unfolding of these thematics. I deal with a number of issues which will be of concern 
throughout the body of the thesis: the definition of the field of inquiry and the inclusion or 
exclusion of relevant concepts; definitions of ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal killing’; the definition 
of the phenomenon in question in this thesis; and, finally, the nature and provenance of the 
documentation which will be used as evidence for my argument regarding the nature of 
dehumanisation.
3 The concept of a ‘discursive strategy’ and the reasons for characterising dehumanisation thus will be explored in 
Chapter Three.
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I. Introducing G enocidal D eh u m an isatio n :
C o n cep tual, T h eo retical, and Em p irical A sp ects
Dehumanisation as a phenomenon exists at the level of the individual and that of the 
collective. It is found in socio-cultural practice, as manifest on both these levels, in an 
evolving historical context. The physical practice of dehumanisation upon the bodies of its 
object tends to be preceded by, accompanied by and followed by discursive dehumanisation 
in the form of utterances, which are chiefly but not solely verbal.4 Given this, in order to 
analyse dehumanisation in genocide and genocidal killing it is necessary to draw, theoretically 
and empirically, on the resources provided by different disciplinary fields, including sociology, 
psychology, anthropology, political science, cultural theory, sociolinguistics, and history.5 My 
approach to the topic will therefore be broadly interdisciplinary. In the following section, I 
will give some idea as to how such an approach may be pursued. Here, however, I explore 
the question of the features of dehumanisation itself as a subject of inquiry, considered as 
introductory problematics in the conceptual, theoretical and/or empirical realms. In the 
process, I will clarify what this thesis aims to demonstrate, and what claims lie beyond its 
compass.
Firstly, to what body of evidence do we target examination of genocidal dehumanisation? 
Given that in this work dehumanisation will be conceptualised as a discursive strategy, my 
key area of investigation is the use of language as representation; and, more specifically, 
metaphor and euphemism. Language is the primary form of representation used to 
dehumanise an outgroup such that they are no longer considered to deserve the moral
4 The term ‘utterance’ is used in preference to ‘language’ not with reference to the particular sense of the term 
found in the work of scholars such as J. L. Austin or Mikhail Bakhtin, but to indicate that although this 
dehumanisation is generally verbal, it may also take non-verbal forms -  for example, visual representation.
5 It has been argued that not only particular aspects, but the very phenomenon of genocide or massacre is so 
complex as to require such an interdisciplinary approach: see for example J. Semelin, Toward a vocabulary of 
massacre and genocide\ Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5 no. 2, 2003, pp. 193-194.
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obligation owed to ‘fellow humans,’ whatever that obligation may be. The discursive 
strategy which constructs the other as a lesser form of life, practised in language which 
names the other as lesser, morally legitimises the subjugation, oppression and mistreatment 
of that group; and in its most extreme manifestation legitimises the outright destruction of 
the group.6
Secondly, given the action that is thus legitimised, in terms of historical cases, what 
episodes are to be examined and why? This thesis focuses on episodes of genocide, and of 
genocidal killing (whilst also making mention of other episodes for points of similarity and 
difference). But even in defining the object of inquiry as ‘genocide and genocidal killing’ it 
will be clear that this represents a broad field, encompassing attitudes and actions toward an 
outgroup which differ extremely in their particularities from case to case. The phenomenon 
into which the work inquires, however, is very specific, and it is my aim to uncover its 
manifestations in otherwise very different episodes, and in so doing to demonstrate the 
commonality of this process. Rhetoric which dehumanises an outgroup by naming its 
members as lesser humans, less than human or nonhuman is a tool which can be employed 
in different ways and for different purposes, but it is nonetheless a common and identifiable 
factor in episodes of genocide and genocidal killing. I examine narratives of dehumanisation 
‘in practice’ in the broad variety of cases which appear in my typology with the aim of 
demonstrating this underlying connectedness (and hence demonstrating the validity of the 
concept of ‘dehumanisation’).
Thirdly, the nature of the theoretical claims to be made must not be mistaken. I will argue 
that dehumanisation is a necessary accompaniment to genocide and genocidal killing; the 
question therefore arises as to whether I am arguing for such dehumanisation as a causatory 
factor. In terms of causation, the question of motivation necessarily looms large. We may
6 For a discussion of my usage of the concepts of ‘the other and ‘othering,’ see Chap. 4, n 2 l.
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address this problem in the following way. There are many reasons for which an outgroup 
becomes such, which may, from the observer’s perspective, appear either rational or 
irrational. That is to say, the negative characterisation of the outgroup may be the primary 
motivation for their mistreatment (as in the case of Jews in Nazi Germany); or there may be 
a more ‘objectively rational’ desire to profit from their mistreatment. Most commonly, 
these are intertwined: for example, European colonisers arrive with a preconceived, 
dehumanised concept of the ‘savage’ natives; but they also have a ‘rational’ reason to 
mistreat the colonised group, namely, to take their land and exploit their labour. At the 
level of the individual, actors are not always motivated by hatred or fear of the outgroup; 
there are many other possible motivations. This thesis, therefore, is indeed concerned with 
the question of motivation (and thus causation); but, I will argue, motivatory dehumanisation 
can be considered a subcategory of dehumanisation, one of two functions, along with 
legitimisation. My argument is that genocide is sometimes motivatory, but it is not in this 
aspect that it is a necessary accompaniment to genocide. Dehumanisation, that is to say, is 
distinct from, although it may overlap with, motivation. Rather, it is in its legitimatory aspect 
that dehumanisation enables genocide to take place by allowing the moral disengagement of 
perpetrators. Dehumanisation, therefore, is not necessarily a cause of genocide; but it is 
necessarily indispensable to the process.
The question of causality in collective practice brings us to our fourth introductory 
problematic: that of the construction of collectives as such. This thesis examines collective 
dynamics (though in doing so a detailed focus is turned upon the psychological state of the 
individual as an individual within a collectivity). Further, I am concerned with the 
characterisation of specific collectivities. Not everyone within a perpetrator society must 
think of the collective object of dehumanisation as lesser humans or as less than human in 
order for action against that group to be generally acceptable; but such rhetoric must be 
common, and be both accepted by, and acceptable within, that society as a whole. By no
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means do I argue that ‘dehumanisation’ means that every member of society, or even a 
majority, are ideologically committed to the genocide of the outgroup. The acquiescent 
bystanding of the majority is quite sufficient for genocide and genocidal killing to take place. 
Dehumanisation provides an overall justification for, and legitimisation of, action, whatever 
the motivation. Therefore, dehumanisation provides not only willing perpetrators, but also a 
population within which individuals may not personally participate in exploitation and 
murder, but where these are accepted by a majority as legitimate and justified, or, at the 
least, as matters of relatively little or no concern. I have, therefore, neither the need to 
demonstrate, nor the intention to make, universalising claims about the subject positions of 
individuals within collectivities.
The issue of the collective opens up a fifth issue -  that of general questions regarding the 
theorising of negative group characterisation. Negative categorisation is used to identify 
outgroups and to stigmatise and dehumanise such groups in various different contexts, from 
the society-wide to the personal level. This thesis concerns itself with the characterisation of 
an outgroup based on a perception of the essentialised identity of its members (even if this is not 
perceived as a biological characteristic). One may ask, why draw the line at genocide and 
genocidal killing? W hy not examine slavery and apartheid, or the dehumanisation of refugees 
or welfare recipients? The focus of this thesis is an attitude which sees, not a behaviour, but 
an essential identity, as fundamentally alien to the true ‘humanity’ of which the perpetrator 
group is the primary example. Therefore, I do not examine cases in which, according to the 
logic of the perpetrators, negative characterisation is related to an alleged behaviour rather 
than an alleged identity. While an intent to create prejudice against such groups exists, it is 
(again, in rhetorical terms) the behaviour of individuals making up such groups which is seen 
as aberrant; and thus their boundaries are understood within the terms of this discursive 
strategy to be fluid. For this reason, such groups are not included. Furthermore, I am
concerned with situations in which a motivation and a desire exists for the elimination of the
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group of people so categorised. Thus, while essentialising dehumanisation certainly occurs in 
cases such as (some forms of) slavery and apartheid, the action to which it is related is of 
such a different nature as to make such dehumanisation a separate subject of inquiry. Here, 
it is only possible to suggest, according to the model I propose, the type of dehumanisation 
which would be likely to be found in these cases, and to give some limited examples.
In speaking of the various ways in which ‘outgroups’ are constructed, I wish to clearly 
recognise that there are different subtypes and different degrees of dehumanisation. In a 
literal sense, perpetrators may characterise victims as inferior humans; or they may 
characterise or name victims as entirely non-human, whether in the strictly metaphorical 
sense in which it is implicitly accepted that jargon and euphemism refer to human beings 
(stucke, ‘pieces’), or in the sense in which there is a more (untermenschen, ‘sub-humans’) or 
less (‘vermin’) literal dehumanising characterisation of victims. There is a tension, and a clear 
distinction, between utterances which depict the other as a threat, arousing feelings of fear, 
hatred and anger (this characterisation is often termed ‘demonisation’), and utterances 
which arouse no emotion whatsoever in that they characterise the other as totally non­
human, as a ‘piece’ or a ‘log.’ In examining different cases of genocidal dehumanisation in the 
context of general theories about negative group identifications and their consequences, this 
work proposes a model of dehumanisation which explains the ‘placement’ of these forms of 
dehumanisation. It examines the relationship of these different kinds of dehumanisation to 
the kind of action taken against outgroups, arguing that it is possible to identify a predictive 
relationship between statement and action.
Finally, the thesis engages with the temporal aspect of dehumanisation in terms of the 
problematics of monolithic, linear, or teleological conceptions of the role of dehumanisation 
in genocide. I will examine the chronological development of modern dehumanised 
conceptions of the other, from the discourses and historical circumstances whose
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confluence gave it origin, to its most extreme modern manifestations; and I will question the 
relationship of the development of dehumanisation with the existence of motivations for 
mistreatment. Does this kind of rhetoric emerge and disappear without necessarily taking 
place simultaneously with action against the outgroup? In exploring such questions, 
consideration is made of where dehumanising rhetoric is present in societies, and how its 
nature may be connected to escalation of harmful action resulting from particular 
circumstances outside the realm of verbal discursivity. Neither in the individual, nor the 
social sense is dehumanisation atemporal or stable; and both of these factors will be taken 
into consideration when looking at the role of dehumanisation in genocide and genocidal 
killing.
These, then, are the major theoretical problematics which arise in dealing with genocidal 
dehumanisation as a discursive strategy. The reader should now have a clearer idea of the 
subjects which will be explored within the thesis, and the claims which will be made, as well 
as those which do not lie within its scope. At this point, we may return to a closer 
examination of the first issue raised in this section: the employment of a multidisciplinary 
approach.
II. G enocidal Dehum anisation: D evelopm ent of a M ultidisciplinary A p p ro ach
In summary, this thesis inquires into the role played by a particular discursive strategy, 
termed ‘dehumanisation,’ in the essentialised construction of a collective other; and into the
relationship between dehumanising utterances, and physical action taken against that other.
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In his work on the ideologies of moral exclusion, social psychologist Christian Tileaga 
insightfully identifies the nature of and the necessity for the undertaking I am embarking 
upon in this thesis:
What is needed is an attempt of [sic] re-conceptualization of depersonalization, 
delegitimization and dehumanization in discursive terms, a look at how particular ways of 
speaking might depersonalize (and sometimes, dehumanize) the other (cf. Billig, 2002, p.
184) and how they are actually accomplished in interaction and in talk about ‘others’. W hat 
is needed is an approach that cuts across the traditional individual/social dualism, as well as 
the traditional micro/macro and majority/minority divisions (Potter, 2003). An approach with 
a focus on the way moral standings in the world, the social structure of group and category 
relations are being ‘produced’, that is described, invoked, categorized, for action and 
interaction.7
In the literature on dehumanisation, diverse epistemologies and methodologies have been 
applied depending on the discipline within which a given analysis has arisen. In the field of 
genocide studies, for the most part, analysis has been weighted toward the historiographic, 
the sociological, and the social-psychological. My own inquiry aims, through a synthesis of 
these approaches with methods belonging to cultural theory and sociolinguistics, to shift this 
emphasis somewhat in order to give an overall picture of the workings of genocidal 
dehumanisation within both specific and universal contexts: that is, to understand the way in 
which the complex interrelationships between historical events, cultural discourses and 
human mental processes give rise to a particular set of utterances and practices. Because 
genocidal dehumanisation is situated at the intersection of the areas which the 
abovementioned disciplines take as their respective fields of inquiry, it is not possible to 
develop an overall model of its nature or functionality through the application of
7 C. Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of moral exclusion: A  critical discursive reframing of depersonalization, delegitimization 
and dehumanisation’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, p. 721.
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unidisciplinary theoretical frameworks. A multidisciplinary approach allows both a more 
nuanced, and a more thorough, understanding of the nature, the crucial importance, and the 
differentiation of the role of dehumanisation in genocide.
The two issues in focus here are, firstly, the genocide-specific question of what exactly 
different disciplinary approaches have been able to tell us about genocide; and, secondly, the 
more general issue of using multidisciplinary tools to theorise a subject which has not had a 
long history of being thus theorised. In order to ground my own standpoint, and to clearly 
elucidate the conceptualisation of genocidal dehumanisation as a discursive strategy, my aim 
is to weave together different disciplinary and thematic approaches through the employment 
of concepts around ‘discourse’ and other heuristics emerging from the field of cultural 
theory. The application of work applying the insights of the ‘cultural turn’ to genocide, 
however, is very much in its infancy.8 How, then, does one go about such a synthesis? It is 
primarily a question of using the appropriate tools to analyse different aspects of 
dehumanisation in order to arrive at a conception.
Given that the way in which I approach my subject matter does not have well-developed 
theoretical antecedents in terms of an application to genocide, in my examination both of 
approaches to genocide, and of the ways in which cultural theory can be applied to such an 
inquiry, my aim is not to critique particular theoretical or disciplinary approaches per se, 
either individually or in a comparative sense, but rather to comprehend how such different 
approaches may be employed in order to illuminate particular aspects of the phenomenon. 
When using the scholarship of different authors, I will indicate whether there are aspects of 
any specific work or theory which are either problematic in terms of my model, or which 
are not relevant or useful; but again, in-depth critique of one or a few theoretical approaches 
to the subject does not serve my purpose. Rather, a synthesis of individual elucidations of
8 Scholars who have written work employing such methods include Jacques Semelin, Norbert Finzsch, Dan Stone, 
and Klaus Theweleit, among others.
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different aspects of dehumanisation allows the creation of an integrated model of genocidal 
dehumanisation. In creating such a model in this thesis, I will first outline previous 
disciplinary and thematic approaches to understanding the questions of the causation of and 
motivation for genocide (in Chapter Two), before explaining the way in which the theories I 
employ can synthesise work from these perspectives in order to tell us something about the 
nature of the subject in question (Chapter Three).
This division has a further logic. I have already mentioned the issue of causation and 
motivation, and the problematics of locating the argument of this thesis within discussion 
about these issues. In the second chapter, therefore, I examine work on the causation of 
and motivation for genocide in order to reveal the ways in which particular disciplinary 
models can shed some light upon the problem at hand, and to locate my discussion within a 
general field of scholarship on the subject of genocide. In so doing, given that 
dehumanisation is considered, here and elsewhere, to be one causatory factor in genocide, 
causatory models are examined thematically, covering psychological, socio-cultural, political, 
economic/demographic, and bio-evolutionary approaches. Rather than giving an overview of 
these entire fields, which would be an encyclopaedic task, I ask what each of these 
approaches can lend to my examination of the questions around genocidal dehumanisation, 
and what problematics they present which may be fruitful in conceptualising this 
phenomenon. In a progressive sharpening of the focus of attention, an overview is provided 
of scholarly work treating the question of how people come to participate in genocide, 
chiefly from a socio-psychological perspective.
At this point, the state of the field regarding scholarship on causation, motivation and 
human involvement in genocide has been established; in so doing, the usefulness of particular 
approaches and conceptions has been mooted, giving some appreciation of the point from 
which my own discussion of dehumanisation in genocide must begin. But thus far, what has
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been undertaken is a survey of the field, rather than a statement outlining my own approach 
to this material. It therefore remains to be asked: how exactly is one to take a cultural- 
discursive approach to this topic, and what does it mean to call dehumanisation a ‘discursive 
strategy’? In the third chapter, I divert focus temporarily away from the question of 
genocide per se and toward that of methodological approaches.
Since, as I have mentioned, there is little scholarly work modelling the application of 
cultural theory to genocide, it becomes necessary to outline important concepts and to 
indicate the way in which textual documentary material can be approached through such a 
lens. I begin Chapter Three with an analysis of Michel Foucault’s use of the concepts of 
‘discourse’ and of ‘discursive strategy,’ with particular reference to The Archaeology of 
Knowledge. The concept of discourse has often been linked to that of ideology, and it is to 
an analysis of the latter term, and its usefulness for this investigation as an analytical tool, 
that I next turn my attention, making specific use of the work of Terry Eagleton and Teun 
van Dijk. Theories developed around these two terms considered as heuristics, I argue, are 
vital to developing an understanding of the nature and function of genocidal dehumanisation. 
Finally, there remains the issue of the way in which this theory can be applied to textual 
material. Here, I outline Critical Discourse Analysis as developed by Norman Fairclough, 
and set out the aspects of this model which can be useful in the examination of a macro-level 
phenomenon such as genocidal dehumanisation. This excursus into methodological 
questions establishes the origins of the concepts that I use, the way in which they are 
employed henceforth in the thesis, what they reveal about their object and how this is done, 
and the reasons why this approach is necessary in order to capture the features and 
demonstrate the nature of this object.
Having established both a point of departure from current research in the field of genocide 
studies, and the nature of and justification for the methodological approach to be taken, I
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return to genocidal dehumanisation as the primary object of investigation. My investigation 
of ‘dehumanisation’ itself begins with the psycho-social dimensions of the problem, from the 
standpoint of common, but problematic, assumptions about ‘human nature’ in the context of 
mass killing. In order to identify and address these problems, it is necessary to embark upon 
a general examination of the concept of ‘dehumanisation’ in academic literature, giving in the 
process an overview of the present understanding of the nature of dehumanisation (as well 
as related terms) and, more specifically, its role in genocide. For the most part, this analysis, 
focussing on scholarship taking genocide, mass killing and collective violence as its subject, 
emerges from the field of psychology, particularly the scholarship of James Waller, Daniel 
Bar-Tal, Israel Charny, and Philip Zimbardo; and from sociology, most notably in the 
research of Helen Fein. In the course of analysing this work, firstly, I give a justification as to 
the development of my definition of the term. Secondly, extending my field of inquiry to 
take in the historical dimensions of the nature of modernity, and in particular questions of 
modern conceptions of moral legitimacy, I formulate an argument as to why dehumanisation 
is a necessary component of modern genocide and mass killing (that is, why such a 
consensus must be constructed, and what purposes it serves); and how it actually functions 
in these circumstances (including the vitally important differentiation between motivation 
and legitimisation). Having considered the historical dimension, I take into account the 
specific role of language (in particular, metaphor) and representation in constructing 
dehumanising practice. Finally, I enquire as to the nature of the various manifestations of 
dehumanisation, and what connection exists between them (connections which allow us to 
consider dehumanisation a phenomenon). I propose a three-part typology of genocidal 
dehumanisation, which will form the structure of the following discussion on the substance 
of dehumanising utterance and practice, and the historically- and culturally-determined 
reasons it manifests in these particular forms.
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At this point the nature of the field, the phenomenon at hand, and the approach which is to 
be taken have all been established. I have provided the analytical tools and the background 
knowledge to directly undertake a detailed description of each of the three types of 
genocidal dehumanisation -  conceived as discursive formations -  chapter by chapter: 
médicalisation, animalisation, and bureaucratic-euphemistic reification. In each chapter, I 
analyse the cultural, social and historical circumstances which gave rise, and gave ‘purchase,’ 
to each type of genocidal dehumanisation, and I provide numerous and representative 
examples of actual utterances of the type in question.
On the basis of this investigation, I emphasise that my proposed model of genocidal 
dehumanisation is instructive both in its historical and predictive dimensions. Ultimately, the 
aim of this work is to provide a hitherto-unconceptualised model of the nature and function 
of dehumanisation in genocide and mass killing. This model, I argue, can be employed as a 
conceptual tool in order to understand what function dehumanisation has played in any given 
historical episode and how it has done so; and also to point to the nature of genocidal 
dehumanisation in the pre-genocidal period, in order to recognise such discourse as it arises 
in possibly pre-genocidal contemporary situations.
§
Thus far, introductory discussion has been made of some problematics inherent in the issue 
at hand, leading into an argument and an outline as to the way in which the issue will be 
approached in this thesis. I have established that I am concerned with the qualitative analysis 
of discursive formations, and that I employ a multidisciplinary theoretical lens to examine a 
broad range of episodes of genocide and genocidal killing. The necessity for a comparative 
approach is inherent, given that my argument concerns genocidal dehumanisation as a 
common and necessary factor in episodes of genocide and mass killing. Given all of this, it
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should now be understood that this thesis is not a work of history in disciplinary terms; it is 
not an examination of the way in which any particular ideology of prejudice causes or 
contributes to genocide; it is not a dissection of Fascism, Nazism or other genocidally- 
related ideologies from the perspective of political philosophy or political science; neither is 
it an exhaustive category of documents relating to dehumanisation in any one episode, nor a 
detailed sociolinguistic analysis of one or a few documents. Any of these would constitute, 
in themselves, a separate work than the present, and one with quite different aims.
I have thus addressed both what this thesis intends to do, and what it does not. Before 
proceeding, there are three further issues to attend to. Firstly, there is a question of 
subjects which are related to dehumanisation, but which are not taken as primary objects of 
analysis. Secondly, as regards terminology, while the question of my own definition of 
‘dehumanisation’ will be dealt with at length in Chapter Four, there remains the question of 
the definition of the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal killing’ as they are used here. In arriving 
at definitions of these terms, I will also explain why I have chosen to gather documentary 
material demonstrating my argument from a broad range of cases, rather than examine one 
or two episodes as detailed case studies; these considerations lead to a discussion of the 
specific nature of the phenomenon in question. Thirdly and finally remains the issue of the 
provenance of the documentary sources which I employ in order to adduce empirical 
evidence for my argument.
III. Dehum anisation: T h e Relevance of Related C o n cep ts
There are certain belief systems or ideologies -  those concerned with identity, exclusion 
and prejudice -  of which dehumanisation is often seen as a sub-category or a manifestation. 
I do not discuss theories of any of these at length in this work. In order to explain this
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choice, clarification must be made of the conceived role and importance of these concepts in 
my overall model. While they are discussed in terms of historical developments which gave 
rise to specific types of genocidal dehumanisation, I do not directly analyse racism, 
nationalism, or denaturalisation (a decision which is given further consideration in Chapter 
Two). Nor do I give detailed attention to questions of gender or sexuality.
I do not intend to deny that there are close connections between tropes of racism (and 
related belief systems such as antisemitism), nationalism, masculinity and emasculation which 
are integral to many forms of dehumanisation, though not all. W hile I do not neglect the 
content of these practices where it is relevant to any manifest form of genocidal 
dehumanisation, I have chosen not to devote separate attention to the discussion of these 
subjects, for the following reasons.
Firstly, a great deal of scholarly work has already been done on the relationship between 
racism, nationalism, and sexism, and harmful action toward the other, both in specific cases, 
and in a more universal sense. I draw upon some of this work for my own analysis, 
particularly in the three chapters forming my typology. However, the contribution of this 
thesis to the study of genocide and mass killing lies not in any specific argument concerning 
any of the above theories, but rather in analysing dehumanisation as a functional component 
of genocidal action. The functionality, and indeed the very existence, of genocidal 
dehumanisation as a common phenomenon consists in the way in which it draws upon 
various different ideas, beliefs, forms and content to serve the same ends, ends which are 
crucial in the commission of genocide and mass killing: that is, legitimisation and/or 
motivation. Therefore, to devote too much space within an analysis of dehumanisation as a 
phenomenon, to theories and arguments concerning the role of nationalism, racism or 
sexism in harming the other, would be to misunderstand the nature of the enterprise. It is 
impossible to conceptualise genocidal dehumanisation without seeing it, not as a sub-
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category of any or all of the belief systems and practices mentioned above, but rather as a 
functional discursive strategy which draws upon them in order to enact its functionality.
Secondly, a detailed discussion of these concepts, and of their manifestations in 
dehumanisation, would in itself constitute a number of different theses. Such an attempt 
would be further complicated by their highly variable manifestations in different socio- 
historical contexts. To embark upon any such project would, for reasons of conceptual 
coherence, make impossible the development of a comparative argument regarding 
dehumanisation as a conceptually unified phenomenon.
Finally (as I will discuss in Chapter Four) there is a component of the essentialisation of the 
identity of outgroups as constructed by perpetrators which may or may not be present in 
these belief systems, but which is an essential aspect of genocidal dehumanisation. For these 
reasons, I do not devote dedicated space within the thesis to discussion of these discourses, 
belief systems or practices as separate phenomena. Rather, the focus of my examination of 
genocidal dehumanisation as a primary subject of investigation is on the function of the ways 
in which the identity of targeted groups is constructed, rather than the content which serves 
as a delivery mechanism for this functionality (content which is dealt with in greater depth in
the typological chapters).
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IV. ‘Genocide* and ‘Genocidal Killing’: Definitions
This thesis focuses on one extreme of what I tentatively conclude is a continuum of 
dehumanisation: that is, dehumanisation in genocide, and in genocidal killing.9 Given this, 
clear definitions are needed of these two terms.
What constitutes genocide is not a question with a simple answer. The term ‘genocide’ 
was coined by the jurist Raphael Lemkin in 1944 from the Greek genos (race or tribe) and 
the ending cide, from the Latin, indicating the killing of the object. Lemkin defined genocide
as:
[T ]he  destruction of the essential foundations of life of national groups, w ith the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration 
of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the 
econom ic existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, liberty, 
health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to  such groups.10
Since Lemkin, many scholars have put a great deal of effort into defining genocide, and 
arguing for particular definitions. This debate has not resulted in any scholarly consensus. 
However, the popular ‘success’ of the concept of genocide as the ‘crime of crimes’ has 
meant that its adoption has come to be a common rhetorical strategy used to indicate 
deeply-felt collective victimhood, rather than any more restricted meaning.* 11
9 As mentioned elsewhere, brief speculation is also made on the role of dehumanisation in mass subjugation such 
as slavery and apartheid, and the way in which this fits into the conception of dehumanisation proposed.
10 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule In Occupied Europe, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington [D. 
C.], 1944, p. 79.
11J. Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia University 
Press, New  York, 2007, pp. 309-313.
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The question of ‘genocide’ is not only academic. Certain national governments (notably 
those of Turkey and Japan, as well as those of colonised regions such as the Americas or 
Australia) have a stake in the denial of historical genocide, while in contemporary cases the 
label of ‘genocide’ is denied both by states which commit the act, and by the leaders of 
nations upon whom, having once admitted that genocide is occurring, action is incumbent, 
either in a legal sense (as signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide), or in a moral sense.
W e  are faced with a need to avoid confounding the activities of the humanities and social 
sciences with the realm of juridical law (while also acknowledging ‘international law’ itself as 
an evolving system). In this context, there is a necessity for a definition which has universal 
features and which is recognised outside the realm of the academy by international bodies 
which concern themselves with the problem of genocide. Given this, as well as the failure of 
all attempts by scholars thus far to establish any other uncontroversial definition, the best 
definition to employ is that found in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. The Convention defines genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical [sic], racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.12
12 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Resolution 260 A  (III) (9 December I 948), 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner For Human Rights, retrieved 30th November 2007, 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm>. The Convention entered into force on 12 January 1951.
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Despite issues with both its breadth (‘in whole or in part’; ‘serious bodily or mental harm’) 
and its narrowness (‘national, ethnic, racial or religious group’), if we are to create and 
engage in a universe of discussion about historical genocide and about prevention, this 
definition, with all its imperfections, seems the most feasible to adopt.
My concern here, however, is not only with cases which uncontroversially fall under this 
imperfect rubric. This thesis is an attempt to understand one aspect of what might be 
termed the genocidal or eliminationist discursive strategy, rather than solely ‘genocide’ as a 
phenomenon considered entirely in isolation. Therefore, I consider not only clear cases of 
genocide as defined by the Convention, but a number of other episodes which I have termed 
‘genocidal killing.’
There are very few cases which can be said to be even relatively uncontroversial as far as a 
definition of genocide is concerned. Even the least controversial, such as the Nazi mass 
killing of Jews and the Rwandan mass killing of Tutsi, are contested outside the realm of the 
academy, or by those with agendas to which such denial is convenient in an ideological sense. 
Given the moral weight generally afforded to ‘genocide’ as opposed to other related terms 
(war crimes, crimes against humanity, massacre, ethnic cleansing, and so forth), this is not 
surprising. The politics of the application of the term ‘genocide’ are thus highly fraught.
In this work, as well as the two cases mentioned above, I will make reference to the 
following cases: the mass killing of Armenians by Turks in the early 20th century; mass 
killings by the National Socialists of Gypsies, the mentally and physically disabled, Russian 
prisoners-of-war and significant strata of the Polish and Ukrainian populations; killing of 
Australian Aborigines and North and South American indigenous peoples by European 
colonisers; killing of the African Herero people by German colonisers; killing of Jews in 
medieval Europe; killing of Muslims by Serbs in Bosnia; killing of East Timorese by Indonesian
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forces; and killing under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. As well as these episodes, I will 
refer to other episodes of the mass killing of civilians, including the Allied bombings of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Japanese killing of civilians in occupied China in the 1930s 
and 1940s.13
Clearly, not all of these cases satisfy the terms of the Convention, chiefly because the 
group concerned (as, for example, in the killing of Khmer people in Cambodia) does not 
satisfy the possible victim groups listed there. They also include cases in which an attempt 
was made to wipe out a group in part, thus satisfying the terms of the Convention, but in 
which there was no intent to wipe out the entire group as such. In these cases the 
commission of the crime of genocide may be unclear. But they are episodes in which, it 
must be recalled, civilian victims of the killing process number in the tens or the hundreds of 
thousands, or more (whilst also recognising that number or scale of deaths is not a 
definitional aspect of ‘genocide’).
‘Unclear’ cases of this kind have often been defined as ‘genocidal killing’ or ‘genocidal 
massacre,’ that is, the mass killing of non-combatant or ‘innocent’ victims because they 
belong to a particular group, without the intent to wipe out that group in its entirety. This 
concept is discussed by scholars such as Leo Kuper, and is given particular consideration by 
Eric Markusen and David Kopf, who note that many scholars concur that ‘an action can be 
genocidal even if it does not constitute a genocide per se.’14 Both Kuper and Helen Fein 
have employed the term ‘genocidal massacre.’ Firstly, it has been used, problematically, to 
indicate scale, in cases where the number of those killed is ‘relatively small.’15 More germane 
to the use of the term here, however, is the conception that ‘genocidal massacre’ refers to
13 In discussing these cases os episodes of ‘killing,’ I do not intend to imply that genocide necessarily involves 
killing. However, in the cases I examine in this thesis, killing has been a primary means to genocidal ends.
14 E. Markusen & D. Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total W ar in the Twentieth Century, 
W estview  Press, Boulder, 1995, p. 62.
15 Markusen & Kopf, p. 63.
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the situation where a portion of a group is killed qua that group, but where there is no 
intention to destroy the group in its entirety.16 It is in this sense -  mass killing in which 
there is an intent to destroy members of a putative collectivity because of their membership 
in that collectivity -  that the term ‘genocidal killing’ (in preference to ‘genocidal massacre,’ 
where the term ‘massacre’ opens up another terminological issue) is employed here.
Finally, I will mention the concept of ‘sanctioned massacre,’ which puts the emphasis on 
‘sanction’ rather than on the objective nature of victims’ association with a specific group. 
Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton give the following definition of sanctioned massacre:
1. [S]uch a policy may be aimed at an objective other than extermination -  such as the 
pacification of the rural population of South Vietnam, as was the case in U.S. policy for 
Indochina -  but may include the deliberate decimation of large segments of a population as 
an acceptable means to that end.17
2. A second feature of sanctioned massacres is that their targets have not themselves 
threatened or engaged in hostile actions toward the perpetrators of violence.18
3. Dehumanization of the enemy is a common phenomenon in any war situation.
Sanctioned massacres, however, presuppose a more extreme degree of dehumanization, 
insofar as the killing is not in direct response to the target’s threats or provocations. It is 
not what they have done that marks such victims for death but who they are -  the 
category to which they happen to belong. They are the victims of policies that regard 
their systematic destruction as a desirable end or an acceptable means.19
16 Markusen & Kopf, p. 63.
17 H. C. Kelman & V. L. Hamilton, Th e  My Lai Massacre: Crimes of Obedience and Sanctioned Massacres’, in M. 
D. Ermann & R. J. Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: problems of Organizational behaviour in 
Contemporary Society (5th edn), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1996, p. 196.
18 Kelman & Hamilton, The  My Lai Massacre’, p. 197.
19 Kelman & Hamilton, The  My Lai Massacre’, p. 205.
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Not all cases are entirely clear or mutually exclusive as to category. It seems to me 
sterile, even distasteful, to engage in irresolvable debates about definitional issues, or to 
make morally-imbued evaluative comparisons regarding particular episodes. Rather, in a 
spirit of analysis undertaken with a view to comprehension, this thesis is concerned with 
situations which involve the mass killing or destruction of civilian out-groups as such groups 
are identified by the perpetrators, whatever these situations may be termed. In so doing the 
bulk of my research has come from the field now known as genocide studies,’ and for this 
reason, I cannot neglect this terminology. However, it is not enough only to refer to 
‘genocidal killing’ and not ‘genocide,’ given that action with this aim is not only restricted to 
killing: a plan to eliminate an essentially-identified group of people can be carried out through 
other means (as outlined in the Convention). To use Jacques Semelin’s phrase, 
dehumanisation is a ‘common problematic’ in all these cases.20 Ultimately, then, my use of 
both the terminology of ‘genocide’ and ‘genocidal killing’ is intended to serve the purpose 
enunciated by Kuper when he wrote that by referring to ‘genocidal massacre’ as well as to 
‘genocide’ he hoped to ‘reduce controversy over the selection of cases, so that the human 
concern for the prevention of genocide [and, we might add, mass killing] may prevail over 
the almost insuperable problem of precision in classification.’21
Before leaving this subject, a final clarification: I have made reference to the fact that 
mention is also made in this thesis of other situations in which an outgroup is thought to be 
and/or constructed as less than human, and mistreated, with this claimed basis of legitimacy, 
in organised and society-wide fashion (for example, episodes of institutionalised slavery).
This material is emphatically not used as an example to demonstrate my argument regarding 
the nature of genocidal dehumanisation. Rather, such cases are relevant to the argument 
that dehumanisation is one, differentiated phenomenon (within which genocidal discourse 
can be considered an extreme of a larger continuum). Given that the subject at hand is the
20 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 382; my italics.
21 L. Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, Yale University Press, New Haven/Yale, 1981, p. 10.
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nature of discursive constructions - which are inevitably social and thus collective - while 
these kinds of cases may be discussed, it should be emphasised that, in terms of empirical 
examples, the thesis does not deal with mistreatment or killing which is understood within 
the contemporary terms of reference of the perpetrator collectivity to be aberrant, as for 
example in individual murder or ‘radical’ minority groups.22
In this section, I have mentioned a large number of cases. The use of such a broad field of 
highly complex episodes as empirical examples of the phenomenon whose existence I intend 
to demonstrate may be seen as a potential difficulty. The alternative to my approach would 
be to look at one or two of these in detail. In a general sense, in the field of genocide 
scholarship (particularly where it overlaps with that of Holocaust studies) many models have 
been developed in the context of the in-depth study of one or a few cases. The 
problematics of this approach in developing a generalisable model should be evident. My 
intent here is to avoid these problematics by beginning from a perspective which takes many 
different cases into account. This is the only way in which to approach this phenomenon as 
one related to that of ‘genocide’ in a way which does not either distort the picture thus 
presented through the lens of individual cases, or fail to provide any evidence that the model 
presented is in fact generalisable in an empirical sense. In other words, despite the 
difficulties inherent in the use of empirical examples drawn from such a wide range of 
diverse episodes, it is the most useful way in which the problem at hand - that of elucidating 
the nature of dehumanisation in genocide and genocidal killing - can be approached. Indeed, 
much of the value and the originality of this thesis consists, not in presenting one or two 
detailed case studies, but precisely in researching and gathering together a wide collection of
22 Here, it may be germane to mention the distinction proposed by Kenneth W . Grundy and Michael A. 
Weinstein between the criminal and political types of organised violence, where political violence is directed at 
the maintenance or change of a normative order, while criminal violence, while it may be impersonal or 
instrumental, is not so directed (K. W . Grundy & M. A. Weinstein, The Ideologies of Violence, Charles E. Merrill 
Publishing Company, Columbus [Ohio], 1974. p. 3). The application of a similar distinguishing model to 
dehumanising discourse should give some idea of what is proposed here.
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material from different episodes in order to demonstrate the validity of my claims about the 
nature of genocidal dehumanisation. The arguments developed here may then be applied to 
other episodes in the course of close analyses (a point which will be further discussed in the 
Conclusion).
V. ‘Genocidal Dehum anisation’: Definition and Clarification of the Phenom enon
Given the above definition of the scope of cases considered in this thesis, we may at this 
point narrow the focus, and ask: what are the specific defining factors of the phenomenon I 
examine? These may be enumerated as follows:
1. I examine episodes in which there is an intent to destroy members of a collectivity 
defined as such. This intention must exist not only at the level of given individuals but at the 
level of the collective -  it is generally, but not always, implemented by the governing body of 
a nation state. Action on this intent must take place in a widespread, standardised and/or an 
organised fashion.
2. The practice of destruction occurs in a situation in which the majority of citizens of the 
perpetrator society license such mistreatment either through collaboration or through 
inaction, for whatever reason -  that is, every member of a society need not feel such a 
desire; it is enough that their concern for the victim collectivity, in the context of the 
consequences of oppositional action, is minimal enough to enable those in a position to do 
so to enact their destructive and exploitative urges, and to recruit others to carry them out.
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3. Utterances, primarily but not solely verbal, are used to identify, categorise and construct 
the identity of the collectivity marked for destruction.
4. Both the use of such language and the treatment meted out to such collectivities are not 
considered aberrant within the moral terms of reference of the perpetrator society (except 
inasmuch as the perpetrators may consider them as an extraordinary response to an 
extraordinary situation which has a finite solution in the destruction of the outgroup) -  that 
is, the use of such language is ‘taken for granted’ within the society, even if there are those 
who publicly dissent. Thus, as mentioned above, this work does not examine episodes in 
which an individual or a small group within a society use such rhetoric to call for or justify 
action against an outgroup when such action is considered illegitimate in the broader 
context of the society in which the group is found; nor situations where such language is 
used by individuals or groups where those groups or individuals are not representative of 
the continuum of expressible opinion within the broader society, and where such language is 
not considered to be acceptable by those who govern politically, and/or who shape 
mainstream opinion. Thus it excludes examination of such language use by prejudiced 
groups considered extremist within their host societies.
5. Membership in the collectivity must be considered and defined by the perpetrators in an 
essentialist fashion. That is, according to the perpetrators, membership in the outgroup 
must be considered an inherent characteristic which cannot be changed solely by the choice 
and actions of individuals who find themselves within such a group. Even when, in certain 
cases, some individuals may be spared as a result of actions undertaken through their own 
agency (such as religious conversion), it is always the perpetrator who controls the 
boundaries of the collectivity; the action of such an individual, from the perpetrator 
perspective, does not necessarily remove their identity as a member of this group per se, but 
spares them the most extreme consequences of membership as long as the larger goal of
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destruction continues to be served. In this thesis, that is to say, I am not concerned with 
the use of dehumanising language towards collectivities which are defined by mutable 
behaviour (in the eyes of those who have the power to define) and/or collectivities toward 
which there is no intent to destroy as such. Thus, official dehumanisation of unwanted 
groups whose disappearance as such would be welcomed but who are constructed as being 
such because they have behaved in a particular way -  for example, asylum seekers or welfare 
recipients -  is excluded.
This definition of the phenomenon points to the fact that the issue of essentialised identity 
is very important, making this phenomenon qualitatively different from many other forms of 
prejudice which may, on the surface, appear similar. The question is whether, in the eyes of 
an ingroup, an outgroup as a collectivity can choose not to be an outgroup defined as such. 
Thus, ‘cultural racism’ which views other cultures as inferior and whose aim is the 
assimilation or ‘improvement’ of individuals within such cultures does not qualify; this type of 
discourse does not, in general, legitimise the mass killing or physical destruction of the 
outgroup. It is only where self-imposed cultural change on the individual level is considered 
impossible that destructive action of this kind may be considered a possible solution. It 
should also be noted that, in terms of the exclusion of outgroups, there is a certain truth in 
the observation that in general a foreigner or a stranger is less human, owed less obligation, 
than a friend or family member; but simply experiencing the human reality of someone with 
whom one comes in close and personal context is not necessarily, or even generally, enough 
to ‘rehumanise’ that individual (as the case of slavery demonstrates). A view which 
essentialises identity can construct particular groups not only as problematic, but as ‘wrong’ 
in the very scheme of things.23
23 In the case of periodic massacre and organised subjugation, which may overlap with slavery, collectives may be 
seen not as ‘wrong’ per se, but as having a particularly ordained place in a scheme of value considered as a vertical 
hierarchy. Daniel Bar-Tal, in discussing ‘ethnocentric delegitimization,’ suggests this difference in arguing that the
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In setting out this definition of the phenomenon to be examined, it may be objected that 
my argument becomes circular, inasmuch as I argue for a commonality of elements between 
cases which I have selected on the basis of containing these elements. However, I have 
defined the cases only in terms of the existence of genocidal intent and of essentialisation, 
not in terms of specifc functional patterns of essentialisation and their relationship to action.
It is the existence and nature of these patterns for which this thesis mounts an argument.
Here it is also appropriate to explain why I have not included discussion of episodes which 
could be considered ‘independent variables.’ My research has not uncovered any cases in 
which the discursive strategy I define as ‘genocidal dehumanisation’ appears in toto in the 
absence of genocide or genocidal killing (though it has certainly been present on the part of 
individuals and non-representative sections of societies; and, as we will see, genocidal 
dehumanisation, in its motivatory and legitimatory forms, tends to be present both in the 
periods preceding and following the actual historical genocidal moment -  which is no more 
than one might expect, given that no discursive type simply appears from nowhere and 
vanishes into nothing). It is worth noting, however, that though it has not been feasible for 
me to pursue in any depth non-genocidal cases, such as slavery or apartheid, I have been able 
to suggest the different type(s) of dehumanisation that would be found in such cases 
according to my model, and to indicate the existence of actual examples of such utterances 
in these cases.
The ‘circular’ objection itself can be given two further responses. Firstly, the episodes that 
I examine range broadly enough, and are different enough in their other features, that the 
very presence of these common elements in cases which are otherwise so widely diverse
two main reasons for ethnocentric deligitimization are ‘the desire to completely differentiate the outgroup from 
the ingroup in order to exclude it from humanity [and] the desire to exploit the outgroup.’ Though these 
reasons often ‘complement each other, they do not necessarily appear together.’ (D. Bar-Tal, ‘Causes and 
Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism’, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40 no. I, 
1990, p. 75).
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can be considered evidence for their universality as patterns. It is, of course, not possible to 
evaluate every case of genocide and genocidal massacre in order to prove the universality for 
which I argue. Secondly, my argument does not rest only on demonstrating through 
documentation that these elements in fact existed in various different cases; but also on 
arguing for the psychostructural reasons for their necessity in every case of genocide and 
genocidal killing. The aforementioned objection cannot apply to this second aspect of my 
argument (which will be laid out in full in Chapter Four).
Having defined the phenomenon in question and the scope of the cases to be examined, I 
now turn to consideration of the nature of the documentation used in this thesis to identify 
the presence and the features of genocidal dehumanisation.
V I. Sources
In taking a comparative approach to genocidal dehumanisation, it is particularly important 
to demonstrate the existence of the utterances on which I base my claims, and to establish 
that the statements which I use as evidence in this way are representative, that they are 
widely acceptable as public/ised rhetoric within their social and/or institutional context (as 
opposed to being universally acceptable, or entirely outside the possibility of debate), and 
that they are not considered to be the aberrant opinions of isolated individuals. 
Furthermore, the production and consumption of discursive strategy and ideology takes 
place on the individual and the collective level. Therefore, the phenomenon must be 
analysed at all strata of public utterance, and also at the level of the individual understanding 
of perpetrators. Given these two necessities, then, the statements I use to illustrate and 
demonstrate my argument must be direct, inasmuch as they are not claims about the use of 
such language made by the authors of secondary literature; they must appear in public
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discourse, except when they relate to perpetrators’ self-understanding (it is, of course, 
always possible to find support for virtually any position on the part of some individuals 
within a society, but this in itself cannot necessarily be considered general evidence of any 
specific relationship between the society and the opinion); and it is not enough to refer to a 
single document as definitive general evidence for the existence of a type or subtype, 
inasmuch as the aim is to demonstrate the representative nature of the rhetoric embodied in 
any given statement and its existence across a range of different contexts.
Considering this, then, I use ‘direct’ (as opposed to ‘primary’) source material to illustrate 
my argument regarding the existence and use of dehumanising metaphors in genocide and 
genocidal killing. Examples are taken for the most part from material produced during such 
episodes: written, visual and oral propaganda material in the media of print (including 
newspapers and books published by perpetrators), film and radio; printed or visual material 
which may not necessarily be considered ‘propaganda,’ such as independent cartoons or 
editorials; internal communications of official bodies; private letters and communications; 
and contemporary records from courts and tribunals.24 Some examples are also taken from 
material gathered in the aftermath of such episodes, from sources such as interviews with 
perpetrators, evidence given in trials, and victim testimony.
These examples are characterised as ‘direct’ in the sense that, wherever they have been 
sourced, they can be considered direct evidence of the existence of such discourse in 
whichever episode is under examination. Thus, a Nazi’s comment that ‘Jews are vermin’ 
would be used as an illustrative example, while a scholar’s comment that ‘the Nazis viewed 
Jews as vermin’ would not. Having said this, however, these direct examples may be taken 
from secondary sources; from historical accounts which document such episodes or which 
gather such material together in one source, or (more rarely) from material created by
24 On the importance of sources of this nature, see Semelin, Toward a vocabulary...’, p. 199.
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perpetrators, but available in the context of historical documentation, such as Adolf Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf or the Nazi ‘documentary’ film Der ewige Jude. Thus the bulk of examples are 
taken from books and journal articles dealing either with historical accounts of particular 
episodes, or with thematic exploration of theoretical issues or cultural discourses pertinent 
to this work.
The fact that the majority of examples used to demonstrate this phenomenon are not 
taken from primary sources may be raised as a limitation. The value of the present work, 
however, is in the identification and examination of a common phenomenon, one that 
occurs in episodes of genocide and genocidal killing which otherwise differ greatly in their 
essential features. Such examination necessitates, as I have argued above, a multidisciplinary 
and comparative approach considering a broad range of different cases in order to 
demonstrate the existence of common features which amount to a general phenomenon. 
Detailed historical examination of one episode, one primary source or a group of related 
primary sources would fail to demonstrate such a commonality. On the other hand, to do 
the vast quantity of research necessary to source every utterance here from primary 
material would not only entail a far longer work, but is unnecessary from the perspective of 
the aims of this thesis. For similar reasons, my research is limited to scholarship in the 
English language, and sources where English translations have been produced; in a 
comparative thesis of this kind, which necessarily casts a wide net regarding the use of 
empirical evidence, it is not possible to research in the original language of every case study 
involved.
The importance of the sets of utterances presented as examples to demonstrate the 
phenomenon of genocidal dehumanisation lies neither in the collection of various primary 
sources, nor in the detailed historical analysis of any particular source; but in the compilation 
of representative examples from diverse episodes. In each case considered, enough
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evidence will be tendered to demonstrate that the dehumanising discourse I examine exists 
both in utterances produced by perpetrators and perpetrator bodies, and as a ‘public 
opinion,’ as a general and publicly-acceptable discourse, not simply in a few isolated and 
unrepresentative examples.25 The fact that many of these statements appear in public fora 
such as newspapers, films, and so forth also indicate that they were considered acceptable 
discourse in the public domain. This in turn indicates, even in totalitarian societies, at least a 
certain level of acceptance of such views in the population at large, inasmuch as they were 
seen as ‘fit to publish’ without major destabilising effect both by those within genocidal 
political regimes, and by others in positions of power vis-à-vis public discourse in society. In 
essence, the intent of this work is to define and examine the role of a common phenomenon 
from a comparative perspective, and it is this which determines my use of documentary 
material.
Finally, in reference to methodological concerns around textual documentation, in Chapter 
Three I will have more to say regarding the need to examine both a specific utterance itself, 
and also the context in which it appears.26 This should not be read, however, as a ‘mission 
statement’ implying that the proximate context of every utterance quoted in this thesis will 
be extensively examined, in the style of critical discourse analysis. The majority of 
utterances examined are presented in the typological sections, each of which can be 
conceived of as presenting a particular narrative or discursive formation. In each instance, 
the discursive nexus, the historical-institutional context, from which and in which that 
particular type (we might think of each type as a ‘sub-discursive strategy’) emerges is 
examined in some detail, and the provenance of each is examined. However, there is no 
detailed, case-by-case examination of the specific, proximate context of each utterance,
25 On ‘public opinion’ see Semelin, Toward a vocabulary...’, p. 201.
26 For an extended consideration of ‘context’ in a multidisciplinary perspective, see T. A. van Dijk, Ideology: A 
Multidisciplinary Approach, SAGE Publications, London/Thousand Oaks/New Delhi, 1998 (reprinted, 2000), pp.
2 1 I -227.
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given that the intention of this thesis is to establish, through the identification of widespread 
discursive similarities in non-aberrant utterances in diverse geographical and temporal 
episodes, the existence and features of a common phenomenon that is termed ‘genocidal 
dehumanisation.’27
§
My intent in this introductory chapter has been to lay the groundwork for a thorough 
investigation into my subject -  that is, genocidal dehumanisation -  and to indicate with 
clarity what I intend to do in this work, what I do not intend to do, and why, and how I will 
go about the task so defined.
The substance of the work is an analysis of dehumanisation in genocide, and of the three 
types (médicalisation, animalisation, and bureaucratic-euphemistic reification) in which it 
manifests. Chapter Four will deal with the topic of dehumanisation itself and its 
development in the context of the modern era, and the three chapters following will each 
explore one of these types. However, given the nature of the project undertaken here -  
that is, theorising genocide through a multidisciplinary lens, and employing culturally-based 
theory as an explanatory framework -  before embarking on these chapters it is 
indispensable to ground my work in the field of theoretical approaches to genocide; and to 
indicate the nature of the theoretical framework that bestows upon my later research its 
significance, alongside an outline of the way in which this theory will be employed. These 
concerns are dealt with in the second and third chapters, respectively.
By framing the subject in this manner, my first aim is to arrive at a clear and thoroughgoing 
survey of genocidal dehumanisation, and to substantiate my claim that it is most accurately
27 ‘Non-aberrant’ should be understood here to refer to utterances which are not considered aberrant within 
the society in which they are uttered.
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and most productively conceived as a discursive strategy. In doing so, I present an argument 
demonstrating the necessity for dehumanisation in modern genocide and genocidal killing. 
From the structure thus laid out, I go on to reveal the functions that such dehumanisation 
performs, and to demonstrate how it does so according to a consistent relationship 
between content and function in dehumanising discourse. Finally, I list the ways in which 
genocidal dehumanisation is manifest, showing how each type, in terms of content, has arisen 
from a confluence of modern discourses. This in turn allows an understanding of the 
function performed by each.
A general theory of genocidal dehumanisation, as developed in this thesis, will both 
contribute to historical analysis of episodes of genocide and genocidal killing, and give insight 
into genocidal tendencies and the unfolding of genocidal discourse in the present. W ith this 
aim in mind, we begin our investigation from an important initial question: within the existing 
field of scholarship on genocide, where can we locate a point of departure for 
dehumanisation as a subject?
C h a p te r 2.
A p p ro a ch e s T o  G enocide: Causation , M otivation and ‘H u m an  Possib ility’
In the previous chapter I established that the purpose of the present work is to reveal the 
anatomy of dehumanisation through the employment of a multidisciplinary and comparative 
perspective.1 This thesis does not attempt to create a model explaining either the 
occurrence, or the causation of genocide and mass killing, nor to deal with the overall 
question of motivation for genocide as a primary subject. However, as I have indicated, it 
does treat the causation of genocide, in terms of the role of dehumanisation as a factor in 
both the causality and ‘human possibility’ of genocide. Dehumanisation can play two distinct 
roles in genocide (a subject upon which I will expand in Chapter Four): legitimisation -  
universally present in dehumanising genocidal rhetoric but not, in itself, a causal factor -  and 
motivation -  present only in some cases, but where it is present, a causal factor. It is 
important to emphasise that, since genocide is not monocausal, in either of these roles 
dehumanisation is one factor among others which fulfils the ‘requirements’ for motivation 
and/or legitimisation in order for genocide and genocidal killing to occur. In other words, 
dehumanisation appears to be a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for genocide 
and genocidal killing, a condition which sometimes, but not always, plays a causal role.
In positing dehumanisation as playing this dual role, it becomes important to examine the 
literature, firstly, on the causation of genocide, and secondly, on motivations for genocide 
and the question of how genocide is ‘humanly possible.’ The second of these questions can 
be considered a subcategory of the first, in that the question of motivation and how
1 While a note of caution should be sounded regarding the term ‘anatomy’ inasmuch as it is, in itself, a 
biologically-based metaphor, it is nonetheless an appropriate way in which to indicate our concern with the 
structure of genocidal dehumanisation as a phenomenon.
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genocide is humanly possible is one aspect of the causation of genocide, and dehumanisation 
itself, the ultimate subject of this inquiry, is one aspect of the question of motivation and 
human possibility. This should be borne in mind over the course of the following discussion. 
In presenting a thematic analysis, I hope to demonstrate what these approaches have 
accomplished, and also indicate the problematics which have emerged for my question 
within the frame of disciplinary and thematic parameters. Furthermore, I will show the 
academic strands on which this thesis draws in presenting a model of genocidal 
dehumanisation. Having done so, I undertake a survey of scholarship on motivation and 
human possibility which will identify important work for the argument about the nature of 
dehumanisation which will be presented in Chapter Four, as well as providing some cautions 
concerning problematics inherent in certain models.
My first aim in this chapter, then, is to examine causatory models thematically, asking what 
these different approaches can lend to my own conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a 
facet of genocide and genocidal killing. In doing so, I intend both to give some idea of the 
nature of the scholarship from which my own work emerges, and to highlight the arguments 
regarding the nature of the causation of genocide which I will synthesise in presenting a new 
conceptual model of genocidal dehumanisation. While this examination is structured by 
theme and not by discipline, it will nonetheless be evident that particular disciplines have 
leant themselves to specific approaches, and hence this chapter should also demonstrate the 
way in which models from different disciplines will be applied to my subject in the following 
chapters. I begin by examining various models concerning the causation of genocide and 
giving some indication as to where my argument fits in terms of these different conceptual 
analyses of its occurrence.
This thesis does not posit dehumanisation as a monocausal factor in genocide, nor indeed 
as a universally causal as opposed to an enabling factor. The overview presented here is not
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intended as a critique as such, although I do mention problematic aspects of particular 
models as the/ relate to my own argument. Rather, I intend to identify the theoretical fields 
from which my conceptualisation emerges, and to demonstrate what the relationship of my 
model is both to these and to other such fields. Thus, I do not intend to take on the 
encyclopaedic task of providing an exhaustive examination of each of these models, but 
rather to give a brief overview in which representative works are examined whose content 
is productive for my own argument, either in terms of premises to be built upon or 
problematics to be developed or contested. This exercise should help to understand the 
parameters of the field in which the problem of dehumanisation emerges as such, and how I 
will address the problem in terms of, and in response to, what has come before. After this 
first section, in which I examine the literature on causation thematically, I narrow the focus 
to look at work on the question of motivation and ‘how genocide is humanly possible.’ In 
each case, my interest is to demonstrate the scholarship upon which my thesis draws, and 
the areas in which my own argument will be developed.
By the time the conclusion to this chapter is reached, the reader should have a general 
idea, firstly, about the current state of thinking on the issue of causation of genocide, and, 
more specifically, how humans come to enact genocidal practices; and secondly, about the 
arguments which are synthesised in presenting the present model -  those which are judged 
to be relevant and those which are not, and why. In other words, I will provide an 
introduction both to the scholarship which lays the groundwork on which a multidisciplinary 
theory of genocidal dehumanisation can be constructed, and to the nature of the lacunae and 
problematics which the construction of such a model addresses.
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I. Models of the Causation of Genocide and Genocidal Killing
As mentioned in the introduction, the word ‘genocide’ was coined by Raphael Lemkin in 
1944, and enshrined in law in the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948.2 In 1949, Jessie Bernard published a book 
entitled American Community Behaviour engaging with the question of genocide, and in 1959 
Pieter N. Drost’s two-volume work on the Convention appeared.3 After this, there would 
be almost no significant scholarly work on genocide until the early 1970s.4 Since this period, 
however, genocide has come to be considered a topic worthy of such investigation, and the 
question of causation has, for obvious reasons, been one of vital importance.
There are a number of different factors which have been considered by scholars of 
genocide (as opposed to those who have dealt with related issues in different fields or with 
different emphases) to be causatory of genocide and mass killing, and/or of particular 
episodes (hence allowing the possibility of extrapolation). As well as considering this 
material, I also examine research which does not deal solely and/or explicitly with questions 
of genocide, but which has been widely employed in, and considered to be relevant for, the 
field of genocide studies; or which is particularly pertinent to important questions raised in 
later chapters. The examination I present in this section is particularly indebted to the 
scholarship of Michael Mann, Adam Jones, and Helen Fein in synthesising different 
perspectives on the causation of genocide.5 For those concerned with issues of causation,
2 Lemkin’s coining of this term came about as part of an ongoing concern with the mass-scale destruction of 
human collectivities. For an overview of Lemkin’s life and work in the context of the Convention and the 
concept of ‘genocide’ see J. Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New  York, 2008.
3 F. Chalk & K. Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies, Yale University Press in 
co-operation with the Montreal Institute For Genocide Studies, New Haven & London, 1990, p. 12.
4 Chalk & Jonassohn, p. I 3.
5 M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, 
pp. 18-30; A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 261-324; H. Fein,
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Fein also gives a useful warning regarding the distinction between preconditions, and aspects, 
of genocide and warns that we must not confuse the two, a precaution which is worth 
bearing in mind over the course of the following pages.* 6 It must be noted that the models 
presented here are themselves ‘ideal types,’ and many if not most analyses (as opposed to 
syntheses), though emphasising one or another of these explanatory models, do not fit 
precisely into that model. This can be considered in a positive light inasmuch as monocausal 
explanations are inherently oversimplistic, a fact now recognised by most (though not all) 
scholars writing on the subject.
Explanations of the causation of genocide, then, include psychological models, socio-cultural 
models, political models, economic-demographic models, and bio-evolutionary models. The 
first three -  psychological, socio-cultural and political -  may be considered the models of the 
causation of genocide to which the most scholarly attention has been devoted, and also 
those of the greatest importance to this thesis. For dehumanisation as a subject of inquiry, 
economic, demographic and bio-evolutionary concerns are of lesser relevance. The 
presence or absence of economic need or greed, or of demographic pressure -  the two 
major factors most often posited as causatory in economic-demographic frameworks -  are 
not influential factors for the presence or absence of dehumanisation given their existence in 
the non-discursive material realm (as opposed to representations of such needs or 
pressures). The question of bio-evolutionary aspects of genocide are only relevant inasmuch 
as the question arises as to whether humans are innately either disposed, or alternately 
disinclined, to violence toward other humans -  a question which is dealt with at length in 
Chapter Four (but which will be foreshadowed in this chapter). For these reasons, these 
approaches are afforded less attention in this section. I begin, then, by examining 
psychological approaches.
Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, SAGE Publications, London, 1993 (first published as Current Sociology 38 ( I )
Spring 1990), pp. 32-50.
6 Fein, Genocide, p. 4 1.
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la. Psychological Models
Given the importance of the internalisation and internal production of dehumanising 
discourse on the part of the individual perpetrator, psychological explanations are 
particularly germane to the present inquiry. Many early theories of genocide, particularly 
those based around analysis of National Socialism, posited the psychopathology of individual 
perpetrators. This perspective would extrapolate to models of cultural pathology such as 
the concept of the authoritarian personality,’ developed by Theodor Adorno and others and 
shared by Wilhelm Reich, or Daniel Goldhagen’s argument regarding a uniquely German 
eliminationist antisemitism.7 However, such theories, which may be problematic inasmuch 
as they conveniently disassociate responsibility from more universal social factors, have, for 
the most part, been discredited or fruitfully problematised.8 In this thesis, we will see the 
way in which perpetrator discourse, rather than relating solely to the nature of the individual 
psyche, draws upon existing socio-cultural tropes in constructing texts which represent the 
meaning of genocidal practice. Social psychology in particular has identified this problematic 
as such, and an important aspect of the discrediting of the ‘psychopathological’ model is 
found in the experimental research of social psychologists Stanley Milgram and Philip 
Zimbardo, which has demonstrated that those who inflict harm need have no sadistic or 
cruel disposition; indeed, Zimbardo notes that sadists are generally selected out of roles as 
torturers and killers, because they are unpredictable and unreliable.9 James Waller also
7 On the authoritarian personality, see T. W . Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, Harper, New York, I 950. 
For a discussion of political-psychological categorisation of personality types and its relevance to warlike or 
aggressive tendencies, see G. Cashman, What Causes War?: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict, 
Lexington Books, San Francisco, I 993, pp. 39-42.
8 Having said this, however, arguments concerning the essential ‘deviance’ or lack of ‘development’ of 
perpetrators continue to be made; see for example S. K. Baum, ‘A  bell curve of hateT, Journal of Genocide 
Research, vol. 6, no. 4, December 2004.
9 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil, Random House, New York, 2007, p. 290.
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explicitly rejects this position, which he calls ‘the dead end of demonization.’10 Social 
psychologists such as the abovementioned scholars have contributed a great deal to the 
study of dehumanisation as a concept, and the way in which it may be applied in genocide 
(given that genocidal perpetrators are not available as research subjects except, with 
difficulty, in a post-hoc situation).* 11 Of particular importance to the current study are 
concepts contributing to a model of the organised reproduction of discourse and practices 
which produce a certain object, and which give the individual a moral ‘script’ in relation to 
that object within which to operate in enacting genocidal practice.
Psychoanalytic, as well as psychological, explanations have been constructed not only 
regarding individual perpetrators, but also on the collective level.12 Israel W . Charny, for 
example, reads genocidal perpetration as a result of a dialectic between life-affirming, and 
life-denying forces;13 this concept sees perpetration, that is, the control of the power over 
life and death, as a manifestation of the individual’s attempt to manage her or his own human 
fear of death (Robert Jay Lifton also employs this perspective14). Such psychoanalytic 
readings point to the importance of the difference in understanding between the 
perpetrator’s self, and the victim as other, with regard to action taken toward the victim. In 
terms of their content, however, they have remained largely speculative.
10 J. Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Moss Killing (2nd revised edn), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp. 98-106.
11 In the field of social psychology, the work of Daniel Bar-Tal, Albert Bandura, Nick Haslam, and Emanuele 
Castano is particularly insightful, and relevant to this thesis, as will be evident throughout the work.
12 For a discussion of psychoanalytic explanations, see J. Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre 
and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 17-21. Research addressed not 
directly to genocide, but dealing with questions of identity and collective conflict from a psychoanalytic and 
psychological perspective, can be found in the work of Vamik Volkan (see for example The Need To Have Enemies 
and Allies: from clinical practice to international relationships, J. Aronson Inc., Northvale [New  Jersey], 1988; Killing in 
the Name of Identity: A Study of Bloody Conflicts, Pitchstone, Charlottesville [Virginia], 2006).
13 See Fein, Genocide, pp. 46-47; see also E. Markusen & D. Kopf, The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and 
Total W ar in the Twentieth Century, W estview Press, Boulder, 1995, pp. 49-50.
14 See Markusen & Kopf, p. 5 1.
Chapter 2 43
If individual psychopathological demonisation is a dead end, and collective psychoanalytic 
conceptions are speculative, what does psychology have to tell us about the causation of 
genocide and genocidal killing?15 Ervin Staub has devoted significant attention to the 
causation of genocide from a psychological-cultural perspective. In The Roots o f Evil, Staub 
addresses himself to ‘the origins’ of genocide and mass killing, taking the perspective of 
personal goal theory as a starting point.16 His analysis synthesises previous models in order 
to understand how the processes they examine impact psychologically on individuals, and 
hence (in this analysis) on groups, to bring about genocidal action. According to Staub, while 
genocide results from a number of influences, these can be divided into ‘a few important 
classes.’17 The origins of genocide, in this model, lie in the following factors: difficult life 
conditions (in which aggression results either from a sense of frustration or a sense of 
threat, whether that threat is ‘concrete’ or a threat to one’s identity or self-conception18); 
the negative psychological needs and goals which these conditions create, and action toward 
their fulfilment; a gradual progression along a ‘continuum of destruction’; cultural-societal 
self-concepts, particularly a sense of superiority combined with an underlying self-doubt, 
authoritarianism, and monolithic rather than pluralistic cultures; and socialisation and 
resocialisation.19 ‘Genocidal dehumanisation’ as I have defined it encompasses a number of 
these factors, including a sense of threat and resulting psychological states, the existence of
15 For an investigation of the problematics in the (dis)connection between historiography and psychology in the 
context of scholarship on the Holocaust (despite a somewhat problematic approach to questions of agency, 
character and disposition), see H. Zukier, The “ Mindless Years” ? A reconsideration of the Psychological 
Dimensions of the Holocaust, 1938-1945’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. I I, no. 2, 1997.
16 E. Staub, The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1989, p. 28; see also E. Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness’, 
Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. 1, 1990.
17 Staub, The roots of evil, p. 33.
18 Staub, The roots of evil, p. 35.
19 Staub, The roots of evil, pp. 13-29. For Staub’s two tables explaining the occurrence of genocide, see pp. 21,
233; for a model of the ‘influences and processes contributing to genocide and mass killing’ see E. Staub, The 
Psychology of Good and Evil: Why Children, Adults, and Groups Help and Harm Others, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 300.
Like others mentioned above, Staub’s work also proposes the self-selection of violent or ‘antisocial’ individuals 
(The roots of evil, p. 69), with all the inherent problematics of such a conception.
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particular concepts regarding self and other, and the exclusion of particular collectivities 
from a monolithically-conceived ingroup.
Another important work emphasising systemic-psychological factors is Christopher 
Browning’s landmark study Ordinary Men, which differs from Milgram and Zimbardo in 
Browning’s emphasis upon the horizontal power and influence of the collective, rather than 
the vertical power and influence of hierarchical-institutional structures.20 Browning’s 
scholarship puts the emphasis for action on systemic structures, careerism, and the influence 
of fellow-perpetrators, arguing against theses which see either ideology or pathology as 
determining factors. The relevance for our investigation is the question of the way in which 
the ingroup conceives of itself as having an influence on the conception of the outgroup 
(explored in Chapter Four), the nature of bureaucratic organizations and bureaucratic 
discourse (Chapter Seven), and the fact that discursive constructions need not be overtly 
ideological in order to motivate action.
The very title of Browning’s book is a critique of the view of perpetrators as 
psychologically pathological. The question of loyalty to peers and organizations, raised by 
Browning, indicates a particularly relevant criticism of individual-pathological psychological 
approaches: as Albert Bandura puts it, ‘[¡]t is the morally justified and principled resort to 
destructiveness that is of greatest social concern but is largely ignored in psychological 
analyses of inhumanities.’21 The focus of these analyses tends to be on the so-called 
‘transgressive’ individual rather than on the collective and institutional; and it tends to be on 
acts which are read as unprincipled transgressions rather than on normative or ‘principled’ 
harm. The critique raised by scholars such as Browning and Bandura points to the fact that 
the psychological problems posed by committing harmful acts require moral justification.
20 C. R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland, Penguin, London, 2001.
21 A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, & C. Pastorelli, ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the 
Exercise of Moral Agency 'Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 71, no. 2, 1996, p. 372.
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Thus, perpetrators’ self-understanding, rather than reflect that which can seem obvious to 
the critical observer, must draw on discursive resources before, during, and after harmful 
acts; and these resources are collectively acceptable, collectively constructed, and become 
available at the level of collective consumption.
From the other side of the question of the psychology of the individual and the collective, 
Staub notes that ‘social psychology is not just individual psychology writ large’ (a point also 
taken up by Fein); we cannot analyse a ‘society’ as a unit, in order to arrive at an 
understanding for motivations behind certain actions, in the same way that might be done 
for an individual.22 Not only are there many possible causatory factors for genocidal 
practices, but, as this thesis will show, even within one factor (dehumanisation) there are 
various functions and types. This question, along with others in the social-psychological 
realm, is addressed in Leonard S. Newman and Ralph Erber’s collection Understanding 
Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust, which, despite focussing on the Holocaust, 
contains a great amount of useful insight into genocide more generally. In this work, 
Newman and Erber emphasise crisis, fear and threat, in combination with culturally specific 
practice, as causatory of targeting and scapegoating; as well as the roles of obedience, 
conformity, and the dialectical relationship between the individual and the collective.23 Once 
again, we see the vital importance of the perception of threat as a causatory factor, but one 
whose manifestation in reaction is determined by the nature of pre-existing and evolving 
cultural forms.
Here, then, we have some important elucidations of the psychological states of 
perpetrators of genocide, in particular the issue of the perception of threat as a motivation, 
as well as some vital pointers toward the importance of the relationship between
22 Fein, Genocide, p. 49.
23 L. S. Newman & R. Erber (ed.s), Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology o f the Holocaust, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2002, pp. 326-344.
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collectivities and collective practices, and the psyche and actions of the individual. In 
expanding the issue regarding collectivities, we come to analyses which deal with socio­
cultural practice.
lb. Socio-cultural Models
While there is a clear distinction to be drawn between models which stress individual and 
group psychology, and those which emphasise socio-cultural factors (often emerging from 
analysis of discourse and language), in practice these often overlap. In terms of social 
psychology, some theorists whose work we will encounter regarding dehumanisation have 
made important contributions. A prime example is found in the research of Albert Bandura, 
who posits that aggression is largely learned from the social environment, and that therefore 
‘the form [it] takes, the situations in which it occurs, its frequency and intensity, and the 
targets against which it is demonstrated are largely determined by social experience,’ and are 
reinforced by structures which reward such behaviour.24 Christian Tileaga, in discussing 
othering and moral exclusion, specifically argues that there is a need to address the 
problems of prejudice, ideology and the moral order through a ‘discursive psychology’ 
approach.25 These arguments point to the determining role played by the socio-cultural 
environment -  a key underpinning of the conception of genocidal dehumanisation presented 
here -  as is the question of what psychological rewards are provided, or necessities fulfilled, 
by genocidal, and, more specifically, dehumanising behaviour and belief systems.
In examining socio-cultural models, an important distinction to be recognised is that 
between essentialist and anti-essentialist constructions. Essentialist theories focus on
24 Paraphrased in Cashman, p. 33.
25 C. Tileaga, ‘Representing the ‘O th e r: A Discursive Analysis of Prejudice and Moral Exclusion in Talk about 
Romanies ’Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, vol. 16, 2006, pp. 22-24.
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putatively unique cultural characteristics of a perpetrator group, and often, though not 
always, specifically on racism and prejudice.26 Ironically, such constructions often essentialise 
the cultural group to which they refer even while arguing against stereotypes.27 In this 
thesis, which points to dehumanisation as a common factor in genocide, the aim is to 
particularise cultures through understanding how particular culture shapes discourse and 
practice, and hence the different manifestations taken by genocidal dehumanisation, while 
avoiding the pitfalls of identifying any specific culture as uniquely pathological through a 
comparative approach identifying the general, and generalisable, patterns of functionality 
played by dehumanisation in all such cases.
Early culturally-based models, since largely discredited, proposed a ‘straight path’ along 
which a steadily increasing prejudice culminated in genocide. Models in this vein tend to 
focus on the historical nature of intergroup relationships in the pre-genocidal period (both in 
terms of discourse and practice), and to seek contingent factors which caused a non- 
genocidal modus vivendi to become genocide. Socio-cultural models of this kind carry the 
danger of tipping over into the kind of cultural essentialism mentioned above, the most 
notorious example being Goldhagen’s thesis regarding a uniquely eliminationist anti-Semitism 
in Nazi Germany as the cause of the Shoah:28
Not economic hardship, not the coercive means of a totalitarian state, not social 
psychological pressure, not invariable psychological propensity, but ideas about Jews that 
were pervasive in Germany and had been for decades induced ordinary Germans to kill
26 For a discussion of the problematics of ‘culturalist’ approaches, see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 12-13.
27 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. 20.
28 Many criticisms have been made of Goldhagen’s work, from various perspectives. For an edited collection, see 
F. H. Littell (ed.), Hyping the Holocaust: scholars answer Coldhagen, Cummings & Hathaway, New York, I 997. For 
a refutation of Goldhagen from a social psychology perspective, see L. S. Newman, ‘What Is a “ Social- 
Psychological” Account of Perpetrator behaviour?: The Person Versus the Situation in Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners’, in Newman & Erber, pp. 43-67. For a criticism of Goldhagen from the perspective of moral 
psychology and ethical reasoning, see R. Kamber, ‘Goldhagen and Sartre on Eliminationist Anti-Semitism: False 
Beliefs and Moral Culpability’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. I 3, no.2, 1999, pp 252-271.
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unarmed, defenseless Jewish men, women, and children by the thousands, systematically and 
w ithou t pity.29
A similar, but more complex view of genocide, presented by Norman Cohn, sees it as a 
consequence of utopian ideological mythologising (spearheaded by a charismatic leader or 
elite).30 A second widely discredited psychological-sociocultural theory is that of 
‘scapegoating,’ whereby genocide and mass killing is understood as the majority group 
projecting the blame for hardship or difficult social conditions onto a minority.31 While we 
have already identified the problems with these types of oversimplistic and/or totalising 
cultural models, they do re-emphasise the importance of cultural scripts and of ideology in 
both the decision to take action, and, more crucially for this thesis, in the narratives 
perpetrators construct concerning the reasons and justifications for such action.
Other theories focus not on the particular culture of specific perpetrator groups, but on 
specific discourses and/or belief systems. A common perspective, for example, would see 
the ultimate cause of genocide and genocidal killing as racism, and/or nationalism. While I 
have already mentioned my perspective on these factors in the introduction, it is true that 
the importance of the modern nation-state in genocide and genocidal dehumanisation is 
indeed crucial, and there is a more nuanced argument to be made regarding state 
nationalism which will be explored in Chapters Five and Seven. However, in themselves, as 
monocausal explanations these are unsatisfactory, given the existence of nationalism and 
racism in non-genocidal situations. A focus on nationalism also falls somewhere between a 
socio-cultural (nationalist discourse) and a political (the nation-state as a political form)
29 Daniel J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Abacus / Little, Brown and 
Company, 1996, p. 9.
30 See Fein, Genocide, pp. 49-50.
31 For a re-examination and new proposed model of scapegoating theory, see P. Glick, ‘Sacrifical Lambs Dressed 
in Wolves’ Clothing: Envious Prejudice, Ideology, and the Scapegoating of Jews’, in Newman & Erber, pp. I 13-142.
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model, indicating that crucial aspects of the analysis of genocidal phenomena are to be found 
at the interstices of disciplinary investigation.
Thus far I have mentioned many problematics of particular socio-cultural explanations; but 
despite the possibility of a tendency to essentialise, socio-cultural analyses are by no means 
inherently flawed. The possibility of analysing genocide from the perspective of the 
perpetrator (which this thesis sets out to do) is a valuable strength of sociocultural models. 
The social psychologists Daphna Oyserman and Armand Lauffer, for example use the 
concept of ‘cultural frames’ to understand ‘how the out-group is perceived in a collectivistic 
cultural worldview.’32 Cultural practice in the historical context can also be accorded 
detailed analysis in these models. Contentions of the intimate relationship between 
modernity and genocide, brought to attention in Zygmunt Bauman’s groundbreaking book 
Modernity and the Holocaust, have since been argued by many others. Bauman attributes the 
Holocaust and, by extension, genocide, to the socio-cultural conditions of modernity, 
namely, its four core features: nationalism, ‘scientific’ racism, technological complexity, and 
bureaucratic rationalisation (Bauman also incorporates Milgram’s insights).33 As we will see 
in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, the forms taken by genocidal dehumanisation are intimately 
shaped by all of these discourses.
The contention regarding the role of modernity is set up in opposition to the earlier view, 
straddling socio-cultural and bio-evolutionary theories, which held that genocide was an 
atavistic throwback particular to aberrant nations who had turned back on the human march 
of ‘progress’ and ‘civilisation’ (in this context Bauman mentions Max Weber, Karl Marx and
32 D. Oyserman & A. Lauffer, Armand, ‘Examining the Implications of Cultural Frames on Social Movements an d 
Group Action’, in L. S. Newman & R. Erber (eds), Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust, 
Oxford University Press, New  York, 2002, pp. 162-187.
33 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New  York), 1989. For detailed 
treatment of modernity, see pp. 83-1 16; for Bauman’s commentary on Milgram, see pp. I 5 1 -168.
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Norbert Elias34). The ‘atavistic’ model can be seen to be related to the ‘ancient hatreds’ 
thesis, which sees a cyclical history of hatred and bloodshed between two groups (thus 
flattening present differences in morality and action, and very often depicting both 
perpetrators and victims as ‘uncivilised’), which at certain moments causes genocide.35 
Bauman refutes such models by emphasising the connection between rationality and 
genocide, without falling back on oversimplified concepts such as the ‘rational actor’ and 
‘strategy’ theories found in the work of scholars such as Irving Horowitz.36 In other words, 
there is a problem in associating the discourses which form the foundations of genocidal 
practice with positive-teleological notions of progress. Genocide is enacted for specific 
reasons which, though they have historical antecedents, emerge from contemporary 
conditions. Bauman’s argument, however, is not entirely unproblematic: while he raises the 
essential question of what ‘human nature’ is in terms of the psychological relationship to 
harming others, his concept of the need to neutralize ‘primeval moral drives’37 in the 
perpetration of genocide raises a similar question to that found in the theories of Zimbardo 
and Waller, in making an assumption that people are by their nature ‘good,’ ‘moral,’ or at 
least ‘ordinary’ - that is, that they are inherently disinclined to participation in genocide (a 
central problematic for this thesis, which will be explored in greater depth in Chapter Four).
Related to Bauman’s work in its examination of the nature of modernity and the role of 
technology in culture, is Eric Markusen and David Kopf s The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing 
(1995). These authors draw a connection between genocide and the emergence of total 
war, a connection which they also see as being established in the social-psychological book
34 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. I 2. This is not to say that these theorists do not have anything useful 
to tell us about genocide; in particular, W eber’s theory of the state as monopolising the legitimate use of force 
will be very important for this thesis.
35 For analysis of these positions, see Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 18-20.
36 Horowitz, Taking Lives: see also I. L. Horowitz, Genocide: State Power and Moss Murder, Transaction Books, New 
Brunswick (New  Jersey), 1976.
37 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 188.
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by Markusen and Lifton, The Genocidal Mentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat.38 The 
warfare-genocide connection, often overlooked in older scholarship, has been emphasised 
more recently by other authors including Paul Bartrop, Martin Shaw, and Christopher J. 
Fettweis.39 Markusen and Kopf argue that the major connections are as follows: that total 
war often serves as a catalyst for genocide; that both involve the deliberate massacre of non- 
combatants; that both are generally conducted by nation-states in the name of national 
security; that both are antithetical to certain principles of democracy (the most problematic 
of these assertions); and that both have been facilitated by similar psychological, 
organisational, and scientific-technological factors.40 In creating this conceptual framework, 
the authors synthesise psychological, organisational, and scientific-technological factors, again 
indicating the interconnected nature of these realms in understanding genocide.41 
Throughout this thesis, and particularly in Chapter Five, we will draw upon the insight 
regarding the close relationship not only between war and genocide as practices, but 
between discourse around war and around genocide, in showing that there is a purposiveness 
here which relates both to the metaphorical transference of realms of practice from one 
situation to another, and to the depiction of an outgroup as a threat.
Finally, anthropological analysis has also focussed on the discursive cultural construction of 
meaning and its implementation in action.42 However, this has often occurred, as is the 
nature of anthropology, in detailed case studies rather than in syntheses, as for example in
38 Markusen & Kopf, p. 51.
39 P. Bartrop, The relationship between war and genocide in the twentieth century: a consideration’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, vol. 4, no. 4, 2002, pp. 519-532; M. Shaw, The general hybridity of war and genocide', Journal 
of Genocide Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, pp. 461—473; C. J. Fettweis, ‘W a r  as catalyst: moving W orld  W a r II to 
the center of Holocaust scholarship’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, pp. 225-236.
40 Markusen & Kopf, p. 55.
41 Markusen & Kopf, pp. 79-89.
42 See Jones, pp. 296-300.
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Alexander Laban Hinton’s treatment of the Cambodian genocide, Why Did They Kill?43 I have 
already indicated that my intent is not to engage in detailed case-study analysis; rather, for 
my present purposes, anthropological analyses have proved invaluable as a source of material 
on cultural features of genocide, including the presentation of documentary texts, which can 
be used both to indicate the specific forms genocidal dehumanising discourse takes, and to 
reveal the relationship of likeness between such discourse in different episodes.
As this overview demonstrates, socio-cultural approaches, despite their inherent risks, 
have been able to point to discursive and pragmatic connections between genocide and non- 
genocidal practices, to re-emphasise the importance of socio-cultural factors and the vital 
but vexed relationship between historical antecedent and contemporary circumstance, and 
to address the link between the individual and the collective. With the importance of these 
insights established, we can turn to examine political concepts of causation, which tend to 
focus more specifically on collective and structural aspects.
Ic. Political Models
Adam Jones, a political scientist and genocide scholar, writes that ‘[t]he core concern of 
political science is power: how it is distributed and used within states and societies’ (while 
international relations approaches make a similar analysis between, rather than within, states 
and societies).44 While theory around ‘power’ will not be a key concern for this thesis, the 
enactment of practice -  that is, the way in which systems and the individuals within them 
operate to manifest particular activities -  is a core issue here. Like other fields, political 
science and international relations approaches do not exist in isolation; there has been
43 A. L. Hinton, Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, University of California Press,
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2005.
44 Jones, p. 307.
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significant overlap with other models, as, for example, in Stuart J. Kaufman’s ‘symbolic 
politics’ analysis of ‘ethnic war.’45 Overlap of these types of approach has occurred 
particularly in the fields of analysis of the psychology of political leaders, in examinations of 
political language, and also in the concept of ‘operational codes,’ sets of political belief 
systems about the nature of political life (including such questions as whether the political 
universe is one of harmony or conflict, whether the future is predictable, how much control 
one can exert over it, and so forth) which will shape the action of leaders.46 The nature of 
these common areas demonstrates the centrality of concerns around language and 
symbolism, the discursive power and productivity of the organization, and the nature of the 
individual psyche.
In terms of analyses of political systems, as opposed to leaders, a number of models 
concern the causation of genocide through particular forms of governance. The terms 
‘democide’ (coined by R. J. Rummel as ‘government mass murder’) and ‘politicide’ (in the 
scholarship of Barbara Harff and Ted R. Gurr) have both been employed in the context of 
political analyses. Rummel contends that power is the determining cause of genocide, and 
thus that, since, according to this argument, totalitarian regimes are more absolutely 
powerful than democratic ones, genocide is essentially a product of authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism, and is prevented by democracy.47 This argument is tied in to the ‘democratic 
peace debate’ (that is, controversy over the theory that ‘democracies’ never, or almost 
never, fight each other or commit genocidal killing).48 However, in regard to genocide this 
thesis is highly problematic given colonial genocide, the problematics around definitions of 
‘democracy,’ and the intimate involvement of Western ‘democratic’ regimes with genocidal 
regimes in such areas as the Central and South Americas, Indonesia, Cambodia, and so
45 S. J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
2001.
46 Cashman, pp. 50-51.
47 Jones, pp. 307-309,
48 Jones, p. 314.
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forth.49 The material presented in this thesis suggests that it is not the nature of governance 
so much as the forms - that is, central, bureaucratised, and with strict idealised geographical 
boundaries - that create the conditions for genocide, and for modern genocidal 
dehumanisation.
A similar argument to Rummel’s is mounted by political sociologist Horowitz. According 
to his conception, ‘genocide ... is the consequence of certain forms of unbridled state 
power.’50 Horowitz examines the benefits and problems inherent in ‘functional’ as opposed 
to ‘existential’ visions of genocide,51 but creates a problematic typology of ‘societal types,’ 
one of which is ‘genocidal societies’52 which he understands to exist on a ‘life-and-death 
continuum’53 (his distinction between societies that do, and do not, take human lives on 
behalf of state power as the ‘fundamental distinction in the twentieth century’ is also highly 
problematic in an age of warfare and capital punishment) .54 Elsewhere, Horowitz also 
employs highly problematic concepts such as ‘criminality’ and ‘deviance’ in regard to 
genocide.55 The ‘democracy vs. totalitarian’ approach is open to the same criticisms as 
Rummel’s, and we have already mentioned the problematics of perceiving genocidal 
behaviour as somehow aberrant. However, the productive side to this model for our 
purposes is Horowitz’s argument that analysis of social structure in terms of formal 
organisation is necessary to explain a system, but not sufficient to explain the entire society, 
an argument in which he describes his concern as the establishment of a ‘sociobiology ... 
grounded in the polity rather than zoology.’56 Horowitz also provides a number of valuable 
warnings: against a close association between political or economic systems, and the
49 On colonial genocide in this context see Jones, pp. 3 15-3 16.
50 Horowitz, Genocide, p. 330.
51 Horowitz, Genocide, pp. 23-40; see also Taking Lives, pp. 297-317.
52 Horowitz, Genocide, p. 42; see also Taking Lives, pp. 155-156.
53 Horowitz, Taking Lives, p. I 78.
54 Horowitz, Genocide, p. 6; and see Markusen & Kopf, pp. 45-46.
55 Horowitz, Taking Lives, p. 74.
56 Horowitz, Genocide, pp. 68, 71.
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personal safety of citizens; against particular sociocultural arguments given the psychosocial 
similarities between warfare and genocide;57 and against seeing genocidal violence as either 
solely individually violent, or as solely systematically violent.58 He also provides the useful 
concept of genocide as a product of the collectivisation of moral obligation -  and the moral 
obligation to involvement in genocide is a theme which is bound up both with vertical and 
horizontal collective influence, and also with response to perceived threat, two crucial issues 
in an explanation of genocidal dehumanisation.59
Other scholarship on the connection between genocide and governmental forms emerges 
from international relations theories examining the concept of international norms and 
prohibition regimes in the occurrence (or otherwise) of genocide and genocidal killing, 
particularly as regards the issue of the legitimacy of action.60 In Chapter Four, we will see 
that the framing of genocidal action on the global level in an era of mass media has 
something important to tell us about perceptions of the legitimacy of genocide, and about 
the influence of such perceptions on the discourse which thus becomes necessary to give 
genocide moral meaning on both the individual and the collective level.
While valorisation of particular political models can be an essentialising exercise, political 
analysis can provide an important counterweight to the kind of cultural essentialism and 
historical progressivism seen in the previous sections. In a counter to the argument for the 
overall ‘civilising’ tendencies of democracy, Michael Mann, in The Dark Side of Democracy, 
takes Bauman’s argument and extends it to connect ethnic cleansing not only with
57 Horowitz, Taking Lives, pp. I 56-160.
58 Horowitz, 2002, p. 212.
59 Horowitz, 2002, p. 55.
60 See Jones, pp. 3 16-320.
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modernity, but with democracy (a political ideal Mann nonetheless endorses) .61 Mann 
focuses on ‘murderous ethnic cleansing,’ which includes but is not limited to genocide (and 
which roughly corresponds to what I term ‘genocidal killing’) .62 Mann’s explanation of this 
phenomenon, which he characterises as ‘essentially political’ in terms of its causation, posits 
a model in which the four sources of social power are ideological, economic, military, and 
political; and he argues that ‘murderous ethnic conflict concerns primarily political power 
relations,’ though as it develops other forms of power become involved (we should note that 
Mann’s usage of the term ‘ideology’ does not correspond to its usage in this thesis, as 
outlined in the next chapter) . 63 According to Mann, ‘political power is inherently territorial, 
authoritative, and monopolistic.’64 Ethnic cleansing is favoured by the combination of 
nationalism, statism and violence.65 Mann argues further that ethnic cleansing, though not 
unknown before the modern age, is intimately connected with democracy because 
democracy entwines demos (‘the population’) with ethnos (‘the nation’ in the sense of an 
ethnic group). Modernity has meant that older social models of class-based hierarchy were 
replaced by situations in which ethnicity became the main form of social stratification.66 He 
argues for the relevance of two different models of the nation in the modern age, ‘liberal’ 
and ‘organic’;67 these correspond fairly closely with a conception of ‘civic nationalism’ as 
opposed to ‘ethnic nationalism.’ While Mann’s argument concerning political systems 
remains problematic, his efforts in synthesising other studies and bringing them to bear on 
the political perspective, as well as problematising oversimplistic concepts which relate 
‘democracy’ to ‘peace’ and ‘totalitarianism’ to ‘genocide,’ is exemplary. Furthermore, these
61 For an example of the connections between the discourse of democracy and genocidal action, see D. Li, 
‘Echoes of violence: considerations on radio and genocide in Rwanda’, Journal o f Genocide Research, vol. 6, no. I , 
2004, pp. 14-15.
62 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 12, 17-18.
63 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 6, 30-33; original italics.
64 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. 33.
65 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, p. 8.
66 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 3-5.
67 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 55-69.
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concerns will be important for this thesis: in later chapters, I will demonstrate the way in 
which the modern nation-state is intimately entwined with genocidal discourse and practice. 
Chapter Five will pay particular attention to the issue of the development of the modern 
nation state, the tension between democratic and homogenising tendencies, and the 
relationship of this form to conceptions of ethnicity and the possibility of the genocidal 
dehumanisation of newly-conceptualised outgroups.
A common problem in political analyses is the nature of the connection between individual 
and collective. Many theories see what Kaufman has termed ‘manipulative leaders’ as the 
cause of genocide.68 Benjamin A. Valentino, for example, argues, in a top-down model, that 
‘an understanding of mass killing must begin with the specific goals and strategies of high 
political and military leaders, not with broad social or political factors.’69 Valentino calls his a 
‘strategic’ perspective ‘which suggests that mass killing is most accurately viewed as an 
instrumental policy ... designed to accomplish leaders’ most important ideological or 
political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats,’ emerging 
from ‘frustration with conventional military and political strategies for dealing with their 
victims.’70 Valentino bases this argument on the uncontroversial fact that societies require 
only public indifference, not support, for genocidal policies, and that participation is a result 
of situation and (in a much more controversial, and largely discredited, argument) that it is 
otherwise explained by the ‘selection’ of sadistic or fanatical individuals and by elite 
manipulation.71 Valentino’s approach is useful, however, in suggesting that attempts to foster 
cultural diversity and ‘democratic freedom,’ which may seem like obvious anti-genocidal 
techniques in terms of analyses focussing on social cleavage or political systems, may be
68 Kaufman, Modem Hatreds, pp. 5-7.
69 Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca & London, 2004, p. 2.
70 Valentino, pp. 3-4.
71 Valentino, pp. 6, 30-65.
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useless or even dangerous in terms of genocide prevention.72 Furthermore, the point that 
only indifference and not firm ideological support are required for genocide can be used to 
elucidate the question of what attitude need be held regarding particular actions toward 
specific outgroups on the part of perpetrators and the public in the broader genocidal 
society. These issues will be explored in Chapter Four. While we might well contest the 
determining importance of leaders, consideration of their goals may well be of use if it 
causes us to ask why, and in what cultural context, leaders might conceive of society in ways 
which lead to the pursuit of genocidal policies.
Political models, then, have something important to tell us about the involvement of the 
nation-state, the political processes which are incumbent upon its adoption as a normative 
global form of governance, the perception of collectivities in response to this discursive 
model, and the relationship of national or political power to violence in the modern age.
They highlight productive questions about the relationship between leaders and ‘the public’ 
in the enactment of genocide; and in doing so they also focus attention on inter-group 
interactions within perpetrator societies in as far as these are implicated in the causation of 
genocide. All of these are important factors for my conceptualisation of dehumanisation.
§
I have already mentioned that, in comparison to the models already explored, economic, 
demographic and bio-evolutionary explanations of the causation of genocide are less relevant 
in the context of a focus on genocidal dehumanisation. Despite this, these models must 
both be recognised as important strands of thought, and given an examination which will 
reveal what light they may shed upon the problem being addressed in this thesis.
72 Valentino, pp. 236-7.
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Id. Economic and Demographic Models
On some views, economic and demographic explanations have remained largely ignored as 
a result of the general humanities and social sciences orientation of genocide research. 
However, demographic arguments have been particularly prevalent in relation to Rwanda; 
there has not been much discussion of whether these arguments might apply to other 
episodes, though this may be a fruitful area of research. ‘Ecological resource scarcity’ is the 
term used by Peter Uvin to refer to a Malthusian narrative, arguing that, in a general sense 
(as opposed to only in Rwanda),
overpopulation and land scarcity unavoidably lead to social conflict and communal violence.
W hen  countries have exceeded their "carrying capacity," there is no other outcome possible 
than famine and/or conflict, allowing nature to restore ecological equilibrium. This is 
unfortunate but unavoidable (except through major progress in containing population 
growth).73
This argument may be put either in a ‘harder’ version, in which case it is seen as the sole 
reason for genocide (Uvin mentions scholars including James Patterson, Maurice King, and 
Luc Bonneaux, as well as various U.N. officials, who have implicitly or explicitly put forward 
this argument); or a ‘softer’ version in which other factors are taken into consideration (in 
this context, Uvin mentions Gerard Prunier, Jean-Claude Willame and others).74 Villia 
Jefremovas (writing from an anthropological perspective) though also examining (broadly) 
political conditions in relation to long-term ‘dynamics of inequality’ in Rwandan society,75 as
73 P. Uvin, ‘Reading the Rwandan Genocide’, International Studies Review, vol. 3, no. 3, 2001, pp. 81-83. For a more 
detailed analysis of resources and agriculture in Rwanda and their connection to genocide, see P. Uvin, Tragedy 
in Rwanda: The Political Ecology of Conflict’, Environment, vol. 38, no. 3, 1996, pp. 6-29.
74 Uvin, ‘Reading the Rwandan Genocide’, pp. 81-83.
75 V. Jefremovas, Brickyards To Graveyards: From Production to Genocide in Rwanda, State University of New York 
Press, Albany, 2002, p. 3.
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well as cultural aspects in terms of propaganda and the colonial legacy,76 emphasises 
Rwanda’s economic collapse along with drought, the economic consequences of war 
(particularly the fact that this meant that major investment was made in arms and the 
military) and a Malthusian population ‘bomb’ as the ultimate cause of the conditions in which 
genocide occurred.77 The connection of the economic collapse in Rwanda to genocide bears 
similarity to theories concerning the relationship of the economic collapse in pre-Second 
World W ar Germany with the rise of Nazism. A Malthusian argument is also in evidence in 
scholarship such as Richard Rubenstein’s The Age of Triage.78 This argument, however, seems 
more likely to appear in texts which do not take genocide as their primary subject, and/or 
those outside the realm of the ‘academic’ perse, such as Jared Diamond’s popular works, 
Guns, Germs and Steel and Collapse.79
Economic arguments have also been mounted regarding the Shoah, in scholarship which 
considers the Nazi looting of the Jews and the profits to be made from their and others’ 
‘disappearance’ as primary factors in genocide, or at least as much more important factors 
than previously recognised. Gotz Aly’s controversial book Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial 
Warfare and the Nazi Welfare State argues that an important and overlooked aspect of 
Nazism, and in particular the support by ‘ordinary Germans’ for the Nazi party, was the 
plunder and looting of Jews and of other European nations.80
In both Rwanda and Nazi Germany, what we see is a situation during a war (bearing in 
mind the relationship between genocide and warfare) brought on, at least in part, either by
76 Jefremovas, p. I 12-1 13.
77 Jefremovas, pp. 109-1 15.
78 R. Rubenstein, The Age of Triage: Fear and Hope in an Overcrowded World, Beacon Press, Boston, 1983; see also 
Fein, Genocide, pp. 41-42, and Markusen & Kopf, pp. 42-44.
79 J. Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel: A Short History of Everybody for the Last 13,000 Years, Vintage, London, 1998; 
Collapse: How Societies Choose To Fail or Survive, Penguin, London, 2005, pp. 31 1-329.
80 G. Aly, Hitler’s beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial Warfare and the Nazi Welfare State (trans. Jefferson Chase), 
Metropolitan, New York, 2006.
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pressure or (in the case of Nazi Germany) by the perception of population pressure. This 
may also be related to the typical modes of production of a given society, inasmuch as these 
may place particular limits on population growth. For our purposes, the relevant factor is 
that in these cases there is both a clear material motivation for genocide, but one which is 
not in itself necessarily morally legitimate, and which may hence demand some other form of 
moral justification on the part of the perpetrator. Scholarship from this perspective, such as 
that of Jefremovas, has also noted the way in which these material pressures play out 
through the faultlines of discursive practice emerging from evolving social and cultural 
conditions; and in these situations we see discourse in which one or more othered groups 
are represented as a (demographic) threat. W e will examine the specific view of the other 
as a biological-demographic menace in Chapter Five; while Chapters Six and Seven will give 
some insight into the role of pre-existing modes of production (whether agricultural or 
industrial) in the killing process.
Speaking of modes of production, we should note that a classic Marxist analysis, very much 
out of favour academically, would see genocide as an extreme instance of the measures 
taken by a ruling class, and/or, in the international context, the various forces of global 
imperialism, to displace the oppressive nature of modern capitalism onto a scapegoat (such 
as the ‘capitalist Jew’) and ensure that power remains in their hands; such an argument sees 
the working classes of perpetrator nations as victims of exploitation themselves, while the 
victims of genocide are simply the ‘weakest link’ in a chain of exploitation, involving a ‘divide 
and rule’ strategy, in the quest to hold on to power.81 While class conflict per se is not our 
subject here, what this analysis does usefully remind us of is the fact that the identities of
81 See for example T. Grant & A. Woods, ‘A month into the bombing campaign: A Marxist analysis of the Balkan 
crisis’, 1999, retrieved 30 April 2007, <http://www.marxist.com/Europe/kosovo6.html>; for an interesting 
problematisation of an orthodox Marxist view which nonetheless remains within the spectrum of Marxist 
thought, see M. Intosh, ‘Marxism and the Holocaust’, retrieved 25 April 2007, <http://internationalist- 
perspective.org/IP/ip-archive/ip_49_holocaust.html>.
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perpetrators and victim groups should not be naturalised or essentialised; rather, they are 
culturally produced in order to serve certain purposes.
Economic models per se, then, are not in themselves highly relevant to the present 
investigation. I have noted, however, a number of ways in which such analyses are germane 
to particular aspects of this thesis; and, before leaving the subject, the significance should 
also be noted of the nature of economic management in the modern era, particularly as 
regards its relationship to the centralised bureaucratic nation-state. This is a subject to 
which we will return in Chapter Seven.
Finally, we turn to the other approach which tends to an orientation away from the 
humanities and toward the sciences: bio-evolutionary explanation.
le. Bio-evolutionary Models
Literature relevant to genocide written from a bio-evolutionary perspective encompasses a 
huge body of research focussed not so much on ‘genocide’ as such, but on the nature of 
human aggression and violence. The causation of warfare and collective violence, in 
particular, has often been the subject of bio-evolutionary analysis, and this section will 
employ the work of scholars such as Greg Cashman and R. B. Zadonc whose aim has been 
to explain, or to synthesise models of these events rather than of genocide per se. 
Nonetheless, without entering into a lengthy review of this field, it is possible to examine 
perspectives which are pertinent to our analysis. There is, at times, significant overlap 
between the realms of biological and psychological explanation as regards the question of 
‘human nature,’ and we will see this in relation to important questions about the human 
psyche addressed by both of these forms of analysis.
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Bio-evolutionary models generally begin from an assumption that humans have an 
inherently aggressive nature (a theory shared by thinkers as diverse as Thomas Hobbes, 
William James, and Sigmund Freud82). Ethnological and anthropological arguments for an 
innate human drive, a need for, or propensity to aggression, considered as having (or having 
once had) evolutionary species-preserving functions, have been proposed by Konrad Lorenz 
(himself deeply implicated in Nazi ideology during the Nazi period), Lionel Tiger, Raymond 
Dart, Robert Ardrey and others.83 Indeed, for Lorenz, ‘aggression’ per se only takes place 
between members of the same species (although Lorenz and others have also noted that 
there are few animals apart from humans which either kill their own kind, or which do so en 
masse) .84 Thus, in contrast to the literature we have already surveyed (and which we will 
examine in greater detail in Chapter Four) which sees humans as innately disinclined to 
enact violence upon their fellows, this contrary view suggests that they (we) are basically 
inclined to do so. In terms of this argument, aggression is often related to territoriality, 
which in turn provides ‘us and them’ conceptions.85 Ardrey has also suggested that war, in 
particular, satisfies human needs for identification, security, and stimulation.86 Ethological 
arguments, however, have been extensively criticised, and in his overview of this literature 
Cashman concludes that the substantive evidence is weak.87
82 Cashman, p. I 5.
83 Cashman, pp. 16-18. See also K. Lorenz, On Aggression (trans. M. Latzke), Methuen & Co., London, 1966., pp. 
17-39. For an overview of ‘ethnocentrism’ from a bio-evolutionary perspective, see V. Reynolds, V. Falger & I. 
Vine (eds), The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism: Evolutionary Dimensions of Xenophobia, Discrimination, Racism and 
Nationalism, Croom Helm, London & Sydney, 1987.
84 In Cashman, pp. 16-17.
85 Cashman, pp. 19-20.
86 In Cashman, pp. 20-21.
87 Cashman, pp. 21-24. See also A. Rapaport, Conflict in Man-Made Environment, Penguin, Maryland, 1974, pp. 109- 
122; M. E. Clark, ‘Human Nature: W hat W e  Need To Know About Ourselves In The Twenty-First Century’, 
Zygon, vol. 33, no. 4, 1998, pp. 647-648.
Chapter 2 64
With regard to genocide, this argument may be extended to suggest that it is part of hard­
wired ‘human nature’ for humans to periodically turn extreme violence upon each other, 
and that genocide is nothing more than a more efficient and large-scale extension of the kind 
of ‘tribal warfare’ which is seen among non-human social animals. A significant aspect of this 
construction is the argument that the purpose, or at least one function, of modern human 
social organization is to minimise and constrain an omnipresent impulse to lawless violence; 
from this premise, it may be argued either that genocide represents a failure of such 
organizations, or, alternatively, that this very system means that innate violence is repressed 
and therefore periodically erupts on a massive scale.
The dominant evolutionary argument for the existence of ethnic conflict (and we should 
recall that by no means all genocide could, or should, should be termed ‘ethnic conflict’ as 
such; indeed, the terminology itself is problematic) rests on the thesis of primordialism: 
‘[proponents argue that peoples' ethnic identities have biological and even genetic 
foundations, and that the motivation for ethnic and kinship affiliation comes from these 
socio-psychological forces internal to the individual and related to primordial human needs 
for security and, more importantly, survival.’88 In other words, biological and evolutionary 
imperatives entrench hatred and fear of the other.89 A more complex, though nonetheless 
problematised, view has been taken by research which has linked bio-evolutionary models 
with social-scientific and psychological models, thus taking into account the interconnection 
of extrinsic and intrinsic influences in examining causation.90
There are two important aspects here which are relevant to a discussion of genocidal 
dehumanisation. The first is the question of whether humans are by nature violent, and
88 Frank P. Harvey, ‘Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities and 
Constraints for Theory and Policy’, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, vol. 
33, no. I, 2000, pp. 39-40.
89 Harvey, p. 4 1.
90 Harvey, pp. 46-47; Cashman, pp. 24-27.
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hence predisposed to genocide, or whether they are, for any number of possible reasons, 
not so predisposed. The second, which depends on the answer to the first, is whether the 
role of ‘society’ is to restrain violence, to channel it, or to encourage its expression in 
certain forms. There is the further issue of whether these factors are determining of 
genocide in themselves. The research outlined above has been applied in various ways in the 
field of genocide studies. Many scholars accept that there is a general genetic potential for 
aggression, and/or individual predispositions to or against aggression, while de-emphasising 
its importance as a factor.91 This issue has been explored and problematised by Zadonc in 
an important article on the ‘zoomorphism of human collective violence.’92 Another critique 
from an influential social psychologist is that of Henri Tajfel, who described theories 
regarding an instinct for aggression (Freudian as well as strictly biological) as ‘blood-and-guts’ 
theories.93 In exploring the reasons for harmful behaviour Milgram gives consideration to 
bio-evolutionary models, but concludes, from his own psychological testing of the subjects in 
his experiment, against any finding that modern society represses ‘natural’ evolutionary 
aggression, inasmuch as his subjects seemed to derive no satisfaction (of the kind that one 
might expect from the release of long-pent-up aggression) in the harm they did.94 
Ultimately, such ‘blood-and-guts’ arguments remain highly controversial, particularly in the 
context of the causation of genocide.
What can we conclude from all of this? Either/or propositions are often oversimplistic, and 
polarised arguments as to whether humans are innately inclined or disinclined to violence, 
and whether societies repress or create violence, I will argue, are both appropriate subjects
91 For example, Staub, The roots of evil, pp. 35, 53. For discussion of this issue, see Fein, Genocide, p. 33.
92 R. B. Zadonc, The Zoomorphism of Human Collective Violence’, in Newman & Erber, pp. 222-238.
93 In M. Billig, ‘Henri Tajfel's “ Cognitive aspects of prejudice” and psychology of bigotry’, The British Journal of 
Social Psychology, vol. 4 1, 2002, pp. I 73-174. On the problematics of instinctivism, see also N. Solkoff, Beginnings, 
Mass Murder, and Aftermath of the Holocaust Where History and Psychology Intersect, University Press of America, 
Lanham/New York/Oxford, 2001, pp. 67-70.
94 S. Milgram, Obedience To Authority: An Experimental View, Pinter & Martin, London, 2005 (first edn 1974), pp. 
125-132, 166-168.
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for this criticism. In Chapter Four, I contend that people are neither inclined nor disinclined 
to violence, and in particular genocidal violence, but rather that certain factors, both 
historical and in the moment of action, influence particular types of action. Biological 
models, however, indicate that not all of these can be reduced to rational cognitive 
processes. That some level of human propensity for aggression and domination may form a 
foundation for violent action, one which is connected to ingroup outgroup evaluations and 
which is influenced, or triggered, by other factors, is also a consideration in a psychological 
model of the enactment of genocidal violence. In other words, we need not agree with 
strong bio-evolutionary conclusions about causation, but rather, we might recognise the 
significance of the nature of the questions being asked.
§
This, then, is a brief look at the major thematic strands of thinking regarding the causation 
of genocide, and the relevance they have for this inquiry. None of these approaches are 
mutually exclusive. In any of these models, dehumanisation can be seen to have a role to 
play, whether primary or secondary; but this is not to say that questions of emphasis do not 
arise. My own analysis, emphasised throughout this thesis, is that dehumanisation is 
sometimes a causal (motivatory) and sometimes an enabling (legitimatory) factor in genocide 
and genocidal killing. In either case, my analysis conceives dehumanisation as a socio-cultural 
and psychological factor (either as a cause, or as an enabler) of genocide, one which takes a 
discursive form based on conditions including the political, and which exists among an array 
of other causatory and enabling factors which variously fall both within and outside of these 
two factors. Thus, for example, political science-based analyses such as that of Leo Kuper 
and others have argued for the importance of myth and symbolism (to which 
dehumanisation is intimately linked), while scholars such as Lorenz have linked bio- 
evolutionarily based concepts such as pseudo-speciation to dehumanisation. Meanwhile, the
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adoption of the political model of the nation-state and of bureaucracy as systems of 
governance have created particular discourses and given them purchase, allowing their 
application in contexts outside the realm of the purely political. Hence we see the 
interlocking factors which contribute to the existence and function of a particular type of 
genocidal dehumanisation. Some indication of similar examples has been given throughout 
this chapter, and they might be expanded in relation to each of the models presented above;
I will examine such arguments in more detail in the chapters examining genocidal 
dehumanisation itself, and the types in which it manifests.
However, in a general sense, in positing dehumanisation as a legitimating and/or motivating 
factor I take what might be termed a ‘socio-cultural constructionist’ view of genocide. That 
is, in relation to dehumanisation, I do not concern myself with causatory arguments 
stemming from evolutionary biology regarding aggression and violence, nor with economic 
and demographic factors, though I do not reject either of these as influential. Furthermore, 
on the basis of the research outlined above, I discount the argument that dehumanising 
individuals are somehow ‘selected’ on account of an aberrant individual disposition. It is 
worth re-emphasising here the point, explored in more detail in Chapter Four, that 
participation in genocide is neither normative nor aberrant; it is too complex a behaviour to 
be considered in either of these ways. Discourse both stems from and acts upon the 
individual (and collective) psyche; but the psychological functions performed by genocidal 
dehumanisation are not wholly discursive in themselves. However, the elements which 
make up genocidal dehumanisation as a discursive strategy are drawn from various narrative- 
discursive strands, including the national-political and the racial-biological. In order to 
understand this phenomenon as such, it is therefore necessary to utilise perspectives from, 
and heed problematics raised by, all of these fields of analysis; the summary above should 
give some idea of what these in fact are, and of how they will be developed over the course
of the thesis.
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Having employed such a framework to examine both thematic models of the causation of 
genocide, and their applicability to the topic at hand, we next sharpen the focus to inquire 
into the question of motivation and the ‘human possibility’ of genocide and genocidal killing.
II. Motivations for Genocide and the Question o f ‘How  is it Hum anly Possible ’?95
Exploring broader questions of approaches to causation is an important ask task in helping 
to understand what theoretical tools, and what arguments, can be brought to bear in 
revealing the contours of genocidal dehumanisation. More proximate concerns, however, 
are the relationship between genocidal motivation and dehumanisation; and also the 
question of how genocide is ‘humanly possible,’ that is, how people can participate in acts 
which seem to the observer so obviously and so extremely cruel and immoral. These two 
subjects -  that concerning motivation for genocide, and the question of how it is humanly 
possible -  are by no means identical (for example, we might consider the ‘ideological killer’ 
whose ideology does not mean s/he is not sickened and disgusted enough by the physicality 
of the action to choose not to kill, at least directly). However, they share enough common 
ground that they may be considered together. In introducing this issue, I am not 
unsympathetic to Fein’s ‘questioning of the question’: she writes that, given the long-term 
record of killing on behalf of the state, we might direct focus not on why individuals will do 
so, but on the right of the state to authorise killing (a right which is often taken for 
granted).96 However, given that in some situations the populace at large (as opposed to
95 The very formulation of the question ‘how is it humanly possible' is problematic in that it assumes two 
foregone conclusions which I argue in this thesis, are misconceived: firstly, that there is a connection between 
‘humanity’ and ‘humaneness,’ and, secondly, that the normative position regarding the perpetration of genocide is 
one of non-participation and that therefore perpetrators must be somehow induced to participate against the 
inclinations of their essentially ‘good’ or ‘ordinary’ initial position. Nonetheless, the sentiment expressed in this 
phrase -  that is, the difficulty in understanding how another person could engage in acts which to most observers 
seem so clearly wrong -  is a clear articulation of the issue at hand.
96 Fein, Genocide, p. 44.
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most individuals involved in the process) has not given widespread support or consent to 
killing, the questions posed here remain, it seems to me, useful ones which have much to tell 
us about ‘macro’ as well as ‘micro’ level issues, and the nature of their relationship;97 as well 
as identifying particular problems in conceptualising issues around these subjects.
A number of writers have synthesised the literature on the question of motivation and that 
of how it is ‘humanly possible’ to kill other human beings in an organised and institutionalised 
fashion.98 As we will see, the question of motivation is sometimes relevant to the function of 
dehumanisation, but the issue of how it is possible to act genocidally - that is, how such 
action can be considered legitimate - is always so. Hence, in introducing a discussion of 
these questions, it is appropriate to begin with a passage from Bandura concerning the 
human possibility of genocide conceptualised as ‘moral disengagement.’ According to 
Bandura such disengagement involves the following factors:
redefining harmful conduct as honourable by moral justification, exonerating social 
comparison and sanitising language ... focusfsing] on agency of action so that perpetrators 
can minimise their role in causing harm by diffusion and displacement of responsibility ... 
minimising or distorting the harm that flows from detrimental actions; and ... dehumanising 
and blaming the victims of the maltreatment."
97 A prominent example of a case in which there was widespread public opposition to killing can be found in the 
case of Nazi ‘euthanasia’; although it is also worth noting that this protest took place outside of a wartime 
context.
98 See for example T. Blass, ‘Psychological Perspectives on the Perpetrators of the Holocaust; The Role
of Situational Pressures, Personal Dispositions, and Their Interactions’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 7, no. 
I, 1993, pp 30-50; H. C. Kelman & V. L. Hamilton, The My Lai Massacre; Crimes of Obedience and Sanctioned 
Massacres’, in M. D. Ermann & R. J. Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: problems of 
Organizational behaviour in Contemporary Society (5th edn), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1996, pp. 
180-207.
99 A. Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency 'Journal of Moral Education, vol. 
31, no. 2, 2002, p. 102.
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While Bandura distinguishes dehumanisation from the other processes he mentions, in 
looking at discursive dehumanisation as it is conceptualised (in Chapter Four) and revealed 
(in Chapters Five to Seven), we will see that it fulfils, directly or indirectly, all of the 
functions listed in this passage. In doing so we will come to understand the way that such 
dehumanisation allows moral disengagement from its object, and hence performs an 
indispensable function in legitimising destruction.
From the general issue of moral disengagement, we may turn to scholarship on the analysis 
of specific motivations. An introductory problematic is found in the fact that a great deal of 
analysis synthesising perspectives on motivation -  most notably that of James Waller and 
Ervin Staub (but also others such as Philip Zimbardo) -  has approached this question as a 
problem of ‘evil.’100 On the one hand, we may say that if we are to employ the concept of 
evil then the subject of genocide or genocidal killing is perhaps the least controversial 
example. On the other, however, the concept is not only inextricably bound up (in 
Western thought) with moral binarism and the legacy of Christianity, it is also inherently 
highly subjective and emotive. Furthermore, it presupposes an answer to the question, 
discussed in the previous section, of whether people are innately inclined to behave in ‘good’ 
or ‘evil’ ways. Hence, the use of such a term, particularly when refracted through the 
disciplinary lenses of psychology and the social sciences, invisible-ises the adoption by the 
scholar of a complex and controversial system of values and beliefs, as well as raising many 
other problematics which are only tangentially related to the questions of motivation and 
the ‘human possibility’ of genocide. For these reasons, I would argue that the question of
100 Waller, Becoming Evil; Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect; Staub, The roots of evil and The Psychology of Good and Evil. 
Staub does pay some very circumscribed attention to the problematics of theorising ‘evil’ (The Psychology of Good 
and Evil, pp. 47-51). An author who has not conceptualised the problem in this way is Mann: for his list of 
motives for genocide, see Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 27-29. In an earlier and shorter work, Mann 
uses extensive statistical evidence to evaluate a posited seven different possible motivations for Nazi 
perpetrators, and examines the evidence for the relative strength of each (see M. Mann, ‘Were the Perpetrators 
of Genocide “ Ordinary Men” or “ Real Nazis” ? Results from Fifteen Hundred Biographies’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, pp. 331-366).
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‘evil’ is one which is best left to be examined through the lenses of theology and philosophy. 
Having sounded this note of caution, however, it should be recognised that these authors 
have nonetheless produced insightful syntheses of the arguments around these questions.
The most thorough of these can be found in psychologist James Waller’s exhaustive work 
Becoming Evil. This book provides an exhaustive overview of arguments concerning different 
motivations for genocide, and proposes a model of motivation which synthesises these 
different approaches. Waller approaches this question as a process rather than an outcome, 
and distinguishes between proximate and ultimate causes, to create a ‘flow-chart’ style 
model of the way in which ‘ordinary people’ commit genocide and mass killing.101 His model 
begins with ultimate causation: the evolutionary-biological makeup of ‘human nature’ (in the 
process problematically assuming a hierarchical distinction between humans and animals, and 
rejecting social constructionist views) to argue that our history as competitive hunter- 
gatherers, in the context of group rather than individual natural selection, favours in-group 
niceness, but between-group nastiness. This has endowed us with the psychological 
mechanisms which make us ‘capable of committing genocide and mass killing when activated 
by appropriate cultural, psychological, or social cues.’102 In other words, we see here the 
argument already outlined above, that (put in very obvious terms) humans both have the 
capacity to engage in genocidal action, and that there is some biological basis for the kind of 
psychological constructions which are involved in intergroup harm. But the question of 
interest both for Waller and for the present inquiry remains: how does it happen that this 
possible propensity is actuated in genocidal practice?
In answering this question, Waller turns to three proximate influences, none in themselves 
sufficient: cultural construction of worldview, psychological construction of the Other, and social 
construction of cruelty. As we will see, while the psychological construction of the other is the
101 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. I 38.
102 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. I 55-161.
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most closely related of these to the subject of genocidal dehumanisation, neither of the 
remaining two influences are irrelevant to the subject or unconnected to its nature and 
functions.
According to Waller, each of these causes contains three causal subcategories. The 
concept of ‘cultural models,’ lenses (which differ from society to society) ‘through which we 
interpret our social world and make judgements about appropriate responses,’103 is used to 
evaluate three worldviews which are implicated in genocide: collectivistic values which define 
individual identity and values in reference to the group and which create ingroup-outgroup 
positive-negative categorisation; authority orientation, in which the social world is ordered 
(or in which this type of order is valorised) in a clear, hierarchical, vertical fashion with 
clearly delineated spheres of power; 104 and the establishment of hierarchies of social 
dominance (which is explained by the evolutionary desirability of the avoidance of constant 
intergroup violence), which creates ideological commitment to a system of ideological 
hatred. 105 All of these factors point to the importance of the cultural construction of 
identity, and to the way in which identity roles, not only those of victims as outgroup 
member but also the ingroup identity as understood by perpetrators, and the specific roles 
allotted within perpetrator collectives, give rise to motivations for genocidal action.
Next, W aller raises the question of the psychological construction of the Other (which 
W aller also terms the ‘social death of the victims,’ a phrase with its origin in Orlando 
Patterson’s comparative study of slavery), specifically, the ways in which victims are 
excommunicated from the perpetrators’ moral community and turned into objects in the
103 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 172.
104 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 179.
105 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 82-88.
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perpetrators’ eyes. 106 Here again we find three subcategories: us-them thinking, consisting 
of ethnocentrism and, conversely, xenophobia; moral disengagement, in which, through 
moral justification, dehumanisation, and euphemistic labelling of actions, perpetrators justify 
their actions and distance themselves from the moral implications of those actions; 107 and 
blaming the victims for their own suffering (a process which takes place on the part of both 
perpetrators and bystanders), which is related to the psychological self-protective 
mechanism of ‘just-world thinking’ and the reduction of perpetrator guilt.108 Once again, the 
way in which categorisation constructs morality is clearly in evidence; given that this factor is 
the most central to the subject of dehumanisation, we will deal with all of the 
abovementioned issues at greater length in Chapter Four.
Finally, Waller examines the third proximate influence, the social construction of cruelty.
By this, Waller refers to ‘the power of the immediate situation’ to ‘enable perpetrators to 
initiate, sustain, and cope with their acts of brutality.’ 109 Such situations (which are the focus 
of Zimbardo, Milgram and Browning) are created in three ways. Firstly, they are created by 
professional socialisation into an organisation, involving escalating commitments to 
organisational goals, ritualistic conduct, and the merging of the role with the individual’s 
identity as an individual (reflecting a continuum from compliance, to identification, to 
internalisation110) . * 111 Secondly, they are created by group identification, in which individual 
conscience is repressed and locally generated values come to dominate, responsibility is 
diffused and the individual undergoes a process of ‘deindividuation’ within a bureaucratic 
system, and in which rational self-interest (either professional or personal) as an individual 
within a system influences action, particularly as over time actors come to have a vested
106 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 198. See also Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study, 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 1982.
107 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 201 -202.
108 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 212-218.
109 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 230.
110 See Kelman & Hamilton in Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 241.
111 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 232-242.
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interest in that system and external groups come to be seen as a source of threat (whether 
to the ego/sense of self, or in a more literal sense) . 112 Thirdly, they are created by binding 
factors of the group, encompassing conformity to peer pressure, ‘kin recognition cues’ which 
come to operate within institutionalised groups, and patriarchal gender norms which valorise 
aggressive and competitive masculinity (which is not to say that this factor only operates 
upon males) . 113 O f W aller’s three influences, this third is the least relevant to the issue of 
the perpetrator construction of a victim identity. However, implicit in this aspect of 
motivation are the conditions of modern bureaucracy and collective dynamics; and, as we 
will see in Chapter Seven, the same bureaucratic discourse which enables and motivates 
genocidal action also works upon the construction of the human object of action. As will be 
evident, then, while W aller does not argue for the sole centrality of dehumanisation, his 
model involves many factors which are vital to the present discussion of the subject, and, in 
particular, for my argument that dehumanisation is a necessary condition for genocide.
W ho else has given attention to the question of motivation and human possibility in ways 
which may inform our analysis? Others include Staub, Zimbardo and Milgram. Staub 
examines motivations for aggression (within his analysis of the causation of genocide), and 
the situations which may psychologically intensify the effects of, or indeed bring into 
existence, such motivations. 114 These may occur on the individual and the cultural level, but 
Staub emphasises that aspects of culture are processes that occur among individuals. 115 It will 
become clear that this reminder that genocide, and thus dehumanisation, is not a static 
process, is very important. Motivation for genocide, dehumanising narratives, and genocidal 
action, are all evolutionary processes not only on the collective, but also on the individual 
level. As such, they cannot be understood through taking a cross-section solely of the
112 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 243-258.
113 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 258-269.
114 Staub, The roots of evil, p. 35.
115 Staub, The roots of evil, p. 5 1.
Chapter 2 75
moment in which genocidal action is committed, but must be placed in the context of 
historical-developmental processes both at the level of individual psychology, and in its 
relationship to collective and social circumstances.
Moving from the individual-psychological to the external, Zimbardo and Milgram both 
examine the situations and systems which operate to produce harmdoers. Zimbardo gives as 
his research question, ‘to understand the processes of transformation at work when good 
or ordinary people do bad or evil things.’116 Before embarking upon an analysis of aspects of 
Zimbardo’s work useful for our inquiry, we should point to two problems it embodies, 
problems, however, through the exploration of which concepts of genocidal dehumanisation 
can be fruitfully developed. Zimbardo’s moral binarism as expressed in this formulation 
(inherent in which is the concept that there is a relationship between ordinary’ and good), 
which is accompanied by a binary distinction he draws between an Apollonian nature which 
resists harm, and (the release of) a Dionysian harmful nature, are highly problematic in 
themselves, as we will see in Chapter Four. 117 A second problem arises in the assumption 
that the everyday lives of these ‘ordinary’ (or ‘good’) people do not involve harming others, 
a highly contentious position; indeed, later in this thesis I will demonstrate that one of the 
ways in which genocidal dehumanisation can function is because it draws a similarity between 
‘morally legitimate,’ ‘everday’ harm, and the harm carried out in genocide.
These issues notwithstanding, in his nuanced examination of the influence of systems and 
situations, as opposed to individual propensities, Zimbardo’s scholarship, building on the 
foundations of Milgram’s experimental findings, is important for an examination of genocidal 
motivation. According to Zimbardo, perpetrators of harm may be divided into three types, 
which he argues are identical to the types Lifton found in The Nazi Doctors: eager (and brutal)
116 Zimbardo, p. 5.
117 Zimbardo, pp. 305-6.
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zealots, methodical workers, and reluctant participants.118 For each of these types, I will 
argue, we can see how dehumanisation can influence participation: in the identity-based 
ideology held by the zealot, the euphemisation of the victim on the part of the worker, and 
the legitimisation of harmful action for the morally reluctant. Zimbardo presents a list of 
methods, extrapolated from Milgram’s research, by which ‘ordinary citizens’ come to engage 
in harmful behaviour. These are: contractual obligation; the creation of meaningful roles; the 
imposition of a set of arbitrary rules to be followed and enforced; altering the semantics and 
thus the reality of harmful action; diffusing responsibility; beginning with seemingly 
insignificant harmful acts whose harmfulness increases only gradually; beginning with a ‘just’ 
authority figure who becomes ‘unjust’ once authority is accepted; making ‘exit’ costs high 
and allowing verbal, but only verbal, dissent (hence reducing psychological dissonance); and 
offering an ideology to justify the use of any means to achieve a seemingly desirable or 
essential goal.119 Some of these (for example, altered semantics and an ideology of threat) 
are more central to our inquiry than others; but in Chapters Four to Seven we will see the 
importance not only of semantics in themselves, but also of the structures within which they 
are found, structures which give form to particular words and actions on the basis of the 
relationship of individuals to collective discursive systems and the way in which such systems 
structure moral psychology.
Despite problematics with specific elements of their models, a more general relevance of 
both Zimbardo’s and Milgram’s conceptions is that each essentially argues for the power of 
the situational, and the systemic, in causing people to commit harmful acts against others. 
While Milgram’s emphasis is more on vertical power (social hierarchies and obedience) and 
Zimbardo’s (like Browning’s, though to a lesser degree) also gives significant weight to
118 Zimbardo, pp. 208-209. In mentioning Lifton’s work in terms of motivation, it should be noted that Waller 
problematises Lifton’s concept of ‘doubling’ as an explanation for perpetrators’ actions (as well as Milgram’s 
‘agentic state’); Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. I 13-125.
" 9 Zimbardo, pp. 273-274.
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horizontal power (‘peer pressure’), both Milgram and Zimbardo find that people who do not 
test for any psychological pathology, and who for the most part would self-report as being 
unable or unwilling to take harmful actions against others (indeed, as Bandura notes, 
empirical studies tend to show that ‘[a]lmost everyone is virtuous at the abstract level’120), 
are extremely likely to do so with alacrity if placed in situations which are structured in a 
certain way. In other words, we cannot assume either that perpetrators of genocide are 
psychologically abnormal, nor, conversely, that ‘psychologically normal’ people are basically 
good or that it takes a great deal of persuasion, or an overwhelming motivation, to induce 
them to participate in genocide. Furthermore, there are many motivations for such 
participation, which include both vertical and horizontal pressures based on particular, 
internalised narratives. In Chapter Four, we will explore the way in which dehumanisation 
can either in itself be a motivation for genocide (when the discursive element of threat is 
present), or can solely legitimate given the presence of other motivations. The research 
presented above, which will be further pursued in that chapter, both gives some idea about 
the multiplicity of genocidal motivation, and the complex relationship between primary 
motivation for action and the factors and influences which make such action psychologically 
possible in the context of the existence of such motivation.
The aforementioned are works which deal explicitly with the research question of 
motivation and ‘human possibility.’ Before leaving the subject, I turn to scholarship which 
treats a major aspect of these related questions, or which offers an individual argument 
rather than synthesising other research into the topic.
In exploring essentialising characterisations of the other, it is important to sound a note of 
caution regarding conceptualisation of ‘hatred’ of the other. My concern here is not with 
theorising hatred as such, but with the question of the functional construction of the
120 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 115.
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collective other in regard to the questions of whether that collective poses a threat to the 
ingroup, and what action may legitimately be taken toward that collective. However, some 
scholarship using synthesis to explain the psychology of perpetrators remains stymied by a 
view which sees hatred as an irrational end in itself, an end which is unrelated to the actions 
of the hated.121 To argue against this approach is by no means to say that those within 
target groups bring victimisation upon themselves or deserve to be victimised, but rather to 
re-emphasise that we must attempt to understand the formation of the worldview of 
perpetrators in terms of external factors, in order to understand their actions.
An example of a more considered treatment is found in Alexander Laban Hinton’s Why D id  
They Kill?, his detailed treatment of genocide in Cambodia. In his conclusion, Hinton 
examines the general question of ‘why people kill,’ and the question of ‘how genocide comes 
to take place,’ as a conclusion to his more specific analysis. As well as obedience (through 
the lens of Milgram), Hinton examines the concept (related to Kuper’s emphasis on genocide 
as a process, not a phenomenon) of ‘genocidal priming,’ including as a factor the top-down 
manufacturing of difference. 122 In terms of motivation, Hinton identifies to a number of 
factors we have already examined: ideology, obedience, localised knowledge, group-level 
dynamics, and distanciation. 123 For the purposes of this thesis, Hinton’s anthropological 
focus on localised knowledge is timely in emphasising the importance of the way general 
narratives take different forms (though not functions) in specific circumstances; as is his 
emphasis on the way motivation changes over time. 124 More specifically, Hinton notes that it 
is necessary for ideology to be ‘put’ to people in such a way that it ‘takes,’ generally by
121 Two examples of work which fall prey to this and other problematics are: N. J. Kressel, Mass Hate: The Global 
Rise of Genocide And Terror (revised and updated edn), Westview, Cambridge [Mass.], 2002; and a work which is, 
unfortunately, often used as a source on dehumanisation and motivation, D. Grossman’s On Killing: The 
Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in W ar and Society (paperback edn), Back Bay Books, Boston/New 
York/London, 1996.
122 Hinton, pp. 280-286.
123 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 295-6.
124 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 288.
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canalising pre-existing popular or widespread cultural discourses, and that this canalisation 
establishes various ‘channels’ which perpetrators ‘tune into’ in their activities as meaning­
making beings.125 In the following chapters, we will see the ways in which the specific forms 
taken by narratives of genocidal dehumanisation are drawn from existing discourses and 
shaped by the particular circumstances in which they come into being, and in which they are 
put to use. Ultimately, Hinton suggests that ‘a more comprehensive explanation must move 
from macro-level historical process to local-level sociocultural dynamics to psychological 
mimetics, with the understanding that all of these levels of analysis are linked and cannot be 
understood in isolation.’126 In the introduction, I have already emphasised the well-made 
point put here: that dehumanisation, as an aspect of genocide, exists across a number of 
different planes and social levels, and that in order to understand it analysis must take place 
which recognises this and which is aimed at pinpointing the relevant features of each. Thus, 
it is with this statement in mind that we will approach the subject of dehumanisation in 
genocide and genocidal killing in the following chapters.
In recognition of its importance for my argument, and as an introduction to the following 
chapter, the final place in the present survey is given to Stanley Cohen’s States of Denial.
This book is a valuable and, in the field of genocide studies, a neglected examination of the 
way in which the human mind, paradoxically, is capable of concealing from itself what it does 
not want to know (the paradox consisting in the fact that, in order not to know something, 
we must know what it is that we do not want to know). In the case of genocide, the mind 
refuses to consciously comprehend, or to admit comprehension of, the actuality and the 
significance of harmful acts (whether on the part of perpetrator, beneficiary or bystander). 
How does this not-knowing function? Cohen divides denial into three categories: literal 
(‘nothing happened’), interpretive (‘what is happening is really something else’) and 
implicatory (‘what’s happening is justified’). Furthermore, denial includes cognition
'25 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 287, 289, 294. 
'26 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 298.
Chapter 2 80
(acknowledgement), emotion, morality, and action. 127 In looking at dehumanisation, we will 
see literal denial that the object is human; interpretive denial of the meaning of the action 
taken toward that object, based on the reshaping properties of discursive accounts; and the 
justification of such action, whether it is justified as legitimate or as necessary.
Denial takes place through what Cohen calls ‘accounts’ (also known as ‘motivational 
accounts’ or ‘vocabulary of motives’). For our purposes, we might conceptualise such 
personalised accounts as the narratives or scripts, mentioned above, which may be available 
as particular discursive formations. Accounts ‘serve to realign people to groups whose 
norms and expectations they have confounded’; they are not the same as post-facto 
rationalisations, but must also be present before and during action. 128 Accounts may be 
justifications (‘those who I killed deserved to die’) or excuses (‘killing is immoral, but I had to 
follow orders’ ) . 129 Excuses are defensive and passive, while justifications, which are closely 
linked to ideology, are active. 130 In line with the argument presented elsewhere in this thesis 
regarding to the ‘truth value’ of perpetrator statements, Cohen writes that we need not 
necessarily be concerned with whether these accounts are genuinely believed, or are (self) 
deceptive. 131 Rather, these denying accounts, in order to be credible, must draw on shared 
cultural vocabularies, and are related to organisational ‘groupthink’ which ‘protects illusions 
from uncomfortable truths and disconfirming information. ’ 132 Given this, Cohen argues that 
‘[t]here is no contrast between pure, prior ideological commitment and situational pressures 
such as obedience’ -  accounts are often jumbled and inconsistent, but it is not in consistency 
that their power lies; 133 furthermore, the relationship of contradictory elements to each
127 S. Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Polity, Cambridge, 2001, p. 9.
128 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 58.
129 Cohen, States o f Denial, p. 59.
130 Cohen, States o f Denial, p. 59.
131 Cohen, States o f Denial, p. 63.
132 Cohen, States o f Denial, pp. 64, 66.
133 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 77.
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other is not logical, but ideological.134 We will explore these features considered as aspects 
of dehumanisation in more detail in Chapter Four, and will see them manifest in Chapters 
Five to Seven.
A vital aspect of dehumanisation as strategic function is that it need not make fanatical 
ideological converts of all within the perpetrator society; rather, it must contribute to a 
social environment in which, as well as willing perpetrators, there are unconcerned or 
supportive bystanders. Cohen points to the importance of this issue when he writes that, in 
terms of the top-down creation of denial, reliable public indifference is more valuable than 
enforced compliance: ‘everyone recognizes the lie, but nobody cares.’135 Cohen calls this ‘a 
post-modern version of the Oedipal state: knowing and not-knowing at the same time, but 
also not caring.’136 Cohen’s position -  that accounts which deny inconvenient knowledge 
serve to make possible the enactment of serious harm toward fellow human beings -  is one 
which is central to the argument of this thesis. The theory of ‘accounts,’ which are here 
viewed through the lens of ‘discourse’ (though an ‘account’ is perhaps better considered a 
sub-discursive formation), provides an entrée to the concerns of the following chapter.
§
In this chapter, I have examined thematic models of causation, and the issue of motivation 
and how genocide is ‘humanly possibly.’ In doing so, my aim has been, firstly, to 
demonstrate where, in the general context of scholarship on genocide, my argument is 
located; secondly, to demonstrate and acknowledge the arguments which my own model 
takes as its foundation and point of departure; thirdly, to point both to particular lacunae in 
need of exploration, and to specific pitfalls which I hope to avoid in the development of my
134 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 103.
135 Cohen, States of Denial, pp. I 14-1 15.
136 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 116.
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argument; and fourthly, to bring the reader’s attention to concepts which are particularly 
useful in my analysis of genocidal dehumanisation, concepts which should be borne in mind 
throughout, and to which we will return in Chapter Four in the course of a more detailed 
discussion of particular facets of dehumanisation.
This discussion, then, has been intended to ground my own argument, to inform it, and to 
situate it within a universe of scholarly discourse about genocide. In so doing I have given 
some idea of my conception of the realm within which my problem lies, and the means 
through which it should be approached as an object of inquiry. I have not, however, 
touched upon the nature of my approach in hermeneutical terms, that is, the heuristics I 
employ -in  particular, concepts of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’ -  in approaching my subject 
matter from a documentary perspective; nor have I examined the nature of such analysis as a 
form of analysis, or my reasons for deciding upon a particular theoretical deployment as the 
best way in which to approach my subject. In Chapter Four, I will apply the scholarship 
presented in this chapter to the specific subject of genocidal dehumanisation. Given the 
nature of this thesis as a work employing texts to construct a model of a process, however, 
before I embark on this task it is necessary to outline the theoretical approach which I will 
employ in order to do so; it is to this task which I turn in the next chapter.
C h a p te r 3.
D iscourse , Ideology and Language: T h e o re tica l Co nsideratio ns
In this chapter, I turn to the consideration of methodology, theoretical approaches, and, in 
the process, to definitional issues regarding methodological terminology. My purpose is to 
outline the nature of the approach that I will apply to the documentary material I present, 
and to give reasons for choosing this particular approach. Our concern here is the 
development of ideas about the relationships between texts, and between texts and 
practices, in the manifestation of power in action: and the two theoretical heuristics which 
are most appropriate to this field of inquiry are those concerning ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology.’ 
The focus of this chapter will therefore be the application of these concepts to the present 
subject matter.
Clearly, the history of these terms and the different ways in which they may be formulated 
are topics which in themselves are subjects of extensive ongoing theoretical investigation. 
Here, however, I do not intend either to outline the history of terminologies or the debates 
over their meaning and usage, but rather to outline the way in which I will employ them in 
revealing something about genocidal dehumanisation. Initially, an overview of concepts and 
definitions of these two terms are examined, and their specific usage in this thesis is clarified. 
I go on to ask how these two terms can be connected in a methodological sense, giving 
particular consideration to the Critical Discourse Analysis approach. Finally, I turn to the 
issue of social constructionism, and give some indication as to how a discursive, social- 
constructionist analysis may actually be applied to genocidal dehumanisation as an object of 
inquiry.
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I. D iscou rse : A  Foucauldian D iagnosis
[T]o speak is to do something -  something other than to express what one thinks[,] to translate 
what one knows . . . t o  show that a change in the order o f discourse does not presuppose ‘new ideas’
... but transformations in a practice, perhaps also in neighbouring practices, and in their common 
articulation.
- Michel Foucault1
This work is premised on the methodology of the analysis of texts. I argue from the 
position that discourse, manifest in texts, constructs meaning, and therefore ‘reality.’ Verbal 
(and visual) manifestations are intimately entwined in, and indeed may constitute, the 
enactment of power. They speak of the self-understanding, the (socialised) identity, of the 
speaker, and they speak also of the culture and cultural understandings from which that 
speaker, and the enunciation itself, has emerged. The reasons why this position is an 
approach which makes it possible to get to the heart of the issue of genocidal 
dehumanisation are outlined over the course of this chapter. I begin with the subject of 
‘discourse.’
In the present work, the term ‘discourse’ is applied not so much in relation to the history 
of and broader traditions around the concept (which would include the work of figures from 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan and Michel Pecheux to Judith Butler, 
among many others), but with specific reference to the formulation of Michel Foucault. On 
this model, ‘discourse’ describes a set of communicative utterances based on a common 
‘knowledge’ (in the sense of a belief system interpreting reality, rather than a true as 
opposed to a false understanding of reality) which is intimately connected with, and which is 
productive of, power. Discourse therefore constructs systems of power, but it is also a 
manifestation of such systems. Hence discourse can be seen both as a strategy and a
1 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (trans. A. M. S. Smith), Routledge, London & New York, 2002, p. 230.
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manifestation, constructing knowledge in particular ways which essentialise certain 
understandings and exclude others. So it becomes evident that it is a system of the 
construction of meaning, and thus of apprehended ‘reality.’
How did Foucault employ the term ‘discourse’? Firstly, he himself recognised that his use 
of the term was not universally defined, that he treated it ‘sometimes as the general domain 
of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a 
regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.’2 Over the course of his body 
of work (in terms of the analysis of particular discursive subject matters rather than his 
critical, meta-discursive work on the scholarly project3) he also took two different focuses, 
the ‘archaeological’ and the ‘genealogical,’ with the first more centred on autonomous 
discourse, and the second on the conception of power.4 A shift took place in the nature of 
his primary analysis, from concern with ‘discourse’ to concern with ‘power/knowledge.’ In 
this thesis, I will chiefly explore the Foucauldian conception o f ‘discourse’ in the 
archaeological sense (though in the typological sections of the work, particularly in relation 
to the conditions of modernity, I will have occasion to make mention of the relevance of 
Foucault’s genealogical model of the operations and ‘technologies’ of power).
Though we are most closely concerned with Foucauldian discourse rather than Foucauldian 
power per se, it is worth noting at the outset that Foucault understood the way in which the 
possibilities of knowledge were intimately related to power, and the way in which power, as 
a productive rather than solely a repressive force, inheres universally in the social. The 
documents in which we can trace genocidal dehumanisation are a body of texts produced by 
perpetrators regarding their own practices. Given this, an approach is needed which allows
2 In N. Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual analysis for social research, Routledge, London & New York, 2003, p. 
123.
3 See M. Foucault, The Order of Discourse’ (trans. I. McLeod), in R. Young (ed.), Untying the Text A Post- 
Structuralist Reader, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Boston/London/Henley, 1981, pp. 70-73.
4 N. Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 49.
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the tracing both of distinctive narratives, and of the historical-philosophical confines within 
which such narratives developed; hence, the adoption of ‘discourse,’ a term which can be 
used both to examine texts in this light and to shed illumination on the connection between 
text and non-textual practice. It is my intent in this thesis to trace the nature of what will be 
defined as a particular discursive strategy, termed ‘genocidal dehumanisation,’ which 
constructs reality (and therefore action) and the course of the operations of power by the 
manifestation of a knowledge which makes claims about the nature of ‘human-ness,’ both in 
terms of essence and in terms of action.5 Given that the concept of ‘discourse’ and the way 
in which it constitutes meaning is central to the argument of this work, then, and given 
varying technical usages of the term and the concept, I present here a brief examination of 
the meaning of the terms ‘discourse,’ ‘discursive formation’ and ‘strategy’ as employed by 
Foucault, and as they will be used in relation to dehumanisation in this thesis, with particular 
reference to the application of these concepts to specific aspects of my argument (thus 
foreshadowing these aspects).6 This discussion, and that which follows concerning ideology, 
is also, in a more general sense, intended to clarify my approach to my subject, the way in 
which I intend to synthesise a coherent argument from diverse disciplinary-methodological 
strands of scholarship.
My approach follows the ‘archaeological’ model of the concept of discourse and discursive 
formations, as outlined in Foucault’s major work dealing with methodological issues, The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969). This work ascribes the following characteristics to
5 It should be noted here that the use of the term ‘discursive strategy,’ used in a Foucauldian sense, should not be 
confused with Jurgen Habermas’ distinction between strategic and communicative discourse in late capitalism.
See N. Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), Longman, Essex, 2001, pp. 163-164.
6 Both Foucault’s use of ‘discourse’ as a term of analysis, and other aspects of his research, have come under 
criticism from many quarters. Influential scholars who have critiqued Foucault’s work include Jacques Derrida, 
Jurgen Habermas and Slavoj Zizek, among others. In this chapter, however, rather than diverting attention away 
from my object (genocidal dehumanisation) by embarking upon a necessarily lengthy examination of these 
complex debates, I wish to explain why in analysing that object specifically the concept of ‘discourse’ - and, in 
particular, Foucault’s conception of it - is a valuable and effective heuristic.
Chapter 3 87
‘discourse’: that it is a system of representation which exists in a particular historical 
moment;7 that nothing has any inherent meaning outside of discourse; that the object of 
discourse is not objectively identifiable, but rather that discourse constitutes its topic, in this 
case, the personified subject;8 that discursive meaning is personified in a subject; that a 
discursive formation can be characterised as an enunciatively regularised, connected group 
of statements formulated according to certain self-created rules, which are the conditions of 
its existence;9 and that discursive formations contain practices for dealing with this 
personified subject. Such an analysis examines the emergence, delimitations, and grids of 
specification of a discursive formation; 10 and it recognises the nexus between ‘institutions, 
economic and social processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of 
classification [and] modes of characterization’ which constitute the object of such a 
formation and from which it emerges, even as every statement in the discursive field 
reconstructs its own past and presents it as truth. * 11 At this point it should also be re­
emphasised that, as stated above, Foucault wrote that his own conception of ‘discourse’ 
treated it ‘sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an 
individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for 
a certain number of statements,’ and that this concept should therefore not be considered 
the rigorous establishment of a model or a theory, but rather the opening up a possibility of 
a model, the freeing of ‘a coherent domain of description.’ 12
By taking a comparative and multidisciplinary approach to the subject of genocidal 
dehumanisation as a discursive nexus and a discursive strategy, I aim to recognise and trace 
the factors enumerated above. Hence, in Foucauldian terms, I am not concerned with
7 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 131.
8 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 35-36.
9 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 36-42, 51, 66, 89, I 30, 162. For a conception of the ‘statement’ see 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 89-127.
10 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 45-47.
11 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 49-50, 140.
12 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 90, 128-129.
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ascertaining the objective truth or falsehood of the claims made by genocidal perpetrators 
regarding their victims;13 in demonstrating internal inconsistencies in such claims; or in 
evaluating these claims as justificatory or mitigatory factors in universal terms (as opposed to 
the terms of perpetrators themselves).14 That is to say, my analysis is not concerned with 
the relationship between ‘words and things,’ with each viewed in essentialist terms, but 
rather with the way in which ‘words,’ or rather, statements, signs or enunciations, are in fact 
practices which do not (only) reflect but which constitute meaning and which form their own 
objects, with the understanding that these objects and/or practices are objects external to 
the discursive order: discourse, as a ‘field of statements ... must be articulated on something 
other than itself.’15 In a phrase particularly germane to the subject of this thesis, Foucault 
writes that discourse is ‘a violence we do to things ... a practice which we impose on 
them.’16 Ultimately, then, I will use the concept of discourse to demonstrate the way in 
which dehumanisation constructs its objects, outgroups and victim groups, in the process of 
enacting enunciative and physical practice toward them
According to Foucault, general discourses (such as medicine, the science of living beings, 
etc) form themes or theories, which he terms ‘strategies’;17 these strategies are deployed 
within discursive formations, but are not secondary elements of independent discursive 
rationality; and they have functions in the non-discursive field of practices, appropriations, 
interests and desires.18 Genocidal dehumanisation (and, more generally, dehumanisation 
overall) is not, properly speaking, a discourse itself, but a discursive formation which can be
13 Though, as the reader will be aware, this issue has already been raised in discussion regarding the usefulness of, 
firstly, the concept of the actuality of threat in terms of the perception of threat, and secondly, claims made for 
‘rational’/ ’irrational’ or ‘pragmatic’/’existential’ distinctions in genocidal types. See Foucault, The Order of 
Discourse’, pp. 54-55.
14 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 52-53; see also pp. 142-143, 168-9.
15 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 53-54, 137; see also p. 182.
16 Foucault, The Order of Discourse’, p. 67.
17 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 71.
18 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 75-76, 77-78, 179-180.
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considered a strategy of this kind, within which we find a typology of sub-themes, of specific 
narratives. As we will see, this particular strategy arises from the coalescence of a nexus of 
discourses contingent upon the conditions of modernity, and consists in the creation of a 
particular, essentialised collective object in a universe of such objects, a creation which 
moreover contains the manner(s) in which this object is to be treated. The concept of a 
‘discursive strategy’ also elucidates the question of the representativeness of particular 
utterances, by demonstrating the way in which the ‘property of discourse’ -  in the sense of 
access to speech, understanding and investment in decisions, institutions or practices -  is 
confined to particular groups.19
In examining the discourses of modernity in each of the following chapters, I embark upon 
a (necessarily brief) exploration of what Foucault terms the ‘economy of the discursive 
constellation’ to which any particular discursive formation belongs. Such an exploration also 
helps to understand the emergence of specific particularities from the entire range of 
possibility.20 In analysing the historical emergence of modern genocidal dehumanisation, and 
therefore the origins of its features, we will bear in mind Foucault’s conception of ‘change’ 
(or rather, ‘transformation’) neither as purely cause (that is, the viewpoint that change, as a 
universal law, is its own principle and thus the endpoint of explanation); nor purely as effect 
(that is, only in terms of external causation with change as an outcome).21 This conception 
of change, as applied to the emergence of modern dehumanisation, is particularly germane to 
the concept of dehumanisation as a strategy with its own internal momentum, and as a self-
19 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 76-77.
20 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 74. The ‘discursive constellation’ concept, though separate, can be 
considered in conjunction with that of the episteme, ‘the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given 
period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.’ The episteme, in 
Diane Macdonnell’s words a ‘ground of thought,’ is that which allows an understanding of the constraints and 
limitations which are imposed upon discourse in any given moment, making possible ‘the existence of 
epistemological figures and sciences’ (D. Macdonnell, Theories of Discourse: An Introduction, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 
1986, p. 87; Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 2 1 I -2 12).
21 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 190-191.
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fulfilling prophecy, in which utterances removing the humanity of individuals within a 
collectivity accompanies practice which does so in the non-verbal realm.
The conception of genocidal dehumanisation as a strategy is also useful in the commonly 
understood sense of the word ‘strategy,’ inasmuch as it is instructive to ask what ends are 
served by this strategy and why such a strategy comes to be employed to fulfil these ends. 
What we are dealing with here is, in Foucauldian terms, ‘discursive practice.’22 Knowledge, 
which is the created object of discourse, is intimately connected with power and practice; 
and it is at this locus that we find the exercise of the discursive strategy of (genocidal) 
dehumanisation in its various manifestations. This will be particularly apparent in my analysis 
of the ideological function of modern scientific discursive formations (specifically, the life 
sciences and the science of bureaucratic management) with regard to genocidal 
dehumanisation.23 In the conclusion to The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault describes his 
analysis as a diagnosis: it is in this spirit that I approach the discursive strategy of genocidal 
dehumanisation.24
All this is not to say, however, that my analysis is entirely in conformity with Foucault’s 
vision for an ‘archaeology,’ particularly as regards his definition of this enterprise as non- 
interpretive, non-documentary, and unconcerned with the relating of discourse to what 
precedes, surrounds or follows it.25 In particular, firstly, I trace the historical origins of 
genocidal dehumanisation (though not in terms of entirely unprecedented originatory 
statements or individuals26) in a manner aligned to the employment of ‘the history of ideas’
22 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 131.
23 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 203-205.
24 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 227. ‘Diagnosis’ is in itself a medical metaphor, and therefore should 
be approached with caution; however, its use in this context is employed in the sense of an understanding of a 
theoretical problem, rather than an actually existing problem where the aim is to remove or destroy this 
problem.
25 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 155.
26 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 165.
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as a method, examining influences and the exchange and transmission of information (in 
opposition to which Foucault sets up his ‘archaeology’ -  though he also denies that this 
analysis takes place outside of the dimension of a general history, that it engages with the 
question of mobility and ‘the rhythm of events’ and ‘maps temporal vectors of derivation’27). 
Secondly, while I do not pursue the concept of a psychological truth concealed by statements, 
but attempt to understand them in their own terms, I expend some effort elucidating the 
psychological states which I understand to be the causes for the existence of such statements, 
with particular regard to intention and motivation (both for discursive and non-discursive 
action), and with some attention (as we have already seen) given to causation.28 Thirdly, I do 
consider these psychological states and their expression in practice to contain an underlying 
unity of a certain kind (hence my argument regarding dehumanisation as a continuum) which 
expresses itself in the form of ‘dehumanisation,’ though this unity is not without 
contradictions and irregularities, which are themselves enlightening as to the nature of this 
strategy.29 Finally, I do not dispute Foucault’s later assertion that the contestation which 
takes place through discourse is not only a contestation over representations as part of 
systems of dominance, but that discourse in itself ‘is the power which is to be seized’;30 but 
it should be borne in mind that it is not this contestation in itself which is the subject of our 
inquiry here, but the consequences of the success of particular strategies. Therefore, my 
employment of Foucault’s concept of discourse in my analysis should be understood, firstly, 
as a guide, and secondly, as an important conceptual tool, but as one among others, rather 
than as a single definitive method to be followed.
§
27 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 155-156, 179, 182, 185-186.
28 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 179-180, 189.
29 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. I 73.
30 In Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, p. 5 I .
Chapter 3 92
This discussion of the way in which I intend to deploy Foucault’s model to my subject will 
demonstrate that my approach focuses on the determining role of culture and the social. 
Specifically, my argument can be considered constructionist inasmuch as it is an argument 
that enunciation constitutes meaning and therefore determines ‘reality’ -  a concept which is 
more fully treated in the following chapter.31 The ‘reality’ thus constituted is, in the analysis I 
undertake here, ‘reality’ as understood by the perpetrators of genocide and mass killing.
A  moral objection may be raised to this approach. It is therefore important to state that, 
in taking it, I do not intend in any measure to justify perpetrators, to deny the agency of 
victims, or to ‘invisible-ise’ victims or their suffering. Rather, I hold that in order to 
understand the perpetration of genocide it is vital to analyse the self-conceptualisations and 
conceptualisations of others in the discourse of individuals and collectivities involved in the 
perpetration of genocide. In Eagleton’s words (regarding theories of ideology), if theorising 
is to have any value at all ‘it is in helping to illuminate the processes by which ... liberation 
from death-dealing beliefs may be practically effected.’32 However, it is in the very act of doing 
so and in order to do so that the nature of the social construction of reality by perpetrators 
must be revealed.
A  second, empiricist objection may be that there can be no proof for a link between 
discursive dehumanisation, and action. There are two replies to this objection. The first is, 
simply, to say that I am concerned with commonalities between what occurs in enunciation 
and in non-discursive practice, and that one of the aims of this thesis is to use documentary 
material to demonstrate the predictability of the link between particular types of
31 For an early, lengthy treatment of the concept of the social construction of reality from a sociological 
perspective, see P. L. Berger & T. Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1966.
32 Eagleton, p. 224.
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dehumanising utterances and particular actions;33 the second reply will be found in my 
examination of the emerging work being done in the field of social psychology which 
empirically links dehumanisation to the mistreatment of the dehumanised group.34
The discussion thus far should summarise both my basic theoretical position as regards my 
conception of my subject matter and its place in the wider realm of the social and the world 
of objects and events; and also deal with some problems which may immediately be seen to 
arise from this position. Foucault’s conception of ‘discourse’ (as part of an ‘archeological’ 
project) is not enough in itself to determine the method of approach of this thesis, 
particularly given Foucault’s de-emphasising of the deployment of a wide range of 
documentary materials in order to demonstrate the features of discourse or strategy. The 
next step, then, is to broaden our theoretical horizons, and inquire into other useful 
theoretical models which emerge from complementary positions, asking how they can be 
employed in the analysis at hand. This task may be begun through an approach to the 
second key concept to this thesis, that of ‘ideology.’
II. Ideology
Thus far, I have primarily discussed the work of Michel Foucault. Though Foucault resisted 
the concept of ideology, this concept is one that is of major utility to our investigation, for 
reasons which will become apparent in the following discussion.35 In general terms, the 
notion of ideology is a useful heuristic to explore the relationships between texts, practices,
33 It is also worth examining Foucault’s response to the possible criticism of his analysis ‘not having to establish 
[its] explicit, rigorous scientificity’ -  see Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, pp. 227-229.
34 More on this topic will be mentioned in the social psychological research presented in the following chapter.
35 Dan Stone suggests that the framework of Foucauldian biopolitics explains the mechanics of the Holocaust, 
whereas a focus on ideology is necessary to explain the genocidal impetus (D. Stone, ‘Biopower and Modern 
Genocide’, in A. D. Moses [ed.]. Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World 
History, Berghahn Books, New York & Oxford, 2008, pp. 170-171).
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and the political realm in the manifestation of power in action, questions which have also 
been developed in conceptions of ‘discourse.’ Given all of this, the term ‘ideology’ also 
requires definition as to its usage here. Examination will then be made of the use and 
features of the concept in recent theory, specifically in the work of Terry Eagleton and Teun 
A. van Dijk. As will become clear, most of the scholars whose texts I examine have linked 
the concept of discourse to that of ideology. In dealing with this connection, I will employ 
the sociolinguistic work of Norman Fairclough and the Critical Discourse Analysis approach.
I la. Ideology in Contemporary Thought and in ‘Discourse’: Conceptions and Definitions
The term ‘ideology’ was initially coined by Antoine Destutt de Tracy in the aftermath of 
the French Revolution. From this point, the concept develops over time through the work 
of scholars including Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Karl Mannheim, Antonio Gramsci, Louis 
Althusser, Clifford Geertz and Paul Ricoeur. Originally intended by Destutt de Tracy to 
indicate the study of ideas, the term came to be used as an indication of a political distortion 
of verifiable reality (still its connotation in common parlance). This conception, however, 
has since been fruitfully problematised, both in terms of its application outside the purely 
political realm, and in the negative connotations and positivistic attitude inherent in the 
concept of falsified representation. For the present work, it’s important to note that the 
complexification of ideas concerning ‘ideology’ flowered into recognition of the importance 
of cultural construction both within and outside the realm of the strictly political, particularly 
in the understanding of the Subject; of the problematics, for particular theoretical objectives, 
of defining particular worldviews or texts as either accurate or distorted representations of 
reality; and of the multidirectional nature of ideological discourse both within different strata 
of society, and inasmuch as the individual is both subject to, and produces, ideological 
representations related to her or his own practice.
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How are we to conceive of ideology? For our purposes, given that the vast majority of, 
though not all, genocides are committed at the behest of and in the name of the nation-state 
and national governments, the nature of ideology as a typical form in which politicised thought 
is expressed, and particularly as a resource related to the implementation of political 
programs, is important to our inquiry. When referring to ‘the political,’ however, we should 
also take into account the fact that, although the concept of ideology is inextricably entwined 
with that of the political, ideology itself has by no means been considered only to be 
concerned with the realm of public politics in the classical sense (this broad conception of 
ideology has been developed to its fullest extent in the various narratives of ‘identity politics’ 
developing from the 1960s and 1970s). For example, in discussing the role of ideology in 
moral exclusion and harmdoing, Ervin Staub suggests that ‘[¡Jdeologies may be regarded as 
group goals, with desired outcomes, associated ways of thinking, and networks of 
cognitions.’36 Michael Freeden notes the way in which, as well as its classical politic usage, 
the term has been used by historians to mean a system of ideas or an organizing idea, and in 
literary and cultural studies ‘as a critical concept referring to the structure of dominance 
around almost any idea or theme.’37 In taking these issues into account, then, some scholars 
have separated the concept of a ‘political ideology’ from that of ‘ideology’ in general.38 In 
the present work, we will be examining ideology at the interface of politics (in 
representational and structural terms) and culture.
How do these conceptions link back in with our use of the concept of discourse? With the 
emerging perspectives of post-structuralism, post-Marxism, and, specifically cultural 
discourse analysis (as opposed to linguistic discourse analysis), a conception of ideology 
focussing on identity (rather than class, as in the original Marxist critique) developed. While
36 E. Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness’, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40, 
no.I, 1990, p. 54.
37 Freeden, Ideology, p. 122.
38 See for example Freeden, Ideology, pp. 32, 51-52, 54.
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this perspective took a critical approach to ideology and focussed on the way it is naturalised 
and internalised within (or ‘written on’) the subject, it had no misgivings regarding the 
rejection of an empiricist model in which there is an objectively-ascertainable ‘reality’ which 
ideology conceals and sublimates. While Foucault is seen as the doyen of the concept of 
discourse, other theorists such as Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and Slavoj Zizek have 
proposed, in terms of ideology, that all practices are discursive and that the social order is 
entirely constructed; discourse is then an integral part of the human condition, and ideology 
is a necessary illusion which, however, does not conceal an ultimate reality.39 Laclau and 
Mouffe, in particular, argue that discursive formations are structured both through language 
and through institution, ritual and practice.40 On this view, in terms of the analysis of 
ideology itself, ‘[¡]nstead of condemning [it] as false, it should be recognized as a powerful 
indicator of the ways in which people actually construe the world .’41 Discourses, in the 
words of Freeden, become ‘the communicative practices through which ideology is 
exercised.’42 W e may explore the issue of the connections between discourse and ideology 
in more depth, and at the same time further the explication of the theoretical standpoint of 
this thesis, through examination of the work of Terry Eagleton and Teun A. van Dijk which 
take ideology as their primary subject.
I begin, then, with a return to the question of a definition. Eagleton proposes that the term 
‘ideology’ has many useful meanings, some of which are incompatible, and ‘[t]o  try to 
compress this wealth of meaning into a single comprehensive definition would thus be 
unhelpful even if it were possible.’43 While one tradition conceives ideology as deception in 
a universe of true and false cognition, others, whose approach is more sociological than
39 Freeden, Ideology, pp. I 10 -1 I I ; Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, pp. 20n22, 66.
40 Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 79.
41 Freeden, Ideology, p. 112.
42 Freeden, Ideology, pp. 105-109.
43 T. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (revised and expanded edn), Verso, London & New York, 2007, p. I ; see 
also p. 222.
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epistemological, are concerned with ‘the function of ideas within social life [rather] than with 
their reality or unreality. ’44 As should already be obvious, it is this second conception of 
ideology which will be employed in this thesis: as van Dijk puts it, ‘we need a pragmatics of 
use of ideology rather than a semantics of tru th . ’45
Any conception of ideology, Eagleton continues, must understand it to be connected, not 
only to (rigid) belief systems or sets of ideas, but to power and the legitimation of power.46 
In particular, one function, which is not necessarily universal (inasmuch as not all social 
interests are seen to need rationalisation) but is highly germane to our own inquiry (in that 
those involved in genocide generally do), is to rationalise social interests: ‘on this view ... 
ideologies can be seen as more or less systematic attempts to provide plausible explanations 
and justifications for behaviour which might otherwise be the object of criticism . ’47 Eagleton 
suggests that ideology is a matter of ‘discourse’ rather than a matter of ‘language’ inasmuch 
as it must be concerned with specific language use in context: ‘ideology is a function of the 
relation of an utterance to its social context. ’48
Ultimately, argues Eagleton, however we define ideology we should not be bound to an 
empirical representation, but see it in lived relations.49 ‘A successful ideology must work 
both practically and theoretically, and discover some way of linking these levels’ -  ‘[v]ery 
often, it refers to the way in which signs, meanings and values help to reproduce a dominant 
social power; but it can also denote any significant conjuncture between discourse and
44 Eagleton, p. 3.
45 van Dijk, p. I 30. For Eagleton’s discussion and refutation of the ‘false consciousness’ conception of ideology, 
see pp. 12-26; for van Dijk’s, see pp. 96-98.
46 Eagleton, pp. 5-6, 54-56. Eagleton notes that this legitimatory function need not mean that the power in 
question is the power of a dominant social group.
47 Eagleton, pp. 5 1 -52.
48 Eagleton, p. 9; see also p. 223.
49 Eagleton, p. 30.
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political interests.’50 In the final analysis, in order to reconcile the two extreme positions of 
ideology as disembodied ideas, or as behaviour patterns, we can regard ideology ‘as a 
discursive or semiotic phenomenon,’ emphasising both its materiality and the fact that it is 
essentially concerned with meaning.51 A more specific concept is that of ideology, not as a 
particular set of discourses, but as a particular set of effects within discourses.52 It is with 
this distinction between the theory of practice, and practice itself, and with the relationship 
between ideology and discourse, in mind, that we go on to examine van Dijk’s formulation of 
ideology.
Teun A. van Dijk begins by suggesting that a theory of ideology needs to be 
multidisciplinary.53 Drawing on the work of other scholars such as Stuart Hall, he takes, as 
key terms, cognition, society, and discourse54; the specific introduction of the concept of 
cognition is particularly important for the psychological aspects of our inquiry (it should be 
noted here that van Dijk uses the term ‘discourse’ to refer to specific communicative events, 
and to the ‘accomplished ongoing “product” of the communicative act,’ in contrast to the 
more Foucauldian sense in which it is generally employed in this thesis55). Discourses, writes 
van Dijk, ‘are not the only ideologically based social practices [but] they certainly are the 
most crucial ones in the formulation of ideologies in their social reproduction.’56 Therefore, 
‘if we want to know what ideologies actually look like, how they work, and how they are
50 Eagleton, pp. 48, 50, 221.
51 Eagleton, p. 194. The discursive nature of ideology has also been acknowledged in the realm of social 
psychology; see for example M. Billig, ‘Henri Tajfel's “ Cognitive aspects of prejudice” and psychology of bigotry’, 
The British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 4 1, 2002, p. 184.
52 Eagleton, p. 194.
53 Van Dijk, p. 5. Scholars dealing with similar issues in other fields have also expressed this opinion - for 
example, social psychologists George Gaskell and Colin Fraser on ‘widespread beliefs’: see G. Gaskell & C. 
Fraser, The  social psychological study of widespread beliefs’, in G. Gaskell & C. Fraser (ed.s), The Social 
Psychological Study of Widespread Beliefs, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990, pp. 15-17.
54 Van Dijk, p. 5.
55 Van Dijk, pp. 193-197.
56 Van Dijk, p. 6.
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created, changed and reproduced, we need to look closely at their discursive manifestations.’57 
In this context, van Dijk defines ideologies as ‘the basis of the social representations shared 
by members of a group’ which ‘allow people, as group members, to organize the multitude 
of social beliefs about what is the case, good or bad, right or wrong, for them, and to act 
accordingly.’58 Ideology must be understood as the ‘interface between social structure and 
social cognition.’59 Therefore, ‘ideologies’ are ‘a specific, type of (basic) mental 
representations shared by members of groups, and hence firmly located in the minds of 
people ... [but] this does not mean that they are therefore individual o r only mental.’60 They 
are ‘the foundation of the social beliefs shared by a social group,’ embodying truth criteria as 
well as specific values.61 Furthermore, a given individual who holds an ideology or ideologies 
need not explicitly understand ideologies as intellectual systems, or even understand the 
principles of ideologies, for these ideologies to function as models for that individual.62
In his development of this basic model, van Dijk maintains that cultural knowledge is the 
foundation of social cognition, and therefore of all evaluative beliefs.63 In particular, we may 
hold a ‘culturally shared moral order,’ which gives rise to a ‘preferred social and moral 
order,’ and which is the basis of judgements about and sanctions against ‘moral deviance.’64 
These shared moral orders are dynamic: they may, and do, shift from being the opinions of a 
specific group to being held by an entire society, and vice versa.65 ‘Ideological institutions’ 
are created, which ‘have as their task the “ realization” of a shared ideology.’66 Here we may 
reflect upon the relationship between dehumanisation and conceptions of morality and
57 Van Dijk, p. 6, original italics.
58 Van Dijk, p. 8, original italics.
59 Van Dijk, p. 8.
60 Van Dijk, p. 48, original italics.
61 Van Dijk, p. 49, original italics.
62 Van Dijk, p. 99.
63 Van Dijk, p. 39.
64 Van Dijk, pp. 39-40, 72.
65 Van Dijk, p. 40.
66 Van Dijk, p. 186.
Chapter 3 100
moral legitimacy, a subject which we will explore further in the following chapter. Van Dijk 
also suggests that many (though not all) ideologies are structured by and organised around 
the categories of ‘problem’ and ‘solution,’ something which becomes very clear in narratives 
of dehumanisation.67 A particularly germane concept for the events we will examine is that 
of the ‘script,’ ‘the knowledge people have about the stereotypical events of their culture.’68
lib. The Narrative Subject and the Question of Moral Legitimacy
The concept of the ‘script’ provides the context in which specific accounts or narratives 
are constructed, a process which we will explore in depth in relation to genocidal 
dehumanisation in Chapter Four. Here, the concept can be developed to demonstrate the 
‘ground’ from which dehumanising narratives and beliefs are synthesised. Van Dijk’s 
conception of ideology as ‘script’ can be related to that of J. M. Balkin, who sees ideology as 
‘cultural software and its effects’: cultural understanding includes beliefs and judgements, as 
well as the cognitive mechanisms which produce and fashion them.69 Narrative is a 
particularly important ideological effect.70 Narratives give us a ‘plot’ which frames our 
understanding of events: ‘[w]e recognize patterns of behaviour as meaningful in terms of 
patterns we are already familiar with,’ bestowing legitimacy and authority on that which is 
expected and allowing us to comprehend the exceptional and unusual.71 ‘[CJultural 
expectations, stored in narrative memory, help frame social reality.’72 Thus, narratives are 
also normative; once a ‘stock story’ is accepted, ‘it is used to filter and organize all of the 
evidence subsequently presented,’ and evidence which does not conform will tend to be
67 Van Dijk, p. 66.
68 Van Dijk, p. 58.
69 Balkin, p. 3.
70 Balkin, p. 188.
71 Balkin, p. 190-191.
72 Balkin, p. 191.
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discounted or ignored.73 Media of mass communication play a particularly determining role 
in both the creation, and the development of such ‘social myths,’ but this is by no means to 
say that there is a one-way relationship between their production and their consumption.74 
Narratives not only frame understandings; ‘they also invite us to play them out in our lives,’ 
and hence they are not only tools of understanding, but tools of action.75 In Balkin’s words, 
they ‘make themselves true’ -  they are ‘mechanisms of self-fulfilling prophecy. ’76 We will 
examine in some detail the playing-out of particular narratives and scripts in the typological 
chapters. Here, however, having examined the role of narrative in ideological belief, we ask 
how such a narrative process constitutes not only the subject’s understanding of what is 
perceived as external, but the subject’s understanding of his or her own subjectivity and its 
relationship to those perceived externalities.
As we have seen, human existence embodies cultural information.77 Our subjectivity, then, 
is socially constituted: as van Dijk puts it, in regard to intergroup relationships, ‘ideologies 
are representations of who we are, what we stand for, what our values are, and what our 
relationships are with other groups, in particular our enemies or opponents. ’78 This 
conception encompasses the following group characteristics as understood by the group 
itself: membership, activities, goals, values/norms, position and group-relations, and 
resources.79 Thus, both the identity and the interests of the group are defined through 
ideology; ‘identity’ also consists in the construction of inclusion and exclusion from the 
group itself; and this process takes place both through intragroup discourse, and intergroup 
discourse.80 Collective attributes, however, do not necessarily apply to every individual
73 Balkin, pp. 191, 197.
74 Balkin, p. 205.
75 Balkin, p. 208.
76 Balkin, p. 213; see also p. 2 15.
77 Balkin, pp. 14-15.
78 van Dijk, p. 69.
79 Van Dijk, pp. 69-70.
80 Van Dijk, pp. 70, 125, 159-160.
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within a group; given individuals have multiple and sometimes conflicting identities (as 
constructed by ideology) .81 In the following chapter I explain that it is because of these 
internal identity conflicts that the discursive strategy of dehumanisation becomes a 
psychological necessity.
W e have discussed the conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a discursive strategy; van 
Dijk points to a number of possible problématisations of this concept. The most important, 
for our purposes, is the question of the primacy of ideology or action: for example, were 
racist ideologies invented to justify the subjugation of African peoples, or were African 
peoples subjugated because they were already seen as inferior?82 I examine the relevance of 
this question to my own subject through the examination of dehumanisation as (one) 
motivating factor, and/or a legitimating factor, in genocidal action. The role of ideologies in 
domination is that they ‘monitor and organize group knowledge and attitudes and hence the 
beliefs that members need in order to construct the models controlling the actions that 
implement domination,’ particularly through the construction and maintenance of 
consensus.83 An important point is that it is only in certain situations that ideological 
legitimation is necessary.84 In our examination of the conditions of modernity and the 
modern subject as perpetrator, it becomes clear why and how such legitimation came to be 
a necessity in modern genocide.
In discussing the issue of legitimisation we should also consider that of morality. Ideology is 
intimately connected to and constitutive of morality or the moral order.85 In discussing the 
function of dehumanisation, the vital relevance of the object of morality, that is, to whom or 
what a moral duty is owed, should have become clear. Ideology is a tool which can
81 Van Dijk, p. 72.
82 Van Dijk, p. 164.
83 Van Dijk, p. 167.
84 Van Dijk, p. 165-167.
85 See for example Balkin, pp. 29-3 I .
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manipulate this object. According to cultural sociologist Robert Wuthnow, ideology can be 
understood as a set of signal utterances which ‘express or dramatize something about the 
moral order’;86 successful ideologies become institutionalised.87 Ideology shapes and informs 
the nature of understandings of moral obligation, and understandings of moral obligation are 
in turn played out in particular types of action. ‘O ur sense of justice,’ writes Batkin, 
‘inevitably has a narrative character.’88 Ultimately, (constructions of) meaning, and of moral 
order -  for both the individual and the collective subject -  are not socio-culturally separate, 
and cannot be analysed as such.
III. D iscourse and Ideology Redux
At this point in a discussion of contemporary conceptions of ideology as a social construct, 
it is germane to return to the question of my own position, as regards an approach to 
deepening an understanding of the relationship between ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology’.
This work is premised on a constructivist understanding of the nature of ‘reality’ and the 
relationship between meaning and the material (and is therefore sympathetic to an 
understanding of ideology which extends it beyond the classical realm of the political). As a 
shorthand, we could say that enunciation determines meaning, and meaning determines 
practice. However, as I have mentioned, this work in itself is not an attempt to mount a 
philosophical argument regarding the existence or otherwise of a universally verifiable 
‘objective reality’ which may or may not be distorted in representations; rather, it sees this 
question as irrelevant to its aims and concerns, which are to understand dehumanisation, in 
theory and as practice, on its own terms, with particular reference to the question of
86 Wuthnow, p. 145.
87 Wuthnow, p. 151.
88 Balkin, p. 209.
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identity in the construction of the other. In taking these aims, the concept of an objectifiably 
identifiable and universally consistent purposiveness is accepted, although this is by no means 
to argue for conscious purposiveness on the part of any individual actor involved in the 
existence of discourse and ideology.
Given the above, then, I do not discard the concept of ‘ideology’ in favour of that of 
‘discourse’ and ‘discursive strategy,’ nor do I see them as incompatible tools of analysis. 
Rather, as analytical tools, they can be employed in such a way as to create a complementary 
relationship.89 I have outlined above the way in which reading text, utterance and practice as 
discourse allows an understanding of the dimensions and characteristics of the phenomenon 
at hand. As part of such an endeavour, the issue of evolving systems of meaning and their 
relationship to morality is vital. The concept of ideology can be used to explicate this 
dimension of the problem. In this thesis, then, previously-developed criticisms which have 
been made possible as a result of the championing of one concept over the other can be 
resolved by employing both of these and so, it is to be hoped, avoiding the weaknesses and 
blind points of each, if such they are. Discourse, and discourses, can be understood to shape 
the conditions from which and in which ideology emerges, and ideology can thus be 
considered in itself a discursive strategy; but at the same time, ideologies, though not 
monolithic or unchanging, can be considered to have an historical existence which is adaptive 
to historical alterations in the nature of discursive regimes.
It should now be very clear that the term ‘ideology’ is not used in this thesis to refer to a 
‘false’ or ‘distorted’ conception. As Balkin puts it, ‘narrative structure is irrelevant to 
truth.’90 Scholarly analysis which critiques ideologies either from a moral, or an intellectual
89 For examples of general critiques of the conception of a complementary relationship between these terms 
(including that of Foucault) -  as opposed to specific critiques of the use of both terms as they are deployed 
together in this work -  see Balkin, p. 262; Macdonnell, p. 83.
90 Balkin, p. 214.
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perspective (as one would a political philosophy) is a dead end in terms of understanding the 
political impact of ideology and practice.91 Rather, it is imperative to ask what purpose 
ideologies serve, and how they go about doing so.92 Having said this, however, it must be 
re-emphasised that it should not be the role of research into genocide and mass killing to 
take a ‘morally neutral’ approach to its subject matter.93 Throughout this work it should be 
evident that the intent of my research is not to mitigate or provide excuses for genocidal 
action. It is not my ultimate aim here to morally evaluate the discourses I examine (a task 
which, in the case of genocide and mass killing, is neither original nor necessary), nor to 
dissect their intellectual logic or coherence. In order to achieve my goals, neither of these 
activities is in fact useful given that my aim is firstly, to understand the functional nature of 
particular discourses, discursive strategies, and ideologies, and secondly, to understand what 
the consequences are in action of their coming into being, their existence and dissemination. 
The primary way in which this process takes place is through the use of language.
Ilia. Language and Ideology
Language as manifest in texts (with some minor mention of visual imagery) is the subject of 
the investigation which takes place in the following chapters. Given that this is the source 
material in which, I argue, the discursive strategy I posit is manifest, it is necessary to ask 
what is the best way to approach the study of language in text from the perspective of 
theories around discourse and ideology. It is apposite to turn to the discipline of socio­
linguistics, in which various works have considered more closely these connections. In 
Robert Hodge and Gunter Kress’ foundational work of ‘critical linguistics,’ Language as 
Ideology, it is suggested that ‘[i]deology involves a systematically organized presentation of
91 Freeden, Ideology, p. 71.
92 Freeden, Ideology, pp. 71-72.
93 On this subject see Eagleton, p. 8.
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reality,’ a presentation which takes place primarily through language.94 The object of 
language is coerced into taking the linguistic form in which any given situation is presented as 
the ‘real form,’ whereas in fact what is being presented is a ‘surface form’ dependent on the 
choice of language used to describe that situation.95 The usage of language involves the 
process of classification, which is ‘at the basis of language and thought.’96 Classification itself, 
as an intellectual strategy, is ‘an instrument of control’ (as we will see in Chapter Seven) .97 
Classification systems, however, are not universal; they are particular, existing only in 
discourse.98 Individuals lmov[e] between the given system and the content to be classified.’99 
Thus, perceived ‘reality’ is constrained by the existing system, but is open to 
reclassification. 100 It will become evident in the following chapters that the use of language 
to create certain out-groups as such and to classify them in certain ways is vital to the 
process of dehumanisation; our concern will be with the development and manifestation of 
such systems.
Furthermore, continue Hodge and Kress, subgroups within society evolve or create kinds 
of languages which serve to ‘reinforce a sense of identity within the group and to exclude 
outsiders.’ 101 These ‘anti-languages’ are ldevice[s] for managing reality, creating the 
necessary counter-reality’ in accordance with the ideology of the group (the example given is 
that of soldiers’ language which names the enemy as ‘gooks,’ bombs as ‘products’ and so 
forth ) . 102 Hodge and Kress describe this type of language as ‘defensive, protecting its 
community from direct grasp of problematic reality ... it reveals, through its evasions, what
94 R. Hodge & G. Kress, Language as Ideology (2nd edn), Routledge, London, 1993, p. 15.
95 Hodge & Kress, p. 28.
96 Hodge & Kress, p. 62.
97 Hodge & Kress, p. 108.
98 Hodge & Kress, p. 64.
99 Hodge & Kress, p. 65.
100 Hodge & Kress, p. 65.
101 Hodge & Kress, p. 71.
102 Hodge & Kress, pp. 71-72.
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parts of reality are problematic for that community.’ 103 Finally, ‘anti-languages’ are 
inexplicable without reference to the nature of the collectivity in which they are found, and 
its place in the larger social structure. 104 The way in which ideology may thus be concealed 
in language, beneath the level of conscious critical awareness, means that, unlike the direct 
presentation of (political) ideology, it does not appear as coercive and is therefore less likely 
to be resisted; and it also accommodates contradictions more easily. 105 In genocide, the 
nature of dehumanisation as a strategy is precisely to employ a particular narrative, manifest 
in a particular (very often metaphorical or euphemistic) language, to conceal from the 
perpetrator the problematics s/he feels regarding the situation in which s/he finds him- or 
herself.
In regard to Foucauldian discourse, Hodge and Kress point out that Foucault ‘rejected 
language [/ongue] as a model for the study of discourse,’ that he argued, in Power/Knowledge, 
that ‘[t]he history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than that of a 
language: relations of power, not relations of meaning.’ 106 However, they argue that, contra 
Foucault’s statement, there need not be a dichotomy between these two positions, and that 
to acknowledge this is to recognise that language and power, meaning and social process, are 
interdependent. 107 This is a vital insight for the present work. Such recognition reveals the 
way in which the terms and concepts with which we are working, that is, discourse and 
ideology, language and practice, are intimately intertwined. Given that all of these concepts 
are employed in developing an argument about the emergence and functions of a 
dehumanising discursive strategy, it becomes necessary to turn to analyses which combine all 
of these models into one perspective in order to understand how this may be accomplished 
from a theoretical (as opposed to a strictly methodological) perspective. Norman
103 Hodge & Kress, p. 77.
104 Hodge & Kress, p. 77.
105 Hodge & Kress, p. 82.
106 Hodge & Kress, p. 153.
107 Hodge & Kress, pp. 153-154.
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Fairclough’s work in critical discourse analysis synthesises all of these concepts and 
delineates a relationship between them, revealing the productive possibilities of their 
intersection within a conceptual model.
IV . Language, Pow er, and C ritica l D iscou rse A nalysis
IVa. The Cultural Turn
The present inquiry, we have thus far established, takes as its subject the relationship 
between language (in the broadest sense) and action, understanding both as related forms of 
practice. In order to do so, it uses the concepts of discourse and ideology as a theoretical 
framework, and employs a multidisciplinary approach to the study of their embodiment in 
language. How are we to constitute disparate heuristic and disciplinary approaches into a 
coherent understanding of the phenomenon, the process and the utterances which we have 
taken as the object of inquiry? To find an answer, we must turn to work which has taken a 
similar goal. I do not intend to apply holus bolus the exact methodologies employed by any 
of these approaches, nor to outline every facet of each approach in detail, but rather to 
identify and analyse theoretical models which have used similar concepts, from similarly 
interdisciplinary fields, and drawn similar connections between them, to those which I 
employ in this thesis. I use these to inform my own approach, particularly by demonstrating 
the connections between the concepts I employ, given their origins in diverse scholarly 
disciplines. This discussion should also give some further idea as to the necessity of taking 
this kind of approach to a subject such as that presently at hand.
W e have already had an entrée into such approaches in examining the work of Hodge and 
Kress. A  number of other scholars have used the concepts of discourse and ideology in
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concert, or examined the nature of an analytical synthesis of these conceptions. Particularly 
useful, from a conceptual point of view, is the way in which critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
as exemplified in the work of Norman Fairclough, approaches the study of text/s from a 
multidisciplinary perspective which is concerned with the existence in practice of language, 
meaning, discourse, ideology, and power. However, as we shall see, I do not intend to 
directly apply the micro-level linguistic methodology of CDA to the texts that I incorporate 
as evidence for my argument, but rather to examine its approach in order to see how it may 
help to comprehend the connections between these concepts, and how, here, I may use 
such comprehension to inform my own approach to understanding the existence, the 
function, and the historical context of what I have termed the discursive strategy of 
genocidal dehumanisation as it is manifest in textual documents.
In examining these works, we must begin with a brief overview of those basic concepts, 
relevant to our enquiry, emerging from what has often been called the ‘cultural turn’ in 
humanities and the social sciences. In the late 1960s, Roland Barthes described a distinction 
between denotation and connotation in signs or signifiers. Denotation is the descriptive and 
literal level of meaning of a signifier, while connotation connects it to the cultural codes of 
meaning in which it exists.108 The connotative meaning becomes naturalised, and thus 
hegemonic, creating ‘myths.’109 Jacques Derrida deepened the concept of an unstable 
relationship between signifier and signified by positing that meaning, and what we understand 
as ‘truth,’ is entirely constructed by the play of interconnected signifiers and the systems of 
representation which contain them.110 W e  have already treated Foucault’s analysis of the 
construction of meaning through discourse, and its relationship to power; Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (and later Richard Rorty and Anthony Giddens) gave a heavier emphasis to the
108 C. Barker & D. Galasinski, Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and Identity, SAGE 
Publications, London, 2001, p. 5.
109 Barker & Galasinski, p. 5.
110 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 9-10.
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pragmatic and social nature of language, to its character as a tool (though with no implication 
of intentionality) -  that is, the question most profitable to ask is not, ‘how do we explain 
language as a system,’ but ‘how is language used in the context of its social circumstances.’ 111 
Thus, language does not represent practice; it is practice, and its relationship to materiality is 
one of causality112 (a particular theoretical focus, one highly relevant for our own inquiry, has 
been on identity and metaphor in the language process113). Given that this is the way in 
which social power operates, descriptions of the social order become ‘stories with 
consequences,’ and social change occurs through the re-description of the social order. 114
A criticism of one aspect of these approaches has been that, in their concentration on 
examining the nature of language as a system or systems of grammar, they have failed to 
analyse actual, ‘living’ language-utterances of speaking subjects. 115 According to this 
argument, there is a need for theoretical exploration which considers persons as social 
actors who employ language ‘tools’ in particular contexts. 116 In this light, I suggest that an 
approach which combines discursive psychology with the analysis of language-in-use can 
show how social constructions are built, designed and deployed, and to what end.117 In the 
terms of such an approach, ideology may be understood as ‘the forms of power/knowledge 
[in the Foucauldian sense] used to justify the actions of persons or groups and which have 
specific consequences for relations of power.’ 118 Another answer to such criticism, relevant 
to this inquiry, may be found in the words of Hodge and Kress regarding their work on the 
first Gulf War:
111 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 15, 39, 44.
112 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 15-18.
1,3 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 58, 61; see also Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), pp. 99-100.
114 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 47, 57.
115 Barker & Galasinski, p. 2 1.
1,6 Barker & Galasinski, p. 21.
117 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 21-22.
118 Barker & Galasinski, p. 25.
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What we do [in contrast to the efforts of investigative journalists and others] may seem in 
contrast to be ludicrously or culpably irrelevant, ignoring the reality of human suffering in 
our concern with language. But the nature of our concern with language is inseparable from 
a concern with the wider issues that are raised by the war, including the vexed issues of 
‘truth’ and ‘what really happened’ ... All the major ideological struggles will necessarily be 
waged in words ... The forms of analysis, the ways of reading that we seek to develop are 
neither unitary nor self-contained, but operate as components of a broader set of strategies 
of interpretation deployed on a diverse and unstable set of objects. . .119
In the following discussion, I will reveal the way in which a C D A  framework can be 
employed to combine historical, psychological and language-based perspectives to reveal not 
only the nature, but also, crucially, the functions-in-action of genocidal dehumanisation.
IVb. Critical Discourse Analysis
Having given brief consideration to the emergence of the ‘cultural’ approach to language 
and its relevance for our subject, we can now turn to the question of C D A  itself. There is 
no accepted universal definition of critical discourse analysis, which emerges from various 
linguistic, semiotic-discursive and socio-cognitive methodologies.120 However, there are a 
number of important common aspects which are relevant to our inquiry. A C D A  approach 
assumes, inter alia, that discourse is socially constitutive; that it is ideological (in the sense 
described above; ideology in discourse has also been described as ‘the attempt to fix 
meaning for specific purposes’121); and that text is intertextual and meaning is accumulative, 
inasmuch as the meaning of any given text is dependent on its relationship to other meanings
119 Hodge & Kress, p. 161.
120 Barker & Galasinski, p. 62.
121 Barker & Galasinski, p. 66.
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and systems of meaning.122 Louis de Saussure and Peter Schulz note that C D A  is a 
particularly useful approach in identifying manipulative discursive practices. 123 Our inquiry 
here, however, in contrast to much CDA, will not be concerned with the technical analysis 
of utterances in a linguistic sense. Rather, we will take a macro-level focus on what C D A  
terms vocabulary’: 124 the analysis of the usage of terminology and connotation in given 
utterances. C D A  itself, when applied at the micro-level, can be, as Chris Barker and Dariusz 
Galasinski point out, ‘a labour-intensive, micro-linguistic enterprise requiring a lot of time 
and, as such, it is very difficult to apply to a large corpora of texts.’ 125 The current work, 
premised on comparative and wide-ranging investigation of texts and utterances, therefore 
aims to ask what this theoretical framework can tell us regarding the nature of language and 
discourse, without employing these methods in quantitative micro-level analysis of texts.
This is done through examination of the work of Norman Fairclough, who is one of the 
founders of the model of critical discourse analysis, as well as an important figure in studies 
of language and ideology. 126
In outlining his approach to critical language study, Fairclough details the various disciplines 
dealing with language use, describing two concepts in particular which are of use to this 
enquiry: from pragmatics, that of ‘speech acts,’ the recognition that an utterance is a form of 
action; 127 and, from cognitive psychology, the insight that an utterance is not merely 
‘decoded,’ but is interpreted and comprehended according to the representations stored in
122 Barker & Galasinski, pp. 64-69.
123 L. de Saussure & P. Schulz, ‘Introduction’, in L. de Saussure & P. Schulz (ed.s), Manipulation and Ideologies in the 
Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2005, p. 
5.
124 Barker & Galasinski, pp.73-74.
125 Barker & Galasinski, p. 26; for a description of micro-level CDA, see also Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd 
edn), pp. 91-1 16.
126 Due to considerations of space and relevance, we will not consider here Fairclough’s entire oeuvre relating to 
CDA, but rather the salient features for our inquiry of his development of this concept as an approach to text 
and language.
127 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 9.
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the psyche of the consumer of that utterance, the resources of that consumer.128 These two 
facets play out in the context of discourse and ideology as manifest in language; in examining 
various works, we can put together a good picture of a C D A  understanding of ideology, of 
discourse, and of the nature of the conceptual relationship between the two. In so doing, 
we will reveal the functionality of language in the implementation and maintenance of specific 
regimes of practice.
IVc. Fairclough on Ideology
[l]n  so far as changes in practices and restructurings can be said to embody representations, 
propositions or assumptions which affect (sustain, undermine) relations o f  power, they can be said to 
be ideological.129 
-  N o rm an  Fairclough
Fairclough understands ideologies as ‘significations/constructions of reality (the physical 
world, social relations, social identities), which are built into various dimensions of the 
forms/meanings of discursive practices, and which contribute to the production, 
reproduction or transformation of relations of domination.’130 Language, according to 
Fairclough, is not only invested by ideology, but is a material form of ideology.131 With the 
advent of the modern age, the exercise of power (and thus, domination and oppression) is 
increasingly achieved through the ideological workings of language (which includes visual as 
well as verbal language) . 132 Since the use of language is the commonest form of social 
behaviour, and also the one in which we rely most on ‘common-sense’ assumptions,
128 Fairclough, Language and Power, pp. 10-1 I.
129 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 80.
130 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, p. 87.
131 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 73.
132 Fairclough, Language and Power, pp. 2, 27-28
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ideology, language, and power are intimately linked; 133 my own inquiry will examine the way 
in which the view of an outgroup as legitimate targets for destruction becomes such a 
‘common-sense’ possibility. Ideology, furthermore, is both a property of structures which 
‘constitute the outcome of past events and the conditions for current events,’ and a 
property of particular discursive events which ‘reproduce and transform their conditioning 
structures. ’ 134 Therefore, both specific utterances, and their context, must be analysed in 
order to understand ideology.
While ideology is embodied in form as well as content, ‘it may be useful to think of 
ideologies in terms of content-like entities which are manifested in various formal 
features.’ 135 The manifestation of ideology in text is the focal point of this concern. 
According to Fairclough, there is ‘a widespread underestimation of the significance of 
language in the production, maintenance, and change of social relations of power.’ 136 In 
terms of the manifestation and enactment of power, a particular aspect of ideology, as 
expressed in language, is the way in which it is an exercise of power which manufactures 
consent or acquiescence, as opposed to coercive exercises such as the use of physical 
force. 137 It is in disguising its own ideological nature that ideology becomes naturalised, 
automatised, ‘common sense.’ 138 Here again, then, we see why the analysis of language is 
important in an approach to examination of participation in genocide.
From this perspective we can expand our investigation by asking what relationship 
Fairclough posits between discourse and ideology, and how his model is useful to this 
inquiry.
133 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 2; see also van Dijk, pp. 102-107 on ‘common sense.’
134 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, pp. 71-72; see also Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, pp. 88-89.
135 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 75.
136 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. I.
137 Fairclough, Language and Power, pp. 3-4.
138 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 82; see also van Dijk, pp. 102-107, on ‘common sense.’
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IVd. Fairclough on Discourse
Despite specifically evoking Foucault, Fairclough’s concept of discourse, in being concerned 
with close readings of specific verbal texts, differs from that of Foucault.139 The theoretical 
insights provided by Foucault’s work which Fairclough suggests are most important for his 
own approach are, firstly, a constitutive view of discourse (i.e., the way in which it 
constitutes its own object); secondly, ‘an emphasis on the interdependency of the discourse 
practices of a society or institution’; thirdly, ‘the discursive nature of power’; fourthly, ‘the 
political nature of discourse’; and fifthly, ‘the discursive nature of social change.’140 All of 
these are relevant to our model of dehumanisation as a discursive strategy. While 
Fairclough’s conception of ‘discourse’ is far less embracing than the Foucauldian model I 
employ, his conceptual model of language, and of analysis which takes language and utterance 
as its subject (as this thesis does), shares the perspective that utterances are, in themselves, 
actions and social practices which are inter-related with non-linguistic physical actions and 
physical practices.141 Fairclough argues that, when taking language as the subject of inquiry, 
we can employ ‘discourse’ to mean internally variable ‘ways of representing aspects of the 
world,’ including representations of possible worlds as well as present reality as conceived in 
discursive terms.142 Discourses constitute ‘nodal points in the dialectical relationship 
between language and other elements of the social.’143 Specific texts may thus include 
various different discourses.144 Elsewhere, he defines discourse as ‘language as a form of 
social practice.’145 Discourse itself reflects ideological power which may inhere in ideologies
139 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 82. For Fairclough’s problematisation of the use of Foucault’s w ork in 
a CDA approach, which are not relevant to  the argument of this thesis, see Discourse and Social Change, pp. 37, 
56-61.
140 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, pp. 39, 41-43, 55-56.
141 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 73; see also p. 74.
142 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, p. 124, 126.
143 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, p. 126.
144 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, p. 128.
145 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 20.
of nationhood, citizenship, religion, science and medicine, or other institutionalised 
ideologies. Particularly germane to our inquiry is the contention that the use of a particular 
combination of specific metaphors is a defining characteristic of different discourses. 146 
There is also what Fairclough terms a ‘felicitous ambiguity’ in the terms ‘discourse’ and 
‘practice’ in that they can refer either to what people do on a particular occasion, or what 
they do habitually in a given situation, either to action or to convention; the felicity lies in 
the way in which the social conventions underlying any individual instance are thereby 
revealed. 147 In our examination of the language of perpetrators and their actions, we will see 
the way in which these things are intimately intertwined.
Fairclough writes that analysis must take place ‘between texts, processes and their social 
conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational context and the more remote 
conditions of institutional and social structures ... between texts, interactions, and contexts.’ 148 
In this work, the section on the theory and practice of dehumanisation will deal with the 
different natures of these, and the way in which they each create and condition 
dehumanisation, while my typology will address examples of these utterances and examine 
the broader socio-historical context, that is, both the constitutive systems and collectivities, 
and the discursive interactions, from which the different types emerge.
Ultimately, Fairclough’s model of the relationship between power, discourse, and ideology 
is that ‘conventions routinely drawn upon in discourse embody ideological assumptions 
which come to be taken as mere “ common sense,” and which contribute to sustaining 
existing power relations.’ 149 ‘Preconstructed semantic systems’ have the power to ‘generate 
particular visions of the world which may have the performative power to sustain or remake
146 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, pp. 131-132; Fairclough refers both to ‘lexical’ metaphors, and also to 
‘grammatical’ metaphors in which processes are represented as things.
147 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 28.
148 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 26, original italics.
149 Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), p. 64.
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the world in their image. ’ 150 A discourse type which is successfully established as dominant, 
is naturalised and legitimised. 151 Ideological naturalisation takes place at the level of the 
meaning of linguistic expressions, at the level of situational types within the interactional 
social order, and at the level of the subject position . 152 This structure also sets ‘interactional 
routines’ which are associated with particular discourse types. 153 Such naturalisation is 
described as ‘the most formidable weapon in the armoury of power. ’ 154 The following 
chapters will provide evidence of the way in which this process has occurred both regarding 
genocidal dehumanisation as an overall strategy (Chapter Four), and as regards particular 
types of dehumanisation and the discursive sources upon which they draw (Chapters Five 
through Seven).
In using Fairclough’s work to understand our subject, then, it is not his close, linguistic 
approach to texts which is of use to this inquiry, but his conception of understanding textual 
utterances, and specifically the way in which the concepts of discourse and ideology can be 
employed to reveal specific, functional aspects of language. As I have already stated, it is not 
my aim to take specific texts and subject them individually to intensive scrutiny and analysis; 
rather, it is my intent to use such utterances as evidence of the way in which a discursive 
strategy of genocidal dehumanisation emerges, exists and functions in the social context.
150 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse, p. I 30.
151 Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), p. 76. This process should never be considered complete, but 
rather a matter of degree.
152 Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), pp. 87, 89.
153 Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), p. 81.
154 Fairclough, Language and Power (2nd edn), p. 87.
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V. Language, ‘Reality’ and the Social
The theme of this chapter has been the functional importance of language in action. Before 
we leave the subject, it is necessary to deal in more depth with the question of social reality 
and the connection between language, and non-verbal practice. In examining this question, 
Pierre Bourdieu writes that ‘the most resolutely objectivist theory’ must take account of the 
way in which agents enact a labour of representation in order to ‘impose their own visions 
of the world or the vision of their own position in the world, that is, their social identity.’ 155 
Bourdieu terms this process the ‘methods of objectification.’ 156 While I do not intend to 
fully detail Bourdieu’s concept of language and symbolic power, there are a number of 
aspects of his model which are particularly relevant to our inquiry.157 According to 
Bourdieu, the meaning of the present is always open (and thus, we might add, always 
contested) .158 Relations of power are present not only in the physical world, but also in 
people’s minds, and they determine structuring principles and categories of perception of 
power relations.159 Thus, knowledge confers the formidable social power to establish 
collective and consensual ‘common sense.’ 160 Ultimately, the social world is, in itself, a 
symbolic system.161 The struggle ‘for the imposition of the legitimate vision of the social 
world ’ is, specifically, a struggle for a monopoly on legitimate naming.162 In our context, the 
power to name with legitimacy is the power to determine who deserves to live, who to die, 
and who (or ‘what’) may legitimately have such a fate enacted upon them.
155 P. Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, in Lyn Spillman (ed.), Cultural Sociology, Blackwell, Massachusetts, 2002, p. 69.
156 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, p. 71.
157 For a short introduction to this concept see P. Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (ed. J. B. Thompson, 
trans. G. Raymond & M. Adamson), Polity Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 163-170.
158 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, p. 69.
159 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, p. 70.
160 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, p. 70.
161 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, p. 71.
162 Bourdieu, ‘Cultural Power’, pp. 70-72; on the power to name, see also Barker & Galasinski, p. 56.
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How does this process of definition come to exercise such determining power? In his 
book The Construction of Social Reality, John R. Searle describes the structure of social reality 
as ‘weightless and invisible’: it is entirely naturalised. 163 Facts, which may be created 
institutionally, can ‘exist relative to the intentionality of observers, users, etc,’ that is, relative to a 
functionality assigned to an object. Furthermore, this meaning construction takes place in a 
field of collective intentionality. 164 Many of these facts are in themselves created by a 
performative utterance (thus making the linguistic element partly constitutive of the fact 
itself) and they can only exist in a set of systemic relationships to other facts. 165 The 
creation of new facts is intimately entwined with the creation, conferral and imposition of 
power. 166 Searle takes a number of telling examples, such as the choice by American 
authorities not to call the Korean war a ‘war,’ but rather a ‘conflict,’ so as not to be acting 
unconstitutionally; or ‘murder,’ where, because of the process described above, ‘killing, 
under certain circumstances, counts as murder, and murder counts as a punishable crime.’ 167 
But all of these, except the ‘brute’ fact of killing (and even that, in historical terms), are open 
to collective redefinition, because they are created by a process of linguistic or symbolic 
representation.168 Language is not (only) descriptive, but constitutive of reality; the existence 
of social facts can happen only ‘by forms of human agreement that essentially involve the 
capacity to symbolize.’ 169 Dehumanisation, then, can fulfil its functional role in genocide and 
genocidal killing because of the power of language to constitute reality through the 
purposive deployment of specific symbols within discursive systems of meaning.
163 J. R. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, The Free Press, New  York, 1995, pp. 4, 47.
164 Searle, pp. 23-24.
165 Searle, pp. 34-37, 54-55.
166 Searle, pp. 96-97.
167 Searle, pp. 50, 89.
168 Searle, pp. 76-77, 99-100.
169 Searle, pp. 120, 228.
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V I. C o n clu sio n
W e  have covered a great deal of theoretical ground in this chapter. How can we briefly 
summarise thus far in relation to the object of analysis? My inquiry here is centred on 
culture and the construction of meaning. I argue that this construction takes place through 
discourse and ideology manifest in language and text; in doing so I draw on theoretical 
models from diverse disciplines. It has been necessary, then, to examine the work of other 
scholars who have employed similar approaches. This discussion has been intended neither 
as an exhaustive dissection of the theories presented nor, in any individual case, as an exact 
guide to the approach undertaken in this work, but rather as a series of relevant signposts 
to, and explanations of the nature of, the way in which I will approach the material 
presented in this thesis. One final example of such an approach, this time applied to a 
subject which is not too distant from the present concern, will serve to conclude my 
discussion of the nature of a theoretical approach to the topic of genocidal dehumanisation.
In his examination of war, the sociologist Philip Smith argues that, rather than the 
traditional rationalist, realist and state-focussed paradigm which has been prevalent in the 
social sciences, there is a need to ‘decode the ways in which constituencies and players make 
sense of wars and the situations that might lead to them’; that is, to understand collective 
violence as a cultural act underpinned by the popular will (as in the theories of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau) or by collective conscience (as in those of Emile Durkheim).170 In order to do 
this, analysis must take as its subject legitimating public discourse and claims, ‘working 
through the cultural logic behind ... utterances and reconstructing the cultural systems 
through which ... claims make sense to others.’171 The causal role of culture should be
170 P. Smith, Why War?: The Cultural Logic of Iraq, The Gulf War, and Suez, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
& London, 2005, pp. 4-7, 223-224. As we will see in later chapters, war, both historically and in terms of its 
frameworks of meaning, is intimately connected to genocide.
171 Smith, Why War?, pp. 10-1 I.
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understood as contributory, though not sufficient; negative symbolism is not solely causal (in 
the sense of being the only cause), but neither is it solely a rationalisation for action driven 
by a more material motivation. 172 The process of the construction of a particular image of 
‘the enemy,’ oriented around norms of reason and the quest for mutual consensus, does not 
occur after the fact of enmification itself. 173
Smith proposes an approach which synthesises the analysis of categorisation through 
dualistic moral criteria, with narrative structures considered in context. 174 In employing such 
a synthesis,
we should think about the role of narratives in real social life (the social science approach) 
and how these will have implications for the ethical or normative regulation of social action 
(the moral philosophy approach), and do this through a generalizable theory of culture (the 
structuralist understanding) that takes narratives as a canteen of cultural tropes and genres 
and not as a smorgasboard of infinite variety.175
W e  ‘will find empirical regularities in war-generating discourse,’ in which similar or identical 
discursive positions, interpretive moves, and efforts to understand events and legitimise or 
de-legitimise particular courses of action can be recognised, in the course of which familiar 
cultural codes are applied to events and actors. 176 Our analytical task (following scholars 
such as Ricouer and Geertz) is to locate meaningful fragments of culture (that is, utterances) 
and systematically relate these to each other. 177 The primary aim of the present work is to 
define the presence and the nature of such a systematic relationship - to reveal the
172 Smith, Why War?, pp. II,  208.
173 Smith, Why War?, pp. 209, 211.
174 Smith, Why War?, p. 14.
175 Smith, Why War?, p. 19.
176 Smith, Why War?, p. 35.
'77 Smith, Why War?, p. 36.
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‘anatomy’ of genocidal dehumanisation -  by collating texts and presenting them in contexts 
both historical and contemporary, discursive and practical.178
In the process of revealing discursive-ideological systems, questions of functionality and 
purpose in the realm of non-linguistic practice inevitably arise. Smith’s work aims to connect 
the study of meaning determination through culture, with outcomes based on the action of 
agents, by suggesting that ‘culture-structures provide the moral horizons and schemas of 
value that afford internalized motivations for action,’ while also ‘establishing genre resources 
to construct stories that helpfully interpret [agents’] world.’179 In other words, culture is 
both ‘a sphere of motivation and value driving action,’ and ‘a sense-making resource for 
action.’180 Here we might think in particular of the dual roles of dehumanising discourse in 
motivating and legitimating genocidal actions (a subject which will be discussed at length in 
the following chapter). Ultimately, to uncover the intricate mechanisms of such systems is 
to engage with the non-linguistic purposes which determine them, and which they in turn 
determine.
This chapter has provided both a framework through which the role of text in constructing 
reality may be apprehended, and some theoretical tools -  in particular, the concepts of 
discourse and ideology -  with which to do so. In concluding, it is germane to turn to a 
quote from one of the too few scholars who have utilised cultural theory in discussing 
genocide. In introducing his work Balkan holocausts, David MacDonald writes:
Throughout this book, I will be using a form of discourse analysis to explore the themes,
ideas and vocabulary present in Serbian and Croatian propaganda. I have used a qualitative
178 On the use of the term ‘anatomy’ in this context see Chap. 2, nl.
179 Smith, Why War?, p. 43.
180 Smith, Why War?, p. 44, original italics. Smith also provides a detailed rebuttal of those he calls ‘culture- 
skeptics,’ who would deny any causal role to culture; he argues instead for a multidimensional model in which 
reasons for action include both the normative and symbolic, and the rational and strategic (pp. 47-50).
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method of analysing primary material, isolating their most important themes and images.
This is in line with Oliver Thomson’s suggestion of paying attention to ‘the more obvious 
pattern frequencies that come from a general view of contents.’ This book, however, strives 
not only to present an analysis of general themes and ideas in Serbian and Croatian historical 
revisions but also to analyse the vocabulary and structure of their language and how it has 
been used.181
In the present work, a similar approach is taken, in that there is no attempt to array as 
many examples as possible of a particular type of dehumanising utterance to prove its 
existence (though for every type numerous examples are given in order to demonstrate that 
any such utterance is not an aberration, nor related solely to the perspective of a single 
individual). Neither is this thesis an attempt to take one, or a few, highly significant 
utterances or texts and analyse them exhaustively to the exclusion of others. Rather, my 
objective is, firstly, to use texts and utterances to identify common patterns of the 
construction of meaning and common patterns of vocabulary; secondly, to examine the 
historical-discursive context in which and from which these patterns emerged; and thirdly, to 
ask what function these pattern-ed texts serve, and to suggest a typology of narratives. The 
ultimate aim of this endeavour is to provide a conception which will both make the concept 
of ‘dehumanisation’ a more precise instrument of the analysis of historical episodes of 
genocide and genocidal killing; and which will allow the concept to serve a predictive 
function in examining language and discourse for genocidally dehumanising tendencies in 
contemporary societies. Having equipped ourselves with these tools, we may go on to 
examine genocidal dehumanisation itself in a more exact and a closer light.
181 D. B. MacDonald, Balkan holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester (New York), 2002, p. 12.
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Dehumanisation
The existence of dehumanisation in episodes of genocide and genocidal killing has been well 
documented. It has been empirically demonstrated that ‘people who are given 
punitive power treat dehumanised individuals more ruthlessly than those who have 
been invested with human qualities.’1 So why, we might ask, does dehumanisation not ‘go 
without saying’? After all, it has often been shown that humans, as ‘categorising animals,’ 
have a very common, and likely universal, psychological predisposition to create 
discriminations along the lines of ‘us’ and ‘them,’ and to ascribe positive characteristics to 
‘us’ and negative characteristics to ‘them’; and argued also that the existence of such 
categorisation has an evolutionary rationale as a dispositive for group cohesion, and hence 
competitive survival.2 Ervin Staub elaborates:
Recent research in psychology has shown that human beings have a tendency to divide the 
world into ‘us’ and ‘them.’ They use seemingly trivial information to create ingroups and 
outgroups and then discriminate against members of the outgroup ... Seemingly, people use 
available information to divide themselves into an ingroup and an outgroup. Obviously, 
people group themselves in many ways ... and they may consider others who do not belong 
to their group as different and less worthy. But the ties that bind people to significant
1 A. Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal o f Moral Education, voi. 3 I, 
no. 2, 2002, p. 109; A. Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, & C. Pastorelli, ‘Mechanisms of Moral 
Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, voi. 7 1, no. 2, I 996, p. 
366, 371; A. Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control’, Journal o f Social Issues, voi. 40, 
no.I, 1990, pp. 38-41.
2 On this issue, see M. Deutsch, ‘Psychological Roots of Moral Exclusion’, Journal o f Social Issues, voi. 40, no. I, 
1990, pp. 21-25. See also Daniel Bar-Tal on ethnocentrism: D. Bar-Tal, ‘Causes and Consequences of 
Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism’, Journal o f Social Issues, voi. 40, no. I, 1990, pp. 73-78.
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ingroups are much stronger than this: deep affective associations, shared understandings, 
com m on goals, and the perception of a shared fate.3
It may seem that there is no need to spend any further effort on this propensity; that we 
may simply accept that it takes place, and that effort would be more fruitfully spent 
examining other aspects of the occurrence of genocide and genocidal killing.
But the problem I address here is not the question of whether this seemingly universal ‘us 
and them’ process happens in fact. Rather, it is the question of why, in some circumstances, 
a particular manifestation of such characterisation is related to genocidal violence, and of 
what, in fact, this relationship consists. For this reason, as well as the fact that racial or 
national groups are not the only victims of genocide, I will not have a great deal to say about 
theories of the racial or national other as such. Rather, I am concerned with the question of 
the construction of an outgroup by an ingroup in the context of the direction of genocidal 
violence toward that outgroup. That is, the focus of my concern is not the huge topic of the 
construction of outgroups per se, but rather, discursive constructions regarding the 
legitimate direction of institutionalised violence at civilian collectivities with the aim of 
obliteration. Given this, I begin my investigation of dehumanisation, not with the issue of the 
highly complex nature of the discursive relationship between the ingroup and the other, but 
with the question of the nature of collective violence.
3 E. Staub, The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1989, p. 58; and see also E. Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness’, Journal 
of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. I, 1990, pp. 47-64, pp. 52-54. Ervin Staub elaborates on the concept of group 
categorisation and fear (The roots of evil, p 59):
Related sources of ingroup-outgroup differentiation are fear as a common human response to the unusual, 
unknown, and different and the tendency to like and prefer what is similar ... A  further source of 
ethnocentrism is the fact that the human mind works by categorization ... W e  would be overwhelmed by 
uncertainty and anxiety if we approached each person (or event) without using past learning as a guide. 
Categorization, however, is a basis of stereotypes, exaggerated beliefs about groups that are often negative.
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Introducing the topic through an exploration of this problematic will provide a reason as to 
why the dehumanising construction of the other can and must be considered not an 
accompaniment to, but a fundamental aspect of genocide; such a reason serves in turn as an 
introduction to the topic of the way in which dehumanisation actually functions when human 
agents participate in genocidal action. From this vantage point, that is, we will be able to 
reframe the ‘big questions’ about genocide and dehumanisation in order to shed some light 
on the problems of defining dehumanisation, asking why dehumanisation occurs in genocide 
and how it functions. In doing so we will pay particular attention to the differences between 
legitimisation and motivation in genocide, and to the role of language and metaphor in 
allowing these factors to inhere in genocidal discourse. Finally, having developed a structural 
and functional model, we will enumerate the different types of genocidal dehumanisation in 
practice and ask how this model can be applied to understand these types in terms of 
connection, similarity and distinctiveness.
I. Predispositions A gainst P erpetration?: Challenging the Paradigm
This investigation commences, then, by considering the position of the individual 
participating in collective genocidal violence. Most people, if they think of it at all, like to 
imagine that the majority of humans must be somehow induced to participate in mass killing. 
That is, it is assumed that not to participate in mass killing would be the normative or the 
initial response, and therefore, in order to do so, this normative resistance must be 
somehow overcome. There is limited truth in this, inasmuch as the modern state is 
designed to enforce an ideology which removes legitimate violence from the hands, and 
choice, of the individual as an individual, and concentrates it in those of the representatives 
of the state (we must remember, however, that representatives of the state, and other 
individuals licensed by the state to employ violence personally or to order it employed, do
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not make up an insignificant social body: police, security guards, soldiers, politicians, social 
workers, judges, immigration officials, creditors, and so on). Overall, however, the 
conception that people are normatively disinclined to harm others is too psychologically 
comforting not to be misleading. The pleasures of enacting one’s will on others, the 
pleasures of the exercise of power and of violence, have been too well acknowledged. As 
we will see, it is rather the case that, in the enactment of the killing of civilians, various 
ideologies come into conflict, some of which predispose unquestioning or enthusiastic 
participation, and some of which do not. As Peter J. Haas puts it,
The agent may well know that murder simpliciter is wrong, but the agent also knows that 
there are contexts in which killing another person is (or might be) morally acceptable. The 
determination of what this concrete situation here and now calls for is one of prevailing 
ethical standards established through language and self evident conventions of thought.4
But before we deal with the moral self-conception of the genocidal agent in the moment of 
action, we must ask a prior question which will inform a developing picture of such an agent: 
what is the nature of an individual’s relationship to the enactment of state violence, when 
they themselves are not directly implicated in that enaction? To draw with a broad 
brushstroke, we have two distinct groups. Firstly, there are the many people who support, 
or fantasise about, the employment of mass violence toward others (particularly if we take 
‘violence’ in a broad sense, to include forcible action against the will of its human objects, 
such as deportation, etc); that is, people who do not have an ideological predisposition 
against institutionalised violence per se, but rather consider it legitimate depending on the 
nature of its object and the reason for its deployment. This group also includes, though it is 
not limited to, people whose personal ideology consists in unquestioning obedience to the 
state. If such people are involved in the actual employment of that violence, some will
4 P. J. Haas, The Morality of Auschwitz: Moral Language and the Nazi Ethic’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 3, 
no. 4, 1988, p. 388.
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continue to believe completely in the (moral) right(eous)ness of such action; some will feel it 
is an unpleasant necessity akin to other unpleasant but not morally troublesome tasks in the 
running of societies; some will be morally troubled, or even come to believe that the action 
is wrong, but continue the action (or merely take steps to make sure that, when possible, 
they personally need no longer be involved in its commission, as was notable among, for 
example, Nazi camp doctors); and a very few will change their minds about the rightness of 
such action, and refuse to participate any further. In other words, in a situation in which 
approval initially exists for genocidal action in the broadest sense (‘we need to solve the 
Jewish Problem by the disappearance of Jews from German territory’), actual experience of 
such action (at whatever level of involvement) may engender (moral) approval, indifference, 
or disapproval, and this response may change over the duration of the period of action, and 
beyond; it is not temporally fixed.
On the other hand, we have a second group: people who believe that the use of violence in 
any case except self-defence (which may or may not include the ‘defence of the State’ or ‘of 
Society’ from a threat) is wrong (raising questions about conceptions of ‘self-defence,’ threat, 
and dehumanisation which are explored elsewhere in this chapter). In their day-to-day lives, 
such people believe that they would not hurt an ‘innocent’ person, or indeed they may 
believe that they would not be capable of violence toward anyone, particularly (and this is an 
important qualification) in a pre-planned or ‘cold-blooded’ situation. The range of responses 
to a situation in which such a person is asked or ordered to enact violence, whether directly 
or indirectly, is similar to that outlined above: that is, equally in the situation in which initial 
approval does not exist or is not a strongly held ideological belief, actual experience of 
action may engender approval (particularly in the context of mass movements), indifference 
or disapproval, in a way which is not temporally fixed.5
s Israel Charny and Daphna Fromer’s study in which they examine responses of students who were asked 
whether they would participate in a program of involuntary mass euthanasia, and divide them into separate 
categories is relevant in this context (I. W . Charny & D. Fromer, ‘A  Study of the Readiness of Jewish/lsraeli
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Overall, then, we cannot begin from the assumption that systems are always necessary to 
enable violence and killing to which people are, by ‘nature,’ ‘inclination’ or socialisation, 
‘inherently’ disinclined - that is to say, normatively disinclined. Such a theory can be simply 
summarised as the concept that everyone has a conscience which must be thwarted or 
obstructed in order to do ‘wrong,’ which the perpetrator must or should on some level 
realise is wrong. Haas puts this well in suggesting that ‘the traditional problem of why 
people do what they (should) know is evil’ is meaningless; rather, we need to ask ‘how 
people come to know at all what evil is.’* 6
Theories of ‘evil’ in genocide, such as that of James Waller, Philip Zimbardo, Ervin Staub, 
Roy F. Baumeister, and others, tend to make the assumption that people are basically ‘good’ 
(or that to be ‘ordinary’ is to be equivalent to ‘basically good’) and that in the process of 
engagement in harmful action the intrusion of ‘evil’ is somehow involved.7 Furthermore, most 
theories of motivation begin from such an assumption - that is, the assumption (thoroughly 
discussed by Waller) that there is a ‘true self or ‘initial self which has a (good) moral 
conscience and a disinclination to violent harm of others; and a separate, non-normative 
state in which this conscience does not apply.8 Thus we have Stanley Milgram’s positing of
Students in the Health Professions to Authorize and Execute Involuntary Mass Euthanasia of “ Severely
Handicapped” Patients’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 5, no. 3, 1990, pp. 3 13-335).
6 Haas, p. 387.
7 This occurs even when the terminology of ‘evil’ is not accepted as entirely unproblematic, usually in the context 
of an argument that there are evil acts rather than evil people; Roy Baumeister, for example, recognises that ‘evil’ 
is in the eye of the beholder, but nonetheless refers to ‘evil acts' and asks such questions as why people would 
choose ‘evil means’ to accomplish their ends (R. F. Baumeister, Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty, W . H. 
Freeman and Company, New York, 2000, pp. 6, 101-108).
8 See J. Waller, ‘Perpetrators of the Holocaust: Divided and Unitary Self Conceptions of Evildoing’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 10, no. I, 1996, pp. I 1-33. The concepts presented in this paper, which focuses on models 
of a divided or a unitary self in ‘evildoing,’ are developed more fully in W aller’s later work Becoming Evil (J.
Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Moss Killing (2nd revised edn), Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2007).
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the ‘agentic state’ which occurs when an individual is integrated into a hierarchy;9 Albert 
Bandura’s positing of moral disengagement as a progressive, transformative process 
removing pre-existing moral disinclinations to harmful behaviour, or ‘disinhibiting’ 
‘transgression’ (as he puts it, ‘decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel 
things’) ; 10 Robert Jay Lifton’s ‘doubling,’ the creation of an ‘Auschwitz self in an environment 
where moral norms do not apply;* I11 Zygmunt Bauman’s argument that ‘modern civilisation 
has made us all (or most of us at least) to [sic] dislike and shun violence’;12 the (discredited) 
‘Goldhagen’ argument that motivation is entirely based upon ideological racism (or, in terms 
outside Daniel Goldhagen’s frame of reference, any other ideological essentialist prejudice) ; 13 
the (again, discredited) theory of the insanity, abnormality or aberration of genocidal 
perpetrators, or genocidal societies; or the ‘Browning’ hypothesis which sees ‘peer 
pressure,’ appeals to masculinity, and appeals to the group as a community, as defining 
factors.14 As Waller has demonstrated, each of these theories is in itself insufficient as an 
explanation of motivation for and legitimacy of genocidal action in the conception of 
perpetrators.
9 S. Milgram, Obedience To Authority: An Experimental View, Pinter & Martin, London, 2005 (first edn 1974), pp. 134-
I 36. I do not deny Milgram’s claim that in this context moral responsibility becomes owed to a system, to one’s 
superior and to the organisation, rather than to one’s inferiors in the hierarchy or to those outside it -  indeed, as 
we will see, this is an important manifestation of dehumanisation
10 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. I 10; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, p. 372; A. 
Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, vol. 3, 
no. 3, 1999, p. 200. It’s important, however, to differentiate the concept of a ‘good’ initial self from the role of 
routinisation of harmful action, and of the way in which, as we will see, systems are structured to draw 
individuals progressively into greater identification with harmful systems and actions.
11 R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (new edn), Basic Books, New  York, 
2000, pp. 418-465.
12 Z. Bauman, T he Duty To Remember, -  But W hat?’ in James Kaye and Bo Strath (eds), Enlightenment and 
Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity (Series philosophy & politics; No. 5), P.I.E. - Peter Lang, Brussels, 2000, p. 53.
13 Goldhagen’s argument is, of course, related to the Shoah, but as a type of explanation it is not limited to this 
episode. See D. J. Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, Little, Brown and 
Company, London, 1996, pp. 416-454.
14 C. R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland, Penguin, London, 2001.
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Given that all of these theories assume rather than demonstrate an initial ‘goodness,’ 
resistance to participation in genocidal action should not be understood as inherent, 
standard or ‘normal.’ Neither, however, is it non-existent. Humans operate within 
frameworks of morality which are created by a process of socialisation (and may be re­
created through a process of resocialisation)15: human acts have human reasons. In any given 
genocidal episode, the motivation of different perpetrators and beneficiaries, from Nazi 
‘desk-murderers’ shuffling ‘units’ on paper, to Rwandan killers who hacked friends and 
relatives apart with machetes, cannot be generalised:16 it relates to the specific circumstance 
of each individual involved, and the specific nature of her or his involvement. Furthermore, 
in most if not all cases, even on the individual level, motivation and legitimisation is not pure 
(ideology, economic gain, obedience to authority, sadistic pleasure, etc) but is mixed, and 
changes over time.17 Moreover, pre-existing frameworks of morality can be engaged and 
disengaged by the individual, depending on the nature of the situation.18
Conflicts with others who are considered equally human, in which there is action, 
sometimes violent, upon a desire to assert dominance or enforce action over an individual
15 Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, p. 364; Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion’, p. 59.
16 D. Bloxham, ‘Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective’, 
Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 2008, pp. 204, 23 I . Bloxham’s article provides an interesting 
synthesis and discussion of the questions of different types of motivation, suggesting that ‘interest, circumstance, 
and convictions’ form a ‘virtual triangle’ of interconnected, and permutating, reasons for the perpetration of 
genocide (p. 217). On the multifarious nature of motivation, see also J. Semelin, ‘Tow ard  a vocabulary of 
massacre and genocide’, Journal o f Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, p. 204.
17 M. Mann, ‘W e re  the Perpetrators of Genocide “ O rd inary Men”  or “ Real Nazis” ? Results from Fifteen 
Hundred Biographies’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, p. 333; M. K. Huggins, M. Haritos- 
Fatouros & P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 2002, p. I 39.
18 Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement’; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, pp. 364-365; 
Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 193. I would suggest that Bandura’s 
model, in which harmful conduct, or what he problematically terms ‘inhumanities,’ can be justified by moral 
justification, euphemistic labelling, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of 
responsibility, disregard or distortion of consequences, dehumanisation, attribution of blame, and/or gradualistic 
moral disengagement, as separate processes, fails to fully recognise the way in which these different strategies 
tend to be inextricably bound together in belief systems which relate to harmful action.
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or a group, occur constantly in any society and between social groups; however, killing, 
while as we have seen not inherently forbidden, is not generally included within the compass 
of what may legitimately be done to a person conceived in essentialist fashion as an equally 
human other, except in certain situations -  for example, during wartime, or in some theories 
approving capital punishment.19 Motivations for involvement in genocide are many, but they 
may also be motivations for other types of non-genocidal action. That is. some motivations, 
related to ideology, could also view non-genocidal action, such as oppression, non- 
murderous relocation, or economic redistribution, as the means to achieve their ends.
Other motivations for involvement, such as careerism, are not necessarily related in any way 
to an ideological view of the characteristics of the human objects of genocidal killing, but are 
nonetheless forced to encounter these objects, whether as ‘units’ on paper o r as living 
beings to be shot down or hacked apart. In either case, legitimisation of the specific action 
which is taken, whether based on a ‘genocidal’ motivation or otherwise, is thus a necessity.
Putting all of this together, we may state that the following are the conditions under which 
genocide occurs in the modern age. There are many possibilities for actions against an 
outgroup perceived as problematic. However, genocide is only sometimes the action which 
is chosen. Whatever the motivation, whether ideological or non-ideological, killing, either of 
collectivities (particularly in war) or individuals (particularly in capital punishment) is by no
19 On this subject, Raul Hilberg gives an interesting quote which directly relates ‘criminality’ to ‘racial biology’ (a 
common subject in eugenicist utterances; the connection between biology and criminality, though without the 
racialist element, was an innovation of the [injfamous Cesare Lombroso), and thus to legitimate killing of 
criminals, during the Shoah:
[T]he Jews were portrayed not only as a world conspiracy but also as a criminal people. This is the 
definition of Jews as furnished in instructions to the German press:
Stress: In the case of the Jews there are not merely a few criminals (as in every other people), but all of 
Jewry rose from criminal roots and in its very nature it is criminal. The Jews are no people like other 
people, but a pseudo-people welded together by hereditary criminality... The annihilation of Jewry is no loss 
to humanity, but just as useful as capital punishment or protective custody against other criminals.
(R. Hilberg, The Nazi Holocaust: Using Bureaucracies, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Genocide’, in M. D. 
Ermann & R. J. Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in 
Contemporary Society (5th edn), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1996, p. 175)
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means universally considered a non-normative or illegitimate activity and resisted as such. 
However, the violent institutionalised destruction of civilian collectivities is generally thus 
considered -  this can be demonstrated, for example, by the fact that such a solution to a 
problem is inadmissible on the world stage, and is generally either concealed or represented 
as a more legitimate action, such as warfare. Therefore, while the conception of a true or 
initial moral self, fundamentally disinclined to involvement, which must be overcome, is 
misleading, neither can we assume, given the existence of ideological and/or material 
motivations for action, that there is no psychological-ideological resistance whatsoever to 
the killing (or violent destruction) of civilians as a means of attaining such ends.20 The central 
and the only common aspect of ideological motivation for genocide (as opposed to motivation 
for involvement in genocidal action), and, more importantly, for the legitimisation of 
genocide, is the construction of the other.21 If we wish to understand how genocide can 
occur, we must therefore examine questions of legitimisation, which (as we will see) include 
the issue of ideological motivation. In doing so, the construction of a civilian collectivity as 
not-equally-human -  that is, as a legitimate target of destruction -  must therefore be our 
starting point and the focus of our labours. In taking this issue as a primary subject of 
inquiry, we must return initially to some introductory questions as to conceptions of the 
relationship between genocide and dehumanisation.
20 Kenneth Grundy & Michael Weinstein point out that all ideologies of violence, whether they propose that 
violence is normally blameworthy or normally praiseworthy, require a justification to demonstrate that ‘there is 
something about certain acts of violence which makes them inherently praiseworthy’ (K. W. Grundy & M. A. 
Weinstein, The Ideologies of Violence, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, Columbus [Ohio], 1974, p. I 16).
21 See Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion’, p. 55, on the way in which pre-existing cultural constructions regarding particular 
collectivities can predispose violence and/or genocide as a solution to a perceived problem.
In this and later chapters, I will make limited reference to the concept of ‘the other’ and ‘othering.’ Given the 
limitations of space, and the fact that this concept in itself is not key to the argument of the thesis, it need only be 
noted briefly here that the term is used, not according to the conceptualisations of Jacques Lacan or Emmanuel 
Levinas, but rather in the tradition concerning the negative or pejorative construction of the Other running from 
the work of G. W. F. Hegel, through that of Simone de Beauvoir and Edward Said, and now widely employed in 
the humanities. In order to avoid the problematics around the theoretical freight of particular usages of the 
term, I have chosen not to capitalise it, except when making direct reference to the work of scholars who have 
done so.
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II. Dehum anisation and Genocide
[E Jach  and every genocider... defines precisely who are the undeserving, condemnable and 
disposable in their era ... Each victim group becomes the object o f damning and unbelievable 
symbolizations by their killers as to their subhuman representations- lice, vermin, diseased, savages, 
heathens. W hat is needed is an understanding o f the commonality o f this process as underlining 
and enabling the development o f genocidal policy and actions.
- Israel W. Charny22
LEO PO RD : W e no longer considered the Tutsis as humans or even as creatures o f God. W e had 
stopped seeing the world as it is, I mean as an expression o f God’s will.
That is why it was easy for us to wipe them out.23
In the introduction to this thesis I made reference to the fact that, while many works on 
genocide mention dehumanisation only a few scholars have thus far considered 
dehumanisation to be a concept deserving meaningful theoretical investigation as a primary 
subject.24 Modern dehumanisation has been considered to be a manifestation, motivation, 
or effect of such diverse phenomena as racism, xenophobia, bureaucracy, colonialism, group 
structure and belief, authority, hierarchy, ancient hatreds, and so forth; but in each case
22 I. W . Charny, ‘Value of Life’, in I. W . Charny (ed.), Encyclopedia of Genocide, ABC-CLIO, California, 1999, pp. 
404-405.
23 J. Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers In Rwanda Speak (trans. L. Coverdale), Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New 
York, 2005, pp. 144-145.
24 In the context of comparative genocide studies, lengthier discussion of dehumanisation and dehumanising 
discourse can be found in the work of (among others) Helen Fein, Israel Charny, Herbert Hirsch, Ervin Staub, 
and James Waller. Leo Kuper also gave brief consideration to the matter in his classic work Genocide: Its Political 
use In The Twentieth Century (Yale University Press, New  Haven/Yale, 1981, pp. 54, 85-92). Other authors, such 
as Daniel Bar-Tal, Stanley Cohen, and Emanuele Castano, have made very important contributions to this subject 
from the perspectives of their various fields. All of the aforementioned works are discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter.
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dehumanisation is considered as an effect or an aspect of the subject under examination.25 
W ith some notable exceptions, there have been few who have questioned why 
dehumanisation manifests in cases of genocide and mass killing, and whether it is present in 
all such cases; neither has much serious investigation been undertaken of whether, in fact, it 
is justifiable to employ ‘dehumanisation’ as a concept. Rather, both in general, the mention 
of, and documentation of the existence of, dehumanisation has been considered to be the 
endpoint, not the beginning, of inquiry, while the raison d’etre and the function of 
dehumanisation have been considered to be self-evident.
As I have already argued, then, the question as to whether ‘dehumanisation’ is a useful 
concept in scholarship on genocide remains open. Here it is appropriate to return to the 
model laid out in the introduction, in order to elucidate the way in which the argument of 
this chapter will proceed. This thesis attempts to answer the following questions. Why 
should genocidal dehumanisation be considered to be an existing phenomenon? How does it 
manifest? What can its presence in particular, differentiated forms tell us about a given 
situation? This is done through an examination of why dehumanisation has become a 
necessary accompaniment to genocide in the context of the modern age (that is, the theory 
of dehumanisation); and, given this, how it functions in genocide (the practice). Before 
answering these questions, I examine existing definitions of dehumanisation and formulate 
my own. I argue that to be employed as a useful tool of analysis, (genocidal) dehumanisation 
must be conceived as both a complex, and an internally differentiated mechanism, one which 
may serve the end either of motivation (sometimes) or of legitimisation (universally). Finally, 
I contend that discursive genocidal dehumanisation manifests in three ‘types,’ which have a 
stable associative relationship with these different functions.
25 For a discussion of this problem from the perspective of social psychology, see C. Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of moral 
exclusion: A critical discursive reframing of depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanisation’, British Journal 
of Social Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, p. 732.
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The analysis outlined in this way may seem too theoretical, a dissection of genocide for the 
purposes of abstract knowledge rather than a concrete attempt to understand its features in 
a way which is useful both in historical analysis, and in strategies of prediction and 
intervention. In terms of the concrete, there are a number of ‘big questions’ or ‘whys’ which 
scholars ask when faced with genocide. At this point, we will reframe the questions asked 
above, and the issues raised in the introduction, in order to understand how inquiry into 
dehumanisation can give insight into answers to these ‘big questions’.
• Firstly, given that violence is always one solution to a perceived problem, and that 
therefore the perception of a problem or conflict can be a motivation for violence, why is 
genocidal violence in some cases viewed by perpetrators as a legitimate solution to that 
problem and enacted as such, while in other cases it is not?
• Secondly, how, given the existence of the desire to enact such a solution, does it come to 
be acceptable not just to those who provide the original ideological impetus for such action, 
but to all the other actors (both collective and individual) involved in carrying it out?
• Thirdly, why, given a motivation to violence, are particular types of violence against 
particular collectivities generally considered to be legitimate (by those involved and/or by 
observers), whilst other types, enacted against other collectivities, are not thus considered, 
except (perhaps, to varying extents) by the perpetrators themselves?
• Finally, how, in the face of the cognitive dissonance produced by actions which are, in 
normal circumstances, considered illegitimate uses of violence, do individual and group
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actors harmonise their self-conception and their conception of the group to which they 
belong, with the actions which are being undertaken?26
The answer to each of these questions lies in the emergence of a particular consensus 
regarding belief and action, in the construction of which dehumanisation has a crucial role to 
play. This thesis outlines this role, and suggests a conceptual model and typology of 
dehumanisation. The most important aspect of this conception, and one which has remained 
thus-far unremarked-upon in the literature, is a differentiation between legitimisation and 
motivation, which may be used to productively analyse the nature of genocidal or pre- 
genocidal dehumanisation in any given situation.
In pursuing this analysis, I begin by examining definitions of dehumanisation and clarifying 
my own use of the term. I then consider, firstly, what purposes genocidal dehumanisation 
serves on the individual and the collective level (why such a consensus must be constructed); 
secondly, how it serves these purposes, and to what effect, in different circumstances; and, 
thirdly, what are its major manifestations, what are their contents and functions, and what 
connections exists between them, which allow us to consider dehumanisation a phenomenon 
as such.
26 For the concept of ‘cognitive dissonance,’ see Leon Festinger’s seminal work, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
(Tavistock Publications, London, 1962). W hile this concept has been critiqued and problematised (see for 
example E. Harmon-Jones & J. Mills [eds], Cognitive dissonance : progress on a pivotal theory in social psychology, 
American Psychological Association, Washington D.C., 1999) the essential contention made here, that 
engagement in the killing of civilians is not an ‘everyday’ activity automatically considered legitimate in itself and 
that, like other activities, it must be ‘accounted for’ in discursive terms, is not controversial; the question of 
legitimacy is explored further below.
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III. D ehu m anisation: A  Proposed Definition
The formulation of a definition of ‘dehumanisation’ as the term will be used in this work 
gives both an entrée to and an overview of the literature on dehumanisation, as well as 
indicating the position taken by the present work vis-à-vis previous scholarly analyses of the 
concept. Many definitions of dehumanisation, and of exclusion which is not considered 
dehumanisation, have been proposed by genocide scholars. In disciplinary terms, the topic 
itself (as opposed to the works in which it is considered) has generally been approached 
from a socio-cultural and/or a psychological perspective. Here, I give a brief overview of 
different definitions, including discussion of advantages and problematics, before proposing 
my own definition based on consideration of these.
As I have already noted, different terms have been used to describe related or similar 
discursive strategies: dehumanisation, devaluation, delegitimization, depersonalisation, moral 
exclusion, social death, and so forth.27 More specific terms, such as démonisation, and
27 The discursivity of dehumanisation has been recognised not only within the humanities, but also by various 
scholars in the field of social psychology; see for example M. Billig, ‘Henri Tajfel's “ Cognitive aspects of prejudice” 
and psychology of bigotry’, The British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 4 1,2002, pp. 185-186. For Bar-Tal’s concept 
of ‘delegitimization,’ defined as ‘beliefs that downgrade another group with extreme negative social categories for 
the purpose of excluding it from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable 
norms and/or values,’ see D. Bar-Tal Croup Beliefs: A Conception for Analyzing Group Structure, Processes, and 
Behaviour, Springer-Verlag, New York, 1990, pp. 93-94; for a somewhat different wording see Bar-Tal, ‘Causes 
and Consequences,’ pp. 65-66. Bar-Tal considers dehumanisation a sub-category of delegitimization.
For ‘devaluation’ see E. Staub, The Origins and Evolution of Hate, W ith  Notes On Prevention’ in R. J. Sternberg 
(ed.), The Psychology of Hate, American Psychological Association, Washington, 2005, pp. 51-66, pp. 52-54. 
‘Depersonalisation’ is a concept emerging from the work of psychologist Henri Tajfel - see Billig; for a discussion 
of ‘depersonalisation’ and its relationship to ‘dehumanisation’ and extreme prejudice see Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of 
moral exclusion’, p. 718.
‘Moral exclusion,’ a phrase proposed by Ervin Staub, is found in the work of Susan Opotow: ‘moral exclusion 
occurs when individuals or groups are perceived as outside the boundary in which moral values, rules and 
considerations of fairness apply’ (S. Opotow, ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice; An Introduction’, Journal of Social 
Issues, vol. 40, no.I, 1990, pp. 1-20, p. I). For a discussion of these terms in the context of language, social 
discrimination, and inter-group aggression, see C. F. Graumann, ‘Verbal Discrimination; a Neglected Chapter in 
the Social Psychology of Aggression 'Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 28, no. I, 1998, p. 47.
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infrahumanisation, have also been applied to such discourse.28 O f all these terms, 
‘dehumanisation’ seems the most common, the least wedded to a particular technical usage 
or disciplinary perspective, and also to cover not only the discursive removal, but also the 
‘lessening’ of perceived humanity (that is, a realm of discourse wherein the object is 
considered either a lesser human or less than human); and for this reason I continue to 
employ this term to refer to the process I will go on to describe here.
How, then, is dehumanisation defined? The term is a broad one, often used in a general 
sense to describe universal modern social trends;29 and this way of thinking sometimes slips 
into academic definitions of dehumanisation, lending it some resemblance to concepts such 
as Emile Durkheim’s anomie.30 Sometimes a distinction is also drawn between discursive 
dehumanisation, and physical dehumanisation, of an object. Here, in the specific context of
For ‘social death’ (a concept proposed in regard to slavery rather than genocide) see O. Patterson, Slavery and 
Social Death: A Comparative Study, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 1982, pp. 38-45.
28 For ‘infrahumanisation’ - to construct a target as less than human, if not wholly non-human - see E. Castano & 
R. Giner-Sorolla, ‘Not Quite Human: Infrahumanization in Response to Collective Responsibility for Intergroup 
Killing’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 90, no. 5, 2006, pp. 805-806; A. Marcu, E. Lyons & P. 
Hegarty, ‘Dilemmatic human-animal boundaries in Britain and Romania: Post-materialist and materialist 
dehumanisation’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, p. 876; Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of Moral Exclusion’, 
pp. 719-720.
In specific psychological terms, infra-humanisation refers to the fact that humans see secondary emotions (such as 
nostalgia, pride, etc) as unique to humans; the denial of, or denial of an equal capacity to feel, these emotions in 
an outgroup thus means that this group is seen as less than fully human, and is referred to as infrahumanisation 
(see N. Haslam, Y. Kashima, S. Loughnan.J. Shi & C. Suitner, ‘Subhuman, Inhuman, and Superhuman: Contrasting 
Humans with Nonhumans in Three Cultures’, Social Cognition, vol. 26, no. 2, 2008, pp. 248-258, p. 249).
Marcu, Lyons and Hegarty suggest an ‘ontologisation’ model in distinction to ‘infrahumanisation’ (p. 876):
The ontologization paradigm takes a historical approach and argues that the majority creates a different 
ontology for those minority groups which have resisted cultural assimilation for centuries in 
order to explain their resistance. Social groups which fail to be culturally assimilated, such as the Gypsies, 
are presumed to have a different human nature from that of the majority, which rationalizes their assumed 
inability to become civilized and thus fully human.
On ‘ontologisation’ see also Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of Moral Exclusion', pp. 719-720.
29 See for example Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement', p. 109.
30 Durkheim borrowed the term from the work of philosopher Jean-Marie Guyau. For an example of this usage, 
see N. Sanford & C. Craig, ‘Epilogue: Social Destructiveness as Disposition and as Act’, in N. Sanford & C. 
Comstock et al (eds), Sanctions for Evil: Sources of Social Destructiveness, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 1971, p. 328.
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genocide and mass killing, I consider physical practices of dehumanisation (identifying 
clothing, imprisonment, shaving and tattooing, degrading treatment, and so forth) to be part 
of a discursive repertoire, and to be the end point of a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
dehumanisation (a topic to which I will return); and I examine the definitions of those 
scholars working specifically in the context of genocide and mass killing, before suggesting 
my own.
Leo Kuper, a political scientist, was one of the earliest scholars to discuss this question in 
a framework of the comparative study of genocide in his classic work Genocide: Its Political 
Uses in the Twentieth Century. Dehumanisation ‘might be conceived as the relegation of the 
victims to the level of animals or of objects or to a purely instrumental role .’31 Israel W. 
Charny defines dehumanisation as ‘a psychological-symbolic removal of the others from the 
province or group classification of human ... if one is enjoined from killing other human 
beings, the redefinition of others as not-human will constitute the removal of any symbolic 
barriers to killing them .’32 Helen Fein distinguishes between ‘dehumanisation’ and defining a 
group ‘outside the universe of [moral] obligation’; but the second, she writes, is a necessary, 
though not a sufficient, precondition for genocide.33
In the conception of Herbert C. Kelman, dehumanisation is the denial of identity. It is the 
denial of each victim as an individual both in terms of her/his rights as an individual and 
her/his culpability in any perceived or real wrongdoing; and the denial of community, that is, 
the denial of each individual as part of an interconnected network of others.34 Denial as an 
overall phenomenon (including ‘interpretive’ and ‘implicatory denial,’ that is, denial involving
31 Kuper, p. 86; see also H. Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, SAGE Publications, London, 1993 (first 
published as Current Sociology, vol. 38, no. I, 1990), p. 36.
32 I. W. Charny, ‘Dehumanization -  “ killing” the humanity of another’, in I. W. Charny (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Genocide, ABC-CLIO, California, 1999, p. 155.
33 H. Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, The Free Press, 
New York, 1979, p. 9.
34 In Kuper, p. 86.
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awareness of the facticity of that which is denied) includes, according to Stanley Cohen, 
denial on the planes of cognition, emotion, morality, and action.35 That is, dehumanisation, 
as a denial of a common humanity, operates on each of these planes as regards the out­
group. In a similar vein, in speaking of sanctioned massacre, Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton 
write that
[sanctioned  massacres becom e possible to the extent that the victims are deprived in the 
perpetrators’ eyes of the tw o  qualities essential to  being perceived as fully humans and 
included in the moral com pact that governs human relationships: identity -  standing as 
independent, distinctive individuals, capable of making choices and entitled to live their own 
lives -  and com m unity -  fellow  membership in an interconnected netw ork  of individuals w ho 
care for each o ther and respect each o ther’s individuality and rights (Kelm an, 1973...).
Thus, when a group of people is defined entirely in term s of a category to which they belong, 
and when this category is excluded from  the human family, moral restraints against killing 
them are m ore readily overcom e.36
Regarding the issue of denial, we may return to Kuper’s conception that the essential 
function of dehumanisation is the denial of the victim as an individual, and the exclusion of 
the victims from a common humanity with the perpetrators and bystanders.37 Kuper writes 
that genocide by definition is a crime against a collectivity, a ‘denial of individuality’.38
35 S. Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering, Polity, Cambridge, 2001, p. 9. It has been 
suggested that one of the most humiliating aspects of dehumanisation may lie in the fact that both the subject an 
the object are aware that the subject knows (at least on some level) that the object is in fact human, and that this 
denial therefore increases the aspect of contemptuous negation of identity.
36 H. C. Kelman & V. L. Hamilton, The My Lai Massacre: Crimes of Obedience and Sanctioned Massacres’, in M. 
D. Ermann & R. J. Lundman (eds), Corporate and Governmental Deviance: problems of Organizational behaviour in 
Contemporary Society (5th edn), Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1996, pp. 204-205.
37 Kuper, p. 87.
38 Kuper, p. 86.
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This denial of individuality, taking place through the use of stereotypes to construct the 
perception of collective homogeneity, allows collective blame and collective punishment.
The use by ingroups of such rhetoric, to employ Daniel Bar-Tal’s concept, enacts a process 
of delegitimization upon the outgroup at which it is directed.39 Delegitimization may follow 
genocidal acts, or it may lead to them, or both; in every case, it justifies genocidal action. 
Ervin Staub uses the concept of ‘devaluation,’ and argues that ‘[j]ust defining people as 
“ them” results in devaluing them. Conversely, devaluation makes it more likely that a 
person is seen as belonging to an outgroup,’ while group distinctions ‘produce stable 
devaluations,’ making mistreatment likely.40 In an important evaluation and critique of social- 
psychological approaches, Christian Tileaga, in suggesting a discursive approach, argues that:
Although pointing to  the process o f moral boundary drawing, authors such as Bar-tal, Staub 
o r Deutsch tend to  point m ore to  the psychological ‘distance’ between groups, the 
psychological mechanisms involved in this process, than to  the moral ‘distance’ and the 
implications o f the flexible use o f a moral discourse. Although a moral dimension is present, 
there is no programmatic concern w ith  charting the discursive accomplishment and 
management o f moral exclusion in actual instances o f occurrence.41
Clearly, each of the definitions and concepts mentioned thus far have something to add to 
understandings of dehumanisation. However, as well as the issues raised by Tileaga 
regarding the importance of morality -  which is inevitably socially constructed -  two further 
problem occur. Firstly, many constructions create a binary or polarised structure in which 
collectivities either fall within or without a ‘moral community’ or a ‘scope of justice,’42
39 For Bar-Tal’s definition, see n26.
40 Staub, The roots of evil, pp. 60-61.
41 Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of Moral Exclusion’, p. 721.
42 See for example Opotow, ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice’, p. 4; Opotow’s conception of ‘moral inclusion’ would 
include ‘willingness to allocate a share of community resources to another,’ and ‘willingness to make sacrifices to 
foster another’s well-being.’ Opotow clearly recognises, however, the problematics of a dichotomous 
construction of the ‘scope of justice,’ as well as its nature as a socio-cultural construct (pp. 4-6).
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whereas moral obligation, or its lack, is more complex, and is thus more realistically 
understood as a question of degree (as will be evident in the chapter on moral constructions 
of animals). Secondly, while recognising the importance of the degree of commonality 
understood by the in-group to exist between that in-group and a given out-group, these 
definitions do not all point to the equal importance of the in-group’s framing of itself (in 
terms of the moral legitimacy of action toward in-group members), as well as its framing of 
the out-group.43 Given this, I propose below my own definition, which is based on 
consideration of these discussions and definitions.
The two crucial terms by which dehumanisation can be characterised are exclusion, and 
denial. In this thesis, however, dehumanisation is not considered to consist solely of the 
literal denial of the human-ness of the victim (the question of definitions of ‘the human’ is 
one to which we will return in the chapter regarding animalising characterisations). 
Furthermore, as Kuper has noted, the rights accorded to the ‘human’ may vary greatly 
between different groups.44 Therefore, I define dehumanisation as a denial that a certain 
group is ‘equally’ human, no matter how that ‘humanity’ is defined (always in terms which 
favour the group doing the defining). That is, it is a discursive strategy that, because of the 
putative nature of the out-group, denies that, in terms of the morality of action, members of
43 The perceived nature of one’s in-group constitutes identity in important ways (including the fact that the 
process of self-identification as a group-member may be understood to involve ‘depersonalisation’ or 
‘dehumanisation), and indeed dehumanisation of out-groups is sometimes read not only as a factor in group 
cohesion and group delineation, which some argue have an evolutionary basis (see Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 55- 
60, 173-179, 198-201), but as an elaborate strategy to maintain one’s positive view of one’s in-group in the face 
of actions taken on its behalf or by ingroup members which run counter to previous normativities. See E. 
Castano, ‘On the Perils of Glorifying the In-group:
Intergroup Violence, In-group Glorification and Moral Disengagement’, Social And Personality Psychology Compass, 
vol. I, no. 2, 2008, pp. 154-170; and also D. Bar-Tal & Y. Teichman, Stereotypes and Prejudice in Conflict 
Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 20-21. Herbert 
Hirsch also devotes some consideration to the relationship between construction of in-group and out-group 
identity: H. Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory: Studying Death to Preserve Life, University of North Carolina 
Press, Chapel Hill & London, 1995, pp. 99-100.
44 Kuper, p. 86.
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that group are worthy of the same treatment or consideration which would be afforded to 
members of the in-group. The definition of dehumanisation I adopt, then, is that a collectivity 
as a collectivity is defined as unworthy o f the moral consideration afforded to members o f the 
ingroup.45 In itself, of course, this discursive strategy is not limited to genocide, and may be a 
human universal in at least some degree, as well as a possible necessity for the function of 
modern societies.46 This points to the way in which genocidal dehumanisation can only be 
understood in terms of dehumanisation as a general and a social (as opposed to purely 
individual-psychological) phenomenon; genocidal dehumanisation is not an entirely separate 
phenomenon from non-genocidal institutional dehumanisation, or from ‘everyday’ 
dehumanisation. What I am concerned with is one extreme of a continuum of 
dehumanisation (a concept to which we will return): ‘genocidal dehumanisation,’ that is, 
dehumanisation in which the outgroup is afforded so little consideration that they have no 
inherent right to exist.
In terms of this definition, it’s important to note that, in defining dehumanisation, I am 
concerned with discourse, and not with solely non-verbal practice (although non-verbal 
practice, of course, is intimately intertwined with, and can constitute, discourse), inasmuch 
as the social definition of a group as worthy or unworthy of particular treatment is separate 
from concrete practice. So, for example, a government may ban a particular expression of a
45 This definition is close, although not identical, to Opotow's ’moral exclusion’: ‘Those who are morally excluded 
are perceived as nonentities, expendable, or undeserving; consequently, harming them appears acceptable, 
appropriate, or just.’ (‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice’, p. I). Opotow, however, conceptualises dehumanisation as 
one among many manifestations of moral exclusion (pp. 10-1 I).
46 For example, for anyone whose profession is intimately associated with trauma, such as physicians, emergency 
workers, and so forth. In more general terms, this definition is inclusive of many non-genocidal practices, such as 
pre-modern forms of ‘interactive’ exclusion such as that of minority subject peoples such as Jews or Armenians
in pre-modern empires. Dehumanisation is in this sense seemingly a universal phenomenon (even in the modern- 
day welfare state, with its rhetoric of equality, we might think of discourse around certain classes of welfare 
recipient, ‘illegal immigrants’ and so forth, although in theory these categories are based on individual actions 
which are, in conceptual terms, chosen as and by an individual); however, the cases I examine are specifically 
those in which dehumanisation is extreme enough to justify not only the mistreatment of the outgroup, but the 
attempt to kill every member of the outgroup and/or destroy its existence as a collectivity as such.
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religion without, in terms of utterance, defining adherents to that religion as less worthy of 
consideration than adherents to others. This may well be discrimination against members of 
that religion (which may in turn be based on a dehumanised view of members of that religion 
by those in positions of power), but it is not in itself dehumanisation.
The other quality which is important to note is that of essentialisation, which, according to 
Bauman, is ‘a favourite modern strategy,’ and indeed indispensable in modern systems of 
power, and modern genocidal processes.47 For dehumanisation to occur, the identity of the 
members of the dehumanised group must be essentialised, that is, considered inherent to 
that group (even if the group itself is not understood to be biologically determined, or 
membership in it immutable, by the in-group or those in positions of power).48 It is in this 
sense that dehumanisation is defined as concerning a collectivity as a collectivity. It is in the 
aspect of their (alleged) membership of an essentialised collectivity that human individuals 
may be treated as unworthy of the moral consideration afforded to another group.
Having established a working definition of dehumanisation, I next turn to the question of 
the necessity or otherwise of dehumanisation in genocide.
IV. Why?: Th e  N ecessity for Dehum anisation in the Modern Era
IVa. A Psychological or a Socio-cultural Phenomenon -  or Both?
In this work dehumanisation is analysed as a strategy, not to imply universal purposiveness, 
but rather to point to the actual existence of dehumanisation in very many, and perhaps all, 
cases of genocide in the modern age. This fact is evidence for the argument that
47 Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, p. 37.
48 On this issue, see Graumann, pp. 51-52.
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dehumanisation is not just a possible accompaniment, a ‘window dressing’, to genocide, but a 
vital part of the process.49 Dehumanisation, as we will see, can be understood as a 
mechanism or a strategy which allows genocide to occur (though it is, in itself, neither the sole 
motivating nor the sole enabling factor; it is necessary, but not sufficient). The question, 
then, is why there is a need for such a mechanism. Given a motivation to destroy a group of 
people, why should there be any need to dehumanise this group?
In order to answer this question, we need to do two things. Firstly, we must differentiate 
the three levels at which dehumanisation occurs: at the level of relationships between 
different collectivities (what Bar-Tal and Yona Teichman term the ‘societal phenomenon’ of 
‘psychological intergroup repertoire ’);50 that of the relationship between collectivity and the 
individual within that collectivity; and that of the individual psyche. That is, we must draw a 
distinction between individualised and collectivised psychological aspects of identity, while 
recognising their interconnectedness. Analysis must take place both at the level of individual 
mental processes, and at the psycho-socio-cultural level of mass society, avoiding the trap of 
ascribing too much importance to either the one or the other of these strata of genocidal 
dehumanisation.51 Frank Bajohr argues for the concept of ‘social practice,’ which would 
describe ‘rule as an amorphous force field —  a complex network of relationships in which 
the actors are embedded,’ in which the interaction between those who seek to shape ‘public 
opinion’ and the ‘public’ is a bi-directional process, and which recognises the complex ways
49 Bandura calls dehumanisation ‘an essential ingredient in the perpetration of inhumanities’ (‘Moral 
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 200).
50 Bar-Tal & Teichman, pp. 22-3, 30-3 I, 53-54; this includes shared beliefs and images about another group 
(stereotypes), shared attitudes (prejudices), shared feelings and emotions toward that group, shared behavioural 
intentions, and shared collective memory.
51 This could also be viewed as (particular) micro- and macro- level analyses; various scholars have formulated 
models of stereotypes and prejudice, or of motivation for genocide, attempting to include both these levels. See 
Bar-Tal & Teichman; Waller, Becoming Evil. On the necessity for these different levels of analysis, see also 
Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, pp. I 15-1 16, Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities’, p. 207.
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in which individuals and groups both resist and follow dictates ‘from above.’52 Furthermore, 
in terms of interaction between these strata of society, we must recognise that, as Bar-Tai 
notes, ‘the socialized person is ... to some extent, a microcosm of society’ inasmuch as the 
world is defined from the vantage point of shared group norms, values and goals.53 I 
therefore argue that, while the needs which dehumanisation addresses are similar on each 
level, the processes which take place are different. These ‘levels’ of dehumanisation are 
clearly interconnected; however, one cannot be explored without an understanding of this 
distinction and the interplay between the two.
In terms of this distinction, then, we need to understand manifest dehumanisation as (in 
Norbert Finzsch’s phrase) a dispositive: ‘an apparatus of power relations that backs up types 
of knowledge and is in turn supported by them. This apparatus consists of a network of 
various and heterogeneous elements, such as discourses, laws, prescriptions, buildings and 
institutions.’54 Dehumanisation must be analysed as a nexus of connected behaviours which 
exists at the meeting point of identity and ideology, of individual and collectivity. Given this, 
analysis of dehumanisation requires a psychosocial approach.
52 F. Bajohr, T he  “ Folk Community" and the Persecution of the Jews: German Society under National Socialist 
Dictatorship, 1933-1945’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 20, no. 2, 2006, pp. 183-184.
On the importance of conceptual models including ‘above’ and ‘below’ as interactional spheres, see Semelin, 
Toward a vocabulary’, pp. 200-202.
53 Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 2. See also W aller on ‘worldviews’ and, as a sub-category, ‘cultural models’ as 
constitutive of perception of, and action in, the social world (Becoming Evil, pp. 171-173).
54 N. Finzsch, ‘“ It is scarcely possible to conceive that human beings could be so hideous and loathsome” : 
discourses of genocide in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America and Australia’, in A. D. Moses & D. Stone 
(eds), Colonialism and Genocide, Routledge, London & New York, 2007, p. 6.
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IVb. The Relevance of Truth-value and ‘Belief in Dehumanisation
PANCRACE: Killings o f that kind are hungry for death, not for life, as with wild animals. Such killings 
feed on everyone they see, they are never satisfied; as long as there is still someone left, they spur 
you on until the last o f the last That is why they do without words. Except for ridiculous words, 
obviously. On the radio we’d hear that the inkotanyi had tails or pointy ears; even if  no-one 
believed it, it did us good to hear it.55
In the previous chapter we have already touched on the questions of truth and objectivity 
in the analysis of perpetrator discourse. In the context of dehumanisation as an object of 
analysis, we return to this issue from a somewhat different angle. I must (re)state, then, that 
in speaking of the necessity of dehumanisation, and of the psychosocial approach, I do not 
intend to deal with the question of ascertaining whether those who create and maintain 
dehumanising discourse, and those for whom it is a justification and legitimisation, believe 
their own utterances or not; that is, the question concerning whether they are ‘true 
believers’ or whether they cynically attempt to manipulate the beliefs of others in order to 
achieve certain goals, or to exculpate themselves in the face of perceived disapproval. 
Individual perpetrators may differ on these points, and it may well be impossible to establish 
what any individual ‘really’ thinks or believes. Furthermore, on the one hand, testimony of 
this kind from the period of killing (as opposed to the aftermath) is very rare, and on the 
other, the nature of the narrative a person tells themselves and others about events in which 
they are involved is not stable, either during the course of these events, or afterwards.56 
More importantly, though, this question is, in fact, irrelevant to the investigation of the 
function and consequences of dehumanisation.57 In order to act (as we will see), a 
motivatory ideological belief is not necessary, but rather, a legitimatory narrative or script, no
55 Hatzfeld, p. 227.
56 See J. Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia 
University Press, New York, 2007, pp. 248-252.
57 See Cohen, States of Denial, pp. 58, 63
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matter whether it is ‘really believed’ (if this is indeed a valid distinction) or not.58 In order to 
fulfil a psychological need such a ‘script’ does not necessarily require wholehearted or long­
term ‘belief.’ It would be a mistake to think that the aim of successful propaganda and 
ideological rhetoric is to convert the target audience, that is, only to create deeply- (or 
‘really’-) held ideological beliefs. Rather, propaganda provides ‘a new universe of meaning for 
all’;59 furthermore, as David Welch points out. it is about edification, about *canal[ising] an 
existing stream’.60 On this subject, Raul Hilberg writes;
The Germans had two kinds of propaganda. One was designed to  produce action. It 
exhorted people to  come to a mass meeting, to boycott Jewish goods, or to  kill Jews. This 
type of propaganda does not concern us here since it was confined, on the whole, to the 
incitement of demonstrations and pogroms, the so-called Einzelaktion. But the Germans also 
engaged in a campaign that consisted of a series of statements implying that the Jew was evil.
This propaganda had a very important place in the arsenal of psychological defense 
mechanisms.
Repeated propagandistic allegations may be stored and drawn upon according to need. The 
statement “ The Jew is evil”  is taken from the storehouse and is converted in the 
perpetrator’s mind into a complete rationalization: “ I kill the Jew because the Jew is evil.”
To understand the function of such formulations is to realize why they were being 
constructed until the very eve of the war. Propaganda was needed to  combat doubts and 
guilt feelings wherever they arose, whether inside or outside the bureaucracy, and whenever 
they surfaced, before or after the perpetration of the acts.61
58 On this issue see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 79-80.
59 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 72.
60 D. Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema 1933-1945 (revised edn), I.B. Tauris, London/New York, 2001, 
p. 254.
61 Hilberg, The Nazi Holocaust’, pp. 173-174.
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Ultimately, then, it may not be useful to distinguish between dehumanising ideology and 
‘reality,’ between the truth-values of theory and practice. As Finzsch notes in relation to 
British colonial genocide, dehumanisation was the reality, and therefore ‘constituted the 
limits of [colonisers’] imaginative capacity to address those relations’.62 In the words of Bar- 
Tal and Teichman, the ‘psychological intergroup repertoire [in this case, the discursive 
strategy of dehumanisation] provides the basis on which explanations, expectations, 
justifications, and rationalizations for the nature of intergroup relations are drawn and future 
plans are designed.’ That is, a dehumanised discursive system regarding an outgroup 
constitutes the reality within which members of the in-group act.63 Herbert Hirsch calls this 
process a ‘willing suspension of disbelief.’64 Fein expands upon the issue of the purposive, 
strategic and/or goal-oriented nature ofgenocidal thinking:
Genocide ... differs from collective violence ... in that it is centrally planned and purposeful, 
and in that its intent is total. While collective violence often serves to put (or keep) a 
subjugated minority in its place, genocide eliminates the group ... Because the notion of a 
self-destroying society contradicts the classic rational notions of the ends for which society is 
constructed, it is hard to conceive of genocide as ‘rational.’ The term is used herein 
completely neutrally, as ‘based on, or derived from reasoning,’ ... without regard to how 
reasonable is the ideology that forms the gound [sic] of assumptions on which the 
murderer(s) draws to reason. To understand genocides as a class of calculated crimes, such 
crimes must be appreciated as goal-oriented acts from the point of view of their 
perpetrators: genocide is rationally instrumental to their ends, although psychopathic in 
terms of any universalistic ethic. This means that we must first concentrate on the goals of 
its perpetrators to understand why they define the problem as they do -  the Jewish
62 Finzsch, p. 19.
63 See Bar-Tal & Teichman, p. 29. As regards threat, in particular, Bar-Tal notes that ‘[w]hen threat is perceived, 
it is real for the perceivers’ (‘Causes...,’ p. 67). Indeed all social identity formations structure social reality for 
individuals who self-categorise as members of collectivities; see also Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, pp. 67, 106.
64 Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory, p. 104.
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problem, the Armenian problem - implying that the object of their concern is the source of 
the problem. What ends does their murder serve?65
For this reason as well, then, our inquiry must aim to comprehend the discursive strategy of 
dehumanisation as presented on its own terms, while understanding that questions of 
‘individual belief and ‘truth value’ regarding the claims it makes are a diversion from the 
question of its function in genocide.66
I have argued thus far that the question of the ‘reality’ of ‘belief is not in itself relevant, and 
also that an analysis of the necessity for dehumanisation must take place in terms of 
individual and collective registers. These questions have concerned where to find 
dehumanisation, and how to approach it. W e  may henceforth concern ourselves with the 
central question of why dehumanisation exists in genocide - its necessity -  and with its 
features. In order to explain the necessity for dehumanisation we must next turn to the 
examination of the nature of social structures with regard to the expression of violence.
IVc. The Social Legitimisation of Genocidal Violence in the Modern Age
In analysing the question of legitimisation and the social, we may begin from Peter J. Haas’s 
premise that
our conceptions of right and wrong [are] ultimately a function largely of discourse, that is, of 
patterns of thought, language and action. That is, it claims that we judge matters as right or
65 Fein, Accounting For Genocide, pp 7-8
66 In terms of ‘veridicity,’ some scholars have also attempted to include, in a definition o f ‘dehumanisation,’ the 
fact that the out-group do not pose a veridical threat to the ingroup. How ever, for the same reasons, and 
because of the difficulty in objectively defining a veridical’ as opposed to a ‘non-veridical’ ‘threat,’ this does not 
seem to me a useful qualification.
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wrong (or good and evil) on the basis of how we look at the world and the words we use to 
analyze and describe its preconceived parts.67
Thus, societies and institutions legitimise certain types of exclusion, and their expression in 
certain types of violence. Social structures at the same time encourage and discourage the 
exclusion of particular others; and they control the expression of that exclusion by placing 
symbolic and physical restraint on such expression both by individuals and by group actors. 
There is no ‘normal’ or ‘innate’ human feeling toward violence (though a ‘normal’ repulsion 
from violence appears a ‘commonsense’ claim, a claim which many scholars perpetuate), 
whether positive or negative (though there does seem to be an extremely common 
repulsion from the visceral physicality of killing for those who practice it at close range, at 
least initially68). Rather, psychological responses by a perpetrator to his or her infliction, or 
involvement in the infliction, of violence upon another is conditioned by that individual’s 
personal socio-historical context, by the normativities of the society to which the violent 
individual belongs, and by the context of any particular act of violence. Dehumanisation is a 
mechanism which operates on and modifies collective and individual constraints upon 
particular expressions of violence. It is a process which, however enacted, allows actors to 
overcome social sanctions and psychological aspects of resistance in order to commit certain 
actions, and to feel certain (more positive) ways about those actions.
The proposition that the dehumanisation of the victim group is a necessary precondition 
for genocide is one contended by many scholars.69 There is widespread agreement that, as 
Finzsch puts it, ‘discourse that endows ... agents with the knowledge/power, justification and
67 Haas, p. 385.
68 Bandura credits this distress to ‘vicariously aroused distress and self-censure’ (‘Moral Disengagement in the 
Perpetration of Inhumanities', p. I 99); I would agree with the aspect of vicarious arousal of distress, while the 
issue of ‘vicariously aroused self-censure’ would seem more problematic.
69 See for example Bar-Tal & Teichman, p. 54, Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 96; Kelman & Hamilton in Cohen, States of 
Denial, pp. 89-90. I deal elsewhere in this chapter with the opposite contention, as put by Fein and by Kuper, that 
dehumanisation is not necessary for genocide.
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rationale for their practices’ is a necessary element in genocide.70 Since genocide, as defined 
by the United Nations, requires intent, any form of genocide requires discursive 
preparation.71 Furthermore, dehumanisation, it is often argued, is necessary because it is a 
process of moral disengagement which legitimises killing which would otherwise be morally 
(or even physically) unacceptable.
One way in which this takes place is through the creation of systems of meaning which re­
label both victims themselves, and actions taken towards them. According to Haas,
meaning in ethics, like any o ther meaning, is in the end a m atter of relationships among 
established and significant entities. W e  com e to  understand w hat something is, o r m ore to 
the point, w hat that something means, through the way w e label o r describe it, and then (o r 
even thereby) set it in relationship to o ther things. This is because something can be 
evaluated and invested w ith significance only when it is placed som ew here in the 
com prehended universe; that is, when it is understood to be like one thing and not like 
another. In short, a thing o r act o r phenom enon makes sense once it is placed into an 
existing taxonom ic grid through which the profusion and com plexity of reality is organized 
and reduced to manageable term s.72
In regard to genocide, Haas continues, meaning is so constructed that elimination of an 
outgroup is seen to fulfil a larger good.73 Murray Edelman uses the work of Konrad Lorenz 
on pseudo-speciation, the process by which humans perceive other human groups as 
different species: ‘[b]y virtue of pseudo-speciation,’ Edelman argues, ‘to kill enemies is not 
perceived as murder in advanced societies and to degrade people defined as inferior is not
70 Finzsch, pp. 5-6.
71 Finzsch, p. 6
72 Haas, p. 387. On this issue, see also Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 239-240.
73 Haas, p. 387. I would add that the nature of that good varies from case to case and from individual to 
individual.
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perceived as oppression.’74 According to Fein, ‘[o]ffenses against persons outside the 
universe of obligation will not be socially recognized and labelled as crime ... Collective 
violence is an offence against a class whose members are outside the universe of 
obligation.’75 For Fein, as we have seen, it is a necessary (but not sufficient) precondition of 
genocide that ‘the victims have previously been defined outside the universe of moral 
obligation of the dominant group.’76 Exclusion of victims from this universe need not entail 
dehumanisation as such, but Fein still sees exclusion as prerequisite - and while Fein argues 
that one may be outside the circle of obligation without being dehumanised, extreme 
dehumanisation surely places victims outside this circle.
However, this in itself is not sufficient to explain the necessity for dehumanisation. W e  
have established that we cannot glibly assume that societies or individuals hold killing in 
general to be illegitimate or morally unacceptable, particularly given the practices of warfare 
and capital punishment. At this point, it becomes necessary to turn to the context of the 
modern period to understand why dehumanisation has become necessary specifically in the 
modern age. In saying this, I should add that I do not intend here to divert the course of my 
exposition by entering into any of the protracted and complex arguments concerning the 
nature, the features, or the conceptual and practical domains of existence of ‘modernity.’ 
Rather, despite my employment of some theoretical work which is very concerned with 
these issues, my intent is to use the term ‘epochally,’ that is, to point to some concepts and 
practices, the existence of which is relatively uncontroversial, which have emerged in 
Western societies in the period since the late seventeenth century; and to explain how it is
74 Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence, Markham Publishing Company, Chicago, 
1971, pp. 63; my italics. W hile Edelman mentions Lorenz, as a concept, ‘pseudospeciation’ is generally associated 
with the work of psychologist Erik Erikson.
75 Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, p. 36.
76 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, p. 9.
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that these characteristics have shaped the discursive sphere with regard to the practice of 
genocidal violence.77
To paint with a broad brush, we may say in a general sense that, in the period before the 
Common Era, among cultures we may loosely term culturally ‘proto-Western,’ the 
destruction of a collective entity, including non-combatants, was a morally accepted possible 
outcome of war between collectivities which were tribal and/or relatively small (at least in 
comparison to the modern age of the nation-state existing on the global scale).78 In the 
period between the ascendance of Christianity and the modern age, however, the concept 
that we would now term ‘genocide’ (as opposed to the practice of the destruction or 
attempted destruction of particular groups, which was by no means uncommon) was not 
conceivable in modern terms, given the construction of a more permeable ingroup based on 
religious belief (in theory, a non-essentialised characteristic), the normative model of 
governance through hierarchical but non-homogenous empires, and the Christian 
prohibition on killing (however ambiguous and little observed). The rise of, on the one 
hand, the nation state, and, on the other, biological science, would change these conceptions, 
making ‘genocide’ conceivable and possible, and at the same time necessitating 
dehumanisation as an aspect of such genocide.79 The relationship between genocide and the
77 See A. J. Vetlesen, ‘Yugoslavia, Genocide and Modernity’, in J. Kaye & B. Strath (eds), Enlightenment and 
Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity (Series philosophy & politics; No. 5), P.I.E. - Peter Lang, Brussels, 2000, p.
152.
78 The historical record is not entirely clear, but we can ascertain that these did not necessarily constitute what 
we now call ‘genocide,’ and in particular, they did not involve biological characterisation of the victim group; but 
they can be considered ‘genocidal killing,’ the intended destruction of a ‘people’ as such. See M. Freeman, 
‘Genocide, Civilization, and Modernity,’ The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46, no. 2, 1995, pp. 218-222. Given the 
presence of collective killing, religious and tribal characterisation and other forms of identity-based practice, I by 
no means intend to argue for the absence of dehumanisation per se in this period; however, my concern is with 
changes to the nature of dehumanisation in the context of modern genocidal practice. See also Bauman, The 
Duty To Remember’, pp. 32-33.
79 On the novel possibility of genocide, see Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, pp. 40-41. W hile Bauman’s 
implicit thesis that it is only the Holocaust which has created this possibility is problematic, his argument 
regarding the conceivability of genocide in the modern age is insightful; that is, as he puts it, we now inhabit an
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discursive strands of biological science, biopolitics, and centralised bureaucratic techniques of 
population has been dealt with extensively elsewhere, and I will return to the question of 
these specific aspects of modern discourse in examination of the typologies of genocidal 
dehumanisation;80 here, I will focus on changes in conceptions of violence and legitimacy.
In the age of the nation-state, and of total war, two important changes occurred in terms 
of the legitimacy of violence, in alignment with the characteristically contradictory focus of 
the discourses of modernity upon inclusiveness and exclusivity.
On the one hand, a particular distinction developed between combatants and non- 
combatants, and between those who controlled the actions of the nation-state and those 
who were subject to that control; and, in theory, mass killing came to be considered 
legitimate only when directed against combatants, or in pursuit of military aims. The simple 
existence of the power to enact such killing was not, in itself, a sufficient justification.81 That 
is, in discursive terms, as shown by Max Weber, a monopoly on legitimate violence (and 
therefore control) was now exercised by the nation-state: this allowed a certain legitimacy 
to inhere in participation in given actions simply because they were directed by ‘the nation­
state.’82 However, the mere existence of a (‘denationalised’) collectivity (within a nation-
age where ‘vexing problems’ may have their ‘final solutions.’ The new conception of the boundaries of identity 
did not, of course, only have repercussions in terms of genocide; Orlando Patterson suggests, for example, that 
in North America, while initially black and white ‘slaves’ and ‘servants’ were more or less synonymous, from the 
late seventeenth century onwards a view emerged in which black slaves ‘did not belong to the same community 
of Christian, civilized Europeans’ (p. 7).
80 Most notably in Zygmunt Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust; see also R. Savage, ‘Disease Incarnate: 
Biopolitical Discourse and Genocidal Dehumanisation in the Age of Modernity’, Journal of Historical Sociology, vol. 
20, no. 3, 2007, pp. 404-440; andj. Kaye and . Strath (eds), Enlightenment and Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity 
(Series philosophy & politics; No. 5), P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, Brussels, 2000.
81 See Grundy and Weinstein on expansionist justifications for violence (p. 47).
82 M. Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, vol. I, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1978, p. 54; this theme was also important for Norbert Elias’ work on the ‘civilising process.’ For 
discussion of Elias in the context of genocide and modernity, see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 52-53. See also 
Bloxham, p. 203. On the nation-state and the legitimacy of genocide in the context of biopolitics, see also D.
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state) was no longer considered a threat which would legitimise organised killing directed 
against that collectivity.
On the other hand, however, the (limited) protection the empire model had afforded to 
outgroups was swept away, particularly with the ascendancy of the related discourses and 
practices of social Darwinism, scientific-biological essentialism, modern forms of colonialism, 
and ethnic models of nationalism. A t the same time, the technological advances, 
centralisation, and mass-bureaucratic organisational system of modern nations made the 
project of the elimination of a particular collectivity from a particular geographical territory a 
conceivable and practically possible solution to a problem or threat which the very presence 
of that collectivity was now understood to pose.
The implementation of such a solution, however, was not in itself considered a legitimate or 
acceptable use of violence. The ideology of the nation-state (often as opposed to its 
practice) sanctioned the killing of combatants in war, and of individuals in capital punishment. 
The experience of total war also created the new logical, conceptual and technological 
possibility (and therefore, possible desirability) of short-term mass killing on an industrial 
scale; and it devalued human life by a new scale of magnitude.83 However, it did not sanction 
in a clear-cut way the mass killing of civilian collectivities as such (and this remains the case 
in the present day: the purposive mass killing of civilians is not an event in which every 
member of a society participates on an everyday, ongoing basis, nor is it, speaking in terms 
of public national and international values, generally considered to be a standard and 
acceptable solution to the fact that an outgroup or another nation-state is seen to pose a 
problem). Therefore, the newly conceivable desire to carry out genocidal actions as a
Stone, ‘Biopower and Modern Genocide’, in A. D. Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and 
Subaltern Resistance in World History, Berghahn Books, New York & Oxford, 2008, p. 165.
83 P. Bartrop, The relationship between war and genocide in the twentieth century: a consideration’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, vol. 4 no. 4, 2002, pp. 523-524, 529; M. Shaw, The general hybridity of war and genocide,’ 
Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, September, pp. 467-468.
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solution to a perceived problem was frustrated by the fact that violent action of this kind 
was now defined as illegitimate. This problem, however, could be resolved by finding a 
justification for the use of such violence.84
Illegitimate violence can be justified in two ways. It can be justified ideologically -  that is, 
the redefinition of violence as legitimate through the ideological rejection of previous 
normativities which would define it as illegitimate (as, for example, in a Nietzschean rejection 
of the ideal of protecting the weak and vulnerable). More commonly, however, violence is 
justified through harmonising the perception of the meaning of such violence by ‘reading’ or 
reframing it in terms of violence which is considered to be legitimate (as, for example, in the 
use of a military narrative regarding the killing of non-combatants). As Cohen notes, 
‘deviance’, whether individual or collective, is much more commonly justified not through 
the out-of-hand rejection of the moral standards it violates, but through acceptance of those 
norms accompanied by a justification as to why it does not in fact violate them, or why it is a 
less severe violation than would appear to be the case.85 Social and moral normativities, 
however, are deeply ingrained, and are not manipulated and/or jettisoned with psychological 
ease.86 In either case, therefore, there is a need for a mechanism which allows a process of 
integrative legitimisation to take place; that is, a mechanism which allows the denial of the 
act as such, through (to employ Cohen’s categories) interpretive denial (‘what happened is 
really something else’) and/or implicatory denial (‘what happened is justified’).87 Such a 
mechanism can be supplied through the practice of a particular discursive strategy regarding 
the victim group.
84 See H. Zukier, The “ Mindless Years” ? A reconsideration of the Psychological Dimensions of the Holocaust, 
1938-1945’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. I I, no. 2, 1997, pp. 197-198; Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, 
pp. 52-53.
85 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 60, 77. Cohen recognises the fact that this theory developed regarding the individual 
within society, but argues that it can be generalised to include groups in the context of intergroup relationships.
86 On this point, see Cohen, States of Denial p. 60.
87 Cohen, States of Denial, p 103.
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IVd. Dehumanisation: A Strategic Mechanism of Deproblematisation
In the idealistic and ideological age of modernity, then, an era in which limitless violence in 
pursuit of naked self-interest is not moral justification in itself, dehumanisation becomes a 
necessary accompaniment to killing and destruction which would otherwise be considered 
immoral, non-normative, or indicative of national pathology: the mass killing and destruction 
of civilians. Modern dehumanisation can thus be considered a strategy which legitimises 
certain actions (whether past, present or future) which would otherwise be considered 
immoral.88 Furthermore, given such a desire on the part of national leaders, it is a strategy 
which manufactures a consensus of acquiescence within the populace, ensuring that, from 
the pool of individuals not originally ideologically intent upon the desired genocidal action, 
there will be enough support or indifference to provide the required number of willing 
perpetrators and acquiescent bystanders for action to take place without the threat of major 
protest or social upheaval.89
In other words, the dehumanisation of victims does not take place solely in the eyes of 
those who are directly involved in the perpetration of genocide. Cohen suggests that 
intervention is less likely ‘when people are unable to identify with the victim ... we help our 
family, friends, community, “ people like us” , not those excluded from our moral universe.’90 
An habituating process of dehumanisation is necessary for these conditions to be fulfilled: 
‘[bjystanders, like perpetrators, are gradually drawn into accepting as normal actions which 
are initially repugnant,’ and these bystanders must feel neither sympathy nor empathy with
88 Dehumanisation, as a functionality, can also be read as a functional belief; for an overview of conceptions of the 
different functions of belief systems, see Bar-Tal, Group Reliefs, pp. 18-21.
89 Cohen notes that denial must be simultaneous, designed to address a number of different audiences 
(perpetrator in-group as a group and as individuals, bystanders and beneficiaries as groups and as individuals, and 
so forth) at different points in time regarding the act (before, during, and after) (States of Denial, p. 82).
90 Cohen, States of Denial, p. 16.
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victims, nor identify with them.91 For this reason, as well as those already examined in the 
introduction, it is necessary to examine dehumanising utterances not only in the discourse of 
perpetrators themselves, but also within the genocidal society, in newspapers, films, journals, 
courts and other fora which give insight into public opinion which is considered acceptable 
to voice. As George Steiner writes, ‘men are accomplices to that which leaves them 
indifferent.’92
Dehumanisation, then, is a strategy and a mechanism which addresses the problems raised 
by the decision to enact genocide (and this decision may in itself involve dehumanisation as a 
motivation93), by collective responses to such a decision, and by individual participation in 
such action. This mechanism functions through the construction of a consensus regarding 
the necessity for and/or the legitimate use of particular types of violence against particular 
collectivities, which at the same time assuages the psychosocial dissonance which the 
existence of, and action upon, such a consensus create, both for collectivities and for 
individuals. As we have seen above, the questions of the credibility of the basis for such a 
discursive construction, and of its credibility in the mind of the individual, are not of primary 
importance. According to Bandura, ‘[m]oral functioning is ... governed by 
self-reactive selfhood rather than by dispassionate abstract reasoning’;94 and, as Cohen 
points out, the human psyche seems to have a capacity to know and not-know at the same 
time -  paradoxically, in order to make sure we do not know something, we must know 
what it is that we must not know.95 What is necessary, rather than firm ideological belief in
91 Cohen, States of Denial, pp. 16, 72.
92 George Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966, Penguin, Middlesex, 1969, p. 131.
93 See Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 94.
94 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 101.
95 Cohen, States of Denial, pp. 21-50. This concept has been related, by Cohen and others, to Sartre’s concept of 
‘bad faith.’
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the truth-value of dehumanising claims, is a coherent narrative -  a ‘script’ or an ‘account’96 -  
which allows one to justify one’s actions both to oneself as an individual, to all individuals 
within the perpetrator group, and (in many and perhaps all cases) to individual and collective 
bystanders and observers, whether internal or external, both before, during, and after acts 
of genocidal violence. Dehumanisation is this account.
V. How?: T h e Functions of D ehum anisation
Va. The Creation of Distance
P/0: . . . In  truth, it came to me only afterward: I had taken the life o f a neighbour. I mean, at the 
fatal instant I did not see in him what he had been before; I struck someone who was no longer 
either close or strange to me, who wasn’t exactly ordinary anymore, I’m saying like the people you 
meet every day. His features were indeed similar to those o f the person I knew, but nothing firmly 
reminded me that I had lived beside him for a long time.
I am not sure you can truly understand me. I knew him by sight, without knowing him. He was the 
first victim I killed; my vision and thinking had grown clouded.97
It has been established that dehumanisation is necessary in modern genocide inasmuch as it 
addresses certain psychosocial problems caused by the enactment of genocide related to its 
perceived legitimacy, on both the group and the individual level. It remains, then, to explain
96 For the ‘account,’ see Cohen, States of Denial, p. 58-64. Cohen notes that, in contrast to a Freudian 
‘rationalization,’ an account must be present before an act (p. 58). Cohen’s concept of the ‘account’ could be 
seen as existing within Haas’s ‘ethical system’ (p. 384), which
establishes] standards and procedures fo r defining what is right and wrong in a culture ... It includes a 
pattern of discourse that provided a systematic definition of good and evil, it was able to shape and judge 
conduct as good or bad in terms of these standards, it drew on a wide range of outside 'scientific' warrants 
to  lend its view credibility, and it allowed for discussion and divergence of interpretation within certain 
boundaries.
97 ‘Pio’ quoted in Hatzfeld, pp. 23-24.
Chapter 4 162
how dehumanisation functions in addressing these problems. This question can be answered 
by an examination of the different ways in which it manifests, what ends are served in each 
case, and how these cases are interconnected (that is, how they can be considered subtypes 
of a single, but differentiated, phenomenon). W e  must ask how dehumanisation actually 
‘works’ in terms of the construction of victim by perpetrator, both at the collective and the 
individual level. In doing so, I will make references to numerous illustrative examples of 
dehumanisation in action.
Dehumanisation shapes intergroup relationships: a set of utterances characterise the victim 
group in a way which places psychological, and therefore moral, distance between 
perpetrator and victim and excludes them from the ‘moral community’ of the perpetrator 
(or what Fein called ‘circles of ...’ or a ‘universe of moral obligation’98). Bandura refers to 
‘moral disengagement’ (both individual and collective): people purposively engage and 
disengage their moral standards.99 The experiments of Stanley Milgram have conclusively 
demonstrated that it is easier to harm distant individuals; and, as Waller notes, distance ‘is 
not simply a physical construct; it is a moral and psychological construct as well.’ 100 This is 
demonstrated in the fact that the lack of physical distance in itself is not enough to ensure 
that others are humanised, as we see in cases such as the dehumanising rhetoric of 
American and English slave-owners, or in many physically ‘close’ genocidal episodes, as in 
Rwanda, or in occupied Eastern Europe during the Holocaust. While ‘bureaucratic’ killing 
inherently entails physical, moral, and social distance, face-to-face killing is also enabled by
98 Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective, p. 36.
99 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 102; Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, p. 372.
100 Milgram, pp. 33-41; Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 196-1 97. Robert Sternberg also suggests that one of three 
factors in hate, and an ideology of hate, is the negation of intimacy, the seeking of distance from a target. See 
also Waller, p. 89. This should not be read as an argument that ‘closeness’ as such necessarily inhibits killing or 
violence, though even the commission of ‘close’ killing and maltreatment, directed at an individual, may 
nonetheless be motivated, justified or legitimised by a categorical understanding of victim/s as ‘distant’ (for 
example, as women, homosexuals, bureaucrats, rivals, etc) (in Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 87).
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the victims having already ‘died a “ social death” in the eyes of the perpetrator.’ 101 The 
Khmer Rouge, for example, spoke of ‘cutting off one’s feelings/heart’ toward a victim . 102 In 
these situations, discursive, and therefore psychological and moral, distance has been created 
which changes the meaning of killing in the psyche of the perpetrator. 103
Vb. A Necessary Precondition for Genocide
In the modern age, dehumanised outgroups become excluded, abjected ‘life unworthy of 
life’ outside the bounds of humanity and of human moral obligation; but while this means 
that they may be destroyed, and that the psychosocial dissonance caused by destruction may 
be more easily countered, it does not provide a motivation for destruction. W e have seen 
that dehumanisation enables genocide, but it by no means always causes (in the sense of 
solely motivating) massacre, or always has massacre as a result. 104 Indeed, some level of 
dehumanisation may be obligatory for the functioning of modern societies. So we cannot 
take for granted the concept of dehumanisation as necessary for genocide.
A number of critiques have been made of dehumanisation viewed as a necessary 
precondition for genocide. Kuper writes that, as well as dehumanisation without massacre,
101 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 197.
102 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 203.
103 For a discussion of separation and distance in discrimination and aggression from a social psychology 
perspective, see Graumann, pp. 49-50.
104 Given the complexity of genocide, monocausal explanations are universally insufficient. As Daniel Bar-Tal and 
Yona Teichman write, ‘the various theories of stereotypes and prejudice formation and change should be seen as 
complementary’ in terms of ‘putting together the pieces of the puzzle’ of genocide (Bar-Tal & Teichman, p. 55). 
See also Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 96; Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. I 38-1 39. Bar-Tal quotes Seliktar (in the context 
of foreign policy) as writing that ‘we cannot infer directly from a collective belief system to a particular decision. 
Nevertheless, the belief system can serve as a collective “ cognitive map” of the ... environment’ (Bar-Tal, Group 
Beliefs, p. 108). Group beliefs, such as dehumanising beliefs, provide a cognitive basis and a prescriptive formula 
for action, and they provide explanations for this action; that is, while not a total explanation, they are at the least 
an important determinant in group action (Group Beliefs, p. 109).
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there may be massacre without dehumanisation.105 I would respond that, while massacre 
without literal dehumanisation (the denial that the victim is ‘human’) certainly occurs, 
massacre by its nature takes place because the victim is viewed not as an individual but as a 
member of a collectivity, as Kuper elsewhere notes. 106 In this sense we cannot say that 
there is massacre without dehumanisation: Bauman calls this process of abstraction 
‘categorical murder.’ 107 Fein has taken issue with the concept of dehumanisation as a factor 
in genocide in that it ‘presumes a universalistic norm barring violence’; 108 Kuper also argues, 
justly, that the rights accorded to those considered ‘human’ vary immensely. 109
W e have already answered one of these objections, in arguing that, though, with Fein, we 
cannot presume norms barring violence or an initial repugnance to violence, in most, 
perhaps all, modern societies -  which inescapably exist within the globalised system of the 
nation-state as a normative model of governance, in the context of international scrutiny (or 
at least with the possibility of such scrutiny omnipresent) -  certain types of violence create 
dissonance which requires techniques of management. Fein’s objection does, however, point 
to the fact that there is not an inevitable link between the presence of this type of utterance 
(at any register, individual or collective, public or private) and the occurrence of genocide or 
massacre. 110 We must take into consideration the historical, cultural and temporal 
dimensions of particular utterances when considering causation and the presence and role of 
dehumanisation either as a motivation, or as an enabling factor. In Germany, for example, 
Jews were being referred to by some as disease organisms for many decades during which 
they were not killed by the state. It is only when other conditions obtain that such rhetoric 
comes to have a role to play in the subjugation and/or elimination of the outgroup whom it
105 Kuper, p. 92.
106 Kuper, pp. 86, 104. On the connection in the modern era between genocide, categorisation and the human as 
an abstraction, see also Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, pp. 35-38.
107 Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, pp. 36-38
108 Fein, Genocide, p. 36.
109 Kuper, p. 86.
110 See Bar-Tal, ‘Causes...,’ pp. 74, 76.
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stigmatises. However, in these cases, its pre-existence is indispensable; as Kelman and 
Hamilton write, ‘[t]he traditions, the habits, the images, and the vocabularies for 
dehumanizing such groups are already well established and can be drawn upon when the 
groups are selected for massacre’; or, in the words of Andreas Musolff, ‘once [a] scenario 
was established as a common and even dominant “frame of reference” in public discourse, it 
was available for reinterpretation.’111
The conditions under which this process occurs are partially determined by the 
interconnections of specific discursive tropes and connections in the context of their 
historical evolution: in terms of Nazi metaphors concerning the nation as a body threatened 
by disease and parasites (to which we will turn in Chapter Five), Musolff notes that ‘[t]he 
apparent “ conclusiveness” of this model for genocide derives not so much from the 
individual “ content” aspects of Hitler’s metaphorization of Jews as parasites (which were 
long-established conventional clichés of antisemitic discourse) but from their integration in 
scenarios that have their own internal logic.’112 However, these conditions also exist in 
relation to other events outside the context of verbal discursivity. George Mosse, for 
example, argues that, although in Germany violent or eliminatory racial antisemitism rose 
and fell in presence and respectability over a period of time between its inception and the 
Shoah itself, ‘it was not completely unproductive ... It helped to prepare the nation for the 
events that followed ... it contributed to shaping a state of mind that either apathetically 
acquiesced in or actively supported the final verdict.’113
111 Kelman & Hamilton, The My Lai Massacre’, pp. 20-4-205; A. Musolff, ‘W hat role do metaphors play in racial 
prejudice? The function of antisemitic imagery in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 41, no. I, 2007, 
pp. 42-43.
"2 Musolff, p. 41.
113 G. L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, Howard Fertig, New  York, 1981 
(first edn 1964), pp. 139-140.
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Prejudice, then - and particularly discursively vicious forms of prejudice - do not lead 
automatically to genocide, but they have an important role to play in preparing the discursive 
ground, both in terms of the exclusion of a group, and in terms of the acceptability of violent 
action toward that group: as Jacques Semelin writes, ‘the public declarations provide 
those who shall be involved in the massacres, in advance, with frameworks of 
interpretation and legitimization of their actions.’114 This argument is borne out empirically. 
Ervin Staub notes, in relation to the Shoah, that ‘[i]n general, Nazis were able to kill more 
Jews in those countries where anti-Semitism and discrimination against Jews were already 
strong’;115 according to Fein, ‘[ojpportunities, costs, and sanctions are weighed by the 
perpetrators. But leaders could not have chosen annihilation (rejecting assimilation) had not 
the victims been previously defined as basically of a different species, outside of the common 
conscience, and beyond the universe of obligation: this was the precondition.’116 Again, in 
the former Yugoslavia, Cathie Carmichael explains that ‘[ajccording to Norman Cigar, 
Serbian scholars specialising in Oriental Studies... “ contributed considerably to making 
hostility towards the Muslim community intellectually respectable among the broad strata of 
the Serbian population” ... The link between the propaganda of the 1980s and the fighting of 
the 1990s has been well documented.’117
This connection is not only theorised by scholars, but has, on occasion, been accepted by 
perpetrators themselves: Cigar gives the example of Vuk Draskovic’s novel Noz (Knife) 
(1982) which
114 Semelin, Toward a vocabulary’, p. 199.
115 Staub, The roots o f evil, pp. 60-61. See also Fein, Accounting For Genocide, p. 6.
116 Fein, Accounting for Genocide, p. 8.
117 C. Carmichael, Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: nationalism and the destruction of tradition, Routledge, London, 
2002, pp. 32-33. See N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of'Ethnic Cleansing’, Texas A & M University Press, 
Texas, 1995, pp. 27-28, 70.
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contains an explicit denial of the Muslims’ existence as a legitimate community. According to 
Draskovic’s central story line, Muslims are supposedly really only descendants of Serbs who 
had converted centuries earlier, thereby betraying their own nation ... Draskovic ... lashed 
out vehemently at the ‘fury of offensive and intolerant Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, the Sandzak, 
and Herzegovina ... [at] the vampire-like resurgence of the tradition of Shariah [religious 
law], and...the strategy of jihad [holy war] with the goal of creating an Islamic state in the 
Balkans.’
That the written word during this phase already had a concrete negative influence can be 
gauged from the effect it had on the future commander of the militia -  the Serbian Guard -  
that Draskovic established later. As the future commander admitted in the late 1980s, ‘I 
beat up many Muslims and Croatians on vacation in Cavtat because of his [Draskovic’s] Noz. 
Reading that book, I would see red, I would get up, select the biggest fellow in the beach, 
and smash his teeth.’ " 8
However, in other instances, without the existence of other causal factors, and without its 
adoption in certain strata of society (i.e., public and institutional), such rhetoric may simply 
‘fizzle out’ over time, may disappear from use without having ever become a factor in 
institutionalised subjugation or destruction.
It is a mistake, that is to say, to understand the relationship between prejudice and 
organised subjugation or destruction as teleological, to read genocidal episodes as the 
inevitable endpoint of a linear and historically increasing prejudice.119 Distinct types of 
utterances exist over periods in which the treatment of their object changes dramatically. 
But it must also be recalled that such utterances emerge at particular historical moments 
from situated events, and their usage in specific situations has consequences. What is 
unthinkable at one time or in one milieu, with the right discursive context, becomes
118 Cigar, p. 25.
119 On this issue in the context of genocide and massacre, see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 62-63.
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thinkable and acceptable in another; what was once ‘empty’ rhetoric becomes a specific 
blueprint for action.
In order to understand how such discourse functions in any given situation one must ask 
who is using it, how it is used, what reception it receives, what action is being taken at the 
time of its use, and (if possible) its development over time in regard to the aforementioned 
factors. While, as mentioned in the examination of methodological concerns, this thesis will 
not embark upon an in-depth textual analysis of every individual utterance presented, a 
detailed socio-historical analysis of types of utterances in their context will be dealt with in 
the typological chapters. Here, however, we must return to the more general question of 
the functional roles played by dehumanisation in genocide and mass killing. As we have 
already intimated, in modern genocide, dehumanisation can play not one, but two, important 
and crucially distinct roles: legitimisation and motivation.
Vc. Legitimisation, Motivation and the Continuum of Dehumanisation: A Question of Threat
Either they are bad, or they do not count.
-  N ev itt Sanford and Craig C om stock .120
Firstly, how can we define the difference between these terms? Motivation, it should be 
clear enough, is the reason ‘why we had to do it’; while legitimisation explains ‘why it was 
acceptable to do it,’ through the discursive strategy which defines victims outside the 
category of those to whom human moral obligation is owed.121
120 Sanford & Comstock, p. 326
121 These may be related to the distinction drawn by Eagleton between ideology which serves social interests, 
and ideology which legitimates social interests. T. Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (revised and expanded edn), 
Verso, London & New York, 2007, p. 55.
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There has been a great deal of historical research into motivation in terms of constructions 
of victim groups in particular genocidal episodes. In the context of the aims of this thesis, I 
concur with Kelman and Hamilton when they write, of the sanctioned massacre, ‘[i]t is more 
instructive to look not at motives for violence but at the conditions under which the usual 
moral inhibitions against violence become weakened ... Through dehumanization, the actors’ 
attitudes toward the target and toward themselves become so structured that it is neither 
necessary nor possible for them to view the relationship in moral terms’ (unless, we might 
add, those terms in fact construct killing itself as moral).122 Hermann Pfannmuller, for 
example, a Nazi physician who was an enthusiastic killer of both children and adults 
‘unworthy of life’, described patients as exhibiting ‘only the semblance of a human 
existence.’123 The psychiatrist and eugenicist Alfred Hoche invoked a concept of ‘mental 
death’ in which people became 8allastexistenzen (‘human ballast’); to put such people to 
death ‘is not to be equated with other types of killing ... but [is] an allowable, useful act.’124 
Khmer Rouge interrogators and torturers referred to the ‘enemy’ (khmang) by the 
derogatory third-person pronoun vea, specifically used to refer to people younger than the 
speaker, of subordinate or lowly status, animals and objects, a linguistic register which John 
Marston describes as ‘objectifying self-orientation.’125 In each case, the construction of the 
object makes destruction legitimate.
I have already outlined in the Introduction the way in which the legitimatory function of 
dehumanisation is a mechanism or strategy which, unlike motivatory dehumanisation, is 
universally present in genocidal killing, inasmuch as destruction as a choice must be justified; 
and victims are destroyed not as individuals but because they belong to a collectivity, and
122 Kelman & Hamilton, The My Lai Massacre’, p. 200.
123 Lifton, p. 120.
124 Lifton, p. 47; original italics.
125 These terms were largely dropped from common usage in the ‘class-free’ DK society, but were often used in 
Khmer Rouge publications, speeches and documents in reference to the ‘enemy’ (A. L. Hinton, Why Did They Kill?: 
Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2005, pp. 182- 
183, 191).
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thus are understood not as individuals but as members or representatives of that collectivity, 
one to which collective characteristics can be ascribed. This legitimatory function of 
dehumanisation is therefore a definitional aspect of genocide which has been accorded far 
less attention than the question of motivatory constructions, particularly from a comparative 
perspective. However, as we will see, legitimatory dehumanisation can only be understood 
in terms of its connection with motivatory dehumanisation, as a manifestation of an 
overarching phenomenon.
What is the connection, then, between these two functions of dehumanisation? 
Legitimisation may be considered a less extreme or complete manifestation of motivatory 
dehumanisation, in that dehumanisation may be legitimatory without being motivatory, but 
when it is motivatory it is always legitimatory. That is, the element of threat allegedly posed 
by an out-group motivates destruction, and also legitimises it as self-defence: when 
dehumanisation is motivatory, it is, in the words of Hirsch, both a legitimating mechanism 
and a call for action.’126 This categorisation of the functions of genocidal dehumanisation 
demonstrates the way in which dehumanisation is a continuum. It is a complex and 
differentiated strategy which enables genocide (as well as other forms of mass violence and 
oppression, though that is beyond the terms of this thesis), and which manifests itself 
through mechanisms which can be placed within a spectrum or a range of extremity. The 
present work explores a particular range found at one end of that continuum, within which 
the self-fulfilling nature of this process is taken to the extreme, and the humanity of the 
outgroup is literally and entirely removed through physical destruction.127
126 Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory, p. 104; my italics. See also Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 94, on the way 
in which deligitimising discourse not only creates meaning in the realm of the psychosocial, but flags behavioural 
intentions toward the outgroup.
127 Paul Chilton describes the self-fulfilling nature of this process as one in which a metaphorical or blending 
textual process creates a coherent cognitive system which, under certain social conditions, is elaborated to the 
point of enactment (P. Chilton, ‘Manipulation, memes and metaphors: The case of Mein Kampf in L. de Saussure 
& P. Schulz [eds], Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind, John Benjamins
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Certain scholars, notably Charny, as well as the psychiatrists Viola W . Bernard, Perry 
Ottenberg and Fritz Redl, have argued that dehumanisation should be understood in this 
way: as a continuum or a spectrum.128 Susan Opotow suggests that ‘moral exclusion’ exists 
in mild and severe forms, which share the following vital underlying characteristics: 
‘perpetrators perceive others as psychologically distant, lack constructive moral obligations 
toward others, view others as expendable and undeserving, and deny others’ rights, dignity, 
and autonomy.’129 W hat has not been undertaken, however, is an analysis of what such a 
continuum might actually consist of, nor of the relationship between its constituent elements 
across a range of manifestation. For example, Bernard, Perry and Redl suggest that there 
are two different types of dehumanisation: partial dehumanisation, in which out-groups are 
perceived as sub-humans, bad humans, or super-humans; and complete dehumanisation, in 
which out-groups are seen as statistics or commodities. The first type of dehumanisation 
engenders feelings of hostility and fear, while the predominant emotional tone of the second 
is apathy.130 In Jean Hatzfeld’s interviews with perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, for 
example, both these attitudes are present:
P IO : W e  no  longer saw  a hum an being w h en  w e  tu rn ed  up a Tu ts i in th e  sw am ps. I m ean a
person  like us, sharing sim ilar thoughts and fee lings.131
Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2005, p. 39). O n  the issue of construction of the enemy other as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy, see also Semelin, T o w a rd  a vocabulary’, p. I 98.
128 In the field of social psychology, a model which suggests a continuum between dehumanisation or 
depersonalisation, and prejudice or bigotry, has also been suggested; see Tileagä, ‘Ideologies of moral exclusion’ 
p. 718; see also Billig, p. 181. Staub suggests a distinction between ‘devaluation’ and ‘hate’; see Staub, T h e  
Origins and Evolution of H ate’, pp. 59-60. O p o tow  also argues for a ‘spectrum of hate’ in a context of moral 
judgement and exclusion (S. O potow , ‘Hate, Conflict, and Moral Exclusion’, in Sternberg, pp. 121-122, 130, 138- 
I 39). In the same volume, however, David Moshman suggests that ‘dehumanization is more important than 
hatred as a basis for genocide’ (D . Moshman, ‘Genocidal Hatred: N o w  You See It, N o w  You D on ’t ’, in Sternberg, 
pp. 206-207).
129 O potow , ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice’, p. 2.
130 Viola W .  Bernard, Perry O ttenberg & Fritz Redl ‘Dehumanization’, in N ev itt Sanford & Craig Com stock (eds) 
et al, Sanctions for Evil: Sources o f Social Destructiveness, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 19 7 1, pp. 105-106.
'3i Hatzfeld, pp. 47-48.
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ALPHONSE: ...I do not believe our hearts detested the Tutsis. But it was inevitable to 
think so, since the decision was made by the organizers to kill them all.
To kill so many human beings w ithout wavering, we had to hate with no second thoughts. 
Hatred was the only emotion allowed for the Tutsis. The killings were too well managed to 
leave us room for any other feelings'32
At first, such a distinction may appear as a possible contradiction: an outgroup is seen as 
categorically inferior, but also as able to pose a dangerous threat to an ingroup. A more 
nuanced reading resolves this problem, by associating anger and fear with a perceived 
element of threat constructed through ‘demonising’ characterisation of an outgroup133 -  that 
is, in cases where such construction is motivatory; while a view of the outgroup as 
subhuman or completely non-human, that is, in which dehumanisation is legitimatory, creates 
disgust, apathy, and/or pity (genocide committed, ideologically, ‘more in sorrow than in 
anger’, an ideology which does not impede destruction) . 134 The outgroup becomes a 
‘universal culprit, ’ 135 and, as Waller puts it, a move takes place from legitimate harming (‘it is 
right to harm these people’) to imperative harming (‘it would be wrong not to harm these 
people’ ) . 136
132 Hatzfeld, p. 221.
133 Regarding anger, Kelman and Hamilton (The My Lai Massacre’, p. 199) make the interesting suggestion that in 
‘sanctioned massacres,’
the expressions of anger in the situation itself can more properly be viewed as outcomes rather than causes 
of the violence. They serve to provide the perpetrators with an explanation and rationalization for their 
violent actions and appropriate labels for their emotional state. They also help reinforce, maintain, and 
intensify the violence, but the anger is not the primary source of violence. Hostility toward the target, 
historically rooted or situationally induced, contributes heavily toward the violence, but it does so largely by 
dehumanizing the victims rather than by motivating violence against them in the first place.
134 This monolithic construction of stereotyped or prejudiced attitudes also seems to appear in other fields: Bar- 
Tal & Teichman note, for example, that ‘[t]he characteristics of a stereotype’s intensity and extensiveness are of 
great importance but have been almost completely disregarded by sociological research’ (Bar-Tal & Teichman, p. 
52).
135 Kecmanovic quoted in D. B. MacDonald, Balkan holocausts?: Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and 
the war in Yugoslavia, Manchester University Press, Manchester (New York), 2002, p. 30.
136 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 202. On killing as imperative, see also Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 255.
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[l]n a perverse way, the ideology that generates a genocide demonstrates at the same time 
that the people committing it believe that they are following their conscience. The self­
defensive ‘kill so that you may not be killed’ is usually not sufficient to mobilize the masses; 
the victim must be seen as a demon and his killing as a universally beneficial act. Even at his 
worst, man likes to think that he is doing good.137
What distinguishes motivatory from legitimatory dehumanisation, then, is the presence or 
absence of the element of threat (and the element of threat is what is often being obliquely 
referred to when the term ‘démonisation’ is used).138 The perception of threat, like 
legitimatory dehumanisation, allows moral disengagement, but unlike legitimatory 
dehumanisation, it also calls for action, as in this example from Rwanda;
LEOPORD: Our Tutsi neighbours, we knew they were guilty of no misdoing, but we thought 
all Tutsis at fault for our constant troubles. W e  no longer looked at them one by one; we 
no longer stopped to recognize them as they had been, not even as colleagues. They had 
become a threat greater than all we had experienced together, more important than our 
way of seeing things in the community. That’s how we reasoned and how we killed at the 
time.139
137 Anzulovic quoted in Carmichael, p. 81.
138 See, for example, Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory, pp. 99-100; S. J. Kaufman, ‘Symbolic Politics or 
Rational Choice?: Testing Theories of Extreme Ethnic Violence’, International Security, vol. 30, no. 4, 2006, p. 53; 
Bar-Tal, ‘Causes,’ pp. 67-73; Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 47-48. An analysis of the different types of threat 
which an in-group understands to be posed against it by an out-group can be found in the intergroup threat 
theory presented by W . G. Stephan & C. W . Stephan, ‘An integrated threat theory of prejudice’ in S. Oskamp 
(ed.), Reducing prejudice and discrimination, Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale (New  Jersey), 2000, pp. 23-46; for a 
revision and a general discussion of this theory (respectively) see W . G. Stephan & C. L. Renfro, ‘The role of 
threats in intergroup relations’ in D. Mackie & E. R. Smith (eds), From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions, Psychology 
Press, New York, 2002, pp. 191-208; W . G. Stephen, O. Ybarra & K. R. Morrison, ‘Intergroup Threat Theory’ in 
Todd D. Nelson (ed.), Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination, Psychology Press, New  York, 2009, 
pp. 43-59. For threat and (concomitant) necessity for ‘self-defence’ as a justification, see Cohen, States of Denial, 
pp. 91-92, I 10. For the relationship between the content of beliefs (in this case, the element of threat) and action 
taken upon them, see Bar-Tal, Group Beliefs, p. 96.
139 Hatzfeld, p. 121.
Chapter 4 174
Likewise, in the former Yugoslavia:
Justifying the measures taken against the Muslims proved less of a dilemma than one might 
have expected, thanks in no small part to the conditioning of views by the government’s 
intensive information campaign. This rationalization has often been used to counter the 
threat to the very basis of Serb values and survival. Almost any action, however, would 
appear reasonable in response to a threat of this magnitude, particularly given the concept of 
innate Serbian superiority. In such an atmosphere, and with the Muslims portrayed in such 
negative and dehumanizing terms, it is perhaps not surprising that there were so many Serbs 
ready to carry out atrocities without qualms. The use of stereotypes not only served to 
mobilize the Serbs but helped lump the Muslims into a common category as dangerous, alien 
and implacable enemies against whom it was legally and morally acceptable, and even 
mandatory, to use any means available ... The official Serbian interpretation was that their 
own people were defending and liberating only what was historically and legally theirs, while 
the Muslims were interlopers who had usurped Serbian lands ... Serb leaders also 
emphasised that their actions were only legitimate self-defense and assumed that anyone else 
in their place would do the same.140
As these examples demonstrate, perpetrators ‘view themselves as faultless operators driven 
to injurious conduct by forcible provocation. Their destructive conduct thus becomes a 
justifiable reaction to belligerent provocations,’ an act of self-defence.141 Viewed this way, 
not only are cruel deeds excusable, ‘but one can even feel self-righteous in the process.’142 
Peter Schrijvers gives the following account, taking place during the Second World War:
140 Cigar, p. 81.
141 Albert Bandura ‘Moral Disengagement' in Israel W . Charny (ed.), Encyclopedia of Genocide, ABC-CLIO, 
California, 1999, p. 417; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement, p. I 10; Bandura, ‘Moral 
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 203; Semelin, Toward a vocabulary’, p. 197; Semelin, Purify 
and Destroy, p. 48.
142 Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement’, p. 417; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement’, pp. 29- 
30; Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 198.
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On 4 february [sic] 1945, 69 bombers dropped nearly 160 tons of incendiaries on Kobe and 
destroyed 2.5 million square feet of the city. A sergeant from the 23rd Field Hospital, 
enraged by evidence of Japanese atrocities committed against helpless Filipinos, wrote to his 
mother on 22nd February: ‘I hope to HELL that Tokio [sic] and all of Japan and EVERY Jap is 
completely destroyed in return for the destruction and sufferings they have caused. There 
can be no pity on the Japs and that goes for women and children...’143
Marlow, Joseph Conrad’s famous narrator, wrote of the Africans he encountered that it was 
not their dissimilarity to ‘humans’ which caused them to be fear-inspiring, but their similarity. 
Semelin suggests that dehumanisation may, in a psychological sense, necessitate cruelty, in 
particular disfigurement and death, inasmuch as it becomes necessary to literally disprove 
the humanity of the other.144 The motivatory fear of a threat represented by the other 
might thus be read as related to the threat of recognising oneself in the other, and of 
imagining that the other wishes to do to one, what one plans to do to him/her.145 Mark 
Cocker writes of the European killing of American peoples that
[t]he image of the bestial and pitiless savage which licensed this onslaught was never more a 
portrait of the Mexica, or the Inca, or the Nama, the Herero, the Tasmanians, or even the 
tigers of humankind, the Apache, than it was an image of Europe’s own destructive capacity.
It is a prevailing irony of this story that as the tide of European conquest engulfed tribal 
peoples, so the colonists’ civilisation succumbed to a savage whom they had so violently 
condemned. But the savage was within themselves.146
143 P. Schrijvers, The Gl W ar Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific during World W ar II, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New  York, 2002, p. 259.
144 Semelin, Toward a vocabulary’, pp. 207-208.
145 On this issue, see Semelin, Toward a vocabulary’, p. 206. For extremely numerous examples from Nazi 
propaganda, see J. Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During W orld W ar II and the Holocaust, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 2006.
146 M. Cocker, Rivers o f Blood, Rivers o f Gold: Europe’s Conflict with Tribal Peoples, Pimlico, London, 1999, pp 369- 
370.
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Conversely, it has often been suggested that the creation of a collective self is premised on 
the creation of an other, on a process of negative definition which creates coherence and 
binds the ingroup together; the characteristics and values ascribed to the outgroup are seen 
as a negative reflection of those ascribed to the ingroup, a process which has been termed 
‘counteridentification.,|47 The perception of an external threat may be an important part of 
this process. In the context of genocide, David Bruce MacDonald has suggested that in the 
Balkans,
negative myths have proved most useful in rallying people together under a common cause, 
namely - the defence of the nation from external attack. Such myths convince members of a 
nation that they are in danger, should they choose not to adhere to the national traditions 
and prescriptions laid forth by their leaders... Proving the guilt of the other in trying to 
destroy the self became a central preoccupation of Serbian and Croatian nationalists seeking 
to legitimate many of their often violent activities...148
[a]s Marc Howard Ross has further explained the phenomenon, the isolation of enemies 
who ‘contain unwanted parts of ourselves’ can allow the nation to purge itself of many 
negative attributes, leaving only the good characteristics... ‘Outsiders can then serve as 
objects for externalisation, displacement and projection of intense negative feelings like 
dissenting perspectives, which are present inside the group but denied.’149
In summary, then, an other whose presence is considered undesirable may be constructed 
in various different ways, considered so for various reasons. These reasons form a narrative 
of dehumanisation which may, or may not, contain the element of threat. When it contains 
this element, dehumanisation is a motivatory factor and a legitimatory factor in genocide;
147 Kecmanovic quoted in MacDonald, p. 27. MacDonald also uses the work of Peter Alter to explain the value 
for ingroups of the conceptual creation and ascription of negative characteristics to other collectivities. See also 
Semelin, Toward a vocabulary’, on the ‘identitarian process,’ pp, 196-197; Mosse, 2000, p. 65.
148 MacDonald, p. 35
149 MacDonald, p. 28
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this form of dehumanisation is sometimes present in genocide. When it does not contain 
this element, it is legitimatory but not motivatory; in this aspect, it is a universal element of 
genocidal killing.
Vd. Legitimisation, Motivation and Temporality
N ot only content, but also context must be taken into consideration. It is a distorted view 
to see motivations for genocide as ‘frozen’ for any given individual; rather, motivation may 
change over time.150 Bar-Tal notes, for example, that delegitimisation and the perception of 
threat become a vicious cycle in which each feeds into the other.151 The presence of the 
element of threat is defined not only in an atemporal way, but by the changing circumstances 
of the relationship between perpetrator group and outgroup. For example, a people who 
are seen as inferior but non-threatening may come to be seen as a threat if they resist the 
efforts of the perpetrator group to treat them in the way understood to befit an inferior 
group.152 This is another aspect of the explanation, given above, for the fact that narratives 
of dehumanisation can exist for a long period of time which is not characterised by genocide, 
nor organised or extreme subjugation; yet this does not mean that such narratives do not 
have a strategic role to play in the fact that the outgroup is ultimately treated in such a way. 
As I have already mentioned, we should be wary of a teleological reading of genocide or 
genocidal killing, in which discrimination and dehumanisation grows until it reaches its zenith 
in such actions; rather, there are specific circumstances under which the decision to
150 Mann, ‘Were the Perpetrators of Genocide’, p. 333.
151 Bar-Tal, ‘Causes’, p. 68; Opotow, ‘Deterring...,’, p. 174.
152 See for example Dan Stone on changing anthropological depictions of the Herero in relation to their growing 
resistance to German power, and the subsequent genocide, in the colonial period: D. Stone, ‘White men with 
low moral standards? German anthropology and the Herero Genocide,’ Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, no. 2, 2001, 
pp. 39-42.
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undertake these actions can be, and are, carried out. 153 Pre-existing dehumanisation of the 
outgroup, in its motivatory as well as its legitimatory aspect, can play a role both in the 
taking of such a decision, and, once taken, in its implementation.
While some might suggest that the existence of dehumanising rhetoric may be used as a 
post-hoc moral justification when it was not in fact present before or during the period of 
action, this does not seem to be borne out by the facts. The Rwandan perpetrators 
interviewed by Hatzfeld after the fact did not use anti-Tutsi sentiment as exculpatory. They 
did not insist that they were brainwashed, or that anti-Tutsi sentiment affected them in their 
killing in the marshes. They found it harder to talk about anti-Tutsi sentiment than about 
their first murder. 154 Neither did the killers examined by Christopher Browning describe a 
role for antisemitism in their actions (although admittedly this case was conditioned by the 
fact that the German legal system to which they were subject looked with much greater 
disfavour on killings motivated by prejudice than those committed for other reasons) . 155
To complicate the picture, however, on the individual level dehumanisation seems to be a 
self-reinforcing cycle. On the one hand, in the period before and during violence, 
dehumanisation legitimises violence which is desired for other reasons (and can also 
motivate violence in itself); but when dehumanisation is not present, at least overtly, in the 
stages preceding violence, it seems during and after violence to be a common psychological 
‘defence mechanism’ which is used by perpetrators to justify their actions to themselves and 
others. 156 Dehumanisation, in whatever form it is instituted, by its nature becomes
153 Two randomly-chosen examples might be the rise of technologies of mass media and propaganda, or the 
ascent to  power of a particular group.
154 Hatzfeld, p. 213.
155 Browning, pp. 73-75.
156 Milgram, p. I I ; see also Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 252-253. On dehumanisation of an out-group as a 
corollary of past mistreatment by an in-group, see also Castano & Giner-Sorolla, p. 8 1 6.
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motivatory; it is both a pre- and a post-hoc justificatory strategy. Therefore, its tendency, at 
least at the level of the individual, is to become more extreme; that is, to move toward the 
motivatory end of the continuum.157
Given all of this, we must accept, within our model of a continuum of dehumanisation, that 
the admixture of each of these roles is not only different in different genocidal episodes, but 
that it changes, both over time, and over cultural ‘space’ (that is, it will manifest differently in 
the diverse individual and collective psychologies of the groups and persons involved in 
perpetration) within any single given genocidal episode. Despite this, however, the argument
My use of Milgram’s work may seem problematic, in that Milgram understands ingrained obedience as the 
mechanism which removes objections to the mistreatment of a victim, whereas I am concerned with the way in 
which dehumanisation fulfils that function. These two positions, however, need not be contradictory.
In the first place, I do not argue that it is exclusively dehumanisation which legitimises violence; and my concern is 
not only with legitimisation, but also with motivation, a subject which is touched upon by Milgram only as regards 
the self-perpetuating nature of acts of violence inasmuch as the previous action itself becomes a motivation and 
justification.
Furthermore, Milgram’s work demonstrates the way in which the authority situation dehumanises the victim, by 
placing her/him outside the realm of normal moral obligation; by stripping the ‘closeness’ that the subject feels 
with the victim; by placing the victim, symbolically and physically, at the bottom of the apex of the hierarchical 
systems of value by which all subjects interpret and understand their place and their role in the social world; and 
by the activism of a psychological mechanism within the subject which means that action against the victim is self- 
perpetuating and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy (since, once the situation is initiated, to fail to take action is to 
damage one’s own self-image as a moral being).
A  more detailed discussion of the inherent presence of dehumanisation in the practices of rational-bureaucratic 
modernity will be presented in Chapter Seven. Finally, obedience and dehumanisation can be intimately 
connected, inasmuch as the response to perception of a threat may be obedience to a saviour-figure (in the form 
of a leader or organisation) (Hirsch, Genocide and the Politics of Memory, p. 100).
157 Kelman and Hamilton (The My Lai Massacre’, pp. 204-205) comment appositely:
The dynamics of the massacre process itself further increase the participants’ tendency to dehumanize their 
victims. Those who participate as part of the bureaucratic apparatus increasingly come to see their victims 
as bodies to be counted and entered into their reports, as faceless figures that will determine their 
productivity rates and promotions. Those who participate in the massacre directly - in the field, as it were 
- are reinforced in their perception of the victim as less than human by observing their very victimization. 
The only way they can justify what is being done to these people - both by others and by themselves - and 
the only way they can extract some degree of meaning out of the absurd events in which they find 
themselves participating (see Lifton, 1971, 1973) is by coming to believe that the victims are subhuman and 
deserve to be rooted out. And thus the process of dehumanization feeds on itself.
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above should demonstrate that there is a vital analytical distinction to be drawn between 
these two functions of dehumanisation.
§
In this chapter thus far, I have delineated the two major functions of dehumanisation in a 
theoretical sense; in order to understand the phenomenon in practice, we must turn to the 
question of how, in practice, these functions are fulfilled. The answer to this question lies in 
an examination of the nature and usage of language and metaphor.
V I. Language and M etaphor in G enocidal D ehum anisation
The responsibility for language is, in essence, human responsibility.. . .
-Thomas Mann158
Via. Language, Naming, and Reality 
According to Colin Tatz,
There are clear-cut steps in race politics, including ... the Holocaust... there had to be, and 
there were, six, possibly seven, sequential steps in Nazi race policy and practice: (I) 
formulation of an idea, followed by (2) exposition, (3) justification, (4) adoption, (5) 
legitimisation, (6) implementation and, subsequent to the events, (7) rationalisation (as 
explanation, justification or exculpation) ... Apart from implementation, all other steps, or
158 This quotation is taken from an open letter to the dean of Bonn University, written by Mann when, after 
having exiled himself from the Reich, he was deprived of his honorary doctorate (in Steiner, p. 144).
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fac to rs  in th e  equation , a re  ‘m e re  w o rd s ’. If o n e  fo llo w s the  steps above, it is plain tha t 
w o rd s  can be, and have been, fata l.159
How are words fatal in genocide? In a general sense, as Haas puts it, ‘an ethic [is] a field of 
meaning created through and within the structure of language.’160 If dehumanisation, a 
practice of ethical legitimisation and motivation, is a necessary precondition for genocide, 
language is a necessary, and usually central, component of dehumanisation. In the previous 
chapter, I explored the way in which ‘reality,’ and, more specifically, meaning, is socially 
constructed through discursive processes. I can now turn to the more specific issue of the 
linguistic construction of reality in analysis of genocidal utterances in order to understand 
how dehumanisation functions in practice. How, in genocide, does language shape 
understandings of reality, and how does it therefore shape action?
Language, according to Herbert Hirsch and Roger W . Smith, ‘both shapes and reflects 
experience’:
P e rcep tio n s  o f rea lity  a re  linguistically c rea ted  and m eaning d erives  fro m  th e  cu ltu ra l, social 
and po litical con tex t. In the  social co n stru ct io n  o f reality , language n o t on ly  rep resen ts  
p e rcep tio n s  o f reality , bu t begins to  co n stitu te  it. V ic tim s a re  b o rn  o u t o f fea r and hate, but 
also th rough  language th a t abstracts  and fixes the  iden tity  o f the  o th e r: the  Je w , the  infidel, 
the  en em y o f  the  re v o lu t io n .161
Language constructs reality: and the reality thus constructed is neither random nor 
accidental. Given this, language is the primary tool which is used to accomplish the re­
labelling which is a mechanism of the dehumanisation process (although visual imagery
159 C. Tatz, W ith Intent To Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide, Verso, London, 2003, p. 25.
160 Haas, p. 385.
161 H. Hirsch & R. W .  Smith, T h e  Language of Extermination in Genocide’, in I. W .  Charny (ed.), Genocide: A 
Critical Bibliographic Review, vol. 2, Mansell, London, 1991, p. 387.
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sometimes has a role to play). Edelman argues that ‘[IJanguage forms perform a crucial 
function by creating shared meanings, perceptions, and reassurances among mass publics’; 162 
that is, in the creation, in this case, of potential perpetrators and acquiescent (rather than 
‘indifferent’) bystanders.163 According to Bandura,
[IJanguage shapes thought patterns on which actions are based. Activities can take on very 
different appearances depending on what they are called. Not surprisingly, euphemistic 
language is widely used to make destructive conduct respectable and to reduce personal 
responsibility for i t ... Cognitive restructuring of harmful conduct through moral 
justifications, sanitizing language, and exonerating comparisons is the most effective set of 
psychological mechanisms for disengaging moral control.164
Language is thus a powerful cultural weapon. The power to control language, to name, is 
the power to shape (perceptions of) reality, and action which is taken based on that 
understanding. Louis Althusser has given us the concept of interpellation, of naming, as a 
way in which the subject is not just characterised, but produced. 165 In discussing 
dehumanisation, Tileaga suggests that it is not the case that dehumanising language is simply a 
reflection of what people ‘carry inside their heads’; rather, ‘people are shown to flexibly 
work up, formulate the nature of actions, events, their and other people’s accountability 
through ways of talking that depersonalize, delegitimize and dehumanize a particular group 
... within the cultural and discursive practices of [a] society.’ 166 Language thus creates the
162 Edelman, p. 65.
163 Bajohr notes that the term ‘indifference’ does not accurately capture the active nature of the attitude taken by 
those in a population who did not resist genocidal action (p. 184); we will see this element also in Stanley 
Cohen's explication of the paradoxical need to know what we do not want to know, in order to know it (Cohen, 
States of Denial, pp. 21-50).
164 Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement’, pp. 415-416; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, pp. 104-106.
165 M. Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, p. 30. On the subject of 
naming, we might think of the literal use of this in the Nazi practice of forcing Jews to take the middle names 
‘Israel and ‘Sarah’ (respectively).
166 Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of moral exclusion’, pp. 721-722.
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out-group as such and defines the way in which that group may be treated. Language which 
names victims as sub-human or non-human, therefore, is not incidental to genocide. It is not 
merely decorative. It is an essential part of the process.
The naming function of language occurs both through literal naming, and through 
metaphorical naming. Language literally dehumanises victims when it is ‘demonstrated’ that 
they are not ‘true humans,’ that they are biologically or culturally inferior, that they are 
disease-carrying or prone to disease, that they ‘overbreed’ and so on; in other words, when 
victims are named literally as inferior and/or threatening. But it is more common for 
dehumanising language to be metaphorical. Utterances which name victims as specific 
animals or as disease organisms are explicitly metaphorical -  and we should note that the 
form taken is usually metaphor (‘Jews are a disease’) rather than simile (‘Jews are like a 
disease’), with the resulting implication that, even though the discourse is understood to be 
metaphorical, it refers to an inherent, essentialised ‘nature’ of the victim group, rather than 
indicating a similarity with a thing or a quality. Euphemistic and bureaucratic language is 
implicitly metaphorical, inasmuch as we are aware that human beings are not ‘units,’ ‘pieces,’ 
and so forth, that is, they are not inanimate objects. 167 Also, as we will see, literal and 
metaphorical claims are often used in concert, where the literal claim precedes or justifies 
the metaphor and the metaphor in turn refers to the allegations made in the claim.
The intimate connection between literal and metaphorical dehumanising language should be 
clear, inasmuch as their content -  that is, the claims they make, their function -  are very 
similar or identical. The subject of metaphor is therefore one to which I will pay particular 
attention in the following discussion.
167 As we will see later, however, this language is a near-universal practice, both when dealing with non-human 
animals, in which case we may also suspect that there is a desire to justify action and erase the biological nature 
of action, and in the case of genuinely inanimate objects, where such a desire is not present.
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Vlb. Language, Ethics, and Genocidal Metaphors
How does particular language function to legitimise and justify the ‘unthinkable’? Given that 
our understanding of reality is socially constructed, the language that we use to describe 
action shapes our understanding of the meaning of that action. Metaphor thus constructs 
social reality. 168 Metaphor is sometimes seen as ‘mere rhetorical ornament,’ but it is much 
more (important) than this. 169 Indeed, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that 
‘metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action.’ 170 
According to Lakoff and Johnson, our conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical in 
nature, and, since this conceptual system defines our everyday realities, reality itself is 
defined by metaphor. 171 These metaphors are discussed in terms of ‘discourse forms’ (for 
example, the form ‘argument is war’) which appear and reappear in utterance - in the 
typological chapters we will see the way in which different types of genocidal dehumanisation 
consistently deploy such specific metaphorical forms. 172 However, the relationship between 
metaphor and conceptual reality is bi-directional; metaphors also work to satisfy a purpose, 
that is, when they allow successfully ‘allow us to get a handle on one aspect of the 
concept.’ 173 Therefore, the use of particular metaphors is not random as such, but is 
culturally and historically constructed, and inherently purposive.
As we have seen, it is misleading to think that ‘evil’ somehow ‘intrudes’ to cause genocide. 
Killing (or other genocidal violence such as child removal) is almost never perceived as 
absolutely and universally illegitimate. Rather, this violence enacted toward certain groups is 
illegitimate; for example, as well as the near-universal practice of killing animals (which we
168 J. M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 1998, p. 247.
169 Musolff, pp. 24-25.
170 G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, I 980, p. I .
171 Lakoff & Johnson, Metaphors W e Live By, p. I .
172 Lakoff & Johnson Metaphors We Live By, p. 5.
173 Lakoff & Johnson Metaphors W e Live By, p. 97.
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will explore in Chapter Six), decades before the genocide of Jews, ‘Germany’ had previously 
committed genocide upon the Herero and other peoples in their African colonies. That is 
to say, it was not simply the fact that Germans came to think of killing as legitimate, whereas 
before it had been illegitimate, which allowed the genocide of Jews. The socio-political 
context of particular situations (warfare is a very common precipitator) is often implicated in 
such shifts; however, they are reliant on pre-existing discursive categorisations and their 
ethical implications. In genocidal episodes, discursive thinking is shifted such that certain 
collectivities are discursively moved into different ethical categories. As Haas puts it,
‘diverse evaluative discourses interact with each other, and at times even can be made to 
intermesh such that they become mutually supportive.’174 Thus, for Haas, the Nazi ethic was 
persuasive because ‘it drew implicitly (if not explicitly) upon values and assumptions that 
were already a part of people's descriptions of reality ... It proved powerful and potent 
because it drew upon and organized, in a certain way, insights and perceptions already 
regarded (or very capable of being regarded) as self-evidently, intuitively, correct.’175 But 
how, in practice, are these purposive connections drawn together into a discursive strategy? 
Metaphor is one of the primary way in which this process occurs.
Metaphor is a powerful form of re-labelling: after all, there is a world of difference between 
the murder of a human being and the excision of a cancerous growth, between massacre and 
cleansing. As that example demonstrates, metaphors (in the words of Paul Chilton) are 
‘dynamic and productive’: one domain has its own rich inherent logic, which is then mapped 
onto another which is in material substance entirely different.176 The employment of 
metaphors defines, and can redefine reality, and, specifically, the categories through which
174 Haas, p. 391.
175 Haas, pp. 391-392.
176 Chilton, p. 24. Chilton distinguishes between ‘metaphor’ and ‘blending,’ the second being the site more 
involved in cognitive processing, but for our purposes it is not germane to enlarge upon this distinction.
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we comprehend the world and bestow meaning upon experience. 177 The process of 
categorisation is essential for all animals. 178 In humans, the categories which thus obtain, 
which are constructed through metaphor and which represent themselves as truth, are 
related not to inherent properties, but to interactional properties thus constructed as 
existing between the speaking subject and the object. 179 Furthermore, in regard to ‘truth,’ 
the use of metaphor turns arbitrary assertions into objectified ‘truths’ which ‘anyone can 
see’; 180 and this apparent obvious truth, the quality of ‘going without saying,’ applies to all the 
entailments that a particular metaphor encompasses. 181 In other words, metaphorical 
models not only describe, but structure understanding. 182 Furthermore, metaphors inherently 
produce ideological effects, due to their nature as partial and selective accounts of 
experience. 183
When translated into action, metaphor ‘defines the pattern of perception to which people 
respond’:
Each metaphor intensifies selected perceptions and ignores others, thereby helping one to 
concentrate upon desired consequences of favored public policies and helping one to  ignore 
their unwanted, unthinkable, or irrelevant premises and aftermaths. Each metaphor can be a 
subtle way of highlighting what one wants to  believe and avoiding what one does not wish to
177 Lakoff & Johnson Metaphors We Live By, pp. I 22-124, I 39-146, 157-1 58.
178 Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, pp. 17-19.
179 Lakoff & Johnson Metaphors We Live By, pp. 163-164.
180 Chilton, p. 29.
181 Balkin, p. 247.
187 Balkin, p. 244.
183 Balkin, p. 245-246.
184 Edelman, pp. 67-68.
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The employment of a given metaphor hides aspects of a concept which are inconsistent with 
that metaphor; and this concealment is itself concealed from consciousness. 185
In terms of genocide, it is the destruction of civilian human equals which must be 
concealed. Victims of the National Socialists were not ‘killed,’ but ‘cleaned up,’ ‘disinfected,’ 
or ‘exterminated.’ Such language prevented perpetrators from ‘equating [their actions] with 
their old, “ normal” knowledge of murder and lies.’ 186 Metaphorical language thus renders 
murder non-murderous; Lifton, for example, contends that, through the use of medicalised 
rhetoric which concealed killing, Nazi doctors created an ‘Auschwitz self in which the 
doctor knew he selected, but did not interpret selections as murder; in which the meaning 
of action was completely disavowed. 187 While they did not believe euphemisms such as 
Rampendienst (‘ramp duty’) or Selektion (‘selection’), ‘the language used gave Nazi doctors a 
discourse in which killing was no longer killing; and need not be experienced, or even 
perceived, as killing. As they lived increasingly within that language - and they used it with 
each other - Nazi doctors became imaginatively bound to a psychic realm of derealization, 
disavowal, and nonfeeling.’ 188 As one former Nazi doctor said to Lifton in reference to 
‘euthanasia,’ ‘there was a certain ... sensibility that this couldn’t be, ... [that] one cannot 
simply murder a mentally ill or ... old person or an imbecile.’ 189 As these examples show, 
there was a ‘cognitive link between the presuppositions embodied in the source concepts of
185 Lakoff & Johnson Metaphors W e Live By, pp. 10-1 I , I 52.
186 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (revised and enlarged edn), Penguin, New 
York, 1983, p. 86. This is not to argue that perpetrators are normatively disinclined to involvement in genocide, 
but that they are disinclined to involvement in activities which they conceive as ‘murder’ or ‘lies.’
187 Lifton, p. 422. While earlier in this chapter I have argued against Lifton’s model in moral normative terms, his 
analysis of the way in which action can be reinterpreted by perpetrators does not depend on this aspect of his 
argument.
188 Lifton, p. 445.
189 Lifton, p. 460.
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Nazi antisemitic imagery and the conclusions at the target level of genocidal ideology and 
practice.’190
As well as this legitimisation, however, metaphor also has another function to perform. In 
looking at the way metaphor is used, one begins to see how ‘metaphorising’ victims may fulfil 
the two possible functions of dehumanisation, not only making their killing a legitimate 
possibility, but also representing them as a threat, thus making it a necessity. In Edelman’s 
words, ‘[political metaphors can vividly, potently, and pervasively evoke changed worlds in 
which the remedies for anxieties are clearly perceived and self-serving courses of action are 
sanctified.’191 Hirsch and Smith demonstrate the way in which fear-inspiring images justify 
killing and call for action. Out-groups will ‘be called vermin, infidels, traitors, heretics, 
enemies of the people
[T ]he  use o f such term s by those w ith political authority is a clear sign that the society is 
moving in a genocidal direction. Language becom es an indicator of a shift in the norm ative 
o rder and serves notice that inhibitions against mass killing have begun to  erode ... [s]uch 
term s prepare the victims for destruction by dehumanizing members of the group and 
providing a w arran t fo r genocide.192
Metaphor, in other words, can also motivate, in that metaphors which name victim peoples 
as a threat, at the same time refer, implicitly or explicitly, to a necessary solution to that 
threat -  its destruction.193 According to Charny, ‘[t]he process that makes genocide 
possible does not stop at dehumanization ... what needs to be added to justify taking 
people’s lives is the proof that the others are also a terrible threat to our lives and that it is
'9°  Musolff, p. 25.
191 Edelman, p. 7 1.
192 Hirsch & Smith, p. 388.
193 See Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of moral exclusion,’ pp. 731-732.
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their intent to take our lives away from us unless we stop them first.’ 194 For example, when 
a collective is named in medical rhetoric, the frame that applies is that of disease epidemics, 
in which ‘[t]he survival of the nation, of civilized society, of the world itself is said to be at 
stake - claims that are a familiar part of building a case for repression (an emergency 
requires “drastic measures,” et cetera. ) . ’ 195 These ‘drastic measures’ trump the moral 
codes which apply outside of an ‘emergency’ situation. In the case of National Socialist 
Germany, ‘[t]he language used to portray the Jew as a parasite, as vermin, functioned 
effectively to dehumanize the potential victims and justify their extermination. After all, it is 
legitimate to kill vermin, and it is viewed as self-defense.’ 196 Language which names people as 
a threat not only justifies their destruction, but the perpetrator may even feel self- 
righteous. 197 In the context of the ‘therapeutic’ aspect of genocide, Lifton describes this as 
‘principled mass killing.’ 198 As we have already seen, when discourse is motivatory it is also 
inherently legitimatory. Hence, through the use of specific metaphors, genocide itself may 
come to be seen not only as a possibility, not only as a necessity, but as morally 
praiseworthy in itself.
Dehumanising metaphorical language can therefore play the dual role of motivation and 
legitimisation, of ‘a legitimating mechanism and a call for action.’ Ultimately, what such 
utterances achieve is the strategic recreation of an understanding of the meaning of action, 
through a discursive reinterpretation of the characterisation of the subject of such action.
§
194 Charny, ‘Dehumanization - ‘killing’ the humanity of another’, p. I 56; original italics.
195 S. Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors, reprint, Penguin, London, 2002, p. 171.
196 Hirsch & Smith, p. 389.
197 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 103; this may apply more widely to any set of utterances which 
imply that harmful action is a moral imperative.
198 Lifton, p. 498.
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In the preceding section, we have examined how dehumanisation functions as motivation 
and/or legitimisation, and how this is played out in language. To fit the final piece of the 
puzzle, we must now turn to the different types of actual manifestations of dehumanising 
discourse and see whether these functions appear, and if so, in what specific form, in 
different types of dehumanising discourse. This discussion will serve as an introduction to 
the tripartite typology laid out in the following chapters.
V II. D ehum anisation: A  Typology
I have now distinguished between functions of dehumanisation as motivation, and as 
legitimisation, while acknowledging that, given the nature of dehumanisation as a continuum, 
there is overlap and interchange between these functions. This insight can then be applied 
to the types of manifest dehumanisation. An examination of these types demonstrates the 
relationship between type and function in genocidal dehumanisation. Furthermore, it points 
to the reasons why, in any given time period and society, dehumanisation manifests in 
particular forms; that is, why particular socio-cultural and temporal locations give particular 
forms of dehumanisation the necessary purchase to fulfil their functions.
Very few scholars have noted or paid detailed attention to internal differentiation of 
discourses of dehumanisation. One exception is the important distinction, referred to in the 
work of Haslam et al, between animalistic and mechanistic constructions.199 However, this 
model does not take into account the aspect of threat which, as we have seen, is inherent in 
certain types of dehumanisation. In the course of my own research I have identified a third
199 Haslam et al, pp. 249-25 I . Haslam et al note the difference between the naming of the object as an animal or 
to a ‘lesser human’ as opposed to naming the object as an inanimate automaton. An issue with this work in 
regard to my own argument is that in empirical terms it deals with collectivities, such as ‘artists’ or ‘business 
people,’ which cannot necessarily be considered outgroups as such.
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category -  that of the outgroup as a medicalised biological threat -  to add to this dual 
schemata of animalisation and ‘less-than-human’-isation, and bureaucratic-euphemistic 
reification. Here, and in the following chapters, I deal with these in order from the most to 
the least extreme position on a continuum of dehumanisation.
Type I: ‘Biopolitics’ -  Medical and Military Metaphorical Utterance
This type consists of a set of utterances which use medical and military metaphors to 
identify outgroups as threatening disease organisms and vermin which (therefore) can only 
be dealt with through the use of violence. The connection, which at first may not be 
apparent, between military and medical metaphorical language occurs in the context of the 
discourses of modernity, and is explained in the chapter on this ‘type.’ While there is a 
longstanding connection between illness and otherness, this type has developed in its most 
extreme form in the period since the advent of germ theory in the nineteenth century; it is 
still very much in currency in contemporary episodes. Given the fatal menace which the 
metaphor evokes, the element of threat is always present in this type, and it can therefore 
be considered the most extreme form of motivatory dehumanising discourse.
Type II: Animalising and ‘De-humanising’ Utterance
This type is made up of utterances which animalise the victim group, by naming the victims 
as non-human animals, either metaphorically or literally; and of language which does not 
literally define victims as non-human, but which ‘de-humanises’ them by constructing them as 
inferior to, ‘behind’ or ‘below’ the superior or ‘truer’ humanity or civilisation of the 
perpetrator group. Animalising rhetoric, though far from gone, has less purchase in the
Chapter 4 192
contemporary context than it has had in historical episodes; it has appeared particularly 
often, though by no means exclusively, in the colonial context. This language may either be 
motivatory, when outgroups are named as threatening wild animals, or as posing an 
essentialist cultural or biological threat to the ingroup; or it may be legitimatory, when 
victims are named as ‘lower in the hierarchy’ than the ingroup, or as domesticated, tamed or 
non-dangerous animals. As such, it can be considered an ‘intermediate’ form of 
dehumanisation, situated between medical, and euphemistic, forms.
Type III; Bureaucratic-Euphemistic Reification
This type consists of language which essentially ‘de-biologises’ victim groups, and thus does 
away with both the meaning, and any moral consideration, of action taken toward them (in 
analysing this form of dehumanisation I will also consider what Cohen terms ‘reverse 
euphemism,’ that is, the relabelling of harmful events as less harmful or pejorative ones200). 
Throughout the modern period its function as dehumanisation becomes both less obvious 
and more widespread, as populaces of nation-states have become accustomed to the 
bureaucratic management of human beings as standard practice. It is in these utterances that 
we see in its purest form the separation of the human object from any aspect of 
consideration as a living being to whom obligation of any kind is owed. It should also be 
noted that bureaucratic (as opposed to euphemistic) dehumanisation takes place in situ and is 
generally intended for an audience of direct and indirect perpetrators, rather than external 
bystanders and observers. This type, given that it makes no reference to threat as such, is 
legitimatory, rather than motivatory.
2°° Cohen, States o f Denial, pp. 106 -107.
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In describing these categories, it becomes clear that there is a stable relationship between 
the functions and the types of genocidal dehumanisation. As well as this link, in the following 
chapters I will mention a related argument about the ways in which legitimisation as a 
function (and its manifestation in particular types) might occur in non-genocidal situations. 
W hile much scholarship has overlooked connections of this kind, in the context of the 
question of what cultural discourse can explain Stuart Kaufman posits an empirical link 
between the nature of discursive constructions, and the nature of violence directed at 
outgroups, on the basis of his analysis of mass violence in Sudan and Rwanda:
The evidence shows that discourses do vary, and they covary with the nature of violence in 
the two cases examined here. Northern Sudanese discourse justifies discrimination and 
repression against southerners, but there is no evidence of the sort of rhetoric that became 
common in Rwanda: southern Sudanese may be seen as “slaves,” but not as “cockroaches” 
that should be exterminated. The point about Rwanda is not that the mythology ‘merely 
made mass violence thinkable’; rather, it made open, rapid, and explicitly intended genocide a 
politically viable option. Sudanese mythology is less extreme, so although war is sanctioned, 
genocide is not: southern refugees were sheltered in the northern capital of Khartoum; they 
were not massacred.201
This is one concrete example of the way in which forms of dehumanisation are related to 
the context and the type of practice which may be enacted upon their object.
Demonstrating that such a connection exists allows in turn an understanding of the reasons 
for the form taken by dehumanisation in any given genocidal episode -  and it is the specific 
features of each of these forms which will be pursued in the following chapters.
201 Kaufman, p. 82.
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V III. Conclusion
The intent of this chapter has been to recognise that genocidal dehumanisation is worthy of 
investigation as a prima fade subject; and, in the process of undertaking such investigation, to 
reveal the connections between the raison d’etre, functions, and types of genocidal 
dehumanisation. When employed as a theoretical concept or an explanatory tool, any 
manifestation of dehumanisation should be analysed with regard to its place on a continuum 
of dehumanisation, its role as legitimatory and/or motivatory, and the specific type of 
dehumanising utterances used, as well as the socio-historical reasons why this type has 
‘purchase’ in a particular context. In this way, analysis of genocidal dehumanisation can give 
insight into the origins, motivations, conceivability, ‘human possibility’ and future likelihood 
of genocidal action, as well as providing a framework with which to analyse and understand 
the meaning of discourses of dehumanisation in non-genocidal situations.
If we are to employ the concept of ‘dehumanisation’ as a meaningful tool of analysis, one 
which can aid in the related tasks of understanding past episodes of genocide, and predicting 
and preventing genocide in the future, this concept must not be considered either self- 
evident, monolithic, or as no more than a ‘window-dressing’ to genocide. Firstly, 
dehumanisation must be acknowledged as a vital enabling component of genocide in the 
modern age. Secondly, recognition must be made that the nature and function of 
dehumanisation varies according to society, geography, temporality and aggregation. This 
variability, however, does not mean that manifestations of dehumanisation are too complex 
to be subject to productive analysis, or that generalisable theories, based on a comparative 
approach, cannot be formulated. This thesis represents a first attempt at the formulation of 
such a theory; and this chapter gives a basic outline of an applicable model of genocidal 
dehumanisation. Having established this outline, we may employ it to give closer
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examination of each of the three types mentioned above, beginning with the most extreme: 
biopolitical dehumanisation.
C h a p te r 5.
‘D isease In carn ate ’: T h e  M edical Model
Nothing is more punitive than to give disease a meaning -  that meaning being invariably a moralistic 
one.
- Susan Sontag1
Life is a window of vulnerability, and the perfection o f the fully defended, ‘victorious’ self is a chilling 
fantasy
-  Donna Haraway2
The source cluster o f body/illness/cure concepts is not an arbitrary constellation o f notional 
elements but a complex, narrative/scenic schema or ‘scenario’, one that tells a mini-story, complete 
with apparent causal explanations and conclusions about its outcome (here, the story o f a body 
suffering illness because of poisoning and therefore needing a radical cure). This narrative scenario 
is mapped as a whole on to the target domain, leading the hearer or reader towards the expectation 
that a healer will appear who will cure the national illness.
-  Andreas Musolff3
Rudolf Hess’s famous statement that ‘National Socialism is nothing but applied biology’ is 
commonplace quotation in commentary on Nazi ideology and rhetoric. But the complex 
webs of meaning behind this and similar statements, and the context in which they were
1 S. Sontag, Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and its Metaphors, reprint, Penguin, London, 2002, p. 59.
2 Quoted in L. Otis, Membranes: Metaphors of Invasion in Nineteenth-Century Literature, Science, and Politics, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1999, p. 174.
3 A. Musolff, ‘What role do metaphors play in racial prejudice? The function of antisemitic imagery in Hitler’s 
Mein Kampf, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 4 1, no. 1, 2007, p. 28; original italics.
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utterable, are often overlooked or dismissed as self-evident. This chapter traces the 
development of the narrative of the outgroup as a biological threat, with particular reference 
to the modern self-representation of a perpetrator group as a ‘body politic’ threatened by 
alien others depicted and dehumanised as viruses, bacilli, microbes, cancerous growths, and 
other images drawn from the medical vocabulary. In doing so, it examines the intimate 
connection between medical and military language, and the functionality of this connection in 
medicalising dehumanisation.
The new biopolitics arising in the W est in the nineteenth century provided not only 
discourse which gave a literal, ‘scientific’ reason as to why outgroups were both inferior and 
other-than-human (thus ideologically legitimising their destruction), as well as threatening 
(necessitating it); but also a metaphorical representation, revolving around concepts of 
hygiene and purity, which fulfilled identical psychological necessities on a symbolic and a 
populist level. A t the same time, the emergence of the nation-state gave rise, for 
perpetrator groups, to an account representing the group as a unitary body within defined 
geographical limits whose ideal state was one of ‘racial’ homogeneity. The indelible 
‘wrongness’ of an outgroup necessitated, in the eyes of perpetrators, the complete removal 
of that group from a geographically bounded territory; a particularly vicious medicalised 
representation of outgroups as a biological threat not only legitimised their disappearance, 
but directly motivated it. This discursive formation, that is, provided both a motive and a 
justification for what was also a new concept, the necessary and possible destruction of a 
biologically-defined group, which would come to be known as ‘genocide.’4
As I have acknowledged elsewhere, much writing has been done on the topic of the
connection between genocide and modernity -  most notably, that of Zygmunt Bauman, to
which this chapter is particularly indebted. Such writing has for the most part focused on
4 See Z. Bauman, The Duty To Remember, -  But What?’ in J. Kaye & B. Strath (eds), Enlightenment and Genocide, 
Contradictions of Modernity (Series philosophy & politics; No. 5), P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, Brussels, 2000, pp. 40-41.
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the authoritarian-bureaucratic-rational aspect of modernity, particularly in the context of 
perpetrator psychology - and these will be examined more closely in Chapter Seven. Here,
I explore a different genocidal mechanism, one equally contingent upon the discourses and 
practices of modernity. This chapter is an examination of a new, distinctively modern type 
of dehumanising narrative, one which was made possible by various converging discourses of 
modernity; at the same time (as will occur also in the following chapters) it investigates the 
function of this type of dehumanisation in genocide and genocidal killing in terms of 
legitimisation and motivation.
In this chapter, illustrative examples are drawn from genocidal killing in the twentieth 
century, both in Western and non-Western contexts. In tracing the history of the 
biopolitical discursive type, I concentrate on developments in Western and European 
history; however, in the modern era, and particularly in the period since the advent of the 
twentieth century - that in which the cases I examine here take place - Western narratives 
have come to be extremely influential on the global stage. The non-Western episodes on 
which I focus - the genocide of Armenians and other non-Turkic peoples in Asia Minor in 
the 1910s and 1920s (heavily influenced by Western nationalism), and the so-called ‘auto­
genocide’ committed by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in the 1970s - both took place 
under the aegis of the implementation of ideologies developed in the W est (namely, state- 
based nationalism, and state-based Marxism). While other episodes are mentioned in 
passing, I also pay detailed attention to two Western European episodes: firstly, genocide 
and mass killing committed by the National Socialists, with victims including Jews, Gypsies, 
Poles, and Russians, as well as biologically-defined ‘life unworthy of life’; and secondly, ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. I will return to the question of the 
applicability of Western historical developments to non-Western episodes in the following 
chapter; for the present, it is enough to note the actual influence of Western ideals in the 
documentary texts which are presented, and, conversely, to note that the fact that these
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discursive formations exist in non-Western societies is also an indication that they are 
generalisable (within a particular historical context) rather than restricted to episodes taking 
place in Western Europe and its direct sphere of influence.
I begin with an examination of the origins of the concept of racial purity and the discursive 
association between race, nationality and disease. I then trace the emergence of this 
biomedical discourse to its roots in the birth of the nation-state; and to developments in the 
study of the natural sciences and in medicine, particularly in Germany (where this discourse 
was most influential), which allowed the creation of literal and metaphorical biopolitical 
categorisation. I go on to examine how these conceptual changes translated into a particular 
metaphorical discursive formation, one which was both an influence on, and influenced by, 
public policy; specific examination is made of the evolution of a militarised metaphorical 
understanding of medicine, both at the level of the individual doctor and patient, and at the 
level of state enactment of public health. Throughout, the reader will see how these 
strategies have played themselves out in the enactment of genocidal policies.
In regard to the set of utterances I examine in this chapter, I argue that modernity 
provided a particular, dehumanising discourse and rhetoric which provided a motivation and 
a legitimisation for genocidal killing, hence allowing it to appear as conceivable, justified and 
necessary. This chapter endeavours, firstly, to identify a nexus between various different 
discourses contingent upon modernity, and to examine the ongoing consequences in action 
of their coincidence at a certain historical moment; and secondly, to demonstrate that this 
discourse and these consequences are common to many otherwise widely different episodes 
of genocide. In doing so, I aim to sketch a brief outline of the historical development and 
the major features of genocidal biopolitical dehumanisation in the modern era.
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I. Racial Purity and Raced Disease: Precursors
In the pre-modern period, institutionalised Christianity had instigated and licensed 
numerous episodes of mass killing and subjugation.5 Despite this, however, Christianity’s 
emphasis on what might be termed the ‘salvageability’ of all ‘mankind’ had, in the pre­
modern era, exercised some restraint on the actions of Europeans.6 W hile the possibility of 
conversion existed, and before the rise of scientific race theory, the theoretical concept of a 
group of people as unalterably (that is to say, biologically) threatening was unthinkable.7 
Notwithstanding this, the ideology of racial purity had deep origins in medieval Christianity. 
After the Christian Reconquista of Spain from Muslim rule, and the expulsion of Jews in 1492, 
the concept of limpieza de sangre (purity or cleanliness of blood) became one of major 
importance, necessarily accompanied by extensive hereditary investigation.8
The medieval period also saw the obverse of ethnic purity: ethnic ‘dirtiness.’ In particular, 
there is a long-standing historical connection apparent between antisemitism and disease. In
5 For example, the massacres of the Crusades, or the Spaniards’ murderous system of ‘Indian grants’ in 16th 
century colonial South America. See D. E. Stannard, American Holocaust The Conquest of the New World, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1992, p. 221; M. Cocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conflict with Tribal 
Peoples, Pimlico, London, 1999, pp. 106-1 10.
6 George Mosse notes that it was after the rise of racial antisemitism that the question began to be asked 
‘whether, if the Jew  lacked a proper soul, he could be classed as human.’ (The Crisis of German Ideology, Howard 
Fertig, New York, 1981 [Istedn  1964], p. 140, original italics).
7 While, for example, Biblically-based arguments defined blacks as Hamitic ‘natural slaves’; but this perceived 
inferiority did not equate to danger.
8 In this period ‘pure’ Christian ancestry was legally required for membership in guilds and military orders, while 
crypto-Jews were mercilessly persecuted by the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions. In another forerunner of 
modern race purity, blood was tied to honour, such that even a commoner could assert a right to such on the 
basis of his purity of blood. ‘Purity of blood’ would also be a crucial anxiety for genocidal child removal in 
Australia, part of a broader project for a ‘white Australia’; see P. R. Bartrop, ‘The Holocaust, the Aborigines, and 
the bureaucracy of destruction: an Australian dimension of genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 3, no. I, 
2001, 2001, pp. 77, 83.
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the Middle Ages it was alleged that Jews spread the plague, and as a result they were 
massacred during epidemics.9 Due to the Jewish relation to Christianity and to territoriality,
[t]he conceptual Jew was a semantically overloaded entity, comprising and blending meanings 
which ought to be kept apart, and for this reason a natural adversary of any force concerned 
with drawing borderlines and keeping them watertight. The conceptual Jew was visqueux (in 
Sartrean terms), slimy (in Mary Douglas’s terms) - an image constructed as compromising 
and defying the order of things...10
In Western culture, the linked metaphorical series, ‘purity/contamination’ (‘clean/dirty’), 
‘light/dark,’ and ‘good/evil’ have a long history and association with race.* 11 Andrew Goatly 
posits that the ‘disease as invasion’ metaphor is in fact an aspect of the ‘purity’ metaphor, 
and this will be borne out in the material presented in this chapter.12 In other words, the 
association between race or ethnicity and disease is not novel. Epidemic disease, that is, 
disease which threatens a society, invariably comes from ‘somewhere else’;13 plagues are 
‘visitations.’14 Susan Sontag takes the example of syphilis, which, when it began to sweep 
through Europe in the late fifteenth century
was the ‘French pox’ to the English, morbus Germanicus to the Parisians, the Naples 
sickness to the Florentines, the Chinese disease to the Japanese ... there is a link between
9 A. Nikiforuk, The Fourth Horseman: A Short History of Epidemics, Plagues and Other Scourges, Phoenix, London, 
1993, pp. 47-48. Well-poisoning (often thought to cause plagues), along with host-desecrating and child- 
murdering (the ‘blood libel’) together made up the major medieval accusatory discourse against Jews, which 
could motivate and/or be used to justify persecution and massacre. The language of ‘poisoning’ continued in Nazi 
discourse; see for example J. Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World W ar II and the Holocaust, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 2006 p. 262.
10 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New  York), 1989, p. 39.
11 A. Goatly, Washing the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2007, pp. 45-49.
12 Goatly, p. 49.
13 Sontag, p. 133.
14 Sontag, p. I 36.
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imagining disease and imagining foreignness. It lies perhaps in the very concept of wrong, 
which is archaically identical with the non-us, the alien. A polluting person is always wrong, 
as Mary Douglas has observed. The inverse is also true: a person judged to be wrong is 
regarded as, at least potentially, a source of pollution.15
The advent of modernity, however, allowed the transformation of this pre-existing 
conceptual association between ancestry and purity, and between disease and otherness, 
into a murderous discursive strategy which motivated not only the mistreatment, forced 
conversion, or expulsion of the other, but their complete destruction.
II. The Modern Era
Ila. The Nation-State
The ‘empire’ model, under which most of Europe had been governed in the period 
preceding the modern era, was premised on a central power under which any number of 
subject peoples were ruled. Subject peoples would have differing degrees of privilege vis-à- 
vis the centre, and subordinate peoples would be subject to various degrees of exploitation, 
repression and even periodic massacre. However, each people had a particular role to play 
in the overall functioning of the empire, conceived neither as unitary nor as homogenous. 
Pre-modern European society was segmentarily structured, divided into castes or estates, so 
that the fact of being set apart did not make minorities unique. Separation was not only an 
antagonistic measure, but also a vehicle of social integration.16
15 Sontag, pp. I 33-1 34.
16 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 35-36.
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The advent of the modern nation-state, however, caused a quantum shift in normative 
perceptions of ideal relationships between culturally distinct peoples and between peoples 
and the territory they inhabited; a conceptual conflict arose between demos and ethnos. The 
nation was, to use Benedict Anderson’s concept, an ‘imagined community’ -  but who were 
the co-nationals imagined by national subjects? Two possible models existed: a more 
inclusive civic model, consistent with the original ideals of the French Revolution;17 and an 
ethnic or ‘organic’ model, in which inclusion as a true national citizen was conditional upon 
membership of the majority group making up the nation, as defined by that group.18 In a 
paradox of the type characteristic of the modern era, the development of the nation-state 
would focus both upon inclusion, bringing previously subjugated groups into the fold as 
citizens, and also exclusion, the boundary-drawing exercise -  partially as a response to this 
inclusivity -  determining who could be afforded the rights and privileges of being thus 
included, and what solution might be found for the existence of those who would not be 
afforded this status.
The ideology of the ‘scientific state,’ as Anthony Smith terms it, was premised on 
‘assimilation of the population, discrimination against some subgroups, a levelling
17 Indeed, under the liberal conception, the nation was ideally made up of the integration of different ‘ethnic’ 
groups and cultural communities. E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since I 780: Programme, Myth, Reality 
(2nd edn), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992, p. 33.
This concept has, however, been challenged; Robert Wokler, for example, suggests that in the French model ‘a 
people partakes of human rights only by virtue of their shared nationality,’ and that this is a causal factor in the 
Holocaust (R. Wokler, The Enlightenment Project on the Eve of the Holocaust’, in J. Kaye and B. Strath [eds], 
Enlightenment and Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity [Series philosophy & politics; No. 5], P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, 
Brussels, 2000, p. 60).
18 Hobsbawm, pp. 63-64; See also M. Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 55-69. Hobsbawm argues that the connection between ethnicity and 
nationalism is not a cause but a consequence of the nation-state; that is, national movements often ‘invent national 
ethnicity’ once a nation has been established. Given the slipperiness of the concept of ‘race’, inclusion in this 
model is premised on an ‘imagined’, that is, culturally determined, rather than a truly genetic or biological, 
ethnicity. Moreover, a genocidal ethnocentric model of the nation need not be ‘undemocratic’ per se; for 
example, see D. Li, ‘Echoes of violence; considerations on radio and genocide in Rwanda’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, vol. 6, no. I, 2004, pp. 14-15.
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interventionism and centralisation, and ... the attempt to apply the latest scientific methods 
and techniques to the problems of government.’19 But this new type of state must 
nonetheless somehow create among its subjects loyalty and a willingness to act on its behalf, 
since it could no longer simply demand and expect these things, as had been the case under 
old orders of rule by divine right, dynastic legitimacy or similar guarantors;20 it must 
assimilate old traditions of ethnocultural allegiance and deal with the question of the 
continuation of the power of previously hegemonic groups, as well as the questions of 
meaning and value which were previously the preserve of religion. One way in which to 
resolve this conflict was for the ethnic group itself to emerge as the discursive bearer of 
meaning and value, for the ethnically-defined ‘people’ to become the ideal order to which 
the subject owed ultimate loyalty.21 Ethnic nationalism is thus a seemingly paradoxical blend 
of traditionalism and modernism, with strong moral normative implications; and, as we will 
see, in genocide these tendencies are taken to the extreme, with the direst consequences.
The redrawing of European national boundaries after the First W orld War, in which state 
frontiers were intended to coincide with the frontiers of nationality and language, 
exacerbated the national problematic. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, ‘[t]he logical implication of 
trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a 
separate ethnically and linguistically homogeneous population, was the mass expulsion or 
extermination of minorities.’22 A t the same time, the rise of mass media and the resulting 
homogenisation of popular ideologies allowed national symbols to become part of individual 
life and the narrative-discursive psyche, breaking down the barriers between private (local)
19 A. D. Smith, Theories of Nationalism (2nd edn), Holmes & Meier, New York, 1983, p. 234.
20 Hobsbawm, p. 84.
21 The concepts discussed here are adapted, in a somewhat altered form and with different emphasis, from Smith, 
Theories of Nationalism, pp. 230-254.
22 Hobsbawm, pp. I 32-1 33. For a detailed historical treatment of the connection between Western nationalistic 
ideals and the commission of genocide, see M. Levene, ‘Creating a Modern "Zone of Genocide": The Impact of 
Nation- and State-Formation on Eastern Anatolia, 1878-1923’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, 1998, 
pp. 393-433.
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and public (national) spheres.23 On the macro level, power now lay in the hands of those 
groups making up a majority in a geographically defined nation-state governed by members 
of, and according to the cultural or political mores of, that same group.
Modernity meant, among other things, a new role for ideas -  because of the state relying for 
its functional efficiency on ideological mobilization, because of its pronounced tendency to 
uniformity ... because of its ‘civilizing’ mission and sharp proselytising edge, and because of 
an attempt to bring previously peripheral classes and localities into an intimate spiritual 
contact with the idea-generating centre of the body politic... [The Jews’] previously unnoted 
incompatibility had now become a problem and a challenge.24
That is to say, a problem lay in the incompatibility of civic and ethnic models. While, from 
the second half of the nineteenth century, ideological representations increasingly imagined 
nations along ethnic lines, and the terms ‘race’ and ‘nation’ were used more and more 
commonly as synonyms, civic ideals led to legislation and practice allowing previously 
subjugated minorities a new freedom to integrate and prosper, incurring possible backlashes 
of resentment among groups who understood this as a challenge to their previous 
hegemonic position.25 Jews and other minorities, previously distinct, distinguishable, and 
subordinate, now moved into the broader community, into positions of influence and 
prestige. The levelling of difference brought about by the enactment of the ideals of 
modernity, and the refusal of the secularised modern state to legislate different social 
practices, created a new sense of a threat posed by minority groups no longer satisfied with 
their allotted place; and the anxieties created by modernisation (particularly among the new 
petty bourgeoisie and lower middle classes which emerged under the nation-state’s aegis) 
could be projected onto such groups, whose enthusiastic embrace of the new order 
(unsurprising given the new opportunities it offered) seemed to place them close to its
23 Hobsbawm, pp. 141-142.
24 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 42.
25 On the increasing synonymity of ‘race’ and ‘nation,’ see Hobsbawm, p. 108.
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centre.26 In other words, the ideology of the levelling of difference meant that members of 
minority groups moved into positions of influence and prestige, and simultaneously the 
perceived incompatibility of minorities became a problem in need of solution.27 In order to 
distinguish such groups as alien to the body politic, a new boundary was necessary, located 
at the level of natural law: ‘Jews had been able to escape from Judaism into conversion; from 
Jewishness there was no escape.’28 In the age of empires, repression had been a tool used to 
keep peoples in their place; but the birth of the nation-state proper created new regimes of 
discourse and practice under which there was no longer any place whatsoever for these 
peoples, and nor could they change their outgroup status.
Scholars in the field of cognitive science and linguistics have suggested that ‘our most basic 
cognitive models derive from our experiences as individuals living within a body.’29 Apropos 
of this, at the historical juncture described above, the ancient metaphor of the ‘body politic’, 
of society as a human body, could be put to use in a new way, with sinister consequences.
In Western culture, this metaphor, which was associated with the concept of the ‘great 
chain of being’ (a concept that, as we will see in the following chapter, is deeply implicated in 
essentialist hierarchies of value), had been used discursively, in support of various different 
positions, from at least the classical Greek period onwards. 30 The concept fell out of favour 
in the seventeenth century, when it was challenged by that of the social contract; but the
26 Hobsbawm, pp. 121-122; Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 57-59; Barta, 2001, p. 38.
27 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 42.
28 Arendt in Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 59; T. Barta, ‘Discourses of Genocide in Germany and 
Australia; a linked history’, Aboriginal History, vol. 25, 2001, p. 40. On the ‘racialising of anti-semitism’ see P. 
Weindling, Health, race and German politics between national unification and Nazism, 1870-1945, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 57-59.
29 Lakoff and Johnson paraphrased in J. M. Balkin, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology, Yale University Press,
New Haven & London, 1998, p. 242. Balkin also notes Pierre Bourdieu’s argument that ‘conceptual development 
of the habitus often involves analogies to bodily experiences and bodily movements’ (p. 243). See also Goatly, p. 
15.
30 On the ‘Great Chain of Being’ in this context see Musolff, pp. 25-26; F. Rash, ‘Metaphor in Adolf Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf, metaforik.de, September 2005, retrieved 10 September 2008, http://www.metaphorik.de/09/rash.pdf, pp. 
89-90.
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rise of biological science and the emergence of the nation-state gave the metaphor renewed 
currency, and though different positions could be and were argued using this metaphor as 
justification, the exclusionist position was a powerful rhetorical device.31 Modern science 
conceptualised the body as a strictly boundaried self whose identity could be defended only 
by strict policing of its borders, drawing on what Paul Chilton, in his discussion of Mein 
Kampf, terms ‘the fundamental cognitive CONTAINER schema ... [which] tells you that the 
contents are protected by the boundary,’ hence giving rise to inherent conceptualisations of 
purity and contamination.32 This model could then be neatly applied to the new ideal of the 
nation-state as a bounded and racially homogenous entity: ‘securing national boundaries ... 
could simultaneously be experienced symbolically as a hygienically necessary reinforcement 
of the body’s own boundaries.’33 This model could hence become fundamental to individual 
and collective identity: Robert Jay Lifton argues that, in our century, any vision of a ‘total 
cure’ must be bound up with a sense o f ‘nation’ which combines ‘spiritual and biological 
connectedness’, and which leads to the conception of a ‘national organism’ whose needs are 
pre-eminent ‘supreme values.’34
As a part of this developing narrative, questions arose pertaining not only to the internal 
structure of ‘national’ collectives, but to their inter-relationships. The Darwinian account -
31 David G. Hale, ‘Analogy of the Body Politic’ in The Dictionary o f the History o f Ideas (online version), 
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHl/dhi.cgi?id=dv I - 1 I (accessed 31st December 2008). See also Musolff, pp. 
25-26; Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 94-96, 163.
32 P. Chilton, ‘Manipulation, memes and metaphors: The case of Mein Kampf, in Louis de Saussure & Peter Schulz 
(eds), Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind, John Benjamins Publishing 
Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2005, p. 30; on disease organisms, parasites, and essentialism in Mein Kampf 
see also pp. 36-38; Musolff; Rash, ‘Metaphor in Adolf H itler’s Mein Kampf, pp. 78-80. For a more extensive 
discussion of the ‘container’ schema, see G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago & London, 1980, pp. 29-32.
33 U. Gerhard, The Discoursive Construction of National Stereotypes: Collective Imagination and Racist 
Concepts in Germany Before W orld  W ar I’, in N. Finzsch & D. Schirmer (eds), Identity and Intolerance: 
Nationalism, Racism, and Xenophobia in Germany and the United States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1998, p. 95.
34 R. J. Lifton, The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology o f Genocide (new edn), Basic Books, New York, 
2000, p. 470.
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which constructed nation-states (as well as ‘nations’ in the sense of ethnic groups) as 
existing, vis-à-vis each other, in a ‘natural’ state of competition which was governed not by 
principles of morality but by a life and death struggle for survival and for pre-eminence taking 
place between internally homogeneous groups -  seemed to have been decisively proven by 
the First W orld W ar.35 Given this, the emergence of the nation-state allowed an ideological 
use of the metaphor of the ‘body politic’ to re-emerge not in relation to the internal 
organisation or structure of a given society, but in relation to a bounded and ideally unitary 
self existing in a world of oppositional others.
Genocidal fantasies concerning the complete extirpation of the alien other were inherent 
in this metaphor. Furthermore, as it relates to the nation-state, the metaphor can be seen 
as a literal macro-level enaction of psychological ‘splitting.’ In this defensive process, 
unwanted thoughts and feelings which are understood as the negative pole of binary 
discrimination are symbolically projected onto an ‘other’, who can then be disavowed and 
expelled, preserving the sense of a unitary and positively-identified self.36 Scott Straus, for 
example, suggests that a primary comparison between the genocidal regimes in Rwanda and 
Cambodia is their ideology of ‘organic purity’: ‘[t]he regimes killed to meet their ideals ... 
eliminating “ contamination” would achieve organic purity, which would be the key to their
35 Mary E. Clark suggests that the very notion of competitive aggression as human evolutionary ‘nature’ logically 
constructs societies which are aggressive, competitive, power-centred, hierarchical, self-interested, and 
misogynistic, and in which these traits are valued above others (M. E. Clark, ‘Human Nature: What We Need To 
Know About Ourselves In The Twenty-First Century’, Zygon, vol. 33, no. 4, 1998, pp. 647-648). On the effects 
of topics of discourse depicting the relationship between nations as a life or death struggle, see also B. Kiernan, 
‘Myth, nationalism and genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 3, no. 2, 2001, p. 200.
36 A. L. Hinton, Why Did They Kill?: Cambodia in the Shadow of Genocide, University of California Press, 
Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 2005, pp. 246-247; interesting examination might be made of this process in light 
of the fact that a common perpetrator strategy is to accuse the victim group of what they, in fact, are doing or 
intend to do; and, in the specific context of the need to preserve bodily integrity, in the mutilations (beheading, 
liver removal etc.) which often accompanied the murder of Armenian, Muslim and Cambodian victims. See for 
example Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 291-296.
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success.’37 Robert Proctor calls the Nazi worldview a homeopathic paranoia: ‘a fear of tiny 
but powerful agents corroding the German body,’ a view which, enacted, was ‘a vast hygienic 
experiment designed to bring about an exclusionist sanitary utopia’ purified of all ‘disease,’ 
from cancer to mental illness to ‘alien racial elements.’38
Greater purchase is often given to such explanatory narratives by the experience of social 
and economic hardship and instability, that is, the sense of being under threat; for example, 
Paul Julian Weindling has documented the way in which adverse circumstances after loss in 
the First World W ar caused German biopolitical thinking to become a viable popular 
explanatory narrative, and a program for action.39 Wilhelm Frick, Nazi minister of the 
interior, introduced early sterilisation law with the declaration that Germany was in danger 
of Volkstod, the death of the Volk (people/nation/race), making the measure imperative. 
Medicalised biological control of unwanted groups was carried out through special 
‘hereditary health courts,’ while among the categories of those to be ‘euthanased’ were the 
‘alien to the community’ (gemeinschaftsfremd) .40 Indeed, the draft law was temporarily titled 
‘Law on Euthanasia for those Incapable of Living and Alien to the Community.’41 Lifton, in 
attempting to answer the question of whether Nazi doctors agreed or disagreed about the 
necessity to kill all Jews, after extensive interviews comes to this conclusion: ‘it is probably 
accurate to say that most Nazi doctors in Auschwitz believed that something they perceived
37 S. Straus, ‘Organic purity and the role of anthropology in Cambodia and Rwanda’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, 
no. 2, 2001, pp. 48-49. Straus notes that this similarity is surprising, given the divide between the nationalist- 
democratic ideological discourse of the Rwandan genocidaires, and the Maoist Communist model in Cambodia.
38 R. N. Proctor, The Nazi W ar on Cancer, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, p. I I.
39 See Weindling, Health, race and German politics. For specific examples, see pp. 393-397, 462-474.
40 For ‘hereditary health courts,’ see Lifton, p. 25.
41 G. Aly, ‘Medicine against the Useless’ in G. Aly, P. Chroust, & C. Pross (eds), Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi 
Medicine and Racial Hygiene (trans. B. Cooper), Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore/London, pp. 52-56; Carl 
‘Hans Heinze’ Sennhenn, a T4 expert who defined the grounds for elimination, wrote of the ‘euthanasia’ program 
as ‘the fight against or extermination of subhumanity.’ An argument was also made in eugenic discourse for a 
Jewish propensity to ‘mental illness’ (see for example E. Ehrenreich, ‘Otmar von Verschuer and the “ Scientific” 
Legitimization of Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 21, no. I, 2007, p. 63).
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as “Jewishness” had to be eliminated, whether that meant sending all Jews to Madagascar, 
forcing most Jews to leave Germany while permitting a small well-established minority to 
remain and undergo complete assimilation, or murdering every last one of them.’42 
Opposition to the ‘organically indivisible’ national German community was considered ‘the 
symptom of an illness which threatens the healthy unity of the...national organism.’43
This model is apparent elsewhere. Philip Verwimp argues that in the pre-genocidal period 
Rwanda’s dictator President Juvenal Habyarimana, following the model of the eighteenth- 
century French Physiocrats, constructed an ideological narrative of a ‘living,’ ‘organic’ 
economy which was likened to ‘a human body where all organs should function together for 
the well-being of the whole’; ‘those who refuse to work’ (that is, by implication, Tutsi, 
viewed as would-be feudal rulers rather than peasants), were therefore ‘harmful to 
society.’44 In the Khmer Rouge’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK), Pol Pot warned that 
‘traitors’ and ‘counterrevolutionary elements’ were not considered ‘to be part of the 
people’; while people having ‘Khmer bodies with Vietnamese minds’ (khluon khmaer khuor 
kbal yuon) were considered ‘impure’, and executed en masse.45 Ben Kiernan suggests that all 
those who did not accept Khmer Rouge rule were viewed as ‘surrogate foreigners.’46 The 
Serb general Radovan Karadzic stated that the Serbian fight in the former Yugoslavia was 
against ‘Asiatic darkness’ and argued that the ‘Serb state has no need to incorporate its
42 Lifton, pp. 205-206.
43 Lifton, p. 438.
44 P. Verwimp, ‘Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide: Rwanda represented in Habyarimana’s 
speeches 'Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, pp. 335-338, 351. As noted elsewhere, Habyarimana’s 
assassination was the first event of the genocidal period, and thus his involvement in genocide is more complex 
than is the case in other episodes; however, the conditions of his period of his rule ( I 973-1994) can without 
doubt be viewed as contributory to the genocide, both in terms of the development of discursive understandings 
and inasmuch as it saw civil war in which ethnic identity was implicated, as well as the enaction of mass violence 
against and mass killing of Rwandan Tutsi.
45 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 167, 229.
46 Kiernan, ‘Myth, nationalism and genocide’, p. 192.
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enemies into its own state. The Serb state should be the home of the Serb nation.’47 As 
Hobsbawm puts it, ‘there is no more effective way of bonding together the disparate 
sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders.’48 In the instability of wars 
and revolutions in particular, an ideology which calls for the defensive extirpation of internal 
enemies from the body politic seems imperative.
lib. Scientific Racism, Darwinism, and Eugenics
‘Modernity,’ writes Bauman, ‘made racism possible. It also created a demand for racism: an 
era that declared achievement to be the only measure of human worth needed a theory of 
ascription to redeem boundary-drawing and boundary-guarding concerns under new 
conditions which made boundary-crossing easier than ever before.’49 According to this 
ideology, the cohesion of the nation-state -  its very existence as such -  was threatened by 
the internal presence of the extraneous; and it could, as an entity in its entirety, be damaged 
by the internal presence of those whose presence did not contribute to, or was detrimental 
to the strength of, the body politic. But this argument said nothing about the intrinsic worth 
or otherwise of the groups concerned. While a realpolitik approach was necessary -  
inasmuch as the struggle between peoples was a struggle for survival -  in itself such an 
argument did not provide any justification for the destruction of such peoples. Rather, it 
would argue for their ‘incorporation’, that is, integration, through force if necessary. But
47 Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy o f‘Ethnic Cleansing’, Texas A & M University Press, Texas, 1995, p. 
65.
48 Hobsbawm, p. 9 1.
49 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 6 1 -62. Although there is no space here to explore this issue, it 
should be noted that Bauman’s stance on the relationship between genocide and the Enlightenment has been 
critiqued; see J. Docker, The enlightenment, genocide, postmodernity’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 3, 
2003, pp. 339-360.
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what if certain groups were incapable of being incorporated or of making a contribution?50 
Developments in science meant that just such an understanding arose.51 Particular groups, 
defined biologically, were categorised as inferior and as threatening; and, due to the 
essentialising and determinist nature of biological-scientific discourse, their status as such 
was considered immutable.
Biological racism proceeded from previous racial prejudice.52 Carl Linnaeus, the 
eighteenth-century botanist, physician and zoologist, was the first to formally define human 
races in modern taxonomical terms, separating Homo sapiens europaeus (‘ruled by customs’) 
from Homo sapiens afer (the African ‘black,’ ‘ruled by caprice’).53 In 1770 the philosopher 
David Hume could write that ‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes ... to be naturally inferior to 
the whites ... In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negro as a man of parts and learning; but it 
is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words 
plainly.’54
50 As Saul Friedländer writes, in early twentieth century Europe ‘[t]he integrity of the Self was both threatened by 
outside penetration and, at the same time, unable to benefit from the contribution of the Other.’ S. Friedländer , 
‘“ Europe’s Inner Demons” : The “ O ther” as Threat in Early Twentieth-Century European Culture', in R. S. 
W istrich (ed.), Demonizing the Other: Antisemitism, Racism, and Xenophobia, Harwood Academic Publishers, I 999, 
p. 212. See also Barta, p. 50: ‘their vice was in being as they were; their being was their vice.’
51 On this subject, Aristotle E. Kallis puts forward an interesting conception of the reason for Nazi hierarchical 
systems of value within outgroups, and the way in which such boundaries were in certain cases open to 
reinterpretation for practical purposes. Kallis argues that from a Nazi perspective some outgroups were ‘usable,’ 
though this did not mean ‘worthy of life’ per se. Depending on discursive perceptions of these outgroups, they 
might be subject to three types of treatment: ‘conscription to work or fight, slave labour and exhaustive work 
primarily conceived as a means of indirect extermination’ (A. E. Kallis, ‘Race, “ value” and the hierarchy of human 
life: ideological and structural determinants of National Socialist policy-making’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol.
7, no. I, 2005, p. 23).
52 See, for example, Barta, pp. 44-46.
53 S. J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (revised and expanded edn), W . W . Norton & Co., New  York and London, 
1981, p. 66.
54 In C. Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, in C. Tatz, P. Arnold & S. Tatz (eds), Genocide Perspectives III: 
Essays on the Holocaust and Other Genocides, Brandi & Schlesinger, Blackheath, 2006, p. 82.
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But while the concept of ‘race’ had been written about for some time, it gained discursive 
purchase only in the second half of the nineteenth century.55 Arthur, Comte de Gobineau’s 
pioneering Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (1853-55) was significant not only for its 
analysis of race, but for the contention that racial history was a science.56 In this period, an 
ideology of ‘science’ was becoming increasingly important, leading ultimately to a political 
transformation of its function: ‘science becomes increasingly a metaphor for the explanation 
of why things are as they are; people look to science to explain the origin of human 
character and institutions; science becomes an important part of ideological argumentation 
and a means of social control.’57 Colin Tatz writes that
[i]deas of racial superiority are as old as human history. Always morally dubious, racism - 
whether against clans, tribes, classes, colours, neighbours, minorities or those who spoke 
differently - was usually explained away by religious doctrine or political expediency. Plato, 
Aristotle, Herodotus, Thucydides, Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Locke,
Rousseau, Kant and Hegel all expressed views on racial national differences. What this rich 
history of ideas lacked, prior to the eighteenth century, was a scientific legitimacy that could 
establish with finality the ‘natural’ hierarchy of the races and which could correlate ‘race’ 
with history, culture, language, psychology, nationalism and imperialism.58
The new biological science, which alleged a hierarchical taxonomy of races and degrees of 
biological ‘worth’, provided such legitimisation. The consequences were different for 
different groups, but, for the most part, race science and eugenics justified the contemporary 
power dynamics of European-ruled society.59 The distribution of privilege as reflected in the
55 R. N. Proctor, Racial Hygiene: Medicine under the Nazis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.), 1988, p. 
12.
56 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. I 2. On de Gobineau, see also G. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of 
European Racism, Howard Fertig, New York, 1978, pp. 51-58.
57 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 12-13.
58 Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, p. 82.
59 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. I 3.
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domination of educated white males over women and over the ‘lower classes’ reflected the 
natural order; African peoples were ‘natural slaves’; and indigenous people of all varieties 
were doomed to extinction (the only question, in regard to such groups, was whether it was 
more merciful to hasten the process of their disappearance, or to ‘soothe the pillow’).60 
Indeed, these latter two were closer to monkeys than to the white males standing at the 
apex of the pyramid.61 Samuel George Morton ( 1799-1851), a distinguished American 
scientist and physician, instituted the ‘science’ of craniometry, ‘setfting] out to rank races by 
the average sizes of their brains.’62 Paul Broca (1824-1880), a French physician and 
anthropologist, continued this work, amassing huge amounts of anthropometrical data 
‘demonstrating’ natural racial hierarchy.63 A t the dawn of the twentieth century the term 
minderwertig ( ‘of lesser value’) as applied to human life came to be introduced into German 
discourse around hygiene, bacteriology, welfare and race.64
These conceptions justified and legitimised subjugation, exploitation and oppression. At 
times, they also justified and legitimised extermination, as in the case of colonised peoples
60 On the topic of the inequalities created by the construction of a ‘natural’ hierarchy premised on evolutionary 
discourse, see Clark, p. 648. On genocide, biopower and social Darwinism, see D. Stone, ‘Biopower and Modern 
Genocide’, in A. D. Moses (ed.), Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World 
History, Berghahn Books, New  York & Oxford, 2008, pp. 164-167.
61 Gould, pp. 66-69. The three greatest naturalists of the nineteenth century, Georges Cuvier, Charles Lyell, and 
Charles Darwin, all ‘established’ a connection between ‘blacks’ and monkeys.
62 Gould, p. 85. On phrenology, physiognomy and racism, see G. L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: 
Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, Howard Fertig, New  York, 1981 (1st edn 1964), p. 89; Mosse, Toward the Final 
Solution, pp. 24-3 I . See also W . E. Seidelman, ‘Medical Selection: Auschwitz Antecedents and Effluent’, Holocaust 
and Genocide Studies, vol. 4, no. 4, 1989, pp. 439-440, on the specific connection between scientific racism and 
physicians.
63 Broca had an ambivalent attitude toward ‘race,’ and many anthropologists believed that ‘race mixing’ was 
fruitful; see Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, pp. 88-92. It should be noted that that this type of dehumanisation - 
naming the other as primitive - is not endemic to Western cultures; Hinton (Why Did They Kill?, p. 216) notes 
that the Vietnamese (those who lived in Cambodia were targeted for extermination under the Khmer Rouge) 
were often referred to in DK literature and by ordinary Cambodians as Yuon (savages), although the linguistic 
correctness of this interpretation of the term ‘Yuon’ has been challenged (see Kiernan, ‘Myth, nationalism and 
genocide’, pp. 188-189).
64 Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 186-187.
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who stood in the way of ‘civilisation.’ But they did not motivate it. Inferior groups had their 
place in the proper order of things. Some groups, however, had no useful role to play in the 
great march of human progress. Their presence, indeed, represented a direct threat to the 
competitiveness of the nation-state within which they were found, as well as a more 
generalised threat to the entire human race as such. The dangers of miscegenation (a term 
coined in 1863) were heralded by the leading scientists of the day, such as the naturalist 
Louis Agassiz, who argued that, for the nation, race mixing meant ‘emasculation.’65
Charles Darwin presented his revolutionary theory of evolution in 1859. Proponents of 
evolutionary ethics agreed that, in light of evolutionary theory, contemporary moral norms 
had to be re-examined. Willibald Hentschel voiced a common opinion when he wrote to a 
fellow eugenics enthusiast: ‘[t]hat which preserves health is moral. Everything that makes 
one sick or ugly is sin.’66 Darwin’s theory summoned up a Nietzschean Weltanschauung of 
perpetual struggle for existence, in which, moreover, the victor was advancing the cause of 
humanity through ‘the unsparing destruction of all degenerates and parasites’:67 this concept 
could be summed up in the phrase ‘evolutionary progress as highest good.’ While England 
and America read Darwinism optimistically, as a justification for their laissez-faire free- 
market policies, by the late 1800s discourse in Germany - which had come up short in the 
struggle for overseas colonies and which was torn by political struggle - had come to stress 
the need for state intervention to stop ‘degeneration’ in the face of democracy and social 
welfare policies.68 In Germany, Darwinism came to mean the survival of the fittest race,
65 Quoted in Gould, p. 81. This was also an important theme in the work of racialists such as de Gobineau and in 
the eliminationist rhetoric of Comte Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854-1936) (Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, 
pp. 5 1 -62).
66 R. Weikart, From Darwin to Hitler: Evolutionary Ethics, Eugenics, and Racism in Germany, Palgrave Macmillan, New 
York, 2004, pp. 43-44. For an analysis of Hentschel in the context of Germanic racial utopianism, see Mosse, The 
Crisis of German Ideology, pp. 112-116.
67 Nietzsche quoted in Weikart, p. 49.
68 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 14.
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rather than the survival of the fittest individual.69 According to this ideology, one way to 
promote evolutionary progress was to engage in artificial selection: humans should make 
reproductive choices to further evolutionary progress. This perspective came to be known 
as eugenics.
Eugenics was enthusiastically adopted, particularly in the United States and in Germany: 
‘[ujnder the influence of Darwinian biology and eugenics, the idea that health should become 
one of the highest moral principles became prominent in the medical profession in the early 
twentieth century.’70 Both the racially and the genetically unfit had to be eliminated to 
ensure survival: Theodor Fritsch (1852-1933), a highly influential antisemitic publicist, wrote 
that ‘Morality and ethics arise from the law of the preservation of the species, of the race. 
Whatever ensures the future of the species, whatever is suited to raise the species to an 
ever higher level of physical and mental perfection, that is moral.’ To ‘seek to preserve the 
degenerate and depraved’ is ‘false humanity.’71 Otto Ammon (1842-1916), a German 
anthropologist and social Darwinist, ‘agreed ... that “ there exists continuity of the germ- 
plasm, the hereditary substance, from one generation to the next” , noted that purity of type 
was favourable, and claimed that the progeny of race-mixing should be “ abandoned to 
annihilation [Vernichtung] in the struggle for existence [Kampf urns Dasein].'"72 According to 
this narrative, the physically and mentally disabled were ‘parasites,’ an image which was also 
an extremely common antisemitic trope.73 In Mein Kampf, for example, evoking the image of 
a struggle between racial groups, Adolf Hitler describes ‘the Jew’ as
69 Arnd Kruger ‘A Horse Breeder’s Perspective: Scientific Racism in Germany, 1970-1933’, in Finzsch & Schirmer, 
p. 393.
70 Weikart, p. 54.
71 In Weikart, p. 55.
72 D. Stone, ‘W hite men with low moral standards? German anthropology and the Herero 
Genocide’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, no. 2, 2001, p. 38.
73 Weikart, p. 100.
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only and always a parasite in the body of other peoples ... [h]e is and remains a typical 
parasite, a sponger who like a noxious bacillus keeps spreading as soon as a favourable 
medium invites him. And the effect of his existence is also like that of spongers: wherever 
he appears, the host people dies out after a shorter or longer period.74
Darwin himself believed that a wide gap separated the races of ‘man,’ and that biological 
differences extended not only to physical but to mental and moral traits.75 Ernst Haeckel 
( 1834-1919), who has been described as ‘Germany’s major prophet of political biology’, 
consistently stressed racial inequality, arguing that different human races are distinct 
species.76 Since the ‘lower races’ are ‘psychologically nearer to the mammals (apes and 
dogs) than to civilized Europeans, we must, therefore, assign a totally different value to their 
lives.’77 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, race in particular moved to centre stage, 
and in Germany increasing stress was placed on the superiority of the ‘Aryan’ race and on 
denigration of the Jews.78 Alfred Ploetz ( 1860-1940) introduced the concept of 
Rassenhygiene (race hygiene) in 1895, calling for consideration not only of the good of the 
individual, but the good of the race (that is, rejection of ‘counterselective’ programs such as 
welfare for the poor and medical care for ‘the weak’).79 The theme of Aryan superiority was 
taken up by such figures as the physician Ludwig Woltmann ( 1871 -1907), Eugen Fischer 
(1874-1967), and Fritz Lenz (1887-1976), who argued that race ‘is the ultimate principle of
74 A. Hitler, Mem Kampf (trans. R. Manheim), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1992 (original date of publication 1943), 
p. 277. On the ‘Jewish bacillus’ a telling quote from the genocidal period is found in Goebbels’ diary in 1942, 
while detailing the extermination taking place at that time: ‘It is a battle of life and death between the Aryan race 
and the Jewish bacillus.’ See Herf, pp. 149-150.
75 For example, bravery, cowardice, diligence and laziness. Weikart, p. 105.
76 Weikart, pp. 105-108. For evidence of the connection drawn by Haeckel between medicinal metaphors and 
authoritarian political forms, see Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 44-47.
77 Lifton, pp. 441-442. Haeckel, who proposed state-enacted eliminationist action, can be seen as a direct 
ancestor of murderous Nazi ‘race hygiene’; see Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, pp. 86-89.
78 Weikart, pp. 116-117.
79 For discussion of Ploetz in the context of racial hygiene, nationalism, and antisemitism, see Weindling, Health, 
race and German politics, pp. 64-80, 123-1 25, 153-154.
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value.’80 At first ‘racial hygiene,’ though based on the superiority of the ‘white,’ was 
concerned with improving the ‘human race’ (or at least the Western ‘cultured races’) as a 
whole; but by the end of the First World W ar in Germany, conservative nationalist forces 
controlled most of the important institutional racial hygiene centres, and the focus turned to 
the question of different races, and, specifically, the ‘Jewish question.’81
Eugenicists, antisemites and racialists proffered a narrative in which morality, dictated by 
science, necessitated the disappearance, so oder so (one way or another), of those who 
posed a threat to the Aryan race and to humanity itself; the ‘unfit,’ the ‘lower races’ who 
stood in the way of advanced culture and civilisation, and the ‘subhuman’ Jews.82 At this 
stage, the discourse of killing and extermination was aimed chiefly at the first two groups;83 
but under the Nazis, the concept of racial struggle to the death, and of immutable biological 
‘wrongness,’ would reach its most extreme consequences.
80 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 48. W hile claiming that his science was not about hierarchy, and denying 
antisemitism, Lenz wrote, for example, that Jews were selected not for the control and exploitation of nature, 
but for the control and exploitation of other men (p. 54); on Lenz and the distinction between antisemitism and 
‘racial hygiene,’ see also Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, pp. 81-82.
In his infamous 1913 study on the ‘Rehoboth bastards,’ Fischer wrote that ‘[wjithout exception, every European 
nation that has accepted the blood of inferior races ... has paid for its acceptance of inferior elements with 
spiritual and cultural degeneration.’ Given this, the only value for inferiors was inasmuch as they were of use to 
the superior races; ultimately, the aim of policy should be the ‘decline and destruction’ of ‘inferior races’ (Barta, 
p. 47).
81 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 18-26; for the role of racial hygienists in the demand for a ‘final solution’ to the 
‘Jewish question’, see p. 21 I; for Lenz’s role in the drafting of the ‘euthanasia’ law see Aly, ‘Medicine Against the 
Useless’, pp. 23-24.
82 Weikart, p. 183. German colonialists would attempt to exterminate the Herero and Nama peoples of German 
Southwest Africa in 1905.
In the history of eugenics, the American eugenicist tradition is also particularly important; however, there is no 
space to consider it within the terms of this thesis. For a brief treatment, see G. E. Allen, The Ideology of 
Elimination: American and German Eugenics, 1900-1945’, in F. R. Nicosia & J. Huener (eds), Medicine and Medical 
Ethics in Nazi Germany: Origins, Practices, Legacies, Berghahn Books, New  York & Oxford, 2002 (reprint 2004), pp. 
13-39. On the subject of American eugenicist physicians’ knowledge of Nazi practice, see Seidelman, p. 441.
83 Weikart, p. 204.
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lie. Disease Discourse in the Modern Age
Susan Sontag, who credits Christianity with the advent of a moralised concept of disease 
which saw it as punishment, describes the following process in relation to disease:
First, the subjects of deepest dread (corruption, decay, pollution, anomie, weakness) are 
identified with the disease. The disease itself becomes a metaphor. Then, in the name of the 
disease (that is, using it as a metaphor), that horror is imposed on other things ... Epidemic 
diseases were a common figure for social disorder. From pestilence (bubonic plague) came 
‘pestilent,’ whose figurative meaning, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, is ‘injurious 
to religion, morals, or public peace - 1513’; and ‘pestilential,’ meaning ‘morally baneful or 
pernicious - 1531.’ Feelings about evil are projected onto a disease. And the disease (so 
enriched with meanings) is projected onto the world.84
In the nineteenth century, however, two discursive changes took place. Firstly, diseases 
used as metaphors for evil changed from epidemic, collective diseases, to diseases like 
syphilis, tuberculosis and cancer, understood to be diseases of the individual.85 Secondly, 
‘the notion that disease fits the patient’s character, as the punishment fits the sinner, was 
replaced by the notion that it expresses character. Disease can be challenged by the will.’86 
Recovery from disease, according to the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer,
84 Sontag, p. 60. Sontag refers specifically to diseases ‘whose causality is murky, and for which treatment is 
ineffectual’, but her model can also be applied, as in this case, to situations where in terms of the understanding 
of the situation this is far from the case.
85 Sontag, p. 60.
86 Sontag, p. 44. According to Mosse, the rise of Social Darwinist and Romantic racism gave rise to ‘the concept 
that the very physical characteristics of people rested on the nature of their inner selves’ (The Crisis of German 
Ideology, p. 88).
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depended on the will assuming ‘dictatorial power in order to subsume the rebellious forces’ 
of the body.87
The coincidence of the idea of disease as punishment with the idea that it is related to the 
will created a punitive and moralistic conceptual framework which allowed disease to be 
seen as a product of weakness, an expression of the inner self which could be reversed by a 
conscious effort of strength.88 On the national scale, defeat and debility particularly 
contributed to perceptions of national ‘illness’: the Ottoman Empire, in a period of 
disintegration and of disastrous, humiliating military defeat, was commonly known as ‘the 
sick man of Europe.’ Hitler described the period following Germany’s defeat in the First 
World W ar as ‘inwardly sick and rotten’; his actions, suggests Lifton, can be understood as 
an effort to recreate the pre-War period and, as Hitler put it, to ‘cleanse it of all impurities, 
and preserve it, so that this time the goal of 1914 would be reached...’89
While moral judgement could only be passed on a diseased individual as an individual, in 
terms of the metaphor of society as a diseased body, society became a secondary and 
redeemable object of moral opprobrium, while the alien bodies of the other could bear the 
full brunt of condemnation. Throughout the nineteenth century,’ writes Sontag, ‘disease 
metaphors become more virulent, preposterous, demagogic. And there is an increasing 
tendency to call any situation one disapproves of a disease. Disease, which could be 
considered as much a part of nature as is health, became the synonym of whatever was 
“ unnatural.” ’90 Invasive diseases ‘constitute the ultimate insult to the natural order’;91 but 
with the exercise of brute force in the service of strength of will, order could be restored.
87 Sontag, p. 45. This idea was explored in nineteenth century works such as Samuel Butler’s satire Erewhon 
(1872), which describes a society in which bodily illness is treated as a criminal offence, while immoral behaviour 
is not seen as chosen, but as a misfortune to be tended to in hospitals.
88 Sontag, p. 47.
89 Lifton, p. 470.
90 Sontag, p. 75.
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lid. Disease and Germ Theory as Metaphor
Eugenics and race theory had provided a literalist, scientific-intellectual narrative as to why 
biologically-defined groups posed a threat to society. At the same time, medicine provided a 
metaphorical rhetoric which, given the established scientific ‘proof,’ could be employed to 
call for the destruction of outgroups. These literal and metaphorical utterances were 
connected through the discourse of modern science. The concept of social disease in the 
body politic was not novel; but the discovery of germ theory allowed a particularly vicious 
conceptualisation of disease and illness as an alien, threatening other invading the body. As 
Chilton puts it (in regard to Mein Kampf),
[t]he body frame, together with the generic-space C O N T A IN E R  schema, creates the 
possibility of evoking a mapping onto V o lk  o r nation o r state, all of which come with a 
cultural frame, the ‘body politic’ ... [I]t further follows from the disease and medicine frame, 
that the fatal disease caused in the host can be cured by removing it o r destroying the 
parasite.92
The terminology might differ, sometimes invoking connections between verminous or 
disease-spreading animals or insects and smaller organisms, but in every case the purpose 
was the same: ‘[wjhether ... depicted as a viper, a bacillus, a leech, a fungus or a rat, he [‘the 
Jew’] is in every case the parasitical driving force of poisoning, physical decay and 
decomposition.’93
91 Sontag, p. 69.
92 Chilton, pp. 38-39. For a detailed treament of the metaphor of the bodily metaphor in Nazism, see Musolff; a 
detailed analysis of the metaphor of Jews as disease organisms can be found on p. 37.
93 Musolff, p. 37; original italics. For the demonisation of lice and other insect parasites in European medical 
discourse from the 1890s onward, due to the discovery of their association with the spread of infection, see P. J. 
Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890-1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp. 6-7.
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The concept that living organisms had a role in causing disease, the ‘animacular hypothesis,’ 
was a theory which dated back to classical times; however, from the 1860s onwards, 
breakthroughs by scientists, most notably Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch, presented 
increasingly convincing proof of the relationship between microbes and illnesses. By 1900, 
‘the general principle that microorganisms [sic] played a central role in causing 
communicable diseases ... had achieved widespread acceptance in both Europe and 
America.’94 The new ‘germ theory’ travelled rapidly into popular consciousness, through 
public health campaigns, lectures and publications in popular science and household issues, 
and advertising.95 In the 1930s, growing recognition of the importance of viruses added a 
new spur to disease rhetoric.96 Illness in general had always been used as societal 
metaphor.97 But the advent of germ theory, and its dissemination into the popular realm, 
allowed more specific and particular kinds of understandings of illness, which then became 
available for strategic discursive use. Previous political metaphors which saw societal 
illnesses as treatable by reason, foresight or tolerance were replaced by a view in which 
disease equals death, in which the emphasis is on diseases that are loathsome and fatal, 
diseases which are not to be managed or treated, but attacked.98
In contrast to previous theories which had seen miasma and vapours as spreading illness, 
germ theory created active agents of illness which sought out their victims, agents which 
could be visualised, confined and destroyed.99 There was a change from a defensive, to an
94 N. Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass./London, 1998, p. 6.
95 J. Brown, ‘Crime, Commerce, and Contagion: The Political Languages of Public Health and the Popularization 
of Germ Theory in the United States, 1870-1950’, in R. G. Walters (ed.), Scientific Authority and Twentieth-Century 
America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London, 1997, pp. 56-60.
96 Tomes, p. 245. ‘Virus’ terminology was available, for example, in Hitler’s rhetoric during the Second W orld  
W ar; see Herf, p. 187.
97 Sontag, for example, pointed out Shakespeare’s metaphor of an infection in the ‘body politic’ in which no 
distinction is drawn between a contagion, an infection, a sore, an abscess, an ulcer and a tumour (p. 73).
98 Sontag, p. 81; see also Musolff, p. 36.
99 Otis, pp. 26-27.
Chapter 5 223
offensive attitude.100 Disease itself changed from a punishment, to something to be 
punished:101 hygiene, which was becoming more and more important to modern conceptions 
of ‘civilisation,’ took on value-laden moral and religious overtones. According to American 
pioneer home economist Ellen Richards, for example, even small hygienic chores had 
become ‘a step in the conquering of evil, for dirt is sin.’102 Disease-causing bacteria were 
described as ‘invisible enemies,’ ‘baneful,’ ‘lying in wait,’ ‘foreign,’ ‘base,’ ‘murderous’ and 
‘cunning’; and they ‘were often described in martial terms as attacking, invading, and 
conquering their human hosts’ (a theme to which I return below).103 A purposeful use of 
Darwinist rhetoric and analogy also emerged. Many of the leading figures in debate were 
committed Darwinists, who saw and described the relationship between microbe and host 
not only as a war, but specifically as a manifestation of the ‘survival of the fittest.’104
While germ theory made disease more comprehensible, it also became more frightening, 
for people, not places, were now responsible for disease - and a closer association was now 
possible between particular groups of people and disease.105 As a bacteriologist w rote in 
the American Popular Science Monthly in 1914, ‘it is people, primarily, and not things
100 Otis, p. 34.
101 Sontag, p. 8 1.
102 Tomes, p. 10.
103 Tomes, pp. 4 1 -44.
104 Tomes, pp. 43-44. In Germany, in particular, the disciplinary spheres of bacteriology and racial hygiene 
became ever more entwined; see Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 186-187.
105 Otis, p. 27; see also p. I 53. This conception, and its association with discrimination, was, of course, not 
confined to ‘germ-borne’ diseases, nor to the historical period after their discovery; for example, Klaus Hodl 
notes the way in which the supposed nature of ‘African’ biological health justified such practices as slavery and 
specifically flogging (which supposedly maintained health in a non-tropical climate, and was therefore humane), 
and the call for the enforcement of sexual segregation (due to the dangers of ‘black’ sickle-cell anaemia) (K. Hodl 
The Black body and the Jewish body: a comparison of medical images’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 36, no. I, 2002, 
pp. 18, 22). Weindling also argues that with the discovery that insects carried disease, ‘the human carriers of 
insects were stigmatised as vermin ... [rjeligious notions of disease as punishment for evil were transmuted into 
biological possession by insect parasites’ (Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, p. 37).
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that we must guard against.’106 The advent of germ theory also gave rise to an important 
change in understanding of the nature of incarnated pollution. It was no longer identifiable 
by outward appearance, which became deceptive: the cleanest-looking person might harbour 
hidden and contagious impurity.107 In the metaphors created by germ theory, this tied in 
neatly with the ideological view which saw assimilation as an unacceptable, and even a 
threatening, option. Assimilated minorities and ‘political traitors’ were more, not less, 
dangerous because they fitted in and because they could not be readily identified.108 For it 
was their essential, immutable inner nature which was the source of the threat.
The rhetoric of victims as disease organisms appeared soon after the inception of germ 
theory - and, in Germany, in parallel with Jewish emancipation and the entrance of ‘upstart’ 
Jews into the previously separate Gemeinschaft (‘community’). De Gobineau maintained (in 
the words of Tatz) that ‘civilisations degenerate and die when the primordial race-unit is 
broken up and swamped by an influx of foreign elements ... Purity of blood was essential to 
maintain that power, and purity had to be protected from dangerous germ plasms, the bacilli 
- the Jews.’109 By 1886 the German scholar and politician Paul de Lagarde, who has been 
characterised as the founder of the Völkisch movement, could describe Jews as ‘nothing but 
carriers of decomposition’ and argue that ‘with trichinae and bacilli one does not 
negotiate...they are exterminated as quickly and thoroughly as possible’;110 and in 1895 
Hermann Ahlwardt (a German antisemitic agitator and member of parliament), attacking
106 Tomes, p. 237.
107 Tomes, p. 63.
108 Friedländer, p. 21 3; see also, for example, Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 225, 264.
109 Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, p. 87.
110 Lifton, p. 478; on Lagarde, see Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, p. 3 I (Mosse describes Lagarde’s 
antisemitism as essentially non-racial’ [p. 44]). See also Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, pp. 
70-72.
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Jewish immigration, labelled Jews ‘cholera bacilli.’111 Richard Wagner’s son-in-law, Houston 
Stuart Chamberlain, wrote that ‘alien elements’ in Teutonism had not yet been exorcised 
‘and still, like baneful germs, circulate in our blood.’112
From this point onwards, such rhetoric is commonly found in the words of the 
perpetrators of genocidal episodes. The term ‘ugly microbes’ was employed in Khmer 
Rouge rhetoric in Democratic Kampuchea.113 A 1976 Khmer Rouge Party Center Report 
(thought to have been written by Pol Pot himself) states the following: ‘there is a sickness 
inside the Party ... we cannot locate it precisely. The illness must emerge to be examined 
... we search for the microbes within the Party without success ... They will rot society, rot 
the Party, rot the army ... W e  must expose them.’114 Those who exhibited ‘regressive’ signs 
were held to have a ‘sick consciousness’ (chhoeu satiaramma); and a Khmer Rouge saying 
held that the goal was to ‘completely annihilate diseases of consciousness’ and create a 
society of pure revolutionaries: ‘what is infected must be cut out.’115 Advances in health 
science, however, were to have political effects beyond making such genocidal figures 
available for discursive use. As well as providing this symbolic rhetoric, these new 
ideological worldviews, and the practices which both prefigured and accompanied them, 
would alter the very enactment of government.
111 Gerhard, p. 89. Gerhard comments that ‘[t]he embodiment of the need for segregation and exclusion is 
provided symbolically using the model of hygienic defense against epidemics.’ See also Mosse, The Crisis of 
German Ideology, pp. 138-139.
112 Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, p. 87.
113 Chandler quoted in E. Kissi, ‘Genocide in Cambodia and Ethiopia’ in R. Gellately & B. Kiernan (eds), The 
Specter of Genocide: Moss Murder in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University Press, New  York, 2003, p. 315.
114 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 96.
115 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 222; Straus, ‘Organic purity’, p. 52.
Chapter 5 226
lie. Disease and ‘Public Health’
W ith the advent of the nation-state, hygienic medicine as a technique of health assumed an 
increasingly important place in the administrative system and the machinery of power. The 
health of the population as a whole became one of the essential objectives of political 
power. 116 The nation-state, shaped as it was by the new technology of population (that is, 
political science), encompassing the tools for internal measurement and regulation, was the 
only body equipped to deal with the necessary processes of discipline: identification, 
categorisation, containment, and (if necessary) elimination. 117 According to this ideology, the 
health of the population must be ensured by the ‘police’ of the social body, and specifically 
by the new formation, ‘medical police’ ; 118 thus, with the new conception of illness, public 
health became more than ever before a question of policing. 119
Germ theory thus redefined the concept of individual liberty, ‘making it acceptable for 
governments to investigate citizens and restrict their movements, since no individual had the 
right to contaminate others.’ 120 Furthermore, in a refashioning of the imperatives of
116 M. Foucault, The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century’, in M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977 (ed. & trans. C. Gordon), Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1980, 
pp. 169-170, 176.
117 M. Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991, pp. 100-102.
118 Foucault, The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century’, pp. 170-171. See also Seidelman, p. 436; for the 
relationship between metaphor, medical science and medical policing in Europe, and their relationship to the 
other constructed from the position of the Western European subject, see Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in 
Eastern Europe, pp. 16-18.
119 See for example Tomes, p. 179.
120 Paraphrased in Otis, p. 34. The quicker absorption of the lessons of hygiene by the educated classes and by 
‘civilised’ Western nations created a vicious cycle in which the drastic drop in communicable disease amongst the 
upper strata of society meant that ‘it became far easier to conceive of controlling infectious diseases by finding 
and isolating the infected person’ (Tomes, p. 242).
However, it’s worth noting that a different tradition saw germ theory as an imperative to help the less privileged; 
the fact that the microbe did not respect wealth or race meant that it was in the interests of the more privileged
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morality, the elimination of illness through state surveillance and state control of the 
individual could be seen not only as a necessity, but also as humane; such a view was 
espoused by important scientists, notably Koch, a founder of bacteriology.121 In Australia, 
for example, in at least one episode (occurring in 1887) the ‘mercy’ killing of indigenous 
people by the Native Police was related to the allegation that ‘the niggers are propagating 
with terrible rapidity the most dreaded form of the syphilitic virus and ruining hundreds of 
men’s constitutions.’122
Whether they were depicted as merciful, or as imperatives in which mercy would play a 
counterproductive role, extreme measures could be justified when framed in terms of public 
health. The Nuremberg laws passed in Germany in 1935, which deprived Jews of their 
citizenship and forbade their marriage to non-Jews, as well as forbidding the marriage of 
those who were ‘genetically ill’ (Erbkranken) to the ‘genetically fit,’ were generally considered 
public health measures. 123 The Blood Protection Law was listed among the official measures 
of German health legislation, while German medical journals described ‘miscegenation’ as a 
‘public health hazard’ and scholars analysing community racial makeup claimed to be 
producing a ‘racial diagnosis’ (Rassendiagnose). The law covering the ‘genetically ill’ was 
named the Law for the Protection of the Genetic Health of German People.124
The sterilisation of the ‘unfit’ in Germany began in 1933. Their ‘medical’ murder, by gas 
and injection (in Germany itself) and shooting (in the occupied East) began in 1939,
to improve conditions for those less fortunate. But this spirit faltered, at least in the United States, in the 
conservative climate which emerged from the late 1910s onward (Tomes, pp. 128-1 30, 205-233, 241-242).
See also Seidelman, pp. 436-437, on the historical development of quarantine and the outgroups who were made 
the object of this practice.
121 Otis, p. 35.
122 Barta, p. 41.
123 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 14 1 -142.
124 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 131-132, 141-142.
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designated by the government as the year of ‘the duty to be healthy.’125 These actions took 
place under a strictly medicalised aegis; for example, administration of the killing institutes 
was carried out by the ‘Reich Association for Hospitals.’126 The mass murder of Jews, 
employing many of the same individuals, began in 1941. Numerous scholars have drawn a 
link between these events, inasmuch as they involve an evolutionary progress of the removal 
and destruction of those who had been categorised in essentialised biological terms, and in 
metaphorical medical terminology, as a threat to society.127 Furthermore, the connection 
between the discourse of medicine and the practice of killing is a continuous thread linking 
these events in the discursive register.
Gotz Aly theorises that the most important connection between Aktion T4 (the Nazi 
‘euthanasia program,’ which was the first Nazi mass murder program to target an entire, 
carefully defined set of people) and the murder of Jews was ‘the discovery made by the 
organisers that all levels of German administration, as well as the German people in general, 
were willing to accept such a procedure.’128 Dehumanising strategies which cast particular 
groups as a threat and excised them, discursively, from the national community had worked 
more than effectively. Walter Gross, head of the Nazi Office of Racial Policy, dated the 
explicit link made between genetic health and German blood to the Nuremberg Laws of 
1935. All subsequent legislation on race and population, Gross claimed, was based on the 
distinction these laws drew between ‘healthy’ and ‘diseased races.’129 The concentration and 
elimination of Jews took place under the guise of ‘quarantine’: ghettoes were a ‘hygienic
125 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. I 77.
126 Weindling, Health, race and German politics, p. 549.
127 See for example Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 194-217. On this issue and the relationship to disinfection and 
gassing, see Weindling, pp. 292-315.
128 Aly, ‘Medicine against the Useless’, pp. 92-93. The killing of the disabled caused a much greater public outcry 
than did that of Jews, and was ‘officially’ ceased (though not ceased in fact) for this reason; it has been suggested, 
however, that this is related not to different perceptions of the object, but to the fact that this killing, as opposed 
to that of Jews and other ‘racial’ groups, began before the outbreak of the Second W orld  W a r  (with its 
consequent increase in personal and national concern on the part of non-Jewish Germans).
129 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 195.
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necessity’ and Jews were characterised as ‘germ-carriers’ who spread epidemic disease.130 
Such rhetoric emerges again in DK, where at times
the eradication of ‘microbes’ was likened to a public health decision ... ‘Leaders justified 
destruction of the “diseased elements” of the old society ... We were told repeatedly that 
in order to save the country, it was essential to destroy all the contaminated parts ... It was 
essential to cut deep, even to destroy a few good people rather than chance one “diseased” 
person escaping eradication.’131
The demands of ‘public health,’ when framed in this way, were in themselves both a 
motivating and a legitimating factor in any calls for eliminationist action. But it was not only 
the dictates of public health which were seen to necessitate such action, but the discursive 
connection of this language to the enactment of ‘legitimate’ killing in the context of warfare.
Ilf. The Military Metaphor and the Role of Physicians
In the modern discursive order legitimate killing is monopolised in the hands of the state. 
Hence, killing becomes legitimate when it is ordered by the state; and mass killing is 
legitimately ordered by the state in warfare (a situation wherein the wellbeing, and very 
often the survival, of the nation is understood to be at stake, just as in Darwinian and 
medicalised rhetoric). Furthermore, implicit in the invocation of military discourse is a 
construction, or a ‘cognitive redefinition,’ of the object of harmful action as intent upon 
harming the subject, thus constructing that object as ‘the enemy’ and justifying that harmful 
action in terms of self-defence.132 Therefore, perpetrators often use the rhetoric of combat
130 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 199-200. See also Weindling, pp. 271-274.
131 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 155.
132 See A. Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal of Moral Education, 
vo\. 31, no. 2, 2002, p. 103.
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and warfare, and the redefinition of civilians as combatants, to justify their roles as killers.133 
During the Second World War, for example, Hitler described ‘Jewry’ as having made a 
‘declaration of war against ‘the European peoples,’ and periodicals were ordered to use the 
term ‘self-preservation’ to describe anti-Jewish measures.134 Victor Klemperer has attested 
to the way in which Jewish Germans were treated as ‘the enemy’ in ‘the Jewish war.’135
133 See for example Herf, pp. 268-269. Warfare in itself is very often one important enabling and/or causal factor 
in genocide, a subject which there is no space to discuss within the context of this thesis; see for example P. 
Bartrop, The relationship between war and genocide in the twentieth century: a consideration’, Journal of 
Genocide Research, vol. 4 no. 4, 2002, pp. 519-532; E. Markusen & D. Kopf, David The Holocaust and Strategic 
Bombing: Genocide and Total W ar in the Twentieth Century, W estview  Press, Boulder, 1995, M. Shaw, The general 
hybridity of war and genocide’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 9, no. 3, 2007, pp. 461—473; D. Bloxham, 
‘Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 2008, pp. 203-245; E. Kissi, ‘Rwanda, Ethiopia and Cambodia: links, faultlines and 
complexities in a comparative study of genocid e', Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 6, no. I, 2004, pp. I 19-1 22; J. 
Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2007, pp. 145-146.
W e  might, however, quote Helen Fein:
the calculus of the costs of exterminating the victim - a group excluded from the circle circumscribed by the 
political formula - changes as the perpetrators instigate or join a (temporarily) successful coalition at war 
against antagonists who have earlier protested and/or might conceivably be expected to protest persecution 
of the victim. This calculus changes for two reasons: the crime planned by the perpetrators becomes less 
visible and they no longer have to fear sanctions.
(H. Fein, Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust, The Free Press, 
New  York, 1979, p 8). Christopher Fettweis suggests that, an important reason for the lack of challenge to the 
Holocaust was the wartime context (unlike the T4 program, which did induce protest) in which the public ‘rally 
round the flag’ and become intent upon the destruction of ‘enemies,’ while ethical constraints are lowered (C. J. 
Fettweis, ‘W a r as catalyst: moving W orld  W a r  II to the center of Holocaust scholarship’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003).
On the relationship between conflict, group perceptions, and the perceived morality of harmful action, see S. 
Opotow, ‘Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction’, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. I, 1990, pp. 6-7; A. 
Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control’, Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. I, 1990, p. 
29; D. Bar-Tal, ‘Causes and Consequences of Delegitimization: Models of Conflict and Ethnocentrism’, Journal of 
Social Issues, vol. 40, no.I, 1990, pp. 66-73.
On the ‘war’ metaphor and its associated entailments, see Lakoff & Johnson, pp. 156-157; in the context of 
Hitler and Mein Kampf, see Rash, ‘Metaphor in Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, pp. 99-100; Weindling, Health, race and 
German politics, p. 545.
134 In Herf, pp. 189-190.
135 V. Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI - Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook (trans. M. Brady, 
3rd edn), The Athlone Press, London & New  Brunswick (New  Jersey), 2000 (original German date of publication 
1957), pp. 172-173.
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During the Second World War, Peter Schrijvers notes that ‘[w]hen the Japanese 
government announced that men and women, old and young, would be called up for home 
defense, the Fifth Air Force’s intelligence officer was swift to declare in July 1945 that “ the 
entire population of Japan is a proper Military Target ... THERE ARE NO  CIVILIANS IN 
JAPAN.'” 136 In Bosnia, according to Norman Cigar, a means of denial ‘was the Serbs’ 
portrayal of the situation ... as one exclusively of “ combat,” an argument that lent legitimacy 
to virtually any target attacked, including civilian ones ... Preemptive [sic] arrests of Muslims 
also found justification because of the “ threat.” ’137 Jean Hatzfeld also observes this tendency 
among Rwandan killers:
Pancrace Hakizamungili, who sometimes seems like the most cynical or indifferent member 
of the gang, boldly announces: Then began the terrible battle of the marshes.’ The 
excessively pious Fulgence Bunani informs us, ‘W e  usually made war with machetes because 
we had no other weapons.’ Encountering our disbelief or irritation, they rapidly abandon 
that tactic to return to a more realistic vocabulary. They say that they ‘hit’ or ‘cut.’138
ALPHONSE: ...In the town, we had got ready to begin new massacres to counter the 
inkotanyi attacks. W e  anticipated just the usual massacres, however, the kind we had known 
for thirty years. The more the inkotanyi pushed into the country, the more we would 
massacre their Tutsi brothers on their farms, to deter them and halt the advance; that was 
how we saw the situation at the municipal level.139
Killing in warfare is justified not only by the legitimate order of the state, but by the 
animosity of the object. Michel Foucault writes that, in the modern order ‘the principle
136 P. Schrijvers, The Gl W ar Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific during W orld W ar II, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2002, p. 258.
137 Cigar, pp. 97-98; and see these pages for more detailed examples.
138 J. Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers In Rwanda Speak (trans. L. Coverdale), Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New 
York, 2005, p. 155.
139 Hatzfeld, p. 177.
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underlying the tactics of battle - that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living 
- has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence at stake is 
no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a 
population.’140 The nation-state thus situates power, and enacts its militaristic tactics, at the 
level of the life, the species, the race, ‘population’.
How does this relate to the medical metaphor? The nineteenth-century tradition of 
hygienic representation and public health practice, argues JoAnne Brown, ‘figuratively bound 
the police power of the state to the healing power of medicine ... at once furthering and 
denaturing the militaristic-cultural equation that permits such barbarous euphemisms as 
“ surgical strikes,” the “war on drugs,” and “ ethnic cleansing.’” 141 The new conceptualisation 
of disease created a metaphorical rhetoric drawing a parallel between medicine and military 
practice. ‘It was when the invader was seen not as the illness but as the micro-organism that 
causes the illness that medicine really began to be effective, and the military metaphors took 
on new credibility and precision.’142
The revelation that illness could be caused by microscopic living organisms lent itself 
immediately to a militarised understanding which turned around the traditional metaphor of 
the body as a metaphor to interpret society, instead using society as a metaphor to interpret
140 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction (trans. R. Hurley), Pantheon Books, New York, 
1978, p. 137. The concept of biopower, developed both in Foucault and in Giorgio Agamben, is one which, 
although it is related to the concerns examined here, there is unfortunately no space to develop without 
departing far from the central concerns of this work; for an examination of dehumanising medical rhetoric from 
the perspective of Foucault’s and Agamben’s theories, see M. Landzelius, ‘“ Homo Sacer” out of left field: 
Communist “ slime” as bare life in I 930s and second world war Sweden’, Human Geography, vol. 88, no. 4, 2006, 
pp. 453—475. For a critique of Agamben in the context of genocide, see Stone, ‘Biopower and Modern 
Genocide’, pp. 167-169.
141 Brown, p. 81. Brown wrote specifically about the North American context, but the relatively close cultural 
connections among the W estern nations mean that her work also casts light on this issue outside the context of 
the United States.
142 Sontag, p. 95.
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the individual body. Sontag identifies the way in which ‘the military metaphor in medicine 
first came into wide use in the 1880s, with the identification of bacteria as agents of disease. 
Bacteria were said to “ invade” or “ infiltrate.” ’143 This metaphor could all too easily be 
turned around to depict out-groups as threatening infiltrators: by the 1920s ‘[t]o liken a 
political event or situation to an illness [was] to impute guilt, to prescribe punishment.’144 
Speaking of the cancer metaphor in particular, Sontag claims that its use is an incitement to 
violence, and may in itself be implicitly genocidal.145 Brown explains that ‘the criminological 
and military analogies of public health were not merely modelled after law enforcement and 
war but also became, and remain, models for criminology and military strategy.’146
In the discourse of biopolitics, then, a twofold metaphorical process takes place: a military 
metaphor interpreting disease, along with a bodily metaphor interpreting society, legitimises 
the use of military techniques of destruction against a civilian outgroup. Brown, describing 
the rise of an adversarial model employing criminological and military analogies for disease in 
the last third of the nineteenth century, argues that ‘[t]he crime-disease and hygiene-war 
equations ultimately strengthened the cultural institutions of policing and the military 
(including the reservoir of public language available for political discussion); that is, these 
equations strengthened the coercive powers of the state ,..’147
W e  see this conceptualisation borne out in genocidal episodes. In German utterances, the 
Herero uprising, and subsequent genocide of the Herero by German colonialists, was 
frequently described as a Rassenkampf (racial struggle); meanwhile, General Lothar von 
Trotha, commander of the colonial forces in German South W est Africa, wrote in his diary
143 Sontag, p. 67. For a history of bacteriology in Germany and its relationship to antisemitism, see Weindling, 
pp. 20-30.
144 Sontag, p. 82.
145 Sontag, p. 84.
146 Brown, p. 53.
147 Brown, p. 55.
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that ‘I find it most appropriate that the nation perishes instead of infecting our soldiers and 
diminishing their supplies of water and food.'148 The carnage of the First World W ar and the 
accompanying shortages in food and medical supplies, along with the Great Depression of 
1929, spurred the nascent German impulse to destroy ‘life unworthy of life.’149 Military 
discourse was clear in Nazi-era rhetoric: Adolf Jost, an early advocate of direct medical 
killing, published Dos Recht auf den Tod (The Right to Death’) in 1895, in which he pointed 
out that the state already exercises the right to demand an individual’s death for the good of 
the state in war.150 Doctors were no longer caretakers of the individual, but must become 
‘warriors against disease,’ ‘physicians to the Volk,’ and ‘biological soldiers’ (while, conversely, 
soldiers could become expert hygiene police);151 patients should overcome the individualistic 
principle of ‘the right to one’s own body’ and embrace instead the ‘duty to be healthy.’152 
Doctors’ responsibility was not to the individual, but to the Volkskörper (roughly, ‘body of 
the people’);153 curative medicine (Fürsorge) was to be replaced by preventive medicine 
(Vorsorge).154 Racial hygiene was conceived as long-term preventive care for human genetic
148 Stone, ‘W hite  men with low moral standards’, pp. 40, 42.
149 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 178; C. Pross, ‘Introduction’, in Aly, Chroust, & Pross (eds), p. 2. During the First 
W orld  W ar, due to shortages in food and medical supplies, nearly half of all patients in German psychiatric 
hospitals died of starvation or disease. See also Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 301-307.
Bartrop also suggests (following Hobsbawm) that the ‘total war’ experience in itself demonstrated the possibility 
of the deliberate killing of millions with impunity (Bartrop, ‘The relationship between war and genocide’, p. 522).
150 Lifton, p. 46.
151 Weindling, Health, race and German politics, p. 167; P. J. Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, p. 
247.
152 See Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 157-158.
153 Lifton, p. 30; see also Rash, ‘Metaphor in Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, pp. 94-97; Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 240, 
on the Nazi slogan ‘the good of the whole comes before the good of the individual’ (Gemeinnutz geht vor 
Eigennutz); Seidelman, p. 440; and Aly, ‘Pure and Tainted Progress’, in Aly, Chroust, & Pross (eds), p. 209; ‘where 
a collective, rather than an individual patient, was the object of curative efforts, mass murder could be considered 
a quasisurgical operation on the body of the nation.’ Peter Haas suggests that a fundamental characteristic of the 
Nazi ethical system was that ‘social groupings are the primary concern of ethics, not individuals.’ (P. J. Haas, The 
Morality of Auschwitz; Moral Language and the Nazi Ethic’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 3, no. 4, 1988, p. 
385).
154 For the connection between defensive war and preventive medicine, see Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in 
Eastern Europe, p. 228.
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material.155 In the words of Aly, ‘treatment of sick people was declared a war, and the laws 
of war are different from those of peace.’156 While the camp experiments of Nazi doctors 
are infamous, the role of physicians was thus much more central and widespread than even 
these outrages.157
In this environment, as we have seen, the destruction of the mentally ill (beginning in 1939) 
was the Nazis’ initial act of organised exclusory mass murder, one which provided a 
template for the ‘excision’ of Jews and Gypsies from an utopian Thousand Year Reich. This 
killing, that is, was the first time the Nazi ideological policy of utopia through murderous 
exclusion was put into practice; but it would not be the last. As well as perpetuating an 
ideology of exclusion as solution, and answering the question of what to do with outgroups, 
the initial mass killing created a framework associating outgroups and health, which could 
then be easily transposed to different victim groups in the form of metaphor. This metaphor 
in turn necessitated the understanding of the problem posed by outgroups as a biological 
one, appropriately dealt with by biological methods. ‘Selections’ in Auschwitz, for example, 
were always made by physicians, and were constantly compared to combat and to wartime 
medical triage.158
Indeed, the metaphor of health and disease is particularly useful in understanding the 
involvement of physicians in genocide, despite the Hippocratic Oath. Medical doctors were 
prominent figures in three of the four cases I focus on in this chapter; and in the Nazi case, 
the medicalised understanding of killing meant that SS doctors were required to oversee 
virtually every aspect of the killing process, despite the fact that many if not most of these
155 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 73, 240-241.
156 Aly, ‘Pure and Tainted Progress’, p. 209.
157 In terms of Nazi human experimentation, there may also be a connection to animalising discourses; Mann 
notes a comment by doctor Kurt Hessmeyer (who experimented on child inmates) that there was no difference 
‘between Jews and guinea pigs’ (M. Mann, ‘W e re  the Perpetrators of Genocide “ Ordinary Men” or “ Real Nazis” ? 
Results from Fifteen Hundred Biographies’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, p. 352).
is8 Lifton, p. 173.
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roles did not require specialised medical knowledge. 159 This discourse allowed the creation 
of what Lifton terms a ‘healing-killing paradox’: 160 the doctor fulfils his (or, less commonly, 
her) traditional and obligated role by destroying the source of disease, in order to heal the 
organism. As Lifton also observes, ‘[w]ar is the only accepted institution...in which there is 
a parallel healing-killing paradox. One has to kill the enemy in order to preserve -  to ‘heal’ — 
one’s people, one’s military unit, oneself.’ 161
In the modern order, according to Foucault, medicine, as a science of the normality of 
bodies, finds a place at the centre of penal practice, in which the penalty must have healing as 
its purpose. In genocide, however, in a murderous inversion, the body to be healed 
becomes solely the Volkskorper. The restoration of its normality utilises what Foucault terms 
the new ‘physics of power,’ which involves bureaucratic organisation, manipulation and 
monitoring of individuals, and the definition of standards which are (re)established through 
corrective interventions that are ambiguously therapeutic and punitive. 162 So much for 
modernity; but the Nazi ideology, in its ‘reactionary modernism’ (Jeffrey Fterfs term), 
blended high-rationalist technological modernity with irrationalist, romantic traditionalism. 163 
This is made manifest in the fact that the ultimate aim of this process harks back to an earlier 
form of corporal punishment: the complete obliteration of the object from the polity. 164 As 
Jacques Semelin puts it, ‘[t]he state is no longer content merely to “discipline and punish.’” 165
159 Lifton, p. I 50. One slogan used in regard to Nazi ‘euthanasia’ was: ‘Let the syringe remain in the hand of the 
physician’ (p. 392).
160 Lifton, pp. 430-432; see also E. Staub, ‘Moral Exclusion, Personal Goal Theory, and Extreme Destructiveness’, 
lournal of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. 1, 1990, p. 5 I .
161 Lifton, p. 43 I .
162 M. Foucault, ‘The Punitive Society’, in M. Foucault, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (ed. P. Rabinow, trans. R. Hurley 
et al), Allen Lane, London, 1997, pp. 34-35.
163 In Proctor, Nazi War on Cancer, p. I 5.
164 Foucault, History of Sexuality, pp. 149-150. In Foucault’s analysis, Nazism throws the full historical weight of 
the old politics of blood (that is, of sovereignty) behind their modern, eugenic (and therefore sexualised) fantasies 
of a utopian society.
165 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 338.
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It is not only Nazi genocide in which physicians, and medical rhetoric, are prominent. The 
genocide of Christians in Asia Minor was carried out at the behest of, and with the 
involvement of, many physicians, both as ideologues and as direct killers.166 Dr. Mehmed 
Resid gave the following rationale for his actions: ‘Even though I am a physician, I cannot 
ignore my nationhood ... My national identification takes precedence over everything else 
... Armenian traitors had found a niche for themselves in the bosom of the fatherland; they 
were dangerous microbes. Isn’t it the duty of a doctor to destroy the microbes?’167 
Genocide scholar Vahakn N. Dadrian cites a series of threatening letters, inspired by Dr. 
Mehmed Nazim and possibly composed by Huseyin Azmi, the Director General of Istanbul 
Police, written to the Armenian press and the Armenian Patriarch. Among other threats 
was this: ‘Know this that the Turks have committed themselves, and have vowed to subdue 
and clean up the Armenian gavurs [infidels] who have become a tubercular microbe for 
us.’168
A few years later, in 1920, Karl Binding and Alfred Hoche had produced their crucial work 
Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens (The Permission to Destroy Life 
Unworthy of Life’) in which they ‘stressed the therapeutic goal of their concept: destroying 
life unworthy of life is “ purely a healing treatment” and a “ healing work.’” 169 In a reversal of 
the military-medicinal metaphor, in the late 1930s one Bielefeld physician compared the 
‘genetic defective’ to a ‘grenade’ waiting to explode.170 In Auschwitz, doctors referred to 
the gas chambers, at first mockingly but then unselfconsciously, as Therapia Magna
166 Most notably, Drs Behaeddin Sakir and Mehmed Nazim, but also others such as Fazal Berki, Mehmed Hasan, 
Mehmed Esad Pasa, Ali Saib and Hamdi Suad (Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, p. 89).
167 In Tatz, The  “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, p. 89.
168 In V. N. Dadrian, The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus 
(3rd revised edn), Berghahn Books, Providence, 1997, p. 216. Similarly, in 1942, writing in his diary, Goebbels 
described the Nazi genocide of Jews as ‘cleaning up the Jewish mob.’ See Herf, p. 177.
169 Lifton, p. 46.
170 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. I 94.
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Auschwitzciense - thus creating the illusion of humane action.171 One medical collaborator 
went so far as to refer to the chambers as ‘the central hospital.’172 Nazi doctor Fritz Klein, 
when asked, ‘How can you reconcile [killing] with your [Hippocratic] oath as a doctor?’ 
replied, ‘Of course I am a doctor and I want to preserve life. And out of respect for human 
life I would remove a gangrenous appendix from a diseased body. The Jew is the gangrenous 
appendix in the body of mankind.’173 One doctor described Jews as a ‘diseased bacillus, 
eating its way into the body of the German people’; another said that ‘there is a resemblance 
between Jews and tubercle bacilli; nearly everyone harbours tubercle bacilli, and nearly every 
people of the earth harbor the Jews; furthermore, an infection can only be cured with 
difficulty.’174
In a 1936 lecture on radiotherapy, SS radiologist Hans Holfeder showed students a slide in 
which cancer cells were portrayed as Jews, and X-rays launched against them as Nazi storm 
troopers.175 Gerhard Wagner, leader of the German medical profession, argued that the 
racially ‘bastardized’ Jews suffered higher rates of certain illnesses (a common argument 
which was used to justify anti-miscegenation laws intended to preserve the ‘relatively pure’ 
European racial stock). From this, he concluded that Jews were a diseased race, and Judaism 
was ‘disease incarnate.’176 Indeed, William Seidelman argues that one of the reasons for the
171 Lifton, p. 208.
172 Lifton, p. 244.
173 Lifton, pp. 15-16.
174 In Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. I 76, 195. For another example of ‘infection’ terminology, see Herf, p. 239.
175 Proctor, Nazi W ar on Cancer, p. 46. Jews were also blamed for the spread of cancer, through their putative 
role in the introduction of tobacco and the tobacco trade, as well as the alleged role their immoral capitalism 
played in the deterioration of German foods (p. 68).
The cancer metaphor was also used in reverse: cancer cells were referred to as a ‘pathological race’ of cells, as 
anarchists, Bolshevists, a ‘state within a state’, ‘directing a civil war against the body’ and other similar metaphors 
(pp. 46-50).
176 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 195-196; Proctor, Nazi W ar on Cancer, pp. 6 1 -62. In the spirit of Cesare 
Lombroso’s influential theory of I’uomo delinquente (‘the criminal man’), Jews were also constructed as biologically 
disposed to criminality; see Proctor, 1988, pp. 202-205.
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creation of walled-off Jewish ghettos in occupied Eastern Europe was an association between 
Jews and typhus.177
The médicalisation of genocide also extends beyond the role of the traditional physician. 
Psychiatrists and psychiatry had important roles to play in Serbian discourse:
Jovan Raskovic headed the psychiatry department at the Neuropsychiatrie Clinic in Sibenik, 
Croatia, where he enjoyed the reputation of taking pleasure in administering electroshock 
therapy to Croats, especially Croatian women. He developed his own psychoanalytic theory 
explaining the inferiority of Croats and Muslims and the superiority of Serbs, by which Serbs 
were destined to dominate and rule over the others.178
Raskovic was the mentor of infamous Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, also once a 
practicing psychiatrist.
In the modern era, then, the doctor, in her/his function as a hygienist rather than a 
therapist, ‘becomes the great advisor and expert, if not in the art of governing, at least in 
that of observing, correcting, and improving the social “ body” and maintaining it in a 
permanent state of health.’179 ‘In the microbial age’, writes Laura Otis, ‘scientists assumed 
the heroic role of soldiers, the creators and the defenders of empires.’180 The new theories
However, the association between Jews and the spread of disease was by no means universal; in the United 
States of America, in regard to tuberculosis, Jews came to be viewed as more resistant or ‘hardier,’ given their 
supposed lack of a ‘natural habitat’ (in earlier theories) or their alleged status as persecuted, or (less 
sympathetically) as urban dwellers (in later, social Darwinist theories); this also held for syphilis (see Hodl, pp. 24- 
33; Ehrenreich, p. 64).
177 Seidelman, p. 442. See also Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, p. xix.
178 P. J. Cohen, T he Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals in Genocide in the 1990s’, in T. Cushman & S. G. 
Mestrovic (eds), This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Bosnia, New York University Press, New 
York & London, I 996, pp. 49-51.
179 Foucault, The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century’, p. 284.
180 Otis, p. 28; on the image of the soldier as warrior and conquistador see also Otis pp. 85-86, 88, 97. See also 
Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, pp. 26-28, 233, 257.
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allowed doctors to understand murderous behaviour in this flattering light. They also 
allowed the use by non-doctors of strategic justification in the form of murderous medical 
rhetoric. Armenians were described as ‘a canker, a malignance which looks like a small 
pimple from the outside, which, if not removed by a skilful surgeon’s scalpel, will kill the 
patient.’ 181 In Nazi Germany, one cartoon in Der Sturmer depicted a microscope under 
which were symbols for Jews, communists and homosexuals, along with the British pound 
and the American dollar. The cartoon was titled ‘Infectious Germs’, while the accompanying 
poem ran: ‘W ith his poison, the Jew destroys/The sluggish blood of weaker peoples;/So that 
a diagnosis arises,/Of swift degeneration./With us, however, the case is different:/The blood 
is pure; we are healthy! 182 Joseph Goebbels declared that ‘our task here is surgical ... 
drastic incisions, or some day Europe will perish of the Jewish disease.’ 183 Hitler ‘was lauded 
as the great doctor of the German people.’ 184 Raul Hilberg describes the way in which the 
removal of ‘asocials’ from prisons to camps took place:
In consequence of an agreement between Himmler and Justice Minister Thierack, so-called 
asocials were transferred from prisons to concentration camps. On November 16, 1944, 
after the transfer of ‘asocials’ had been largely completed, the judiciary met to discuss a 
weird subject: ugliness. The phrase on the agenda was "gallery of outwardly asocial 
prisoners.”  The summary of that conference states:
During various visits to the penitentiaries, prisoners have always been observed who - 
because of their bodily characteristics -  hardly deserve the designation human: they look like 
miscarriages of hell. Such prisoners should be photographed. It is planned that they too
181 In Lifton, pp. 488-489.
182 Image in Proctor, Racial Hygiene, fig. 34; translation in Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 162.
183 Lifton, p. 477. As Proctor writes, ‘Goebbels routinely castigated the objects of his contempt as “ cancers” or 
“ malignancies” - this included not just the Jews and homosexuals but the Foreign Office ... and Stalin’s 
communist empire’ (The Nazi War on Cancer, p. 46).
184 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 64; fig. I I; see also Weindling, Health, race and German politics, p. 493. On the 
metaphor of Hitler as healer in Mein Kampf, see also Musolff, pp. 29-30.
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shall be eliminated. Crime and sentence are irrelevant. Only such photos should be 
submitted which clearly show the deformity.185
Another example is Heinrich Himmler’s notorious speech in which he congratulated senior 
SS officers on having killed thousands and still ‘stayed decent’: ‘[w]e had the moral right, we 
had the duty towards our people to destroy this people that wanted to destroy us ... W e  
do not want, in the end, because we destroyed a bacillus, to be infected by this bacillus and 
to die. I will never stand by while even a small rotten spot develops or takes hold. 
Wherever it may form we will together burn it away.’186 German radio stations carried a 
report by an associate of Goebbels who had recently visited wartime Warsaw and Lodz, 
which described the ghetto Jews as ‘ulcers which must be cut away from the body of the 
European nations.’187
This specific type of utterance was also present in the former Yugoslavia. Cigar documents 
the following case:
In late 1991, lashing out against the alleged Islamic inspiration of articles in a Sarajevo 
newspaper, a Serbian Orthodox cleric wrote in the official Church organ about the 
‘malignant disease of the authors of these texts and of those at whose orders they write.’ ...
[H]e rhetorically asked the Muslim population in Bosnia-Herzegovina to decide ‘whether this 
disease has been contained or whether it has infected the majority of its organism.’
Moreover, he suggested menacingly that ‘instead of a condemnation or a tit for tat, the Serb 
must help the Muslims to cure or excise that rather naive tumor from their breasts.’188
185 R. Hilberg, The Nature of the Process’, in J. Dimsdale (ed), Survivors, Victims, and Perpetrators: Essays on the 
Nazi Holocaust, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1980, p. I I.
186 Quoted in I. W . Charny (ed.), Encyclopedia o f Genocide, ABC-CLIO, California, 1999, p. 241.
187 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 200.
188 Cigar, p. 3 I .
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The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic used the same imagery: Serbs were protecting 
Europe by making sure ‘Islamic fundamentalism doesn’t  infect Europe from the south.’189 
Thus, in all these cases, discursive resources were available not only allowing physician- 
perpetrators to take on the role of legitimate and moral killers; but allowing killers to 
represent themselves as fulfilling the healing role of the physician.
§
From where do these examples arise, and what do they demonstrate? The rise of the 
nation-state, and developments in science, allowed the creation of a narrative determined by 
a bodily metaphor in which the perpetrator society was presented as a unitary body invaded 
or infected by threatening life-forms, which might be all the more dangerous because of their 
invisibility.190 For the very survival of the patient, these organisms must be destroyed. This 
metaphor has been persistent since its establishment: Brown writes that from the inception 
of germ theory until the mid-twentieth century, although the specific threat changed, ‘the 
generic image of the germ as “ enemy,” and of hygiene as “ defense,” remained constant, with
189 Cigar, p. 100. Non-Serbian supporters of the genocidal Serb actions used similar rhetoric: ‘Russian ultra­
nationalist Zhirinovsky, known for his deeply ingrained anti-Muslim outlook, approved unreservedly Serbian 
policy with regard to Muslims. He equated the policy with a defense of Europe from “ Islamic fundamentalism" ... 
“ It is better to have an influenza in Bosnia-Herzegovina than AIDS in Europe’” (p. I 13).
190 Semelin suggests that it is the similarity (and hence invisibility) of the other which causes the perceived threat 
to be understood as ‘betrayal’ (Purify and Destroy, pp. 31-32). Otis writes that ‘[i]n the 1880s, because of their 
miniscule size and deadly effects, bacteria became a metaphor through which one could articulate fears about all 
invisible enemies, military, political, or economic’ (p. 94). See also, for example, Otis, p. 70, on Santiago Ramón y 
Cajal, director of the Spanish National Institute of Hygiene and founder of neuroscience: ‘The greatest threat of 
infectious bacteria was that they could enter human beings unobserved; if rendered visible, they could eventully 
be defeated.’ Cajal called microbes ‘invisible poisoners’ and ‘the invisible enemy of the human race’ and envisaged 
health workers, analogous to police, as ‘soldiers destined to shelter us from the formidable gang of poisoning 
microbes, that lie in wait, traitorously hidden in the invisible.’ See also Herf, p. 10. This construction might also 
apply to literal scientific discourse about race and disease; see for example Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in 
Eastern Europe, p. 256.
Chapter 5 243
continuing implications not only for health, disease and medicine but also for ... political 
conceptions of social danger.’191
It is important to acknowledge that in and of itself this metaphor alone was not a 
motivation for genocide. I do not attempt to establish a relationship of singular causality; 
this rhetoric had been available for use, and had been used by various figures, for 70-odd 
years before it was employed by the Nazis in support of their quest to make greater 
Germany Judenrein (‘Jew clean’). Rather, such rhetoric, as a discursive strategy, is a tool: 
when it is used by those in positions of power and influence as widespread and widely- 
accepted public discourse it serves a justificatory and a legitimatory function. As Lifton 
observes, the ‘genocidal threshold requires extensive prior ideological imagery of 
imperative.’192 Such discourse is, according to Alexander Laban Hinton, a key part of the 
process of ‘genocidal priming’: victim groups, too, are ‘imagined communities,’ imagined, 
however, not by themselves but by their persecutors.193
It is not the metaphor itself, but the ‘reality’ which this metaphor represents, the 
perception of intrinsic essentialised threat, which is a motivation for genocide; and such 
rhetoric serves to establish the connection in populist and powerfully symbolic terms. 
Nancy Tomes writes that
[t]he identification of dread disease with a concrete enemy piqued popular interest in germ 
theory from its earliest days. As one commentator observed in Popular Science Monthly in 
1885, The germ theory appeals to the average mind: it is something tangible; it may be 
hunted down, captured, colored, and looked at through a microscope, and then in all its 
varieties, it can be held directly responsible for so much damage.’194
191 Brown, p. 62.
192 Lifton, p. 480.
193 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 280, 283-4.
194 Tomes, p. 6.
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W e  have established, then, how this metaphor became available for use by political elites and 
ideologues; and how it has been used to legitimise and motivate genocidal action to the 
direct perpetrators, the ‘men on the ground,’ constructing victim groups as a threat and 
quashing whatever moral qualms may be felt in relation to the destruction of people who 
might otherwise be seen as fellow human beings. W e  may now examine in more detail how 
tropes of purity and contamination operate in constructing victim identity to serve these 
purposes.
III. Hygiene, Purity and Cleanliness in M etaphor
Auschwitz was described by the Nazi doctor Heinz Thilo as anus mundi, the anus of the 
world: psychiatrist Antoni Kqpinski perceptively suggests that, rather than being an 
expression of disgust at what was happening there, this statement accurately reflects the 
Nazi vision of ‘the necessity to sweep clean the world,’ of ‘a world where there would be no 
place for sick people, cripples, psychologically immoral people, contaminated by Jewish,
Gypsy or other blood.’ All of these were, for the Nazis, biomedical waste material, and 
Auschwitz was the locus of their expulsion.195
Identity, it has been argued, is defined not by inclusion, but by exclusion. In the narrative of 
what has been termed the social bodily metaphor, a discursive vocabulary of sickness and 
health in the context of the container schema becomes a polarised system in which
195 In Lifton, p. 147. In similar rhetoric, the Danzig surgeon Erwin Liek, infamous as ‘the father of Nazi medicine,’ 
wrote in 1933 that Nazism represented the cleansing of Germany’s ‘Augean stables’ (Proctor, Nazi W ar on 
Cancer, p. 23); again, Jovan Raskovic described Bosnian Muslims as ‘victims, as Freud might have said, of anal 
frustrations, which incite them to amass wealth and to seek refuge in fanatic attitudes’ (Cohen, T he Complicity 
of Serbian Intellectuals’, p. 50).
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‘[t]otality may be reinterpreted as bodily integrity, giving the idea of health vs. illness.’ 196 
Furthermore, ‘the borders of the self made identity possible. To be was to determine what 
one was not, and to reject it .’ 197 Disease organisms are not a part of the patient, but an 
alien other: ‘you are being replaced by the nonyou. Immunologists class the body’s cancer 
cells as “ nonself.’” 198 Brown has coined the term ‘Social Contagionism’ (as a counterpart to 
Social Darwinism) to describe the way in which germ theory created a perception of 
particular danger inherent in contact with the alien other. 199 In this way we see how 
disease-bearing organisms, which threaten the homogenous ‘purity’ of the body, are, to use 
anthropologist Mary Douglas’ concept, matter out of place: they are dirty.100 In the modern 
period, then, in which these narratives arise and coincide, marginal or liminal groups may 
thus be seen as polluted and polluting, particularly as they come to move within wider 
society as a result of the levelling processes of the modernist project;201 ‘organic’ models of 
nationalism suggest the possibility and desirability of ‘organic purity .’202 Furthermore (as 
noted by Semelin), the very definition of the self as pure ‘implies categorizing some “ other” 
as impure.’203 The disorder, and therefore dirtiness, that such impure alien presences 
engender may be solved by a murderous reordering process, by the inscription of impurity 
and of difference (and thus a clear demarcation between ‘us’ and ‘them’) on the body:204 for 
example, ethnic Vietnamese in the ‘clean’ DK social system, who were turned into the 
nonhuman impurity that they putatively represented (that is, into grotesque, water-logged
196 D. Weiss, ‘Stalinist vs. Fascist propaganda: How much do they have in common?’, in de Saussure & Schulz 
(eds), p. 259.
197 Otis, p. 63; see also p. 168. See also Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 27.
198 Sontag, p. 68.
199 Brown, pp. 70-71.
2°o m . Douglas, Purity and Danger: An analysis of concept of pollution and taboo (new edn), Routledge, London, 2002, 
pp. 44-45. On ‘out-of-place-ness’ and moral exclusion, see also C. Tileaga, ‘Ideologies of moral exclusion: A 
critical discursive reframing of depersonalization, delegitimization and dehumanisation’, British Journal of Social 
Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, pp. 722-728.
201 See for example Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 225, 284.
202 See Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy, pp. 6 1 -68.
203 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 33.
204 See Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 225-229, 286.
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corpses) by being killed and tossed in the Mekong to float back to Vietnam - and thus both 
‘cleansed’ and ‘reordered.’205
Dirt, as Douglas also observes, contaminates. The polluter ‘becomes a doubly wicked 
object of reprobation, first because he crossed the line and second because he endangered 
others.’206 It is not only the presence of foreign agents which weakens and destroys the 
body; it is their corruption of the healthy cells around them. Behaviours considered 
immoral are ascribed to the influence of the alien intruder. Not only does this intruder in 
his/her person destroy the body; her/his presence weakens its pre-existing and otherwise 
healthy structure. The lawmakers of the Nuremberg Laws, prohibiting marriage or sexual 
contact between Jews and non-Jews, described themselves as ‘permeated with the 
knowledge that the purity of the German blood is a precondition for the continued 
existence of the German people.’207 These laws had their origins in the German colonies in 
Africa, where, three years after the 1905 genocide of the Herero and other peoples, ‘mixed- 
race’ marriages were annulled and henceforth forbidden in German South W est Africa.208 
Indeed, one of the German objections to Jews was that Jews as a race were seen to be of 
‘impure’ (mixed) blood, as were most ‘Gypsies’;209 a similar fear of ‘race mixing’ existed with 
regard to the ‘purity’ of white Australia, a narrative which would lead to the institutionalised 
removal of ‘half-caste’ children.210
Discursive tropes constructing the other as dirty gave rise to the related concept of the 
‘cleansing’ of victim peoples. As Cigar describes in relation to genocide in Bosnia,
205 Straus, ‘Organic purity’, p. 50; Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 217.
206 Douglas, p. I 72. For example, on the contrast between Nazi persecution of those who had never ‘belonged 
to the Volk' and those who had ‘chosen’ by their actions to ‘deprive themselves’ of this position, see Kallis, pp. 7- 
8.
207 Lifton, p. 25. On the rejection of mixing of different types in Hitlerian metaphor, see Musolff, pp. 32-33.
208 Barta, p. 47.
209 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 197, 214.
210 See Barta, pp. 4 1, 52.
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[pjerhaps nowhere was the power of language to categorize and destroy as evident as the 
choice of the term ‘cleansing,’ used freely in unofficial discourse to describe the violent 
removal of Muslims. Logically, a procedure with such a name ... could only be viewed as 
positive and desirable, the implicit antithesis and correction of an assumed impure, unnatural, 
and demeaning state. When the commander of a Serbian militia unit was able to report that 
‘this region is ethnically clean,’ for example, he was clearly proud of what he viewed as an 
achievement.211
‘Ethnic cleansing’ was ‘a euphemism invoked by the Serbs themselves to describe the process 
of creating ethnically pure Serbian regions through the methodical murder and expulsion of 
non-Serbs.’212 The term has a long history: the ruler of Montenegro, the Vladika (Bishop) 
Petar II Petrovic Njegos, an early Serb nationalist intellectual, was ‘one of the first writers to 
use the word “ cleanse” (odstiti), with all its Christian overtones of the redemptive powers of 
baptism, to describe the killing of Muslims in Belgrade in 1806.’ Cetnik ideologue Stevan 
Moljevic also advocated ‘cleansing the land of all non-Serb elements.’213 Norman M. Naimark 
comments that ‘[¡]n both Slavic and German usages, “ cleansing” has a dual meaning; one 
purges the native community of foreign bodies, and one purges one’s own people of alien 
elements.’214
In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge announced the creation of ‘the cleanest, most fair society 
ever known in our history’ and, when their plans ran into problems, began to ‘purify’ the
211 Cigar, p. 7 1.
212 Cohen, The Complicity of Serbian Intellectuals’, p. 45.
213 C. Carmichael, Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: nationalism and the destruction of tradition, Routledge, London, 
2002, pp. 23, 32, 87.
214 N. M. Naimark, Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass.)/London, 2001, pp. 4-5. Naimark also notes that the Russian equivalent, chistki, was used to 
refer to Soviet Union purges.
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general populace.215 ‘Hidden enemies burrowing from within’ were to be ‘cleansed from 
inside the ranks of our revolution,’ while regiments were charged with ‘sweeping clean’ (boos 
samat) the enemy, and ‘revolutionary young men and women’ were exhorted to ‘purify 
various bad compositions so that they are completely gone, cleansed from inside the ranks 
of our revolution.’216 Urbanites were described as being ‘poisoned’ by the ‘rotten culture’ of 
U.S. imperialism, in contrast to the practices of the ‘pure and clean’ peasantry.217
Nazi medicalised killing, both of ‘life unworthy of life’ and of Jews, was termed ‘disinfection,’ 
and in Auschwitz, under the supervision of a presiding doctor, medical technicians called 
Desinfektoren (‘disinfectors’) transported and inserted the pellets of Zyklon B into the gas 
chambers.218 In 1941, Nazi ideologue Alfred Rosenberg referred to the ‘total solution to the 
Jewish question’ as a ‘cleansing biological revolution.’219 In such a context, Lifton argues that 
genocide ‘is a response to collective fear of pollution and defilement,’ one which brings to an 
older impulse toward ritual purification a deadlier modern stress on health and hygiene.220 
Paul Julian Weindling suggests that, in early twentieth-century Germany, particularly in the 
context of colonialism and scientific claims around the role of animals in spreading disease, 
‘the rhetoric of extermination ... invaded the vocabulary of hygiene.’221 ‘Extermination’ 
could be thus viewed as a complete removal of the sources of pollution. In Nazi genocide,
215 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 8-11.
216 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 34, 39, 261; for further examples of ‘purification’ and of ‘cleaning up’ the 
enemy, see pp. 82, 143, 162, 205.
217 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 78, 82.
218 Aly, ‘Pure and Tainted Progress’, p. 215; Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. 190; Lifton, p. 148. Zyklon B was originally 
used for ‘pest control’ and debusing, a reason which continued to be listed on paper for its necessity; and after 
1942 it was supplied by the SS Hygienic Institute. In this context one might recall Himmler’s claim that ‘anti- 
Semitism is exactly the same as debusing’ (Lifton, p. 477). For a history and a close reading of Zyklon, poison gas 
as a disinfectant, and the discursive and practical relationship of these to Nazi genocide, see Weindling, Epidemics 
and Genocide in Eastern Europe, pp. I 18-1 30, 260-263.
219 Weindling, Health, race and German politics, p. 556.
220 Lifton, pp. 481 -482. See also J. Semelin, Toward a vocabulary of massacre and genocide', Journal of Genocide 
Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, pp. 197-198.
221 Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe, p. 29; see also p. 39 on the emergence of ‘[a] new 
vocabulary of destruction with terms like “ disinfestation” and “ deratization.” ’
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purifying principles were subsumed into modern ‘medical materialism,’ the invocation of 
bodily hygienic explanations for spiritual and psychological matters, in a way which lent itself 
directly to purification through killing in the name of healing.222
The image of the pure, homogenous, body whose defenses are penetrated, violated by 
foreign agents, was also guaranteed to arouse sexualised anxiety.223 The desired ‘body 
politic’ was a strong, in-control, and therefore masculine body which could be sullied and 
emasculated by its own incapability to defend itself against violation in such forms as 
“ ‘foreign racial penetration” (rassische Überfremdung).’224 For the Khmer Rouge, for example, 
it was necessary to recreate the history of the party ‘into something clean and perfect, in 
line with our policies of independence and self-mastery.’225 This particular fear is closely 
related to the nature of the scientific discourse from which the narrative emerges; Evelyn 
Fox Keller hypothesises ‘that the ideal of scientific objectivity reflects a carefully cultivated 
masculine personality type that conceives of connectedness as a loss of control.’226 The 
desire for control, writes Julia Epstein, is produced by metaphors of mystery and 
otherness.227
The specifically sexual-biological anxiety which this narrative arouses may be read in the 
putative threat posed by the reproduction of the other, from the threat to the national 
‘germ plasm’ or to the ‘white race’ allegedly posed by the ‘genetically ill’ or by
222 Lifton, pp. 482-483.
223 See Otis, p. 60. This rhetoric also emerges conspicuously in the late nineteenth century; Heinrich von 
Treitschke, notorious for his comment ‘the Jews are our misfortune,’ was warning in 1879 of the ‘penetration’ of 
Germany’s eastern boundary by Polish Jews (Gerhard, p. 85).
224 The German ‘racial hygienist’ Otmar Freiherr von Verschuer, writing in 1934 (quoted in Ehrenreich, p. 62).
225 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, p. 141.
226 Otis, p. 172. For an insightful empirical analysis of masculinity (including considerations of bureaucracy) in the 
self-conception of torturers and killers which touches on various among the issues mentioned here, see M. K. 
Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros & P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct 
Brazilian Atrocities, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 2002.
227 Otis. p. 171.
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‘miscegenation,’ to the fear of biological ‘swamping’ of Serbs due to the allegedly high Muslim 
birthrate. Nazi-era racial hygienist Martin Stammler called Germany’s declining birthrate a 
‘black plague.’228 The 1935 Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honour 
defined and outlawed ‘racial pollution’ (Rassenschande), sexual contact between Germans and 
Jews;229 the Deutsches Arzteblatt, Germany’s leading medical journal, praised the law, arguing 
that it would help protect the German ‘body’ against ‘foreign racial elements’ and help to 
‘cleanse the body of our Volk.’230 A biological problem must be met with a biological 
solution, from the sterilisation of the genetically inferior, or the Serb rape camps which 
aimed at the impregnation of Muslim women, to the physical destruction of ‘unwanted 
biological material.’231 In all of these examples we see the way in which the modern 
medical-military dehumanising narrative both pointed to a problem, and, implicitly or 
explicitly, named a specific solution.
IV. Conclusion
With the inception of modernity, various discourses emerged which contained ideological 
ideals of integrity, homogeneity, and the determinability of essentialised identity. These 
converged to form a discursive strategy of biopolitics; under certain conditions, in otherwise 
widely different circumstances, this narrative provided both a literal reason and a 
metaphorical rhetoric calling for the destruction of alien others, each of which served the
228 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, p. I 25. For discussion of ‘heredity’ and sexuality in German race science, see 
Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 90-94; for discussion of social hygiene, racial hygiene and birthrate, 
see Weindling, Health, race and German politics, pp. 291-295.
229 This term is also translated into English as ‘racial defilement’; literally, it means ‘racial shame’ (Klemperer, p. 
178).
230 Proctor, Racial Hygiene, pp. 132-133,214. The paper also wrote of the ‘struggle against the Gypsy plague 
[P/oge].’ See also Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, p. 141 on the obsession of Völkisch thinkers with sexual 
contact between ‘Aryan’ women and Jewish men.
231 It should be noted that ‘eugenic’ sterilisation was widely practiced not only in Nazi Germany, but in the 
United States, Europe and elsewhere.
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same motivatory and legitimatory purpose at different registers. Literal rhetoric worked at 
the scientific-intellectual-political level; metaphorical, at the emotional-populist level. Thus 
emerged an entirely novel medicalised and militarised discursive formation which allowed for 
‘genocide’ to be conceivable, and which, furthermore, eased the path for its enactment by 
the legitimisation and justification of the acts of perpetrators through the dehumanisation of 
victims. As we have seen, such dehumanisation ‘primes’ the society or the perpetrator 
group, and provides one motivation for destruction, one reason to follow the ‘twisted path’ 
to genocide. Once that end is reached, dehumanising discourse continues, as perpetrators 
and bystanders justify their acts to themselves and to others. In the final stages of genocide, 
this rhetoric is literally imprinted on the bodies of the victims; they are forced to live under 
conditions ‘which (re)produce their essentialized identity.’ In the cases examined here, the 
disease-ridden, dehumanised state to which victims are reduced makes genocide ‘seem like a 
justifiable “ purification” process’ for the protection of the national body.’232
As mentioned elsewhere in this work, not all episodes of genocide demonstrate the specific 
biomedical utterances which are apparent in the cases examined in this chapter; neither does 
every episode which employs the discourses of modernity employ its techniques.233 Many 
factors motivate genocide, and many different categorisations and metaphors are used to 
understand outgroups as undesirable or as legitimate targets for destruction. But without 
the specifically modern, essentialist concept of a group as extraneous and as indelibly wrong, 
genocide as we know it is conceptually unthinkable. And when this rhetoric is presented in 
the biomedical terms we have seen throughout this chapter, it is universally a motivating and 
legitimating factor in genocide.
232 Hinton, Why Did They Kill?, pp. 212, 223-225.
233 In Rwanda, for example, the naming of Tutsi as ‘cockroaches’ had a strong relationship not only to animalising 
the victims but to naming them as objects of pollution; but this modern rhetoric was matched with much more 
so-called ‘primitive’ techniques and methods of killing, though deployed in modern fashion in terms of forms of 
organisation and implementation.
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My aim in this chapter has been to sketch the features of biopolitical dehumanisation in 
genocide, both as a common factor and as an essential aspect of the process when it is 
present. In doing so I have attempted to weave together a number of seemingly disparate 
theoretical and historical threads to create a synthesis which allows this subject to be 
understood as a coherent and influential narrative of exclusion, rather than glimpsed in 
scattershot fashion. The twentieth century is bookended by cases I have examined here 
(namely, genocides in Asia Minor, and in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). In 2005, when 
I first began work upon this chapter, in Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe began a 
campaign to clear ‘slum’ areas, ostensibly to crack down on illegal housing, and as an effort to 
prevent the spread of infectious disease (it should be noted that the targeted sections of 
Zimbabwean society form much of the internal opposition). The campaign was named 
‘Operation Murambatsvina,’ Shona for ‘Drive Out Trash.’ There is no reason, in other 
words, to think that the discourse I have examined has lost its power in the contemporary 
period. In societies and cultures which remain wedded to a particular convergence of 
cultural and social models provided by modernity -  in which biopolitical language and 
imagery is available for use in a vocabulary of exclusion -  the presence of this rhetoric in its 
typical manifestations should be viewed as a sign of very dangerous societal tendencies. In 
this chapter I have traced the way in which biopolitical dehumanisation in the modern era 
became a lethal self-fulfilling prophecy; but for as long as the discursive formations of any 
society provide this rhetoric as a viable manifestation of exclusory practice, biopolitical 
dehumanisation will continue to play an integral role as a mechanism of genocide.
In the next chapter, we turn to a discursive formation which, in its extreme forms, at times 
has some resemblance to medicalised rhetoric in its representation of outgroups as vermin 
or disease-carrying organisms; the representation of victims as animals, and as sub-humans.
C h a p te r 6.
‘N o  w ar m ay be conducted hum anely against nonhum ans’: 
V ictim s as anim als and subhum ans
[The] rhetoric o f threat and conspiracy is added to by that of the dehumanisation o f the ‘enemy’ or 
rather by his ‘bestialization.’ Whether it be in Africa, Asia or Europe, victims are described as 
‘germs,’ as ‘harmful pests,’ as ‘rats’ or ‘cattle.’ But to what extent is this zoological representation 
(that is also found on military battle grounds) a ‘preparation’ for the act o f massacring one’s fellow 
human? Or rather is it a rationalization elaborated in situ or a posteriori by the executioner who 
becomes convinced that his victims are animals? There is a lack o f empirical studies o f the 
vocabulary o f executioners before and during massacres.
- Jacques Sem elin1
Jacques Semelin’s quote encompasses the way in which ‘bestialising’ dehumanisation of 
victims serves all three of the purposes -  pre-hoc preparation, in situ rationalisation, and post- 
hoc justification -  outlined in Chapter Four. But what of the role of motivation? In the 
previous chapter, examining biopolitical rhetoric, we have seen a form of dehumanisation 
which is inherently motivatory. In this chapter the animalisation of victims will be revealed 
as motivatory in some instances (when the element of threat is present), and solely 
legitimatory in others. Semelin is one of few authors in the field to recognise the
1J. Semelin, Tow ard a vocabulary of massacre and genocide', Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, pp. 
193-210. From a social psychology perspective, see also Afrodita Marcu, Evanthia Lyons and Peter Hegarty: ‘few 
theorists and experimentalists have reflected on how the human-animal boundary is drawn or why it might serve 
as such a robust resource for delegitimizing out-groups’ (A. Marcu, E. Lyons & P. Hegarty, ‘Dilemmatic human- 
animal boundaries in Britain and Romania: Post-materialist and materialist dehumanisation’, British Journal of Social 
Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, p. 877)
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importance of this form of dehumanisation, and the fact that the questions that the existence 
of such discourse raises have not been satisfactorily explored. Furthermore, scholars 
including Semelin and Peter Coates have pointed to the historical and semantic importance 
of the connection between killing animals and human beings which is found in the etymology 
of the word ‘massacre.’2 As we will see over the course of this chapter, the interconnection 
between such killings extends beyond the strictly terminological.
W e have already had an entrée to this subject in the previous chapter, in the examination 
of construction of collectivities as ‘vermin’ and ‘parasites’; there exists an area of crossover 
between the negative depiction of outgroups as disease organisms and as certain kinds of 
animals, one which will be explored here. The issue thus indicated is the nature of the 
names used -  and hence their functionality -  when outgroups are constructed as ‘lesser’ 
humans o r as non-human animals. In episodes of mass killing, the animal world, in Leo 
Kuper’s words, ‘has been a particularly fertile source of metaphors of dehumanisation.’3 In 
genocidal killing, the ‘bestialising’ of victims is a form of dehumanisation which legitimises the 
killing of victims in that it names them as creatures to whom little o r no moral obligation is 
owed -  and, as I have mentioned, it may also provide a motivation.4 In this chapter, I 
examine how this has come to be so, and I demonstrate the discursive process by which 
particular human groups are discursively classified beyond the pale of humanity, as non­
human or ‘less-than-human’ life forms. Specific attention is given to the distinction between 
victims represented as non-threatening and as threatening animals (wild animals, loathsome 
animals, and vermin); that is, in the context of our argument, the functional use of such
2J. Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2007, p. 32; P. Coates, ‘"Unusually cunning, vicious and treacherous” ; The Extermination of the 
W o lf in United States H istory’, in M. Levene & P. Roberts (eds), The Massacre In History, Berghahn Books, New 
York/O xford, 1999, p. 164-165.
3 L. Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, Yale University Press, New Haven/Yale, 1981, p. 88.
4 It should be noted here that humans are themselves animals; in this chapter, then, the term ‘animals’ is used as a 
shorthand for ‘non-human animals,’ rather than suggesting a dualistic o r mutually exclusive distinction between 
these tw o classes.
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utterances either to solely legitimise, or also to motivate killing. In this chapter, then, I will 
inquire as to how naming victims in general as animals and lesser humans reshapes moral 
narratives to construct killing as legitimate; and why naming them as specific animals 
constructs killing as necessary, that is, motivates killing.
In Chapters Five and Seven I give more emphasis to establishing the historical patterns 
which created the type of utterance than to enumerating documentary examples by class. In 
this chapter, however, I will devote more space to establishing actual examples of animalising 
language, prefaced by a relatively short excursus on the history and the modern 
development of the conceptual narratives on which thinking about the ‘human’ and the 
‘animal’ is based, and the meaning of this distinction for practice. I follow this method of 
argument for two reasons: firstly, because, unlike the other types, the animalisation of a 
collectivity is clearly internally differentiated as regards the type of animal names employed 
by perpetrators, and each of these types is a different repository of meaning which must be 
separately explored; and secondly, because the links between the types presented in the 
other chapters -  that is, medical and bureaucratic discourse -  and killing, have been more 
firmly and fully established in previous work dealing specifically with genocide and genocidal 
killing, whereas animalisation as such has, for the most part, been given a less in-depth 
investigation, and, in the few cases that it has been examined, has been confined to specific 
types of genocide, usually colonial episodes (even if they are then related to non-colonial 
episodes).
In this chapter, then, after examining the history of moral obligation owed to animals with 
regard to killing, I enumerate the various different animal names which perpetrators of 
genocide and mass killing have affixed to their victims, and I give some background as to why 
these names perform certain functions (I will also mention the positive discursive 
associations which inhere in certain animal types). The projection of animality onto groups
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seen as inferior or undesirable is by no means limited to the context of genocide, mass 
killing, or even that of violence. However, the fact that such discourse can exist in other 
situations should not discount the role it plays in genocide and genocidal killing (indeed, it 
may be seen as evidence for a continuum of dehumanisation). Rather, in the context of the 
existence of motivation for involvement in genocidal action, this narrative may play a vital 
part. In the course of this chapter it will be established that bestialisation plays the specific 
role in such episodes of legitimising killing (as opposed to other actions against outgroups); 
while naming outgroups as particular, threatening animals is either representative of a 
distinct pre-existing motivation, or provides in itself a motivation, for their destruction. In 
this way, it will become evident that ‘bestialisation,’ as sometimes motivatory and sometimes 
legitimatory, can be seen as an intermediate form between medicalised dehumanisation 
(which is always motivatory) and bureaucratic-euphemistic reification (which is solely 
legitimatory). In undertaking this task here, I begin with the question of the discursive place 
of animals within the moral order.
I. W h a t Moral O bligation is Owed to Animals?
[ W ]e distance ourselves from whatever is different by equating it with something we have already 
objectified.
-C a ro l J. A dam s5
Ideology that constructs a one-way instrumental relationship between humans and non­
human animals has a long pedigree. The European conception of animals, based on both the 
Bible and classical thought, was that they were created for the use of ‘man’ (despite classical 
dissenters such as Pythagoras, Plutarch and Porphyry). Aristotle taught that nature made
5 C. J. Adams, The Sexual Politics of Meat A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory (10th anniversary edn), Continuum, 
New York, 2000, p. 55.
Chapter 6 257
nothing in vain and everything had a purpose. ‘Plants were created for the sake of animals 
and animals for the sake of men. Domestic animals were there to labour, wild ones to be 
hunted.’6 In Genesis, after creating life the Biblical God grants Adam dominion over all living 
things. This authority is renewed after the Flood: ‘the fear and the dread’ of man shall be 
upon all other living things, and ‘every moving thing that liveth shall be meat’ for him.7 In 
other words, there was no reason why humans should not kill animals if it was considered to 
be in their interest to do so. Important Christian thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas took the 
same view: ‘[t]here is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. ... [I]t is lawful 
. . . to  take life ... from animals for the use of men.’8 These foundations shaped Christian 
attitudes to animals for many centuries. Keith Thomas presents some telling examples from 
17th century England:
They have no right or propriety in anything,’ emphasized Samuel Gott, ‘no, not in 
themselves’ ... W hen  animals grew troublesome, [said] Henry More, then man had the right 
to curb them, ‘for there is no question but we are more worth than they’ ... [e]ven Thomas 
Hobbes, who rejected scriptural sanctions for man’s ascendancy, agreed that there could be 
no obligation to animal, because ‘to make covenants with brutes is impossible’ ... In the 
eighteenth century Philip Doddridge considered th a t ... it was ‘fit that their interests should 
give way to that of the human species whenever in any considerable article they come in 
competition with each other.’9
6 Paraphrased in K. Thomas, Mon and the Natural World: Changing Attitudes in England 1500-1800, Allen Lane, 
London, 1983, p. 17; see also P. Singer, Animal Liberation (2nd edn), Pimlico, London, 1995, pp. 188-189.
7 Thomas, p. 18. On this topic, and the issue of animal offerings in religion, see also W . Sofsky, Violence: Terrorism, 
Genocide, War (trans. A. Bell), Granta Books, London, 2003, pp. 4-5.
8 In Singer, pp. 193-194.
9 Thomas, pp. 21-22.
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Not everyone believed that animals had absolutely no rights whatsoever (although many 
did), and nor was any cruelty to animals for any reason necessarily considered permissible; 10 
but whenever the interests of humans and animals (assuming a position, by no means held 
universally, in which animals were considered to have interests) was understood to conflict, 
this narrative constructed the right of ‘man’ to enforce his own desires in whatever way he 
deemed necessary, including killing, as both moral and legitimate. * 11
The concept of the ‘great chain of being,’ extending from the Classical through the 
Medieval tradition, posited a hierarchy of beings, at the top of which, in Christian philosophy, 
was ‘God,’ and beneath ‘him,’ ‘man.’ 12 This pre-modern view was heavily influential on the 
development of modern scientific-rational discourse emerging from the Enlightenment, a 
discourse which was shaped by the context of the eighteenth-century Christian pietist and 
evangelical revival (and was hence in evidence not only in Britain but in many European 
countries) . 13 In discursive terms, the development of evolutionary theory in the context of 
modern Enlightenment science built on the Great Chain of Being concept such that the 
evolution of ‘man’ proceeded ‘up the ladder’ of animal life to remain in ‘his’ position at the 
apex - in which position ‘he’ is, as Mary Clark notes, ‘inevitably equipped at an early stage 
with a weapon! ’ 14 (it’s worth noting here, in terms of the psychological ‘pull’ of this 
conception, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s argument that orientational, that is, spatial
10 See Thomas, p. I 53. The concept of ‘rights’ which may be ‘possessed’ is, of course, in itself a particular and 
contingent historical development.
11 This was an ideology which it was in the human interest to support, even when its purported sources were 
less than clear; Thomas observes, for example, that English theologians who used Biblical arguments to justify 
human dominion over and killing of animals ‘tended to disregard those sections of the Old Testament which 
suggest that man has a duty to act responsibly towards God’s creation’ (p. 24).
12 For an interesting commentary on the relationship of this concept to human metaphor, see A. Goatly, Washing 
the Brain: Metaphor and Hidden Ideology, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2007, pp. 
148-152.
13 See G. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism, Howard Fertig, New York, 1978, pp. 2-5.
14 M. E. Clark, ‘Human Nature; W hat W e  Need To Know About Ourselves In The Twenty-First Century,’ Zygon, 
vol. 33, no. 4, 1998, p. 647. See also S. Opotow, ‘Animals and the Scope of Justice\ Journal of Social Issues, vol. 49, 
1993, p. 72.
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metaphors are the way in which most fundamental concepts are organised; and that ‘high’ or 
‘up’ is generally a positive association15).
In the seventeenth century René Descartes famously declared that animals were nothing 
more than machines or automata without minds or souls, incapable of reason, speech, and 
even (on some interpretations) sensation, thereby forming (in Thomas’s words) ‘the best 
possible rationalization for the way man actually treated animals,’16 and, as Descartes put it, 
freeing men ‘from any suspicion of crime, however often they may eat or kill animals.’17 
According to this ideological belief system - one which was shared and shaped both by pre­
modern and modern discourse - the killing of animals, if considered needful for whatever 
reason, was entirely morally legitimate. W ith the advent of the modern possibility of 
‘genocide,’ given these pre-existing attitudes, it is easy to see how naming victims as animals 
becomes a step to removing the ‘old, normal knowledge’ that killing is wrongful murder.18
This narrative, with its moral implications for action, was available not only in regard to a 
distinction between humans and animals, but also between different human collectivities. A 
scientific taxonomical view of animals, beginning with Carl Linnaeus, created the discursive 
possibility of classificatory hierarchies of worth and ‘dispassionate’ scientific classification of 
living creatures, which might then be mapped on to humans (a theme we have already 
developed in the previous chapter). Indeed, Linnaeus explicitly included distinct human 
‘races’ in these systems of categorisation.19 Within the ‘great chain of being,’ then, the 
category ‘man’ was not necessarily unitary, and its boundaries might be shifted to exclude 
groups which had previously been included. The place of Jews within such racial hierarchies
15 G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1980, pp. 14-18.
16 Thomas, p. 33.
17 Thomas, pp. 33-34.
18 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (revised and enlarged edn), Penguin, New York, 
1983, p. 86. See Chap. 4, nl86.
19 Goatly, pp. 45-46.
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was confused and ambiguous (and hence stood in defiance of boundary-drawing activities); 
black peoples were very commonly placed between animals and (white) humans, either as 
ape-like humans or as human-like apes.20 These raci(al)ist discursive constructions had vitally 
important consequences for pragmatic institutional action: as Mark Cocker writes,
It was an axiom of Christian thought, propounded in the opening portion of its most sacred 
text, the Bible, that all organic life on earth was arranged in a hierarchy, at whose apex stood 
Christian man. As its appointed masters, Christians could look down upon this entire 
physical realm as a God-given field for their use and enjoyment. If the savage were not 
differentiated from the natural environment, then it followed that he too would be 
incorporated in that utilitarian prospect. Since he was outside the fellowship of Christian 
civilisation, he would enjoy no greater legal or moral status than any other flora and fauna.21
An example in the genocidal context (as observed by Paul Chilton) is found in metaphorical 
passages in Mein Kampf in which ‘animals and the captivity of animals are merged with a 
domain of knowledge about humans,’ endowing that domain with a ‘great chain of being’- 
esque vertical orientation.22 W ith regard to the relationship of this discursive domain to the 
genocide of indigenous peoples, we may turn again to the words of Cocker:
Nature was fruitful, but she was also wild and threatening, which carried profoundly negative 
implications for those humans who lived closest to her ... many Europeans [viewed] tribal
20 Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, pp. 14-16.
21 M. Cocker, Rivers of Blood, Rivers of Gold: Europe’s Conflict with Tribal Peoples, Pimlico, London, 1999, p. 14.
22 P. Chilton, ‘Manipulation, memes and metaphors: The case of Mein Kampf, in L. de Saussure & P. Schulz (eds), 
Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2005, p. 30. Chilton mentions that the cognitive sciences have postulated a module for 
zoological categorisation as part of the human brain, which may then be related to the persistence of human 
racial categorisation and the ‘naturalisation’ of racial categories (pp. 31-33); there is also a possible connection 
between categorisation and the technical (tool-making) ‘module’ of the mind, which then allows human groups to 
be treated as non-human instruments (p. 40). For a thorough analysis of the use of animal dehumanisation in 
Mein Kampf, see F. Rash, ‘Metaphor in Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, metaforik.de, September 2005, retrieved 10 
September 2008, < http://www.metaphorik.de/09/rash.pdf>, pp. 103-106.
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peoples as having retained the menacing characteristics of wild animals, as much as the 
natural qualities of fellow men. Time and again, Christian society defended its transgressions 
against tribal society on the grounds of the latter’s subhuman condition.
It is perhaps as much a measure of the prevalence of such attitudes in the fifty years after 
Columbus’ historic voyage, as it is of papal concern, that Pope Paul III issued a bull in 1537 
giving the Catholic Church’s official judgement that Indians were indeed ‘true men’, not 
beasts. It is equally a measure of how ineffectual such official statements were in challenging 
attitudes that as late as 1902 a member of the Commonwealth parliament in Australia felt 
able to announce that There is no scientific evidence that the Aborigine is a human being at 
all.’ ... Viewing aboriginal society as beyond the pale of humanity had legal and political 
implications that were deeply sinister for its constituents.23
In this traditional qualitative or characteristic-oriented taxonomy, then, all animals are 
worth less than humans. Susan Opotow suggests that animals are very often ‘outside the 
scope of justice’; they are ‘perceived as expendable creatures that deserve neither rights nor 
autonomy.’24 Albert Bandura has empirically demonstrated that people described in 
animalistic terms are treated more punitively than those invested with human qualities.25 
Furthermore, as we will see, some animals are also less worthy of consideration than other 
animals.
The distinction at play here, however, is not only a vertical construction of moral worth or 
value in the sense of a distance from ‘true’ or normative humanity, but also regards the 
supposed behaviour of particular collectivities with regard to the threat that they may pose 
to worthier groups. In my research, I have found that when they are named, not as lesser
23 Cocker, pp 13-14.
24 Opotow, ‘Animals and the Scope of Justice’, p. 72.
25 Albert Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, p. 200.
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humans, but as animals, victims of genocidal killing are most often (though not exclusively) 
compared to wild animals, dangerous animals, vermin and ‘immoral’ animals. As we will see, 
this is related to the threat that such animals pose. W e  will return to the question of why 
such animals are threatening; here, it is important to note that describing humans as wild 
animals and vermin dehumanises in a more extreme fashion than other animal terminology. 
Many scholars have claimed that, at least until the contemporary advent of conservation 
ideologies, wild animals have been owed less obligation than others. Edmund Leach argues 
that humans divide animals into verbal categories which ‘discriminate areas of social space in 
terms of “ distance from Ego (self),” ’ and posits that wild animals are those which are farthest 
from the self.26 Lynda Birke suggests that, ‘[i]n transforming animals from “wild” to “ tame” , 
humans reconstruct the boundary between the animal and ourselves. No longer symbolic 
or representative of recalcitrant nature, “ taming” recasts the animal, bringing it closer to our 
idea of humanity.’27 Given that ‘vermin’ also fall outside the sphere of human control, they 
too can be considered distant from the self. In the specific context of constructions of and 
harm to animals, James Serpell contends that:
In the field of social psychology, it is widely recognized that humans tend to apportion their 
social and moral obligations according to how close or similar others are to themselves 
(Deaux & Wrightsman, 1984). Thus people are more inclined to behave altruistically 
towards those who are familiar or related ... and are proportionately less inclined to treat 
these individuals in harmful ways. Conversely, people tend to feel less inhibited about 
harming more distant categories of individual, such as strangers or foreigners.28
26 E. Leach, ‘Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and Verbal Abuse’, in E. H. Lenneberg (ed.), 
New Directions in the Study of Language, M.l.T Press, Massachusetts, 1964, pp. 36-37. Leach is concerned with the 
English language. However, he argues that the principles he adduces are very general (p. 30), and, in illustration, 
discussed the Kachin language spoken by certain groups in northeast Burma (now Myanmar), who seem to have a 
parallel classificatory system in which, for example, the word ni means both ‘near’ and ‘tame’ (pp. 54-63).
27 L. Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew, Open University Press, Philadelphia, I 994, p.
19.
28 J. A. Serpell, ‘Sheep in wolves’clothing? Attitudes to animals among farmers and scientists’, in F. L. Dolins (ed.), 
Attitudes to Animals: Views in Animal Welfare, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 3 I .
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Dehumanisation, as we have seen, is the purposive creation of distance-from-self; in 
genocide and genocidal killing the gap between perpetrator self and victim other becomes so 
wide that the victim falls beyond the boundary of the ‘human’ (a category of which the most 
knowable definition or manifestation is the self). In this chapter, the discursive boundary 
construction practices that we examine are those between humans and non-human beings 
(excluding plants, and microscopic life forms); and between different kinds of non-human 
beings. In what do these boundaries consist, and how have they been used?
‘Inhibitions about the treatment of other species,’ writes Thomas, ‘were dispelled by the 
reminder that there was a fundamental difference in kind between humanity and other forms 
of life. The justification for this belief went back beyond Christianity to the Greeks.’29 
However, ‘there was a marked lack of agreement as to just where man’s unique superiority 
lay. The search for this elusive attribute has been one of the most enduring pursuits of 
Western philosophers ... What all such definitions have in common is that they assume a 
polarity between the categories ‘man’ and ‘animal’ and that they invariably regard the animal 
as inferior.’30 A particular discursive formation which encapsulates the quest for the nature 
of such a distinction has in itself concealed the naturalisation of the posited a priori existence 
of the distinction itself.
The naturalisation of this binary differentiation has had disastrous consequences not only 
for animals, but for humans. ‘In practice ... the aim of such definitions has often been less to 
distinguish men from animals than to propound some ideal of human behaviour’; ‘if the 
essence of humanity was defined as consisting in some specific quality, then it followed that 
any man who did not display that quality was subhuman, semi-animal.’31 Furthermore (in line 
with our discussion in Chapter Four regarding the nature of dehumanisation more generally)
29 Thomas, p. 30.
30 Thomas, p. 3 I .
31 Thomas, pp. 3 1, 4 1.
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the ideological nature of such beliefs may not be firmly held by an individual, or in ideological 
rhetoric, but may be adapted to the pragmatic psychological needs of system justification in 
situations of dominance.32
It has been suggested that the functionality of the use of animal metaphorical terms in 
regard to human outgroups may be to ‘show how little they matter, as a defence against 
sympathy.’33 Michael Peters asserts that the definition of ‘human’
has practical consequences since the distinction between man and the other animals has, for 
all practical purposes, been taken as synonymous with that between beings entitled to moral 
consideration and those not so entitled ... The true significance of defining ‘Man’ is not to 
tell us what a human being is ... but to rigorously bar any extension of man’s rights and 
privileges to others ...
This kind of monopoly of privilege (such as the right to continue living, to control one’s own 
body, etc.) by the human race is related to analogous forms of behaviour towards different 
races of human beings. Indeed, the connection is far more than an analogy, since any 
definition of ‘humanity’ can be used to exclude some humans who fail to match up to the 
conceptual criteria, or a criterion may be selected which is graded so that some human 
beings will be less human than others and therefore be given less of the privileges.34
‘Once perceived as beasts,’ writes Thomas, ‘people were liable to be treated accordingly. 
The ethic of human dominion removed animals from the sphere of human concern. But it 
also legitimized the ill-treatment of those humans who were in a supposedly animal 
condition.’35 Animals were ‘outside the terms of moral reference.’36
32 See Marcu, Lyons & Hegarty.
33 Ekman quoted in Goatly, p. 152.
34 M. Peters, ‘Nature and Culture’, in S. Godlovitch, R. Godlovitch & J. Harris (eds), Animals, Men and Morals: An 
enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, Victor Gollancz, London, 1971, p. 214.
35 Thomas, p. 44.
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The analysis thus far should begin to outline the way in which this animalising language is 
not standard or ‘everyday’ animal abuse of the kind heard in conversation, nor the typical 
insults or stereotypes which are used about a disliked individual or group (although it is 
related to these through the continuum of dehumanisation). Rather, it is a purposive 
discursive formation which is available for deployment as a resource in specific situations, 
shaping normative regimes of practice regarding the relationship and power dynamic 
between collectivities. John W. Dower, after cautioning that animal comparison is not 
inherently demeaning, goes on to say:
What we are concerned with here is something different: the attachment of stupid, bestial, 
even pestilential subhuman caricatures on the enemy, and the manner in which this blocked 
seeing the foe as rational or even human, and facilitated mass killing. It is, at least for most 
people, easier to kill animals than fellow humans.37
II. A re  A ll Anim als Killable?
In the normative moral order which has been shaped by the aforementioned discursive 
practices, little, if any, moral obligation is understood to be owed by humans to animals. In 
drawing a connection between this conclusion and genocide, one criticism which might be 
raised is the fact that to animalise is not automatically to render killable. Thomas, for 
example, argues that ‘[ajnimal insults remain a feature of human discourse today. But they 
have lost the force they possessed in an age when beasts enjoyed no claim to moral 
consideration.’38 A specific objection may be that, considering the value placed on certain 
animals, as well as the dissemination of concepts of animal welfare and animal rights, one
36 Thomas, p. 148. See also Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 38.
37 J. W. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War, Pantheon Books, New York, 1986, p. 89.
38 Thomas, p. 48; and see p. 119.
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cannot say in a straightforward fashion that to call victims animals in general is to say that 
they may legitimately be killed out of hand.39 However, a widespread political and 
philosophical conception of the concept of animal rights (as opposed to animal welfare, 
which still concerns itself with softening the impact of human instrumental use of animals 
rather than challenging such use) post-dates the majority of case studies examined here, and 
tends to be restricted to small groups in only a few nations. In any case, despite 
contemporary changes in attitude and the continuing historical value placed upon certain 
animals, human interests continue automatically to take precedence over those of animals 
(except in the beliefs of individuals and collectivities with little or no access to political or 
discursive power, generally considered to be an extreme fringe).
Just as I do not intend to argue that all animals are afforded no moral consideration 
whatsoever, so I do not intend to argue that there are no positive discursive associations 
with animality. Indeed, some perpetrators have associated themselves with positively- 
conceived aspects of animality, as with the notorious Serbian paramilitary group Arkan’s 
Tigers. Many positive animal associations are related to predatoriness perceived as 
connected with ‘virtues’ like ‘courage,’ ‘honour’ or ‘pride’ (most notably, in the case of 
eagles and big cats), as well as to the positive qualities associated with dogs (also predators, 
and, as pack animals, relatively subservient to humans and hence ‘faithful’ or ‘loyal’). 
However, as we will see in the next section, ‘the animal’ as a general category is not 
associated with any of these specific virtues. Victims are characterised either with 
unspecified ‘animality,’ or they are named as specific animal types in which positive qualities 
do not inhere: as Semelin puts it, in massacres the “‘Supernumary other” is certainly not
39 Marcu, Lyons & Hegarty suggest that ‘the dilemmatic construction of the categories “animal” and “human” 
along such dimensions as rational autonomy and sentience suggests not only that these should be viewed as ends 
of a humanity continuum (cf. Demoulin et al„ 2004) but also that one continuum may be not enough. Also, even if 
emotions and traits are placed on a humanity continuum, their places on this continuum may not always be the 
same, but may vary function of context or rhetorical purposes.’ (p. 889)
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endowed with the dignity of the European buck or African lion.’40 Victims of genocidal killing 
are not named as just any animal; they are named as particular types of animals in a way 
which both legitimises killing if necessary, and, when the animal is a threatening type, 
constructs victims as posing a threat to the in-group in a situation in which one or the other 
group must take precedence.41 All animals may be killable, but some animals are more 
killable than others (pace Orwell).
The  ideal of human ascendancy ... had implications fo r men’s relations to each other, no less 
than fo r the ir treatment of the natural world. Some men were seen as useful beasts, to be 
curbed, domesticated and kept docile; others were vermin and predators, to be eliminated.42
III. Anim al Nam es: A  Genocidaire’s Bestiary
ADAL BERT: When we spotted a small group of runaways trying to escape by creeping through the 
mud, we called them snakes. Before the killings, we usually called them cockroaches. But during, it 
was more suitable to call them snakes, because o f their attitude, or zeros, or dogs, because in our 
country we don’t like dogs; in any case, they were less-than-nothings.
For some of us, those taunts were just minor diversions. The important thing was not to let them get 
away. For others, the insults were invigorating, made the job easier. The perpetrators felt more 
comfortable insulting and hitting crawlers in rages rather than properly upright people. Because they 
seemed less like us in that position.43
‘The Japs,’ a lieutenant o f the 160th Infantry wrote to his parents on 26 January 1945, amidst 
vicious cave warfare in Luzon’s Zambales Mountains, ‘live like rats, squeal like pigs and act like
40 Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 38.
41 See Marcu, Lyons & Hegarty, p. 889.
42 Thomas, pp. 46-47.
43 J. Hatzfeld, Machete Season: The Killers In Rwanda Speak (trans. L. Coverdale), Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, New 
York, 2005, p. 132.
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monkeys.’ . . .A booklet entitled The Jap Soldier made sure to tell GIs that marines fighting in the 
Solomons had reported the enemy to exude ‘the gamey smell of animals.’ Another War 
Department publication unabashedly likened Japanese soldiers to poisonous snakes. ‘Our training 
led us to believe,’ a private of the 5th marine Division admitted, ‘That they were less than human.’44
As we have already seen, it is the element of threat which transforms a dehumanising 
narrative from legitimising genocide to motivating it. The distinction between the types of 
animal names which are used in given situations demonstrates something about the 
purposive use of discursive strategy. Dehumanising utterances can be legitimatory (where 
no element of threat is present) or motivatory (where such an element is present). For 
example, the Nazi politican Robert Ley wrote that it was not enough to ‘take [“the Jew”] 
someplace’ because ‘that would be as if one wanted to lock a louse up somewhere in a cage 
. . . I t  would find a way out, and again it [sic] come out from underneath and make you itch 
again.’45
At this juncture it should be noted that such utterances may also represent a pre-existing 
motivation. For example, in the case in which a colonised outgroup use violent means to 
resist their colonisation, utterances which represent this group as a threatening animal 
represent a motivation rather than constituting that motivation. However, the drawing of this 
line is not always clear. For example, there may be no evidence that such an outgroup are in 
fact planning rebellion; rather, their characterisation by the ingroup as violent and 
untrustworthy means that the ingroup expect and fear that they will do so (increasing the 
likelihood of repressive or ‘pre-emptive’ action against the outgroup, which in turn foments 
rebellious discontent). So we may divide animalising representation into three cases: 
dehumanisation which only legitimises; dehumanisation which directly motivates; and
44 P. Schrijvers, The Gl War Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific during World War II, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2002, pp. 218-219.
45 In J. Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 2006, p. 155.
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dehumanisation which represents a motivation and which in doing so legitimises. None of 
this, however, invalidates either the ontological distinction between legitimisation and 
motivation, or the claim that motivation always legitimises, but not vice versa.
Having said this, we can turn to the question of how victims are animalised in cases of 
genocide and genocidal killing, and how this relates to the distinction between legitimisation 
and motivation, that is, to the role of dehumanisation in these events.
When outgroups are named as lesser humans or as less-than-human, the purposiveness of 
the discursive strategy is to legitimate, rather than to motivate. Later in this chapter we will 
return to examples of such utterances. In the context of killing, such language is sometimes 
seen, usually when victims are compared to domestic animals which are subject to slaughter; 
but more often, different names are employed. Specific animal names are used which tend 
to fall into particular categories of animal. ‘Why,’ asks Leach, ‘should expressions like “ you 
son of a bitch” or “ you swine” carry the connotations that they do, when “ you son of a 
kangaroo” or “ you polar bear” have no meaning whatever?’46 The case studies examined in 
this thesis beg a similar question. When I began my research, I found that in the majority of 
cases of genocide and massacre (as opposed to, for example, slavery and apartheid) victims 
were most often compared to particular types of animals: wild animals, morally offensive 
animals, and vermin and disease carriers. Why should this be so? The answer lies in the 
relationship of such constructions to a perception of threat, necessitating the elimination of 
victims. Each of these types of animal is constructed as threatening to human interests.
In discursive constructions of human morality and its connection to conceptions of ‘human 
nature,’ humans have projected many of their own exclusive characteristics which are
46 Leach, p. 29.
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considered negative or immoral onto animals.47 A  binary distinction, reflecting that between 
the human and the non-human animal, has been constructed and naturalised within the 
human, between the allegedly exclusively ‘human’ aspect of the person (that is, positively- 
perceived virtues) and those qualities which humans supposedly share with animals. The 
second category of qualities have come to be understood to be characteristic or typical of 
the ‘animal.’48 Barry Lopez calls this ‘theriophobia’, the fear of the beast.49 Characteristics 
and impulses perceived to be immoral or negative, like gluttony, ferocity, and sexuality, are 
displaced onto animals and perceived as the lower, ‘animal’ aspect of the human psyche.50 
Birke identifies this process in stating that ‘“ beasts” clearly have considerable rhetorical 
power in the English language. They symbolize our denial of aspects of ourselves that we 
don’t like.’51 ‘False and contemptuous’ animalised terms not only construct the ‘animal’ as 
threatening and/or immoral; they are also used ‘to establish and maintain emotional distance 
from other animals. This distance permits abuse without commensurate guilt. Humans 
blame their nonhuman victims.’52 Negative constructions of the ‘animal’ are enshrined in the 
(English) lexicon; Peter Singer observes that ‘[t]o say that people are “ humane” is to say that 
they are kind; to say that they are “ beastly,” “ brutal,” or simply that they behave “ like
47 Harriet Ritvo suggests that human constructions of animals in all fields of research are often ‘extended, if 
unacknowledged, metonymy, offering participants a concealed forum for the expression of opinions and worries 
imported from human culture’ (H. Ritvo, The Animal Connection', in J. J. Sheehan & M. Sosna (eds), The 
Boundaries of Humanity: Humans, Animals, Machines, University of California Press, Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, 
1991, p. 70).
48 See Goatly, p. 150, for a list of metaphorical-linguistic associations with the animal’.
49 B. H. Lopez, O f Wolves and Men, ]. M. Dent & Sons, London, 1978, p. 140.
50 Thomas, pp. 40-41; see also J. Dunayer, ‘Sexist Words, Speciesist Roots’, in C. J. Adams & J. Donovan (eds), 
Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations, Duke University Press, Durham/London, 1995, pp. 17-18. 
Ironically, many actions considered ‘bestial’, such as torture for its own sake or mass killing of a group targeted as 
such, are for the most part practised, intra-species, only by humans (and, some claim, by our closest relatives, 
primates).
51 Birke, p. 18.
52 Dunayer, p. 18.
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animals” is to say that they are cruel and nasty. W e rarely stop to consider that the animal 
who kills with the least reason to do so is the human animal.’53
This anthropomorphic conceptualisation of ‘the animal’ in general, and its direct relation to 
normative morality regarding characteristic action, allows specific animals to be blamed for 
the putative threat they pose to humans. This process is evident, for example, in the Nazi 
propaganda film Der ew/'ge Jude (The Eternal Jew’), in which Jews were compared to rats, but 
rats described anthropomorphically as ‘cunning, cowardly, and cruel.’54 The negative general 
construction of the ‘animal’ has not only had catastrophic consequences for animals 
themselves, but has allowed the strategic possibility for humans who are named as animals to 
be automatically attributed with these ‘animal’ characteristics.
In discursive terms, some animals have become particular repositories for attributed 
characteristics which are threatenening, either physically or morally. Colin Legum insists 
that the process in which ‘there is official sanction for talking about a minority group in non­
human terms ... seems essential to provide some kind of justification for dealing with other 
human beings as one would treat dangerous animals -  by eliminating them’;55 Leo Kuper 
recognises that ‘[s]ome ... animal descriptions or animal analogies seem specially designed to 
awaken horror and to elicit fear, as in the image of the octopus-like tentacles reaching out.’56 
Given this perspective, then, I will examine in turn each of the categories of threatening 
animal mentioned in the introduction to this chapter -  ‘lesser’ creatures, wild animals, 
vermin, and loathsome animals -  in order to understand the nature of the threat they are
53 Singer, p. 222. As we have seen elsewhere, even a scholar such as Albert Bandura, who has empirically 
demonstrated that ’animalised’ people are more punitively treated than ‘humanised’ people, refers to harmful 
intra-human acts as ‘inhumanities.’
54 A similar process takes place with regard to disease organisms: see A. Musolff, ‘What role do metaphors play 
in racial prejudice? The function of antisemitic imagery in Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 41, no. I, 
2007, pp. 38-39.
55 In Kuper, p. 86.
56 Kuper, p. 88.
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constructed as posing. Having done this, I will go on to provide examples demonstrating the 
existence in various different episodes of these types of animalising utterances.
To begin, I discuss the naming of outgroups as less than human or as lesser humans, a 
category which legitimises but does not, in itself, motivate (although it may be related to 
motivation, as, for example, when it is believed that these inferior, animal-like creatures 
reproduce more prolifically than ‘truer humans and thus pose a threat in this regard; an 
example is the statement by a Serb soldier fighting in the siege of Sarajevo to the journalist 
journalist Ed Vulliamy that ‘their [Muslim] women are bitches and whores. They breed like 
animals, more than ten per woman...’57).
I next turn to the subject of threatening animals. W ild animals, in the first place, lie outside 
the sphere of human control, and are thus unpredictable and potentially dangerous to 
person and property. According to Leach, wild animals are not only furthest-from-self, they 
are also perceived as hostile.58 Predators such as wolves and snakes, furthermore, are not 
only dangerous, but also, through anthropomorphisation, are conceived as behaving in ways 
which are treacherous and immoral.59 The use of the wild animal metaphor is seen 
particularly often, though by no means exclusively, in the genocide of tribal peoples. As 
Kuper observes, ‘[h]unters and gatherers have been a frequent repository of images 
borrowed from the bestiary. Described as animals, they have been hunted down like 
animals.’60
57 C. Carmichael, Ethnic cleansing in the Balkans: nationalism and the destruction of tradition, Routledge, London, 
2002, p. 33.
58 Leach, p. 45.
59 See, for example, Coates, p. 173. For a list of negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with the reptilian, 
see Goatly, p. 151.
60 Kuper, p. 88.
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Existing outside the sphere of human control, vermin are also wild: Birke views vermin as 
‘animals whose wildness we seek to eliminate by eliminating the animal itself.’61 The 
dictionary definition of ‘vermin’, Leach notes, is ‘comprehensively ambiguous: mammals and 
birds injurious to game, crops, etc; foxes, weasels, rats, mice, moles, owls, noxious insects, 
fleas, bugs, lice, parasitic worms, vile persons.’62 Here we have a very clear example of the 
power of utterance to construct that which it ostensibly only describes: ‘vermin’ are by 
definition animals which are injurious to person or property. Apart from the threat they thus 
pose, Leach suggests another explanation for the loathsomeness of animals generally 
considered vermin: in English, ‘[a]ll creatures that are edible are fish or birds or beasts.
There is a large residue of creatures, rated as either reptiles or insects, but the whole of this 
ambiguous residue is rated as not food. All reptiles and insects seem to be thought of as evil 
enemies of mankind and liable to the most ruthless extermination.’63 ‘Vermin’ is an 
anomalous category which cuts across established boundaries. Thus, vermin, to use Mary 
Douglas’ concept, are matter out of place: they are dirty.64 The dirtiness of vermin manifests 
itself in the role they play as disease carriers (and thus this category of animalisation is 
closely related to the medicalised biopolitical model discussed in the previous chapter).
The next category of animals discussed here are animals which, while not falling into the 
other categories, have somehow been constructed as immoral, dirty and disgusting. When 
humans are compared to these animals, it is not in the first instance human life or property 
which is threatened, but rather the ‘moral values’ or moral schema of a society, represented 
as essential to its survival. One has only to think of the stereotype of the Jew as a greedy 
financier, or as a seducer of Christian or ‘Aryan’ women, to see that a people may be
61 Birke, p. 20.
62 Leach, p. 45.
63 Leach, pp. 41-42, original italics: Leach excludes only the bee from this category. See also Thomas, p. 57.
64 M. Douglas, Purity and Danger: An analysis of concept of pollution and taboo (new edn), Routledge, London, 2002, 
pp. 44-45. For the demonization of lice and other insect parasites in European medical discourse from the 1890s 
onward, see P. J. Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide in Eastern Europe 1890-1945, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2000, p. 6.
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represented as a threat not only to the actual physical lives of those within the perpetrator 
society, but to the moral order of that society.65 These groups threaten not individuals 
within a society (or not only), but the society (or indeed ‘civilisation’ itself) from within, 
through moral corruption and moral perversion. In the case studies I present, two animals 
fall into this category: pigs and dogs.
Pigs are immoral for their putative filth and greed;66 comparison to the pig also holds a 
special sting for Jews and Muslims as a forbidden animal. Leach notes that not only is the pig 
a general scavenger, but also that, in contrast to other domestic animals reared for wool, or 
milk, or eggs, as well as for meat, pigs are bred ‘for the sole purpose of killing and eating 
them, and this is a rather shameful thing, a shame which quickly attaches to the pig itself.’67 
Pigs, that is, are both shamefully dirty, and inherently ‘killable’ in a way that pets and other 
‘farm’ animals are not.
Dogs are considered dirty, lustful and immoral in many cultures, even those which in other 
interpretations place great value upon them.68 In England, for example, writes Thomas,
‘[t]he Eastern view of dogs as filthy scavengers had been transmitted via the Bible to 
medieval England and was still widely current in the sixteenth century. The Book of 
Revelations suggested that dogs, like other unclean beings, would be excluded from the New 
Jerusalem,’ and dogs were sometimes even classified as ‘vermin.’69 Dogs, in their negative 
aspect, are lustful, cowardly and lazy (as well as ‘wild’ or ‘mad’). They are also dirty, because 
they have no ‘horror of excrement and no shame about their sexual functions’;70 verbally, 
they are often invoked as objects of contempt, and as creatures who are treated, in the
65 See Musolff, pp. 39-41.
66 See Goatly, p. 151, for a list of English negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with the porcine.
67 Leach, pp. 50-5 I .
68 See Goatly, p. 150, for a list of English negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with the canine.
69 Thomas, p. 105.
70 Thomas, pp. 150-151.
Chapter 6 275
general order of things, as the lowest of the low (‘one wouldn’t treat a dog that way’).71 The 
same connotations of dirtiness and shameful behaviour which attach to the pig also, in 
certain constructions, inhere in the dog.
Finally, the category of immoral animals includes creatures which are considered sinful or 
evil (for the Western or Christian perpetrators in the episodes examined here) because of 
religious or supernatural associations: the goat, the snake and the vampire bat.
Ultimately, the representation in utterance of a victim group as any of these types 
constructs them as a serious threat to the fabric of the perpetrator society in a way which 
means that their destruction is viewed as legitimate, as necessary, and as self-defence.
Having reviewed examples of these utterances, I will then return to an animalising type 
which, like the view of outgroups as lesser humans, does not make reference to specific 
threatening animals, but which, like the view of outgroups as specific animals, does inherently 
refer to their destruction as proper in the scheme of things: the view of outgroups as ‘fauna’ 
who may either be wild or tame (and are therefore to be treated accordingly), and who may 
be killed for ‘sport and game.’ Before concluding, I will mention in brief two related issues: 
that of perpetrators’ utterances drawing a connection between their own identity or actions 
and animality; and that of animal naming in episodes of mass subjugation (which have also 
involved killing) such as slavery and apartheid. Examination of these issues will shed light 
both upon animalisation as such, and upon dehumanisation as a differentiated process 
occurring in the genocidal and non-genocidal context.
Before embarking upon this enumeration, however, we must briefly consider the problem 
of the huge cultural differences which exist between different collectivities in regard to
71 Thomas, pp. 150-151.
Chapter 6 276
conceptions and constructions of ‘the animal,’ and between collective constructions of 
different animals.
IV . A ttitu d es to A n im als and C u ltu ra l Difference
The material on attitudes towards animals presented here is for the most part analysis of 
language and culture in the European Judeo-Christian tradition. Many of the episodes I 
examine have taken place at the hands of European perpetrators; but by no means all. Some 
of the analytic material presented, such as the work of Thomas, is specific to the European 
and even the British historical circumstance; other analysis, such as that of Leach, may reveal 
patterns which occur both in Western and non-Western societies. While attitudes to 
animals vary greatly from culture to culture, from the research I have undertaken it seems to 
me that the pattern of animal naming which I discuss -  that is, this particular discursive 
formation employed strategically in relationship to a particular practice toward an outgroup 
-  is common to Western and non-Western cultures, although the specific animal names 
used to vilify may differ from culture to culture. The concept of genocide itself is, as we 
have seen, intimately related to Western modernity, and is perhaps inconceivable outside 
the ideological framework of the models of the modern Western nation-state and biological 
or bureaucratic essentialisation of identity (models which have been disseminated on a global 
scale). Furthermore, in many of the episodes I examine where perpetrators are non- 
Western (for example, Rwandan, Japanese, and Cambodian perpetrators) colonisation or 
Western cultural-ideological influence have played a highly significant role.
The non-Western examples presented here in themselves shed light on constructions of 
particular animals in the perpetrator societies: Rwandan Tutsi, for example, ‘will be crushed 
like cockroaches,’ and an operation to kill Tutsi is code-named ‘Insecticide.’ W e can infer
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from this evidence that attitudes toward cockroaches in Rwandan and European cultures are 
not too dissimilar.72 From the way this naming takes place, that is, we may infer attitudes 
not only toward the victim groups but also toward the animals whose names are used to 
vilify. Unfortunately there is no space here to investigate whether a similar process takes 
place in societies in which values of vegetarianism or non-violence toward animals have been 
influential (for example, whether, during Partition violence in the Indian subcontinent, Hindu 
perpetrators named their victims as animals). In such circumstances, the applicability of my 
model may be judged on an individual basis; but I have included enough culturally and 
geographically diverse cases here to indicate that these cases may be considered exceptional, 
and to demonstrate the wide applicability of my argument concerning the functions of animal 
naming.
V. A n im alisation
Va. Sub-humans, Lesser Humans, and Non-people
The category of ‘sub-human’ does not directly ‘animalise’ the victim group as such. 
However, it is worth noting the episodes of genocide in which this representation of victims 
has taken place hand in hand with animalisation, and the way in which (as we have seen) it 
legitimises killing. After all, what is a ‘sub-human’ if not an inferior living creature to which 
lesser or no obligation is owed?
We have already mentioned -  and will see in the various sections below -  that biological 
racism, as well as concepts around hierarchies of ‘civilisation,’ very often defined colonised 
peoples as somehow less ‘human’ than the colonisers. Indeed, the reasons for collectives
72 On the cultural comparison of metaphorical systems, see Lakoff & Johnson, pp. 154-1 55.
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being depicted as ‘not-true-people’ or ‘less-than-true-people’ vary widely, from biology, to 
culture, to technology, to the concept of property. As Cocker observes,
[sjometimes the sum of Europe’s greater achievement was the opportunity to treat tribal 
societies as animals without masters, or as a worthless species to be eliminated like vermin 
... Technological and cultural progress was seen as a measure of the distance between man 
and his simian origins. It separated him from the apes of the forest. It was his triumph over 
the limitations of nature and time, and carried implications of moral and spiritual 
improvement ... Europe’s ingrained perception of human culture as a linear development 
had deeply sinister implications for those who seemed not to be making the same 
progressive journey ... white colonial officials even in this century believed the Aborigines 
had failed to achieve full humanity.73
However, this type of utterance is not confined to episodes of colonial killing. It is well 
known that the National Socialists called conquered Slavic peoples Untermenschen, sub­
humans, but not so well know that in Democratic Kampuchea the captive urban populations 
were given a similar moniker (anoupacheachun).74 American attitudes toward the Japanese 
during the Second World W ar also demonstrate this type of rhetoric:
Asked in a postwar Army survey how he had regarded Japanese troops, a former sergeant of 
the I 32nd Infantry curtly replied: ‘Our hatred for the Japanese increased. W e  thought of 
them as the lowest form of life. So what did I think of them as people? They were not 
people.’ ... ‘If the Japs were not like animals,’ a sailor, frustrated by the prolonged battle for 
Saipan, noted in his diary in June 1944, ‘they would have given up a long time ago because 
their cause is hopeless.’'5
73 Cocker, p 362.
74 B. Kiernan, ‘Twentieth-Century Genocides: Underlying Ideological Themes from Armenia to East Timor’, in R. 
Gellateiy & B. Kiernan (eds), The Specter of Genocide: Moss Murder in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2003, p. 33.
75 Schrijvers, p. 218.
Chapter 6 279
Norman Cigar has documented in detail the way in which this process took place in the 
former Yugoslavia, particularly through the agency of Serbian Orientalist scholars specialising 
in the study of Islam:
Overall, Muslims, as well as Croatians, were depicted routinely as virtually non-people, 
essentially being labelled - with little historical basis - as Serbs who had converted to Islam 
or Catholicism, respectively, but who were lacking consciousness of their very roots and 
identity ... Some Serbian intellectuals went even further and interjected a clear tinge of 
racism into their arguments. One of them, Dragos Kalajic, dismissed Bosnia’s Muslims as 
‘not belonging to the European family of nations’ ... Yugoslavia’s [‘semi-Arab’] Muslims 
allegedly exhibit a long list of inherited character flaws... ‘simply put, the semi-Arab is not 
capable of understanding the essence of one of the most basic traits of the European, namely 
the uniqueness of personal freedom which is fundamentally above any collectivity’ ...
In general, Serbian scholars taxed Islam and Muslims with being retrograde and a threat to 
modern civilization, both in general terms and to Serbia specifically. Miroljub Jevtic, a 
political scientist and specialist on Islam at Belgrade University, was perhaps the most active 
proponent of such ideas. He claimed that Islamic ‘fundamentalists,’ a label he applied freely 
to any Muslim, are little more than a reflection of the ‘darkness of the past.’ They 
understand ‘slavery and equality, not the way a civilized person does, but rather the way 
their God understands it’ ... Behind every action by the Muslims lay an alleged master plan 
to undermine Serbia.76
The attempt to redefine the Serbian self-image from the 1980s resulted in the drawing of
a Manichaean contrast between Serbs and others - a lopsided philosophy of dualism in which 
the Serbs monopolized all such positive virtues as bravery, tolerance, long-suffering patience,
76 N. Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy o f ‘Ethnic Cleansing’, Texas A & M University Press, Texas, 1995, pp. 26-
28.
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superior morality, culture, and even intelligence ... For yet another nationalist leader, Seselj, 
the Serbs are ‘a historical people in the true sense of the word, unlike the Slovenes and the 
Croatians. When I say that, I am following good old Hegel, to the effect that a people is 
historical if it knows how to build its own state, and how to defend it.’77
Sources of authority constantly reiterated the message that these outgroups ‘represented all 
that is base, undesirable, and naturally subordinate.’78
In the former Yugoslavia, these types of utterances continued during the genocidal period, 
providing ‘added scholarly explanation and vindication for war crimes ... Another Serbian 
academic, Nada Todorov, even purported to see the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
motivated by their “Islamic way of life, which has nothing in common with European 
civilization.’”79 Like others, Todorov used the pseudo-medical terminology of psychoanalysis 
to explain Muslim ‘barbarism’ (in a classic example of the function of the type of medicalised 
rhetoric we have explored in the previous chapter).
In all of these episodes and others, however, the general naming of victims as a different 
and inferior form of humanity tends to be accompanied by representations which represent 
them as specific types of animals.
Vb. Vermin
In A  Common Humanity / say that no human being, no matter how foul their actions might be, 
can rightly be killed in the spirit of ridding the world of vermin. A student responded by saying that
77 Cigar, pp. 73-75.
78 Cigar, pp. 73-75.
79 Cigar p. 70.
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perhaps ‘vermin’ should never be killed in the spirit o f ridding the world o f vermin. Perhaps he was 
right
-Raim ond G aita80
The categories of disease organisms and ‘vermin’ cannot always be discretely separated.81 
Each category calls for the cleansing of dirt. In Rwanda, for example, Tutsi ‘cockroaches’ 
required ‘a big clean up.’82 Sometimes the link is directly drawn in perpetrator discourse. 
Herbert Hirsch and Roger W . Smith cite the testimony of a Jewish smuggler who escaped 
from the Warsaw Ghetto: ‘When I was in Aryan Warsaw, I sometimes tried, in spite of the 
danger, to tear down the large posters showing a hideous Jew with a louse-ridden beard. 
‘Jew-louse-typhoid,’ it said. W e  were germ carriers, vermin.’83 According to Jean Hatzfeld, 
in Rwanda
[t]he  elements of anti-Tutsi propaganda are strangely similar to  those of anti-Semitic 
propaganda -  in singling out physical characteristics (low  o r high foreheads, hooked o r 
straight noses, crooked  o r slender fingers); psychological qualifiers relating to cowardice, 
slyness and treachery; and allusions to greed and arrogance. Equivalent term s sum up this 
correspondence: parasites and cockroaches.84
After the medicalised type we explored in the previous chapter, the category of ‘vermin’ can 
be considered the next most extreme characterisation of a target group as unworthy of life. 
As Singer observes, ‘[n]o consideration at all is given to the interests of the ‘pests’- the very 
word ‘pest’ seems to exclude any concern for the animals themselves.’85
80 R. Gaita, The Philosopher’s Dog, Text, Melbourne, 2002, p. 205.
81 See, for example, Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 39.
82 Kiernan, ‘Twentieth-Century Genocides’, p. 33.
83 H. Hirsch & R. W . Smith, T he Language of Extermination in Genocide’, in I. W . Charny (ed.), Genocide: A 
Critical Bibliographic Review, vol. 2, Mansell, London, 1991, p. 389.
84 Hatzfeld, p. 209.
85 Singer, p. 233.
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At times the term ‘vermin’ or pests’ is used in general. According to George Steiner, in 
occupied Warsaw during the Second World W ar ‘[t]he men who poured quicklime down 
the openings of the sewers ... to kill the living and stifle the stink of the dead wrote home 
about it. They spoke of having to “ liquidate vermin.’”86 Hirsch argues that the Aryan myth, 
with accompanying propaganda, ‘effectively functioned to dehumanize the potential victims 
and justify their extermination. It is legitimate to kill vermin. In essence, this was the key to 
the creation of a target population for which extermination was justifiable.’87
In Democratic Kampuchea victims were referred to as ‘pests buried within’ and traitors 
‘boring in.’88 During the Second World War, General Sir Thomas Blarney, in a 1943 speech 
to his troops, after comparing the Japanese to apes went on to say that ‘[y]ou know that we 
have to exterminate these vermin if we and our families are to live ... W e  must go on to the 
end if civilization is to survive. W e  must exterminate the Japanese.’89 In Queensland in 
colonial Australia, white colonists considered indigenous people ‘vermin,’ ‘loathsome’ and 
‘scarcely human.’90 In 1883 Arthur Hamilton Gordon, the British High Commissioner, wrote 
privately to William Gladstone, the English Prime Minister, that
[t]he habit of regarding the natives as vermin, to be cleared off the face of the earth, has 
given the average Queenslander a tone of brutality and cruelty in dealing with ‘blacks’ which 
it is very difficult to anyone who does not know it, as I do, to realise ... I have heard men of 
culture and refinement, of the greatest humanity and kindness to their fellow whites ... talk, 
not only of the wholesale butchery ... but of the individual murder of natives, exactly as they 
would talk of a day’s sport, or having to kill some troublesome animal.91
86 G. Steiner, Language and Silence: Essays 1958-1966, Penguin, Middlesex, 1969, p. 141.
87 H. Hirsch, ‘Why People Kill: Conditions for Participation in Mass Murder’, in H. Hirsch &J. D. Spiro (eds), 
Persistent Prejudice: Perspectives on Anti-Semitism, George Mason University Press, Virginia, 1988, p. 45.
88 Kiernan, ‘Twentieth-Century Genocides’, p. 33.
89 Dower, p. 71.
90 C. Tatz, With Intent To Destroy: Reflecting on Genocide, Verso, London, 2003, p. 79.
91 In Tatz, With Intent To Destroy, p. 79; original italics.
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While these instances give examples where the term vermin’ is used as a general 
description, in other instances, reference to specific verminous animals is made.
Vermin: Rodents
To call a human a rat is a familiar and a well-established metaphor.92 Perhaps the most 
infamous instance of Nazi verminisation of Jews is the ‘documentary’ film Der ewige Jude, 
made between 1939 and 1940. This film showed images of swarming rats, with the following 
narration (which also demonstrates the link between victims depicted as animals and as 
disease organisms):
W h e re v e r  rats appear they bring ruin, by destroying mankind’s goods and foodstuffs. They 
spread disease and plague such as leprosy, typhoid fever, cholera and dysentery. They are 
cunning, cow ard ly  and cruel, and are found mostly in large packs. They represent craftiness 
and subterranean destruction- just like the Jew s among other human beings.93
Unlike Jud Süss, the fictional antisemitic film of the same period, Der ewige Jude was a 
commercial failure, although it was required viewing for many Nazi institutional 
organisations. However, as we have seen elsewhere, the purposiveness of this work was 
not so much to instil antisemitism in the German public, as to suggest a solution to a 
problem which, it had already been accepted, existed in fact. Stig Hornshoj-Moller writes
92 See Goatly, p. I 5 I , for a list of metaphorical-linguistic associations with the rodent. See also C. Tileagä, 
‘Ideologies of moral exclusion: A  critical discursive reframing of depersonalization, delegitimization and 
dehumanisation’, British Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 46, 2007, pp. 730-73 I .
93 Quoted in S. Hornshoj-Moller, ‘Propaganda and Produced Reality in the Holocaust’, in I. W . Charny (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Genocide, ABC-CLIO, California, 1999, p. 473.
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:hat this film, along with Jud Süss, ‘was used to legitimize the annihilation of European Jewry 
:o the German public.’94
During the Second W orld  W ar, the Japanese were also characterised as rodent vermin, 
not only in wartime propaganda, but by officials and military leaders. This image by no 
means applied only to combatants: during the internment of Japanese-Americans the 
governor of Idaho, opposed to having evacuees brought to his state, declared, ‘a good 
solution to the Jap problem would be to send them all back to Japan, then sink the island. 
They live like rats, breed like rats and act like rats.’95
Vermin: Insects96
IGNACE: We called them ‘cockroaches,’ an insect that chews up clothing and nests in it, so you have 
to squash hard to get rid o f them. We didn’t want any more Tutsis on our land. We imagined an 
existence without them. At first, we favored getting rid o f them without actually killing them. I f  they 
had agreed to leave -  for Burundi or other likely destinations -  they could have gone and saved their 
lives. And we wouldn’t have piled up the fatalities o f the massacres. But they couldn’t imagine living 
there without their ancient traditions and their herds o f cows. That pushed us toward the 
machetes.97
The most extreme example of the ‘insectisation’ of victims occurred during the genocide of 
Tutsi in Rwanda. Rwandan Tutsi were the victims of periodic massacres throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century, culminating in the genocide of the mid-1990s. The
94 Hornshoj-Moller, p. 472.
95 Dower, p. 92.
96 See Goatly, p. 151, for a list of English negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with the insect.
97 Hatzfeld, p. 23 I . Note that here, as in the colonial context, the aim is to clear the victims from the land one 
way or another; however, since they’re not considered human equals, killing is one acceptable means. For more 
examples o f ‘crushing’ Tutsi ‘cockroaches’ see Hatzfeld, pp. 15, 100, I 13, 219.
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term inyenzi, cockroaches, was originally used as a self-description by guerrilla Tutsi groups 
who invaded the country in the 1960s, and by the predominantly Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) rebels. However, the word came to be used as perhaps the foremost pejorative 
term of abuse for any Tutsi, and for Tutsi as a group.98 As a term used to mean both ‘Tutsi’ 
in general and ‘insurgent’ specifically, it served to characterise all Tutsi as a literal threat. In 
1992, Leon Mugesera, an anti-Tutsi propagandist, made a speech to members of the then- 
ruling MRND party, in which he insisted that the RPF (and thus, according to the meaning 
implicit in anti-Tutsi propaganda, Tutsi in general) must be called Inyenzi, never the more 
respectful Inkotanyi (a term the rebel groups had chosen to call themselves, but one which 
would also be used to label all Tutsi as dangerous traitors), and labelled the opponent 
‘vermin’ that must be ‘liquidated.’99 Genocidal anti-Tutsi propaganda was distributed 
through newspapers and radio stations, in particular Radio Television Libres des Milles 
Collines (RTLM) which began broadcasting in 1993.100 Kangura, a prominent anti-Tutsi 
propaganda newspaper, published an article in March 1993 entitled ‘A cockroach cannot give 
birth to a butterfly.’ The article read, in part:
W e  began by saying that a cockroach cannot give birth to a butterfly. It is true. A 
cockroach gives birth to another cockroach ... The history of Rwanda shows us clearly that
98 R. Melson, ‘Modern Genocide in Rwanda: Ideology, Revolution, War, and Mass Murder in an African State’, in 
R. Gellately & B. Kiernan (eds), The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective, Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2003, p. 333; P. Gourevitch, We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our 
Families: Stories From Rwanda, Farrar Straus & Giroux, New York, 1998, p. 32.
99 Des Forges, pp. 84-86. The MRND (Movement Révolutionaire pour le Développement, later Mouvement 
Républicain national pour la démocratie et de développement) under President Juvenâl Habyarimana ruled 
Rwanda as a single-party state from 1973 until 1991, and continued to rule in a multiparty state until 1994, when 
Habyarimana was killed when his plane was shot down. Responsibility for this crime has never been established, 
but it allowed the Hutu Power movement to seize power and implement the genocide. Hutu Power was, 
however, closely intertwined with the MRND; the MRND militia, the Interahamwe, were to play an important 
role in the killings. Thus, while Habyarimana himself did not implement the genocide, the actions of the MRND 
in the years before 1994 created the preconditions for genocide. For a detailed account of the historical 
conditions for genocide in Rwanda see A. Des Forges, “Leave None To Tell The Story”: Genocide in Rwanda, Human 
Rights Watch, New York, 1999, pp. 3-178.
100 Gourevitch, p. 99.
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a Tutsi stays always exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil are 
just as we knew them in the history of our country. W e  are not wrong in saying that a 
cockroach gives birth to another cockroach. W ho could tell the difference between the 
Inyenzi who attacked in October 1990 and those of the 1960s. They are all linked ... their 
evilness is the same.101
According to Rwandan military sources, an operation designed to strike behind RPF lines 
was code-named ‘Operation Insecticide,’ ‘meaning an operation to exterminate the inyenzi 
or “ cockroaches.” ’102 Philip Gourevitch quotes one RTLM broadcast in 1994 in which the 
broadcaster stated ‘[y]ou cockroaches must know you are made of flesh ... W e  won’t let 
you kill. W e  will kill you.’103 When James Orbinski, a Canadian physician, attempted to 
evacuate an orphanage, he met a Rwandan officer who said ‘[tjhese people are POWs, and 
as far as I’m concerned they’re insects, and they’ll be crushed like insects.’104
Insect imagery has been used in other episodes of genocide. In 1864 at Sand Creek in 
Indiana, troops commanded by Colonel John Chivington ‘slaughtered 100 to 500 unarmed 
women and children and scalped nearly all of them.’105 Chivington campaigned to ‘kill and 
scalp all, little and big,’ because ‘Nits make lice’; ‘the phrase became a rallying cry of his 
troops.’106 As David E. Stannard writes, ‘[cjlearly, Colonel Chivington was a man ahead of 
his time. It would be more than half a century, after all, before Heinrich Himmler would 
think to describe the extermination of another people as “ the same thing as debusing.’” 107 
jews were often described as ‘lice’ in National Socialist Germany: in the words of Joseph
101 Quoted in Des Forges, pp. 73-74.
102 Des Forges, p. 666.
103 Gourevitch, p. 114.
104 In Gourevitch, p. 134.
105 D. E. Stannard, American Holocaust The Conquest of the New World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, I 992, p. 
131.
106 Stannard, p. 131.
107 Stannard, p. 131.
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Goebbels, ‘[t]hey have to be exterminated somehow; otherwise they will again play their 
tormenting and annoying role. Only if one proceeds against them with the necessary 
brutality will we be finished with them. When you spare them, you subsequently become 
their victim.’108 Furthermore, this rhetoric was not restricted to Jews, but also applied to 
other peoples such as Poles.109 Julius Streicher’s infamous, influential and much-imitated 
propaganda paper, Der Sturmer, depicted Jews as insects and also as spiders, not only vermin, 
but morally offensive in their use of poison and cunning entrapment.110 Ernst Hiemer, a 
contributor to Der Sturmer, wrote a book of children’s stories, The
Poodlepugdachshundpinscher (the title refers to the dangers of ‘race mixing’), in which Jews 
were compared to (among other things) locusts, bedbugs and drones.* 111
The insect image was also prominent in the case of Allied characterisations of the Japanese. 
Robert Sherrod quotes a veteran marine en route to Tarawa as saying that getting the 
enemy out of his holes would be ‘like pulling a tick out of a rug.’112 When, in the early stages 
of the Guadalcanal campaign, the men of the 1st Marine Division met not the ferocious 
Japanese troops they had been led to expect, but only Korean laborers (themselves subject 
to Japanese imperialism), they unleashed their pent-up hatred against these harmless 
workers instead. ‘Contact with termites were also witnessed,’ one intelligence report 
mentioned, ‘and more of these laborers might have been taken alive if eager marines had not 
shot them as soon as spotted.’113
According to Dower, ‘[ejspecially during the last few years of the war, “ exterminationist” 
figures of speech did become a stock way of referring to the killing of the Japanese, not only
108 Herf, p. 121; see also, for example, Hirsch, ‘W h y  People Kill’, p. 45; Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide, pp. 
276-277; on Jews as ‘insects’ and ‘grasshoppers’ see also Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide, p. 71.
109 See for example Weindling, Epidemics and Genocide, pp. 272-273.
110 R. L. Bytwerk, Julius Stretcher, Stein & Day, New York, 1983, pi. 25.
111 Bytwerk, p. 105.
112 In Schrijvers, p. 218.
113 Schrijvers, p. 219.
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in battle but also in the cities of Japan’s home islands,’ by political and military leaders as well 
as in popular usage.114 Dower cites, among other examples, a cartoon in the military paper 
Leatherneck which ‘depicted common afflictions suffered by the Marines in the Pacific and 
concluded with “ Louseous Japanicus,” a grotesque insect with slanted eyes and protruding 
teeth ...’ It was explained that the Marines had been given ‘the giant task of extermination 
... Flamethrowers, mortars, grenades and bayonets have proven to be an effective remedy. 
But before a complete cure may be effected the origin of the plague, the breeding grounds 
around the Tokyo area, must be completely annihilated.’115
Vermin: Birds
At first glance, birds may not seem particularly threatening to humans.116 In certain 
circumstances, however, they are not only wild, but fall into the category of pests and 
vermin. Indigenous Australians were notably characterised as sparrows, birds considered 
pests and a threat to crops, and particularly as crows, birds which were both pests and black 
in colour. In Tasmania in the nineteenth century, European settlers often referred to 
Aborigines as ‘“ crows” or “ black crows” or “ black vermin’” ;117 and ‘crow’ hunting was 
sometimes combined with a country picnic en famille.118 In an unexpected parallel, Cigar 
cites a slogan used in Serbian nationalist rallies organized by Slobodan Milosevic in the late 
1980s which used the same image: ‘Oh Muslims, you black crows, Tito is no longer around 
to protect you!’119 (Cathie Carmichael comments that ‘[bjlack crows are a symbol of bad
114 Dower, p. 90-91.
115 Dower, p. 9 1.
116 See Goatly, p. 15 I , for a list of English negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with the avian.
117 Cocker, p. I 27.
118 Cocker, p. 148.
119 Cigar, p. 34.
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luck in South Slavonic culture, somewhat similar to magpies in Western Europe’120). Victims 
have even been compared to birds considered morally offensive: Jews were depicted in Der 
Stürmer as vultures, and in The Poodlepugdachshundpinscher as cuckoos as well as sparrows.121
Victims may be depicted as various different forms of animal parasites, pests, or vermin. As 
all of the examples given above demonstrate, however, in every case this imagery serves to 
present the victim group not only as repulsive, but as threatening; and a dual purpose is 
served both by using threat to construct killing as legitimate, and by creating a connection of 
identity between victims and animals which are commonly killed (because of the threat they 
pose to human activities) as part of everyday experience.
Vc. Morally Offensive Animals
Morally Offensive Animals: Pigs
The naming of victims as pigs occurs most prominently in a period, not of genocide, but of 
genocidal killing, that enacted upon Jews in medieval Europe, in which they were periodically 
the target of pogroms and murderous crusades. A Christian tradition of animal abuse 
towards Jews has a long history; such abuse is prevalent, for example, in the writings of John 
Chrysostom, who had this to say about Jews: ‘beasts unfit for work, they are fit for killing ... 
fit for slaughter.’122 Porcine vilification of Jews found expression in the medieval Judensau 
image, found commonly in German-speaking areas of Europe. This was a pictorial motif of 
Jews suckling from a sow’s udders and eating and drinking pig excrement, which was
120 Carmichael, p. I23n5.
121 Bytwerk, p. 105.
122 For this as well as other examples see M. Lazar, The Lamb and the Scapegoat: The Dehumanization of the 
Jews in Medieval Propaganda Imagery’, in S. L. Gilman & S. T. Katz (eds), Anti-Semitism in Times of Crisis, New York 
University Press, New  York, 1991, pp. 47-48.
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depicted in architecture and painting at places of worship, on public structures such as 
bridges, and in printed material.
The association of Jews with pigs was one tailored to offend in light of kosher laws which 
regard the pig as unclean; yet there was more to the image than this. The Judensau does not 
literally represent Jews as pigs, but a very clear association is made.
The attitude expressed in the Judensau towards the Jews is not just scurrilous. There was a 
further element or sub-motif present in all its representations: the Jews belong to the sow, 
the sow to the Jews. These people, in other words, belong to another and abominable 
category of beings; they are the sow’s offspring and turn to their mother for their proper 
nourishment ... The Jews are, by this association with the animal, implicitly but clearly 
labelled as not being human ‘like us’: not, as the German would put it, unsereiner ... it seems 
that in the intimate association of Jews and sow there is an element similar to such verbal 
animal-abuse as ‘son of a bitch’. Both essentially transfer hated persons to a distinctly 
different and loathsome natural category -  by implication sanctioning aggression, and then in 
itself expressing an aggressive attitude ... It seems clear that the Judensau -  honouring the 
Jews more or sometimes less humorously with a porcine ancestry -  had been contributing 
toward a transfer of the Jews to a totally different, non-human, category ... The appeal of 
the Judensau lay in its obscenity; its effect was to help in fixing the idea of Jews being 
absolutely ‘not of us.’123
Isaiah Schachar cautions that this image, ‘[ajlthough uninhibited in its abuse ... was not 
originally conceived as a polemic image, nor was it intended or used to insult Jews 
throughout its early development,’ but took on defamatory features in the period of the 
Reformation, and that individual examples did not necessarily indicate local conflict with 
Jews;124 but this is hard to reconcile with the views he expresses in the passage quoted
123 I. Schachar. The Judensau: A Medieval Anti-Jewish Motif and its History, The Warburg Institute, London, 1974, p. 3.
124 Schachar, p. 2.
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above. In this period Jews were also associated with pigs in other ways. Joshua 
Trachtenberg describes a catalogue of secret Jewish ailments and disabilities, published by 
the converted Jew Franciscus of Piacenza in 1602, which were alleged to differ between each 
of the twelve tribes of Israel:
Naphtali, according to this imaginative account, hid their children in pigpens, with 
instructions to grunt and squeal when Jesus passed by, and when they asked him what these 
were, and he replied They are your children,’ they denied it, insisting these were pigs; 
whereupon Jesus said, ‘If they are swine, then swine let them be, and swine let them remain,’ 
and thus the tribe of Naphtali have four large pig teeth, pigs’ ears, and stink like swine.125
Trachtenberg concludes by noting that ‘it can readily be seen ... that Johann Fischart’s 
illustrated Wunderzeitung of the year 1575, announcing the birth to a Jewish woman of 
Binzwangen, near Aubsburg, of two little pigs, need not have unduly strained Christian 
credulity. Nothing was too monstrous to be told about the Jew.’126
The pig comparison also occured in other episodes of genocidal killing. According to Iris 
Chang, ‘both before and during the [Second World] war, members of the Japanese military 
at all levels frequently compared the Chinese to pigs. For example, a Japanese general told a 
correspondent: “To be frank, your view of Chinese is totally different from mine. You 
regard the Chinese as human beings while I regard the Chinese as pigs.’” 127 Another animal 
reference occurs in the testimony of a Japanese private named Tajimura: ‘[o]ne day Second 
Lieutenant Ono said to us, “You have never killed anyone yet, so today we shall have some 
killing practice. You must not consider the Chinese as a human being, but only as something
125 J. Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception o f the Jew and Its Relation To Modern 
Antisemitism, Yale University Press, New  Haven, 1943, pp. 51-52.
126 Trachtenberg, p. 52.
127 I. Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust o f World War II, Penguin, London, 1998, p. 218.
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of rather less value than a dog or a cat.’” 128 On the other side of the Second World War, 
American soldiers would use such rhetoric as ‘Japan and the swines that are her sons,’ 129 
while practises showed attitudes toward the Japanese that did not exist for the Germans:
Racial scorn easily combined with cultural and religious disdain to form a poisonous brew. In 
his review of thousands of censored military photographs taken during W orld  W ar II, for 
example, historian George Roeder, in sharp contrast with what he found on the war against 
Japan, never encountered any evidence of GIs taking body parts of European soldiers as 
trophies.130
Evidence also exists of the use of porcine abuse in more clear-cut episodes of genocide. 
Although it should be recalled that ‘swine’ was a generalised term of abuse in Germany, 
Charles Patterson notes particularly that during the National Socialist genocide Germans 
would call Jews called Saujuden.131 Patterson reports an incident in which an Austrian squad 
leader, preparing for the arrival of a group of Hungarian Jews, told his men to get ready to 
kill them: ‘[tjhese dogs and pigs all deserve to be beaten to death together.’ 132 Randall L. 
Bytwerk cites a letter in Der Stiirmer in which a Jew who allegedly tortured a cat is berated 
thus: ‘[sjhame on you, you cold-blooded miserable pig-Jew - there is nothing else to call you 
... You should croak like a worm .’ 133 At least two cases taking place during the Cambodian 
genocide are also mentioned by Alexander Laban Hinton: ‘[a] soldier told one ‘‘new” person 
that it was better that her mother had died ‘‘than a cow ... [cows] help us a lot and do not
128 Chang, p. 56.
129 Schrijvers, p. 216.
130 Schrijvers, p. 2 16.
131 C. Patterson, Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment o f Animals and the Holocaust, Lantern Books, New  York, 2002, p. 
47. In a personal testimony to the widespread antisemitic use of this language, Victor Klemperer’s The Language 
o f the Third Reich gives many examples of his common experience of being abused through ‘pig’ and ‘dog’ language 
(V. Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI -  Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook [trans. M. Brady, 
3rd edn], The Athlone Press, London & New Brunswick [New  Jersey], 2000 [original German date of publication 
1957]).
132 Patterson, p. 47.
133 Bytwerk, p. 179.
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eat rice. They are much better than you pigs.’” Another victim testified that ‘[m]any times 
we heard soldiers shout, “ Prisoners of war, you are pigs.’” 134
Morally Offensive Animals: Dogs
Native American peoples, both Southern and Northern, were often depicted as dogs. In 
colonial South America in the sixteenth century, Christopher Columbus implemented the 
murderous repartimiento (later referred to as encomiendas) system of ‘Indian grants.’135 The 
Dominican priest Bartolomé de Las Casas reported that under this system, in which entire 
peoples and communities were granted to Spanish masters as slave labour, overseers 
‘treated the Indians with such rigor and inhumanity that they seemed the very ministers of 
Hell, driving them day and night with beatings, kicks, lashes and blows and calling them no 
sweeter names than dogs,’ while those who became too ill to work were called ‘lazy 
dogs.’136 Stannard also quotes the Spanish magistrate Juan de Matienzo, a member of the 
governing Audiencia, who in his 1567 treatise Gobierno del Peru (‘Government of Peru’) 
justified the system, in which native people were worked to death or killed them outright if 
they proved reluctant or rebellious, by characterising them as ‘animals who do not even feel 
reason, but are ruled by their passions.’137 In 1890, just before the infamous massacre at 
Wounded Knee in South Dakota, L. Frank Baum, the editor of that state’s Aberdeen Saturday 
Pioneer (and remembered today as the author of the Land of Oz children’s books), wrote:
134 A. L. Hinton, ‘Comrade O x Did Not Object W hen His Family W as Killed’, in I. W . Charny (ed.), Encyclopedia 
of Genocide, ABC-CLIO, California, 1999, p. 135.
135 It should be noted that this was not a system equivalent to the type of slavery in which life has some value as a 
means of production. Las Casas estimated that perhaps ten per cent of the people subjugated within this system 
survived until they became too sick to work and were dismissed, while Stannard comments, ‘so enormous was 
the reservoir of native muscle and flesh that no rational slave driver would spend good money on caring for 
these beasts (and beasts they were, and natural slaves, so the wisest of wise men had come to agree); it was 
more efficient simply to use them up and then replace them’ (p. 221).
136 In Stannard, pp. 73-74.
137 Stannard, p. 220.
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The nobility of the Redskin is extinguished, and what few are left are a pack of whining curs 
who lick the hand that smites them. The Whites, by law of conquest, by justice of 
civilization, are masters of the American continent, and the best safety of the frontier 
settlements will be secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians. W hy not 
annihilation? ... better that they should die than live the miserable wretches that they are.138
A similarly contemptuous characterisation was expressed of indigenous Australians by a 
clergyman in the 1870s: ‘If our instincts are true we must loathe the Aborigines as they are 
now, less estimable than the mongrels that prowl like them in the offal of a station ,..’139 In 
all these episodes, the utterances which have been used are clear demonstrations in 
themselves of the connection between the way in which people were characterised, and the 
justification of cruel and murderous treatment.
Vd. Animalised Supernatural Creatures
In a classic example of the anthropomorphisation of human ‘sinfulness,’ certain animals have 
historically been associated with supernatural evil. ‘What,’ asks Thomas, ‘were religion and 
morality, if not attempts to curb the supposedly animal aspects of human nature? ... It was 
no accident that the symbol of Anti-Christ was the Beast, or that the Devil was regularly 
portrayed as a mixture of man and animal.’140 Judeophobic material has commonly 
portrayed Jews as devils or demons. For the purposes of this investigation, however, the 
salient point is that the features which identified Jews as demons (or sometimes monsters) 
were animal characteristics: horns, cloven hooves, beards and tails. Such motifs were
138 Stannard, p. 126.
139 Quoted in C. Tatz, Genocide in Australia, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 
Research Discussion Papers #8, Canberra, 1999, p. 18.
140 Thomas, pp. 36-37.
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common in medieval Judeophobic images; they later appeared in National Socialist material 
such as Der Stürmer.141 These particular animal characteristics are those of the goat, which, 
like the snake, has long been associated with Satan in Christian tradition. Trachtenberg 
observes that ‘[t]he Bock, or billy goat, as the Middle Ages knew full well, is the devil’s 
favorite animal, frequently represented as symbolic of satanic lechery.’142 The Judensau was 
sometimes combined with the animalistic demon motif, as in the famous Frankfurt Judensau, 
sculpted in the fifteenth century (which also includes the image of Simon of Trent, the 
fifteenth-century subject of a well-known ritual murder or ‘blood libel’ allegation, thus 
emphasising the identification of Jews as a murderous threat).
In some cases Jews were forced to wear horns as distinguishing marks: ‘in 1267 the Vienna 
Council decreed that Jews must wear a ‘horned hat’ (pileum cornutum) ... and Philip III 
required the Jews of France to attach a horn-shaped figure to the customary Jew badge.’143 
Another goatlike characteristic attributed to Jews in medieval prints and in folk tales was the 
Ziegenbart (goat’s beard). As Trachtenberg notes, it was common to represent the Jew with 
the he-goat as either his favourite domestic animal or favourite mount; ‘perhaps the 
Ziegenbart emphasis is intended to identify the Jew as the human goat.’144 Trachtenberg 
cites a Judensau carved in relief on a Frankfurt bridge which ‘included the figure of a Jew with 
two unmistakable goat’s horns on his head. To make certain the origin of those horns was 
not missed, the artist cut a billy goat with identical horns into the stone, interestedly 
watching the proceedings.’145
141 Bytwerk, p. 105.
142 Trachtenberg, p. 47.
143 Trachtenberg, pp. 44-46.
144 Trachtenberg, pp. 46-47.
145 Trachtenberg, p. 47.
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Another animal related to the supernatural and often used in Judeophobic propaganda is 
the vampire bat. Many cartoons in Der Stürmer pictured the Jew as a vampire bat. 146 The 
association, of course, was of the Jew as a bloodsucking parasite or leech upon the body of 
the people, phrases which occur and re-occur in Mein Kampf itself, as well as very commonly 
in Nazi rhetoric and propaganda. 147
Indeed, the discursive relationship between killing, religious symbolism and animality is 
complex and often deeply intertwined. Carmichael quotes John Allcock on the language of 
the Croatian Ustasa during the Second World War, noting ‘the conjunction of the words for 
the slaughter of animals (klanje) and sacrifice (zrtvovanje).’ He argues that ‘killing of this kind 
is more than mere killing: it is the offering of the slain as if they are sacrificial animals. It is 
atrocity raised to the level of sacrament.’ 148
Ve. Predators: Morally Offensive and Wild
Some animals threaten both because of their predatory wildness and their 
anthropomorphic immorality. 149
146 Bytwerk, p. 105; pi. 9.
147 For example, A. Hitler, Mein Kam pf (trans. R. Manheim), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1971, pp. 309-3 10, 313. 
For an encyclopedic empirical analysis of metaphors used in Mein Kampf, see F. Rash, A Database of Metaphors in 
Adolf Hitler’s Mein Kampf, 2005, retrieved 10 September 2008,
<http://webspace. qmul.ac.uk/fjrash/metaphors_mein_kampf.pdf>.
148 Carmichael, p. 90.
149 See Goatly, p. I 50, for the negative English metaphorical-linguistic association in the terminology of predation.
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Predators: Wolves
A common image of the predator as an immoral wild animal is that of the wolf. Peter 
Coates writes that ‘[n]atural histories of the wolf from the Renaissance onwards were on a 
par with the crassest racism, focusing on their murderous savagery, cannibalism, cunning, 
deceit, cowardliness, perversity, depravity, exponential reproduction, and stench.’ In North 
America, the wolf was ‘beyond the moral pale.’150 Again, religious associations arise: Lopez 
comments that, for medieval Christians, the Biblical principle of retributory justice found in 
the Old Testament was seen to preserve cosmic order; an unexpiated act of killing risked 
divine wrath. There was thus not only a right, but a moral obligation to kill wolves and 
other predatory murderers of humans and of livestock.151 The wolf, like the goat and the 
snake, has also been a symbol of Satan in Christian discourse (related to the metaphor of 
Jesus as ‘lamb,’ the congregation as a ‘flock’ and the religious leader as a ‘shepherd’). As 
Lopez observes, there is a deeply-held belief that ‘the wolf is “wrong” in the scheme of 
things, like cancer, and has to be rooted out.’152
The wolf image has been prevalent in a number of different contexts. In Mein Kampf, Adolf 
Hitler compared Jews to wolves:
In the Jewish people the will to self-sacrifice does not go beyond the individuals’ naked 
instinct of self-preservation. Their apparently great sense of solidarity is based on the 
primitive herd instinct that is seen in many other living creatures in this world. It is a 
noteworthy fact that the herd instinct leads to mutual support only as long as a common 
danger makes this seem useful or inevitable. The same pack of wolves which has just fallen 
on its prey together disintegrates when hunger abates into its individual beasts.153
150 Coates, p. 168.
151 Lopez, pp. 145-146.
152 Lopez, p. 165.
153 Hitler, p. 301.
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In one case, that of a Jew found guilty of ‘racial defilement’ under the Nuremberg Laws, a 
Stürmer article asserted that ‘the people will not be able to understand how the Jew W o lf ... 
received only four months.’154
Indigenous Americans were often compared to wolves, as well as other predators. George 
Washington described the Indians as ‘beasts of prey,’ similar to the wolf ‘tho’ they differ in 
shape,’ who deserved nothing but ‘total ruin.’155 Andrew Jackson recommended ‘that 
American troops specifically seek out and systematically kill Indian women and children who 
were hiding, in order to complete their extermination; to do otherwise, he wrote, was 
equivalent to pursuing “ a wolf in the hammocks without knowing first where her den and 
whelps were.’” 156 In 1703 one of New England’s most esteemed religious leaders, the 
Reverend Solomon Stoddard, ‘formally proposed to the Massachusetts Governor that the 
colonists be given the financial wherewithal to purchase and train large packs of dogs “ to 
hunt the Indians as they do bears ... if the Indians were as other people ... it might be 
looked upon as inhumane to pursue them in such a manner,” but, in fact, the Indians were 
wolves, he said, ‘and are to be dealt withal as wolves.’” 157 The treatment of native peoples 
during this era would come to be a model for other acts of killing, as in the Second World 
War: ‘[w]e were fighting no civilized, knightly war ... W e  were back in the primitive days of 
fighting Indians on the American frontier.’158
154 In B/twerk, p. I 56.
155 Dower, p. 150; Stannard, pp. I 19, 240-241.
156 Stannard, pp. 121-122.
157 Stannard, 241; Thomas, 47.
158 Schrijvers, p. 2 17.
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Predators: Snakes
FULGENCE: When we sow Tutsis wriggling like snakes in the marshes, it made the guys laugh.
Some let them crawl awhile longer for more fun. But that was not the case for everybody. Some 
didn’t care one way or another and didn’t bother with that mockery. I f  it was easier to catch them 
crawling, that was better, and that was all.159
Snakes, dangerous wild animals, are often considered immoral both for their ‘treachery’ (‘a 
snake in the grass’), for their poisonousness, and, in cultures influenced by Christianity, their 
association with Satan. Martin Luther himself described Jews as ‘venomous serpents.’ In The 
Poodlepugdachshundpinscher Jews are compared to poisonous snakes, while cartoons in Der 
Sturmer bore titles such as The Satanic Serpent Judah.’160 In the Americas, Edward 
Waterhouse, the secretary of the Virginia Company, in an early document on the company’s 
progress in the New World called indigenous people a ‘Viperous brood ... of Pagan Infidels’ 
and called for their extermination.161 In the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, with the 
exodus of both Tutsi fleeing the genocide and Hutu fleeing justice, ‘ethnic cleansing’ began to 
take place in neighbouring countries such as Zaire, where the government was also anti- 
Tutsi: there, Gourevitch reported, officials began to refer to the Banyamulenge, Zairean 
Tutsi, as ‘snakes.’162 According to an eyewitness report of a massacre of 400 civilians in East 
Timor in 1981, an Indonesian soldier uttered a remark ‘which was considered to be part of 
the wisdom of Java. He said: “When you clean your field, don’t you kill all the snakes, the 
small and large alike?” ’163 An American marine general who served during the Second 
World W ar recalled that ‘Killing a Japanese was like killing a rattlesnake.’164
159 Hatzfeld, p. 132.
160 Bytwerk, pp. 105-107.
161 Stannard, p. 228.
162 Gourevitch, p. 295.
163 Kiernan, ‘Twentieth-Century Genocides’, p. 50.
164 Schrijvers, p. 218.
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In each of these cases, it is evident that the classification of an animal as ‘predatory’ -  like 
that of ‘vermin’ -  inherently refers to a threat which that animal poses, and is related to 
perceptions of immorality. In the utterances documented in this section, representing 
victims in this way has clearly served the dual purpose of constructing them as threatening, 
and (thus) justifying the treatment which is to be meted out, even when in other contexts it 
might seem illegitimate. W e now turn from the categories of predatory animals to language 
which more generally associates victim peoples with the characteristic of ‘wildness’ and its 
associated negative qualities.
Vf. W ild Animals
W ild Animals: Brutes and Beasts
In Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Kurtz, the murderous colonial overseer, has written 
an eloquent and benevolent pamphlet for the International Society for the Suppression of 
Savage Customs. At the foot of the last page, however, is scrawled a final addendum: 
‘Exterminate all the brutes!’ Marlow, the narrator, regards this phrase as ‘the exposition of 
a method.’ Kurtz and his fellows have been in the process of suppressing not so much the 
savage customs as the savages themselves.
In a linguistic sense, the term ‘brute’ has been a convenient one for the characterisation of 
others as sub-human (and is related to the section above on the construction of collectivities 
as lesser humans, sub-humans and ‘not-humans’); it is a noun which can refer both to 
humans and to animals, and thus, applied to humans, is already partway to animalising them. 
Sven Lindqvist, author of a profound meditation on the significance of Conrad’s phrase -  and
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of colonialism itself - to genocide, writes that, in colonial Tasmania, ‘[t]he natives did not 
have to be treated like humans, they were “ brutes” or “ brute beasts.’” 165 Massacre of 
Aborigines was carried out by settlers, soldiers and Native Police, and an eliminationist 
mentality was evident in popular settler rhetoric. In the 1820s the local press demanded 
that the government should ‘move’ the natives, or, if not, they should be ‘hunted down like 
wild beasts and destroyed.’166 In 1883, a columnist in the Queensland Figaro wrote, ‘[t]he 
blackfellow is a “ brute” and must be put out of the way.’167 ‘North Gregory,’ a 
correspondent to the Queenslander, explained that ‘[¡]f the whites are to settle and occupy 
their country, then a certain amount of cruelty and severity is unavoidable. You say we treat 
them like wild animals. Well, to a certain extent their attributes are the same, and must be 
met in the same manner.’168 Aborigines were also compared to other wild animals: ‘A. W . 
Stirling drew “a curious likeness between the ways of the Kangaroo and the habits of the 
blackfellow who inhabits the same country.” He then went on to talk ominously of the 
destruction of the “ hated marsupial.’” 169
The characterisation of victims as ‘beasts’ has been particularly prevalent in episodes of 
colonial genocide. The words of one Father Domingo de Betanzos, a Spanish missionary in 
South America in the sixteenth century, explicitly reveal the connection between the 
‘beasting’ of victim peoples and the genocidal mentality: ‘the Indians were beasts and ... God 
had condemned the whole race to perish for the horrible sins that they had committed in 
their paganism.’170 The very first English-language book on America, published in 1511,
165 S. Lindqvist, ‘Exterminate All the Brutes’, Granta, London, 2002, p. 118.
166 Lindqvist, p. 118.
167 R. Evans “The Nigger Shall Disappear. . Aborigines and Europeans in colonial Queensland’, in R. Evans, K. 
Saunders & K. Cronin (eds), Exclusion Exploitation and Extermination: Race Relations In Colonial Queensland, Australia 
and New  Zealand Book Company, Sydney, 1975, p. 77.
168 Quoted in H. Reynolds, An Indelible Stain?: The question of genocide in Australia’s history, Viking, Ringwood, 
Victoria, 2001, p. 115.
169 Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , 76.
170 Stannard, p. 218.
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described the native people as ‘lyke bestes without any resonablenes.’171 Indigenous 
Americans in Virginia were described by a settler around the end of the sixteenth century as 
‘cruel beasts’ with ‘a more unnatural brutishness than beasts,’ and as ‘more brutish than the 
beasts they hunt.’172 In the 1700s Hugh Brackenridge, a jurist and novelist, ‘wrote that 
extermination would be most fitting for “ the animals vulgarly called Indians.’” 173 A German 
perpetrator of the genocide of the Herero asked, ‘can one hope that a Negro people 
[Negervo/k] can have developed so far in fifty years that beasts have become civilized 
people?’174 In the context of colonisation (and the now-well-established connections 
between Nazi genocide and colonial discourse), Tony Barta notes the way in which Hitler 
and the Nazis considered the Slavic peoples - who, as colonised subjects, were to be 
subjugated for their labour and destroyed as independent cultures - ‘dirty’ ‘brutes’ and 
(honorary) ‘blacks.’175
The term ‘beasts’ also refers, implicitly or explicitly, to the danger allegedly posed by victim 
groups. Robert Gellately quotes the mayor of a German town who wanted to have a Soviet 
prisoner of war camp opened to the public, so that they could ‘see for themselves “ these 
animals in human form” and imagine what would have happened if “ these beasts” had 
conquered Germany.’176 Cigar cites ‘an academic work published in 1989 on the anniversary 
of the Battle of Kosovo [which] applauded and justified the policy of massacre by which 
Danilo Njegos, the eighteenth century ruler and Orthodox bishop of Montenegro, had 
eliminated the Muslims from Montenegro.’ The book’s author wrote that
171 Stannard, pp. 225-226.
172 In Patterson, p. 33; in Thomas, p. 42.
173 In Patterson, p. 34.
174 D. Stone, ‘White men with low moral standards? German anthropology and the Herero 
Genocide,' Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, no. 2, 2001, p. 35.
175 T. Barta, ‘Discourses of Genocide in Germany and Australia: a linked history’, Aboriginal History, vol. 25, 2001, 
p. 54, 54n41.
176 R. Gellately, The Third Reich, the Holocaust, and Visions of Serial Genocide’, in Gellately & Kiernan, p. 260.
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Turks [local Muslims] had been the very symbol of all that is evil in this world, Satan’s seed 
... one can and one must struggle against evil, and that that is the greatest Christian and 
human duty. To struggle against evil was Njegos’s duty toward God. He sought revenge, 
revenge without mercy ... For Njegos, revenge was a holy, divine, act! Yes, he was in favor 
of peace and love among people, but only among people; that did not apply to beasts with 
human faces.177
Wild Animals: Apes and Monkeys
Dower calls the monkey image ‘perhaps the most basic of all metaphors traditionally 
employed by white supremacists to demean nonwhite peoples.’178 Those ‘nonwhites’ have 
included the Japanese and Jews, as well as African peoples who are the more common 
targets of simian abuse. The ape or monkey may either be perceived as lesser but 
unthreatening, or as a threatening animal, depending upon the context of the purpose of 
action taken toward the collectivity thus characterised.
According to Jon Bridgman and Leslie J. Worley, white settlers in German Africa ‘normally 
referred to black Africans as “baboons” and treated them accordingly.’ One missionary 
reported that ‘the average German looks down upon the natives as being about on the same 
level as the higher primates (‘baboon’ being their favourite term for the natives) and treats 
them like animals. The settler holds that the native has a right to exist only in so far as he is 
useful to the white man.’179 In 1900 a petition of 75 signatures was sent to the German 
Colonial Department from Windhoek, seat of the colonial authority, which stated in part
177 Cigar, pp. 4 1 -42.
178 Dower, p. 86. See Goatly, p. I 50, for a list of English negative metaphorical-linguistic associations with 
monkey terminology.
179 J. Bridgman & L. J. Worley, ‘Genocide of the Hereros’, in S. Totten, W . S. Parsons & I. W . Charny (eds), 
Century of Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Garland, New York/London, 1997, p. 9.
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that ‘[a]ny white man who has lived amongst natives finds it impossible to regard them as 
human beings at all in any European sense.’180 This attitude would be a factor in the 
attempted extermination of the Herero and Nama peoples in 1904-1905 in a response to 
their rebellion against the increasingly oppressive German colonial regime. General Lothar 
von Trotha, commander of the exterminating forces, stated publicly that ‘no war may be 
conducted humanely against nonhumans.’181
In Australia, the majority view in the scientific community held that Aborigines were the 
most debased specimens of humanity, rather than non-humans.182 This was not an opinion 
universally accepted, however. ‘Polygenesist’ thought, proposing the different races as 
several separate creations, provided ‘a rationale for treating some human groups like animals 
of another species.’183 The Aborigine,’ it was suggested, might be ‘the connecting link 
between the human and the brute creation,’ and the link between ‘man and monkey tribe.’184 
In colonial New South Wales, ‘some of the more educated residents referred to the 
Aborigines as ... “ monkies.” ’185 As late as 1896 the Australasian Anthropological Journal 
‘drew a direct relationship between Aborigines, “ the orang-otang and the other apes.’” 186 
The conviction that Aborigines were not fully human resulted in such unedifying episodes as 
the gruesome conflict which took place in 1869 between representatives of London’s Royal 
College of Surgeons and the Royal Society of Tasmania over the remains of William Lanney, 
the ‘last’ ‘pure-bred’ Tasmanian Aboriginal man, partly because of ‘the belief that he 
represented a last living link between man and ape.’187
180 A. Palmer, Colonial Genocide, Crawford House Publishing, Adelaide, 2000, p. 167.
181 Quoted in I. V. Hull, ‘Military Culture and “ Final Solutions’” , in Gellately & Kiernan, p. 154.
182 See Evans, 1975, p. 70.
183 Marvin Harris in Evans, p. 74. See also Mosse, Toward the Final Solution, pp. 32-34.
184 Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 75.
185 M. Sturma, ‘Myall Creek and the Psychology of Mass Murder’, Journal of Australian Studies, no. 16, 1985, p. 67.
186 Sturma, p. 67.
187 Cocker, pp. I 16, 127; L. Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians (2nd edn), Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1996, p. 214.
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The monkey image would also occur in National Socialist imagery. In 1881, Theodor 
Fritsch had claimed (in George Mosse’s words) that ‘God had created the Jew as a buffer 
between man and ape,’ and by 1931 a Nazi speaker could assert that ‘the non-Nordic was 
not a whole man, for he still share traits with the apes.’188 Der Sturmer compared a fisheye 
shot of Jimmy Durante (who was mistakenly thought to be Jewish) with an adjacent picture 
of a long-nosed monkey.189 The Poodlepugdachshundpinscher contained material comparing 
Jews to monkeys: ‘[t]heir sneaky gait and posture suggest the apes. Many Jews have a small, 
receding hairline and a forehead like a gorilla.’190 In Mein Kampf Hitler wrote, ‘To what 
extent the Jew takes over foreign culture, imitating or rather ruining it, can be seen from the 
fact that he is mostly found in the art which seems to require least original invention, the art 
of acting. But even here, in reality, he is only a “ juggler,” or rather an ape ...,|91 In 1942, 
during the period of killing, Gendarmerie chief Fritz Jacob wrote of Polish Jews, These were 
not human beings but ape people.’192
Wild Animals: Wild and Tame
The discursive distinction between ‘wild’ and ‘tame’ characterisations demonstrates the 
purposive and strategic nature of genocidal dehumanisation inasmuch as it can be seen to 
directly relate to the nature of physical practice enacted upon its object. The very positing 
of such a distinction might be a justification in itself: Cigar quotes Vojislav Lubarda, a leading 
Serb literary figure from Montenegro:
188 G. L. Mosse, The Crisis o f German Ideology: Intellectual Origins o f the Third Reich, Howard Fertig, New York, I 981 
(1st edn 1964), p. 143.
189 Bytwerk, p. 105.
190 Bytwerk, p. 106.
191 Hitler, p.303.
192 In Patterson, p. 46.
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[Lubarda] stressed that Muslims allegedly only understood force. In late 1993, he said: ‘Let 
me mention just two personal characteristics that are true of the majority of Muslims: when 
faced by that which is stronger (such as a stronger man or a stronger force), they become as 
docile as lambs and submissive beyond words. However, their nature changes as soon as 
they sense that they are the stronger ones, and that power is in their hands, whereupon they 
become insatiably ruthless.’193
In the former Yugoslavia, the Serbian press called the building of new mosques without a 
permit ‘wild’ (as opposed to ‘illegal’).194
However, this distinction - this type of utterance - has more usually been drawn in 
episodes of colonial genocide, between ‘wild’ and ‘tame’ colonised peoples. Michael Sturma, 
commenting on the 1838 Myall Creek massacre in New South Wales, maintains that ‘[n]o 
doubt [Aborigines] were widely spoken of in animalistic terms as if part of the natural fauna. 
George Anderson for example, an assigned servant at Myall Creek who seems to have been 
sympathetic to the blacks, described one of those spared death as “ completely 
domesticated.’” 195 According to Raymond Evans (as well as Sturma), the distinction drawn 
between ‘tame’ and ‘wild blacks’ was common.196 Responding to the killing of settlers by 
indigenous people, the Gayndah correspondent of the Moreton Boy Courier wrote, ‘when 
such terrible proof is given of the impossibility of peace, treat them as they deserve; [if] it is 
useless trying to tame them, then destroy them, as you would any other savage beast, men 
they do not deserve to be called.’197 According to J. G. Wood, writing in 1870, the severity
193 Cigar, p. 7 1.
194 Cigar, p. 36.
195 Sturma, p. 68.
196 Sturma, p. 68; Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , pp. 88-89.
197 Quoted in Reynolds, p. 122; Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 77.
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of the Native Police was caused by ‘the singular antipathy which invariably exists between 
wild and tamed animals, whether human or otherwise.’198
This classification has generally represented the nature of practice to be enacted upon 
particular (subcategories of) outgroups: the ‘wild’ are to be killed, the ‘tame’ to be exploited 
or ignored. Evans observes that ‘Aborigines who were no longer regarded as a dangerous 
threat were usually spoken of as “ tame blacks” - a further reference to their basic 
“animality.” ’199 In North America, after the massacre at Wounded Knee, L. Frank Baum 
wrote, ‘we had better, in order to protect our civilization, follow it up and wipe these 
untamed and untamable creatures from the face of the earth.’200 Before genocide had been 
committed upon them, the African Herero people were described as ‘wild animals’ in 
successful war; in the official German military history of the genocide, which frankly 
celebrated their ‘end,’ they were described as having an ‘innate wildness’ which, it was 
alleged, along with other putative unpleasant characteristics led to the 1904 revolt which 
triggered the genocidal German response.201 These examples demonstrate the argument 
concerning the dual functionality of animalisation as a discursive strategy: the killing of 
animalised victims is necessary while they are compared to animals which pose a threat. 
Once tamed, killing, while very possibly morally legitimate, is no longer necessary.
198 Quoted in Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 76.
199 Evans, pp. 88-89.
200 Quoted in Stannard, p. I 27.
201 Stone, ‘W h ite  men with low moral standards’, p. 41.
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Wild Animals: Sport and Game
PANCRACE: . . .  But at the end only the strong and sly ones were left, and it got too hard. They 
gathered in little groups, very well hidden. They were picking up all the tricks of the marsh game
ICOcreatures
For present-day Westerners, the hunting of animals for sport has become a minority 
interest. But this does not mean that such rhetoric has not played a role in modern killing, 
as we see in the above example from Rwanda. The view of indigenous people as ‘fair game’ 
is documented well into the 20th century: ‘as late as 1972 in southern Colombia, a party of 
hunters were acquitted of gunning down Amerindians when they pleaded in their defence 
that it was a sport and not a punishable offence.’203
Once again, in this rhetoric we see that a particular set of utterances is directly related to a 
particular type of non-verbal practice toward an outgroup. John P. Synott notes that, in the 
murder of Australian indigenous peoples, there was a ‘“ play” or “ sport” element created as 
an avenue for indulging in mass murder.’204 Metaphors could be necessary, as the killing of 
Aborigines was legally murder, although few prosecutions were brought. Thus talk of killing 
was couched in animalised terms: one common practice was to report ‘the hunting and 
shooting of “ kangaroos” instead of ... the hunting and shooting of Aboriginal men.’205 
Charles Heydon, a witness to killings in the Endeavour River area in Queensland, protested 
in 1874 that ‘[pjrivate persons go out to kill blacks and call it “ snipe-shooting.” ’ The use of 
metaphorical language in murder was not lost on Heydon, who continued,
202 Hatzfeld, p. 61; for other examples o f ‘hunting’ in Rwanda see Hatzfeld, pp. 72, 73, 219.
203 Cocker, p. 149.
204 J. P. Synott, ‘Genocide of Aborigines’, in Charny, p. 112.
205 R. Kimber, ‘Genocide or Not? The situation in Central Australia, 1860-1895’, in C. Tatz (ed.), Genocide 
Perspectives I, Centre for Comparative Genocide Studies, Macquarie University, Sydney, 1997, pp. 43-44; see also, 
for example, J. Critchett, ‘Encounters in the Western District’, in B. Attwood & S. G. Foster (eds), Frontier 
Conflict: The Australian Experience, National Museum of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p. 60.
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[a]wkward words are always avoided you will notice. ‘Shooting a snipe’ sounds better than 
‘murdering a man’. But the blacks are never called men and women and children; ‘myalls’ 
and ‘niggers’ and ‘gins’ and ‘picaninnies’ seem further removed from humanity ... What right 
have ‘myalls’ to exist at all - mischievous vermin with their ignorance, and their barbarism, 
and their degradation and their black skins?206
The commonness of the representation of killing as sport is evidenced by newspaper 
reports such as one quoted by Evans, in the Boomerang in 1891, which ‘greeted the news of 
the shooting of an Aboriginal with mock impatience; “W hy bother us at such critical national 
time with everyday commonplaces like this? Has it come to this in Australia that the taking 
off of a solitary blackfellow is to be wired all over this island-continent? Have coloured 
persons ceased to be a national gamer”207 Evans mentions the case of A. C. Bicknell, who, 
‘stranded overnight in the bush near Herberton, wrote, “ I had with me a five shooter and 
twenty rounds of ammunition ... quite expected to get a brace or two of black game before 
the morning ...” ’208 Victims have also been classified as game in other episodes of colonial 
genocide. One example, cited by Stannard, was a law of the Massachusetts Bay Colony of 
the 1630s which made it illegal to ‘shoot off a gun on any unnecessary occasion, or at any 
game except an Indian or a wolf.’209 This connection would seem to inhere also in non- 
English terms such as the German Wild, which can refer to ‘game’ and also to ‘savages,’ and 
was in public use around the time of the Herero genocide.210 The narrative of ‘sport,’ then, 
in conjunction with a discourse of identity concerning ‘wild’ and ‘tame’ victims, is another
206 In R. Evans, ‘Across the Queensland frontier’, in B. Attwood & S. G. Foster (eds), Frontier Conflict The 
Australian Experience, National Museum of Australia, Canberra, 2003, pp. 64-65.
207 Quoted in Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 50; my italics.
208 Quoted in Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 77.
209 Stannard, p. 241.
210 See Stone, ‘W h ite  men with low moral standards’, p. 37. Stone notes that at least one anthropologist argued 
that there could be no definitive distinction between Kulturvölkern (civilized people) and Wilden (savages), but this 
does not mean that the term and similar ‘non-biological’ characterisations have no role to play in genocide, as 
Stone’s article demonstrates.
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way in which killing may be associated with a morally legitimate activity, and hence both 
normalised and justified.
W ild  Animals: Fauna
In more than one colonial episode indigenous people have been characterised or classified, 
more often implicitly than explicitly, as fauna, a classification which, like ‘beasts’ and 
‘monkeys,’ may either legitimise, or may motivate.
In Australia a clear parallel was drawn on numerous occasions between the disappearance 
of Aborigines and of Australian animals, one which, though not explicitly identifying these 
two groups as identical, placed them by inference in a similar category. In 1876 the 
ethnologist Oscar Peschel wrote, in The struggle for Existence in Australia,’ that ‘[i]t was 
inevitable that the last surviving and superceded forms of past ages should succumb ... and 
the kangaroo hunter disappear with the kangaroo.’211 Herbert Spencer, in his 1850 Social 
Statics, argued that imperialism had served civilization by removing the inferior races from 
the earth: ‘[t]he forces which are working out the great scheme of human happiness, taking 
no account of incidental suffering, exterminate such sections of mankind as stand in their 
way ... Be he human or be he brute - the hindrance must be got rid of.’ Lindqvist, in 
discussing this passage, comments that ‘the human being was expressly placed on equal 
footing with the animal as an object for extermination.’212 In similar fashion, the killing of 
indigenous Australians was sometime framed as ‘put[ting them] out of their misery,’ ‘more 
mercy than a crime.’213 A  similar attitude has appeared in North America, where, for 
example, in 1812 Thomas Jefferson wrote that white Americans were ‘obliged’ to drive the
211 Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , p. 81.
212 Lindqvist, pp. 8-9.
213 Barta, p. 4 1.
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‘backward’ Indians ‘with the beasts of the forests into the Stony Mountains.’214 It has been 
noted both by contemporary observers and by historians that the type of exterminating war 
conducted against indigenous peoples in North America bore a great similarity to that 
conducted against the wolf.215 Meanwhile, official statements made in Australia with regard 
to the ‘breeding out’ of indigenous people referred to the ‘mating’ of Aborigines.216
Discourse which implicitly represented indigenous peoples as fauna explicitly defined them 
out of existence as humans, a process which (like the American example mentioned in the 
previous section on wolves) took place in the field of the enactment of judicial power as well 
as in more general verbal discourse. Alan Atkinson cites speeches made in the Supreme 
Court in Sydney in 1827 in which the barrister William Charles Wentworth and his partner 
Robert Wardell ‘defended the white murderer of a black man named Jackey Jackey by 
arguing that the indigenous people had no existence in law. The colonists must deal with 
them as they found them, they said, within in [sic] a Hobbesian state of nature, and, given 
their evil propensities as a people, “ an exterminating war” against them might be perfectly 
justified.’217
A philosophically-based definition which saw the concept of ‘private property’ as essential 
to humanity was also used to define colonial victims beyond the pale of humanity. Thinkers 
such as Luther, and later John Locke, pointed to the possession of private property as 
characteristic of true humanity.218 For those who followed this convenient logic, not only 
were peoples deemed not to possess their land considered not to be human equals, but they 
could be cleared from the land as any other non-human ‘hindrance’ would be. In 1622 one
214 Stannard, p. 120.
215 See for example Coates, pp. 167-169; Stannard, p. 145.
216 P. Bartrop, The relationship between war and genocide in the twentieth century: a consideration', Journal of 
Genocide Research, voi. 4, no. 4, 2002, pp. 75-76.
217 Quoted in A. Atkinson, ‘Historians and moral disgust’, in Attwood & Foster, p. 117.
218 Stannard, pp. 233-234.
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of the first formal justifications for the expropriation of land in North America was published 
by a British colonist, who wrote, in part, ‘[t]his then is a sufficient reason to prove our going 
thither to live lawful; their land is spacious and void, and they are few and do but run over 
the grass, as do also the foxes and wild beasts.’219 In Australia, the existence of Aborigines 
as people who had rights over the land they lived on was written out, in the first place, by 
declaring the country legally terra nullius, empty land (while in New England the legal principle 
of vacuum domicilium was used to justify the seizure of land 220).
In Australia, the chief contemporary metaphor used to describe the killing of Aborigines, 
employed by both colonial officials and settlers, was ‘dispersal.’221 According to Richard 
Kimber, this word ‘can be viewed universally as a euphemism.’222 ‘Dispersal’ is a term which, 
though not exclusively referring to animals, certainly has overtones of the animal in much 
the same way as ‘extermination.’ Lindqvist observes that
[t]he  Latin exterm ino means ‘drive over the border,’ terminus, ‘exile, banish, exclude.’
Hence the English exterminate, which means, ‘drive over the border to  death, banish from  
life’ ... the object o f the action is seldom a single individual, but usually whole groups, such as 
quitchgrass, rats, o r  people. Brutes, o f course, reduces the object to  its mere animal 
status.223
§
The types outlined above constitute the major forms of animalising identity construction 
which take place in genocide and genocidal killing. Before leaving the topic of examples of
219 Quoted in Stannard, p. 235.
220 Stannard, pp. 234-235.
221 For example, Evans, “The Nigger Shall Disappear” , pp. 60-61.
222 Kimber, p. 43.
223 Lindqvist, p. 8.
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animalising utterance, however, there are three further aspects which should be mentioned: 
positive animal associations; the connection between bestialisation, domestic animals, and 
non-genocidal mistreatment; and the nature of killing methods. The second of these, in 
particular, casts light upon the construction of dehumanisation as a continuum containing 
differentiated functions.
V I. Killers' Self-Identification as Beasts
Victims of genocide and genocidal killing are not the only group ever to have been 
animalised in perpetrator discourse. Killers have also sometimes presented themselves as 
becoming animal-like in their actions. For instance, the notorious Serbian paramilitary leader 
Arkan (Zeljko Raznatovic) called his paramilitary force ‘Arkan’s Tigers.’ There are numerous 
examples from Rwanda:
IG N A C E: Some [perpetrators] hunted like grazing goats, others like wild beasts.224
PIO: W e no longer saw a human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps. I mean a 
person like us, sharing similar thoughts and feelings. The hunt was savage, the hunters were 
savage, the prey was savage -  savagery took over the mind.
Not only had we become criminals, we had become a ferocious species in a barbarous
world.225
ALPHONSE: Man can get used to killing, if he kills on and on. He can even become a beast 
without noticing it.226
224 Hatzfeld, p. 39.
225 Hatzfeld, pp. 47-48.
226 Hatzfeld, p. 49.
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P A N C R A C E : Killings of that kind are hungry for death, not for life, as with wild animals.227
Similar utterances can also be found in other episodes. As these examples show, such 
discourse may be related to positive values associated with certain types of animal, or they 
may relate in less positive, though often exculpatory, ways to killers’ understanding of their 
own participation.
In regard to this phenomenon, a number of hypotheses may be mentioned. Firstly, there is 
often a relationship between dehumanisation undergone by perpetrators (in such contexts 
as the dehumanisation of military training and systems of command; or of initial forced 
participation in perpetration, as in Rwanda and elsewhere), and the dehumanisation which 
the same perpetrators direct toward their victims.
Furthermore, in the genocidal circumstance of the changed nature of legitimate violence, 
and particularly in genocidal situations (such as Rwanda) where perpetrators may have a 
certain degree of freedom of implementation rather than being ‘micromanaged’ by central 
authorities, there may be a perception that the entire situation has returned to a (supposed) 
uncivilised ‘state of nature’ where the killing of the weak by the strong is the norm. This 
construction may, in post-hoc explanations of events, then be used as a justification both 
internally, in terms of perpetrators’ self-understanding, and externally, in recounting 
perpetrators’ participation in events and explaining, not only why they behaved in the way 
they did, but why those who were not present cannot understand this or would be likely to 
behave in a similar fashion under the same circumstances - and therefore cannot pass 
judgement.
227 Hatzfeld, p. 227.
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Finally, this perception may also symbolise the cultural ambivalence around animality in 
representations of powerful predators (and perhaps other prestigious animals) as admirable 
symbols of strength and dominance. This demonstrates the difference in meaning that 
specific animal names (as opposed to the general category of ‘animal,’ ‘brute’ or ‘beast’ 
conceived in opposition to the ‘human’) used in particular human narratives about animals 
construct; while such positive associations are beyond our purview, their existence as 
differentiated forms of animalisation points to the functional nature of the specific discourse 
employed by perpetrators about their victims.
V II. D o m estic A n im al N am es in Slavery and A p arth eid
It is apposite now to turn briefly to the subject of certain non-genocidal episodes, in a 
discussion of tropes around domestic animals. In the course of my research into episodes of 
genocide and genocidal killing, a few references to victims as domestic animals - specifically 
labouring animals rather than ‘pets’ - occur. For example:
In Rogatica during the Second W o r ld  W a r ,  the ‘Ustasa shoed an O rthodox  priest; they 
nailed horseshoes to his palms and knees and then climbed on his back and rode him into 
tow n ’ in a grotesque attem pt to dehumanize their victim and to turn him into a beast of 
burden.228
A L P H O N S E : In the evenings old folks would ask quietly, ‘W h y  don’t w e  simply kill the 
trampling cows, take some prime fields, and still leave plenty of Tutsis alive?’ T he leader 
would reply, ‘No. The ir tradition is too  ancient. Tutsis have been trailing after their cattle
228 Carmichael, p. 87.
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for too long, they will start over again with new cows. Slaughtering cows and Tutsis, it’s the 
same task.’229
PIO: ...And then we must remember a remarkable thing that encouraged us. Many Tutsis 
showed a dreadful fear of being killed, even before we started to hit them. They would stop 
their disturbing agitation. They would cower or stand stock still. So this terror helped us to 
strike them. It is more tempting to kill a trembling and bleating goat than a spirited and 
frisky one, put it that way.230
These examples, however, are not hugely numerous, and they seem to exist in episodes in 
which there is in the society or community in question widespread experience of the 
treatment of domestic animals in such a way (whether, as in the first example, in terms of 
shoeing and riding a horse, or, as in the second, in terms of individual slaughter). In a general 
sense, however, such naming is not common in genocide and genocidal killing, particularly in 
relation to the prevalence of the forms of animal naming outlined above.
Employing the model I present here, I would predict that, given the relationship of the 
construction of collectivities to the purposiveness directed toward them, investigation would 
be likely to find that, in cases of organised subjugation and exploitation, outgroups would be 
named as domestic animals, that is, animals whose chief purpose was to be enslaved and 
managed for productivity, rather than killed outright. Marjorie Spiegel has devoted an entire 
book to demonstrating this connection (The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal 
Slavery).231 It should also be noted that there may be historical overlap between situations of
229 Hatzfeld, p. I 90.
230 Hatzfeld, pp. 37-38. This quote gives an example of the way dehumanisation is a self-perpetuating cycle 
wherein victims are forced to live under conditions which reinforce their dehumanisation in the eyes of the 
killers, and thus the killers’ feeling that they deserve to die - compare also Hatzfeld, pp. 61, 144.
231 M. Spiegel, The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery (revised and expanded edn), New York, Mirror 
Books, 1996. See also S. Pious, ‘Psychological Mechanisms in the Human Use of Animals’, Journal of Social Issues, 
vol. 49, 1993, pp. 30-31.
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genocide and of mass subjugation, particularly in the pre-modern period where groups such 
as Armenians (who were sometimes termed raja, sheep to be fleeced) or Jews were 
tolerated as a presence within a hierarchical social framework, but could also be subject to 
periodic massacre.
My preliminary research into this area indicates that this pattern of naming is, in fact, the 
case, as for example in South Africa, where Afrikaners have historically described educated 
black people as nageaapte Blankes, apes who ape white men.’ Another example of 
animalising language in South Africa is found in the rationale for the Afrikaners’ Great Trek 
north, which was begun after the British abolished slavery in 1833. Anna Steenkamp, the 
daughter of the Boer leader Piet Retief, explained that ‘[¡]t is not so much their [Africans’] 
freedom that drove us to such lengths as their being placed on equal footing with Christians.’ 
According to Steenkamp, Africans were schepsels, creatures, other than human, and 
therefore incapable of being placed on the same footing as humans.232
In other words, while animal naming certainly plays a role in non-genocidal forms of mass 
violence and organised subjugation, the forms it takes are by no means identical to those in 
genocide and genocidal killing; rather, they are discursively appropriate to the function that 
they perform. These examples thus provide further evidence for the argument that the 
form in which dehumanisation manifests has a predictable functional relationship to the type 
of action which is taken toward the group whom it is used to characterise.
232 Tatz, With Intent To Destroy, p. 108.
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V III. Methods of Killing
EUE: The club is more crushing, but the machete is more natural. The Rwandan is accustomed to 
the machete from childhood. Grab a machete -  that is what we do every morning. We cut 
sorghum, we prune banana trees, we hack out vines, we kill chickens... The blade, when you use it 
to cut branch, animal or man, it has nothing to say.
In the end, a man is like an animal: you give him a whack on the head or the neck, and down he 
goes. In the first days someone who had already slaughtered chickens -  and especially goats -  had 
an advantage, understandably. Later, everybody grew accustomed to the new activity, and the 
laggards caught up.233
The issue mentioned in the previous section, concerning the familiarity of perpetrators with 
violence against particular non-human animals, may also relate to a possible connection 
between the name of the animal used, and the method by which the victim is killed. As we 
have seen, one functional aspect of legitimisation is to discursively shift a collectivity into a 
category (such as animals) toward which there is already in existence both an ideology of 
killing and harmful treatment as legitimate, and the physical practice of such killing and 
harmful treatment.
In the first place, we might bear in mind that the entire ‘science’ of eugenics, motivating and 
justifying killing and violence in many different socio-geographical contexts, emerged from 
the practices of animal husbandry and pedigree animal breeding.234 In Australia, the 
genocidal removal of ‘mixed blood’ children was done explicitly in order to ‘breed out the
233 Hatzfeld, p. 37.
234 C. Tatz, The “ Doctorhood” of Genocide’, in C. Tatz, P. Arnold & S. Tatz (eds), Genocide Perspectives III: Essays 
on the Holocaust and Other Genocides, Brandi & Schlesinger, Blackheath, 2006, p. 85. See also D. Sztybel, ‘Can the 
treatment of animals be compared to the Holocaust?’, Ethics & The Environment, vol. I I, no. I, 2006, pp. 106-107; 
for specific examples, see P. Weindling, Health, race and German politics between national unification and Nazism, 
1870-1945, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. 474-476, 554-563.
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color.’235 In some episodes, however, there seems to be an even more direct connection; 
for example, in the gassing of ‘verminous’ Jews, the ‘crushing’ of Tutsi with clubs or the 
‘cutting down’ of Tutsi ‘tall trees’ with machetes, the ‘dispersal’ of indigenous Australians 
along with the distribution of poisoned food, or (as we have seen) the hunting of ‘wild’ 
indigenous peoples. 236 Numerous scholars, including Charles Patterson and David Sztybel, 
also draw a connection of similarity between, firstly, the practices of modern ‘rational’ 
science (in particular, I would add, experimentation on living subjects whose wellbeing is 
considered worthless) ; 237 secondly, the Nazi use of Zyklon B as an insecticide (under which 
auspices it was sent to the death camps) as well as the substance used for the mass killing of 
humans;238 and thirdly, the assembly-line (or rather, disassembly-line) industrialisation of 
death in modern slaughterhouses and the industrialisation of death in Nazi death camps - 
another link both to the practices of modernity and to the killing of domestic animals.239 
Indeed, Sztybel lays out a detailed, thirty-nine point comparison of ways in which the 
treatment of animals and of Nazi victims may be compared, many of which (such as ‘vermin,’ 
‘hunting,’ ‘namelessness’ and ‘bureaucratization,’ as well as the ways in which moral 
responsibility is disowned or rejected by perpetrators) are relevant to the discursive 
concerns of this and the following typological chapters.
235 Bartrop, p. 75. As regards justificatory dehumanisation, the evidence would suggest that many involved in this 
program believed that, since indigenous Australians were not at the level of ‘true [that is, white] humans,’ they 
did not grieve for their children in the same way that white people would; as C. F. Gale, the Chief Protector of 
Aborigines in W estern Australia, said in 1909, while the ‘momentary grief of a mother might be ‘frantic,’ ‘they 
soon forget their offspring’ (in Bartrop, p. 79).
236 For Australia, see Barta, p.41 n 12.
237 Michael Mann notes a telling comment by a Nazi physician that there is no difference ‘between Jews and 
guinea pigs’ (M. Mann, ‘W e re  the Perpetrators of Genocide “ Ordinary Men” or “ Real Nazis” ? Results from 
Fifteen Hundred Biographies’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, vol. 14, no. 3, 2000, p. 352).
238 Musolff, p. 24. For the history of Zyklon and the use of poison gas for ‘disinfestation,’ see Weindling, 
Epidemics and Genocide, pp. I 18-1 36.
239 Patterson, p. 109-122; Sztybel. In his article, Sztybel also demonstrates with some thoroughness why it is not 
unethical to draw comparisons between the treatment of animals and the treatment of Jews in the Holocaust.
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This question, however, is relevant to the present work only inasmuch as it strengthens the 
argument that discursive changes in identity construction are directly related to particular 
practices to be enacted upon certain objects. Discourse may refer not only to the nature of 
the object and the treatment which must be, or which may be, enacted upon that object, but 
also to the specific method which is used to carry out that practice. Names tell 
perpetrators not only why they may kill and why they should kill, but even how they should 
kill.
IX . Co nclusion
In this chapter, we have seen the way in which the discursive construction, either 
metaphorical or literal, of collectivities as subhumans or as animals may reshape the moral 
order in such a way as to either motivate or legitimate the destruction of that collectivity. 
The question as to which of these functions is being performed is, as I have outlined in 
Chapter Four, related to the concept of threat; in animalisation, the presence or absence of 
threat is related to the specific animal name which is used to characterise the collectivity. 
This type of terminology is found in the context of multifarious motivations for genocide; the 
threat thus implied may be a metaphorical representation, or it may be inherent in the 
characterisation itself. As documentary examples demonstrate, specific names will vary both 
geo-culturally, and temporally; however, there is a common pattern regarding the use and 
functions of this discursive strategy, and the forms in which it manifests.
W e have considered here the ideological construction of ‘the animal’ in human society, 
animal naming in episodes of genocide and genocidal killing, and some examples of the way in 
which this kind of naming is used outside of genocidal situations. This has provided, firstly, a 
demonstration of commonalities of presence and function of animalisation in genocide and
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genocidal killing; and secondly, some idea as to how the functional use of animal names fits 
into what can be considered a continuum of dehumanisation. W ith regard to our primary 
subject -  the range of that continuum which relates to genocide and genocidal killing -  
animal naming may perform either the less extreme function of legitimisation, or the more 
extreme function of motivation (which is inherently inclusive of legitimisation). However, an 
acknowledgment of the different kinds of animal naming which take place in episodes of 
subjugation, exploitation and oppression -  and also of the use of animal naming in ‘everyday’ 
discourse -  is an indication of the existence of dehumanisation as a differentiated continuum. 
W ithin this continuum, a thematic of content (in this case, animal naming) exists across a 
range of different functionalities or purposivenesses, where this range can be understood in 
terms of the extremity of the negative attitude toward the object. While animalising 
language is thus not specific to genocide and genocidal killing, in such episodes it may play a 
very specific role (one which is different from that which it plays in other types of event) -  
and it is the nature of that role which has been demonstrated in this chapter.
Thus far in a three-part typology of genocidal dehumanisation, I have examined two types 
of discursive formation which name victim groups as living organisms, and I have exposed the 
ways in which these types have emerged in the historical-discursive context of the modern 
era. In the final typological chapter I consider the discourse of bureaucracy -  a type that is 
also closely associated with the discourses and conditions of modernity -  and in doing so I 
explore the ways in which bureaucratic systems impose reified instrumental, mechanistic and 
euphemistic characterisations upon their objects.
C h a p te r 7.
‘W ith  scorn and bias': G enocidal D ehum anisation in B u re a u cra tic  and
Eu p h e m istic  D iscourse
The quantification o f nature, which led to its explication in terms o f mathematical structures, 
separated reality from all inherent ends and, consequently, separated the true from the good, 
science from ethics.
-  Herbert Marcuse1
[T]o use bureaucratic planning and procedures and regulation for a massive operation o f systematic 
murder throughout a whole continent speaks o f almost inconceivably profound dehumanisation.
-  Leo Kuper2
... political language has to consist largely o f euphemism, question-begging and sheer cloudy 
vagueness. Defenseless villages are bombarded from the air, the inhabitants driven out into the 
countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire with incendiary bullets: this is called 
pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent trudging along the roads with 
no more than they can carry: this is called transfer of population or rectification of frontiers. 
People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back o f the neck or sent to die o f scurvy 
in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable elements. Such phraseology is 
needed if  one wants to name things without calling up mental pictures o f them.
-  George O rw ell3
1 H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, Abacus, London, 1972, p. 121.
2 Quoted in D. Sztybel, ‘Can the treatment of animals be compared to the Holocaust?’, Ethics & The Environment, 
vol. I I, no. I, 2006, p. 113.
3 G. Orwell, ‘Politics and the English Language’, in G. Orwell, Collected Essays, Mercury, London, 1961, p. 347.
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Orwell is, of course, the dean of investigations into the political (in the broadest sense) use 
of bureaucratic and euphemistic language to conceal the reality to which it refers, and which 
it constructs. This chapter investigates this set of utterances in episodes of genocide and 
mass killing: it is an analysis of the ‘regimes of practices’ (to use Michel Foucault’s term) 
contingent upon the emergence of modernity, of the rise of what Philip Zimbardo terms 
‘administrative evil.’4 These regimes spawned a discursive strategy of bureaucratic 
dehumanisation that legitimised the mass killing of collectivities categorised according to 
demography, and dealt with these collectivities (that is, oppressed and killed them) in 
rational-instrumental fashion.
My intent in this chapter is both simple, and specific: to examine the role of bureaucracy as 
a form of dehumanisation in genocide and genocidal killing. I do not intend to mount a 
general critique of bureaucratic centralisation as a system of power, though I will draw upon 
such critiques to inform my argument. Nor will I present a more general case concerning 
bureaucracy as a functional aspect of national governance which makes genocide possible, 
though many aspects of such an argument have points of relevance for the subject matter at 
hand. Both of these arguments -  that is, general critiques of bureaucracy as a system of 
domination, and a claim concerning the centrality of bureaucracy in toto as an aspect of 
modernity which is deeply implicated in the practice of genocide -  have been well outlined in 
the apposite literature. My purpose in this chapter is not to re-cover this ground, but rather 
to use it as a point of departure to examine bureaucratic dehumanisation as a discursive 
strategy within the framework of genocidal dehumanisation laid out in Chapter Four. I do so 
by looking at the way in which this strategy came to be constituted, how it is internalised 
and enacted by perpetrators within bureaucratic systems, and how it may discursively 
construct its objects in ways which legitimise genocidal action toward them.
4 P. Zimbardo, The Lucifer Effect: Understanding how good people turn evil, Random House, New York, 2007, p. 381; 
as I have mentioned elsewhere, Zimbardo’s analysis is useful despite my major misgivings about the use of the 
term and concept ‘evil.’
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How are we to define ‘bureaucracy’? While both bureaucratic practice and modern 
society has changed a great deal since the time of his writing, Max W eber’s definition of 
bureaucracy is still a good ‘shorthand’ to identify what is meant when referring to this 
system (it should be emphasised, however, that W eber’s bureaucracy is an ‘ideal type,’ one 
which is not fully manifest in any given situation). That is, bureaucracy is understood in 
principle as a system of domination which is centralised, hierarchical, governed by a set of 
general, rational(ised) rules and based upon written documents, in which authority is graded 
in levels, particular bodies have fixed jurisdiction, and the (appointed) office of the individual 
is separate from her or his person (in terms of private life and domicile).5 In analysing 
bureaucracy, it is important to distinguish between its aspect as a delegated structure of 
responsibility, and as a record-keeping exercise. Both of these aspects, however, have roles 
to play in dehumanisation, roles which will become clear over the course of this chapter.
The critiques of bureaucracy which we will encounter here will show, firstly, how, contra 
Weber, the necessity, neutrality, and rationality of modern bureaucracy as a system have 
been challenged; and secondly, the way in which this system, as a system, is deeply implicated 
in the enactment of death and destruction.
Bureaucratic management can be considered both a technique, and a technology. Kathy E. 
Ferguson writes that ‘[t]he term “ bureaucratization” refers to the invasion of disciplinary 
technique into both the discursive and the institutional practices of a particular realm of 
human relations ... reshaping both the roles and the events available to people, and the 
language commonly used to describe those events, along bureaucratic lines.’6 W ith regard 
to the human, it has been argued -  most notably by Weber -  that bureaucracy’s ‘specific 
nature ... develops the more perfectly the more [it] is “ dehumanized,” ’ that is (according to 
this logic) the more it operates under the principle of sine ira ac studio, ‘w ithout scorn or
5 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays In Sociology (ed. & trans. H. H. Gerth & C. W right Mills), Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London, 1948, pp. 196-200.
6 K. E. Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1984, p. 37.
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bias.’7 The material presented in this chapter will not analyse this claim as regards the 
function of bureaucracies in completing tasks, but it will be shown to be utterly false in the 
relationship it posits between dehumanisation and equal or respectful treatment.
In the following discussion, then, I deal with the ‘realm of human relations’ which pertains 
to bureaucratic mass killing. I examine, firstly, the inherently dehumanising tendencies of 
bureaucracy as a system, and their specific implication in mass killing; and secondly, 
bureaucratic and euphemistic language which names victims as non-sentient objects. This 
most often occurs in bureaucratic utterances in which individuals are referred to as ‘pieces,’ 
‘units’ and so forth, but it may also occur in more direct metaphors in which victims are 
thought of or referred to as, for example, ‘logs.’ The salient feature of this type of utterance 
is that victims are ‘de-biologised’; they are entirely denied agency and individuality; they are 
removed from the question of the moral order in regard to their status as objects of action; 
and they are turned into units of production (though ‘destruction’ might be the more 
appropriate term). In the course of this investigation it will become apparent that even non- 
bureaucratic de-biologising utterances tends to follow and emerge from the patterns created 
by modern bureaucratic discourse, and that such utterances are intimately connected with 
overtly bureaucratic dehumanisation.
I begin by outlining the historical developments which created the system and the discourse 
of bureaucratic management, and the inherent ideological tendencies which were ‘built in’ to 
this system from its inception. I trace the ways in which the dehumanisation with which this 
chapter is concerned emerges, firstly, from the centralising project of modernity and the 
nation-state; secondly, from the mass scale on which ideology became able to be realistically 
conceived and action logistically executed; and thirdly, from the tendency, not to ignore the 
existence of the individual as such, but to perceive, categorise and act upon the individual as
7 Weber, From Max Weber, pp. 2 15-216.
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an idealised type, and only as a representative of that idealised type. I go on to demonstrate 
the way in which bureaucratic and euphemistic construction creates social, moral, physical 
and psychological distance, which ‘invisible-ises’ victims’ humanity and the meaning or reality 
of involvement in action taken against them. I then examine the way in which the logic of 
bureaucratic discourse and practice is weighted against the humanisation of victims, before 
turning to the differences between the nature and use of bureaucratic and euphemistic 
discourse on the part of bureaucratic ‘middlemen’ in the killing process, and on the part of 
direct killers.
I. B u reau cratic D iscourse, B u reau cratic Eu phem ism , 
N o n -b u re au cratic  Eu phem ism
The purported nature of the ideal bureaucratic-rational system is that it is free from affect, 
and that its very purpose is to deal with and to make comprehensible processes concerning 
concrete physical reality. However, in contrast to this aspect of its own ideological self­
representation, the bureaucratic style tends to be heavily euphemistic in its reduction of 
every item to a unit of production which is interchangeable with other units in the same 
category, the specific nature of which is not important to the process. Bureaucratic 
discourse therefore produces euphemistic language such as (as we will see) the classification 
of humans as ‘units.’ Bureaucratic management also produces non-verbal dehumanisation -  
for instance, the tattooing of numbers onto Nazi camp prisoners. As well as these forms of 
strictly bureaucratic dehumanisation, in this chapter (as I have mentioned) I also deal with 
non-bureaucratic euphemistic language (which may nonetheless relate to production, the 
better to associate killing with activities which do not produce equal psychic or cognitive 
dissonance), which names victims as inanimate objects. As noted above, the connections
between these forms, which at times seem unrelated, should become clear over the course
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of the chapter. A t this point, it will suffice to say that bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic 
euphemism often work hand-in-hand, as in the Nazi case, where euphemisms which were 
not strictly bureaucratic, such as Endlosung (final solution) were used within official circles 
(indeed, euphemistic language, or lying, was itself specifically known as the ‘language rule’) 
along with strictly bureaucratic euphemisms relating to units, numbers, and so forth. As we 
will see, these two related types of utterance, while not always present in the same situation, 
are mutually reinforcing.
II. Modernity, Bureaucracy and the Nation-State: The Creation of Distance
‘I am not a number, I am a free man!’ ran the memorable catchphrase from the 1960s 
television series The Prisoner. While most people accept, grudgingly or otherwise, that 
modern mass society must be run on centralised bureaucratic principles in which statistics 
are the method by which policy decisions affecting individuals are made, this does not mean 
that being treated as a statistic does not cause fear and resentment, as in the case of 
‘Number Six’; and rightly so, given that this discursive strategy objectifies the individual and 
denies her/him agency in the construction of the nature of his/her own identity. As well as 
this, the conceptualisation of the individual as one ‘unit’ among other identical units of the 
same kind (whatever the category chosen) allows the making of decisions which impact on 
individuals, without reference to their humanity -  as Weber puts it, ‘[t]he “ objective” 
discharge of business primarily means a discharge of business ... “ w ithout regard for 
persons’”8 -  and therefore without reference to the human impact of such decisions. In 
modern bureaucratic society, emotional distance is created between the decision-maker or 
facilitator in a centralised position of power, and the object of her or his decision. In the
8 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 2 15.
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words of James Waller, ‘[rjeduced to data, dehumanised victims lose their moral standing 
and become objects requiring disposal.’9
The most famous example of the murderous bureaucrat who manages to disavow 
connection with the consequence of his or her actions is, of course, Adolf Eichmann; but 
Schreibtischtäter (‘desk murderers’) are not confined to Nazi genocide. According to 
Zygmunt Bauman, ‘the essence of bureaucratic structure and process’ is the sole focus on 
instrumental-rational criteria for means, and the consequent dissociation of ends from moral 
evaluation.10 This occurs through ‘the meticulous functional division of labour,’ and ‘the 
substitution of technical for a moral responsibility.’* 11
How has this discursive formation emerged? W e can begin to answer the question 
through the examination of a number of characteristics of the modern bureaucratic society -  
namely, the physical size and internal distances of units of governance, along with new 
technologies of communication; the psychological distance which accompanied its physical 
counterpart; the assumption of ethical authority by the state; and discourse emerging from 
Enlightenment ideology valorising ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’ as ends and as moral good in 
themselves.
In the modern era the nation-state model, along with the rise of mass society, involved the 
centralisation of power and the implementation of demographic techniques of population
9 J. Waller, Becoming Evil: How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Moss Killing (2nd revised edn), Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2007, p. 208. On bureaucratic distance and psychological impact, see also D. Bloxham, 
‘Organized Mass Murder: Structure, Participation, and Motivation in Comparative Perspective’, Holocaust and 
Genocide Studies, vol. 22, no. 2, 2008, p. 218.
10 Z. Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (New York), 1989, p. 98. See also S. 
Opotow, ‘Deterring Moral Exclusion,’ Journal of Social Issues, vol. 40, no. I, 1990, p. 175.
11 As well as Bauman, see J. Betton & T. J. Hench ‘“Any color as long as it’s black”: Henry Ford and the ethics of 
business’ Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 4, no. 4, 2000, p. 539, on technical responsibility. See also M. K. 
Huggins, M. Haritos-Fatouros & P. G. Zimbardo, Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct 
Brazilian Atrocities, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 2002, pp. 170-172.
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conceived and enacted from the centre (and made possible by modern technologies of 
speedy communication over long distances, technologies Weber calls ‘the pacemakers of 
bureaucratization’12), as the standard method of governance. 13 The physically-distanced 
nature of modern society in itself has repercussions; as Bauman observes, ‘responsibility is 
silenced once proximity is eroded; it may eventually be replaced with resentment once the 
fellow human subject is transformed into an Other,’ a process which may be all the easier 
considering the lack of intimate knowledge of the other occasioned by physical distance. 14 In 
this society, ‘the distance at which human action may be effective and consequential ... 
grow[s] rapidly’; but the capacity of the moral drive remains limited to the proximity of the 
individual. 15
The distance created by modern bureaucratic systems, however, is not only physical, but 
also psychological. Bureaucratic organisation creates a class of ‘middlemen’ (bureaucrats) 
who are vital to the enacting of power, but who do not feel a connection with these actions 
inasmuch as they neither order action (in the sense of deciding what action will be taken), 
nor physically carry it out. 16 Bauman writes that, as opposed to the conditions inhering in 
the pre-modern order, in the bureaucratic division of labour ‘most functionaries of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy may give commands without full knowledge of their effects.’ 17 It thus 
becomes possible for action to be disavowed by every party involved: ‘[f]o r the person on 
whose behalf they are done, they exist verbally or in the imagination ... The man who has 
actually done them, on the other hand, will always view them as someone else’s and himself
12 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 2 1 3.
13 On the techniques of population in the context of mass killing, see Semelin, Purify and Destroy, pp. 338-339.
14 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 193. This is not to  say that familiar proxim ity always inhibits violence, 
as we see in episodes such as the Rwandan genocide.
15 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 193.
16 A. Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
vol. 3, no. 3, 1999, p. 199.
17 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 99; Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 249.
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as but the blameless instrument of an alien w ill. . . ’ 18 The division of any action into minute, 
functional, separate tasks spreads responsibility so thinly that no individual need feel it in 
regard to the final action: 19 ‘the organization as a whole is an instrument to obliterate 
responsibility.’20 As W aller notes, the larger the group is, the less responsibility is felt by any 
individual.21 The acceptance of personal responsibility is also inhibited by the fact that ‘[t]he 
bureaucratic division of labor ... creates an ethos in which refusing to kill would only 
alienate -  in a condemnatory fashion -  one’s friends and colleagues and, in the end, not 
deter in the least bit the killing operations’ (a subject to which we will return ) .22 Ultimately, 
responsibility is both displaced onto the agency of others, and diffused to the point of non­
existence.23
Furthermore, bureaucratic language (similar to that often used by perpetrators reporting 
their own participation in brutality) can be characterised as an ‘agentless, passive style’ which 
serves as a linguistic tool to create the appearance that action (in this case, action which 
might on other interpretations appear immoral) is ‘the work of nameless forces rather than 
people’:24 Stanley Milgram calls this ‘counteranthropomorphism,’ the attribution of an 
impersonal quality to forces which are human in origin and maintenance.25 Bureaucratic
18 In Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 25; see also S. Milgram, Obedience To Authority: An Experimental View, 
Pinter & Martin, London, 2005 (1st edn 1974), pp. 9-10; A. Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement in the 
Exercise of Moral Agency’, Journal of Moral Education, vol. 3 I, no. 2, 2002, pp. 106-108.
19 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 100; see also Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 247-250; Milgram pp. 12-13; A. 
Bandura, C. Barbaranelli, G. V. Caprara, & C. Pastorelli, ‘Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of 
Moral Agency 'Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 71, no. 2, 1996, p. 365.
20 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 163.
21 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 248.
22 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 250.
23 Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, p. 365; Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities’, pp. 196-198; A. Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement of Moral Control’, Journal of 
Social Issues, vol. 40, no.I, 1990, pp. 34-37.
24 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 12; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 105; Bandura, ‘Moral 
Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 195; Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement’, p. 
32.
25 Milgram, p. 10.
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processes thereby not only allow the evasion of responsibility, but create their own 
momentum, both actual and psychological, and, as we will see, ultimately become their own 
end.
Another aspect of the rational, centralised and bureaucratic nation-state (and nationalist) 
model of governance is the usurpation of supreme ethical authority by state powers on 
behalf of the societies which they rule.26 T h e  good of the nation-state’ (or, as W eber put it, 
‘reasons of state’) become the ultimate ethical authority, and technical experts are in turn 
employed to advise on action which in itself becomes a foregone, unquestionable conclusion. 
Following from this, Milgram notes that a specific characteristic of modern society is the way 
in which it teaches individuals to respond to impersonal authorities.27 In Rwanda, according 
to Alison Des Forges, the claim by perpetrators that they killed because authorities told 
them to kill reflects not a predisposition to obey orders, but a recognition that the moral 
authority of ‘the state’ made the unthinkable both thinkable and do-able.28
The rise of the distance society, operating in the framework of the model of the nation­
state, was necessarily accompanied by a massive expansion both of the techniques and 
discourse of bureaucracy, and of the bureaucratic classes. Bureaucratic demography was 
intimately informed by Enlightenment ideals which made ‘rationality,’ placed in opposition to 
a devalued ‘emotionality,’ a guiding principle and ideology of management and governance -  
the ideal, as Weber puts it, is ‘[t]he “objective” discharge of business ... according to 
calculable rules and “without regard for persons.’” 29 Ideology that depicts bureaucracy as a 
rational and pragmatic system dealing with concrete reality also conceals the value-laden 
metaphorical nature of the language which it employs. Herbert Marcuse calls this ideology
26 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 199.
27 Milgram, p. I 39.
28 A. Des Forges, "Leave None To Tell The Story’’: Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch, New  York, 1999, p. 
12.
29 W eber, From M ax Weber, p. 215; original italics.
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‘technical rationality,’ and views it (at least in the Nazi case) as the ‘legalized terror of 
bureaucratisation,’ an all-embracing instrument and apparatus of mass domination.30 Logic, 
in Marcuse’s view, emerges from and must pay tribute to systems of domination; rationality, 
expressed as an hypothetical system of forms and functions, is dependent on a pre- 
established universe of ends (ends which, as part of this process, conceal their pre- 
established nature); and rationality develops not only in, but for this system of ends.31 
Within this discursive-ideational system, the individual is literally reified: turned into a res, a 
thing, whose only pertinent qualities are those which are quantifiable.32 Ultimately, then, in 
modern society the ‘rational’ is inherently political, and (rather than the irrational, as in some 
commonly held theories about oppressive social domination) it becomes the most effective 
vehicle of mystification.33 In this process, ‘the object world (including the subjects) is 
experienced as a world of instrumentalities’ in which ‘[t]he technological context predefines 
the form in which objects appear’34 (incidentally, we might also be reminded here of the way 
in which ‘rationality’ or ‘reason’ has been used as a justification for the oppression and 
destruction of humans who were claimed not to possess these qualities, and therefore to be 
in a ‘lower,’ ‘subhuman,’ or ‘animal’ condition35). Ultimately, ‘rationality’ (a means) comes to 
be seen as an end in itself, and as such conceals the actual purpose, or end, for which action 
is taken (as, for example, genocidal killing).
W e have examined, then, the characteristics of modern bureaucracy and their relationship 
to dehumanisation; what, we must now ask, is the relationship between the system itself, and 
the individual within this system?
30 H. Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism: Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, (Vol. I, ed. Douglas Kellner), 
Routledge, London and New York, 1998, pp. 77-78.
31 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 137.
32 See Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. I 38.
33 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. I 53.
34 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. I 73; original italics.
35 See Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 186.
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III. T h e  Individual within the B u reau cratic System
How are individuals subsumed into a bureaucratic system? The characteristics of 
bureaucracy outlined in the introduction to this chapter tell us something about the way in 
which this process occurs. As Marcuse puts it,
bureaucracy ... emerges on an apparently objective and impersonal ground, provided by the 
rational specialization of functions, and this rationality in turn serves to increase the 
rationality of submission. For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated and 
synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable it is for the 
individual to withdraw or withstand ... The rationality embodied in the giant enterprises 
makes it appear as if men, in obeying them, obey the dictum of an objective rationality ...
Private power relationships appear not only as relationships between objective things but 
also as the rule of rationality itself.36
This ideological representation of harmony between the special and the common interest is, 
however, delusive.37 Marcuse also suggests that the creation or expansion of an ideologised 
bureaucracy (as in Nazi Germany) offers numerous novel opportunities and creates a new 
elite, factors which in themselves bind individuals to bureaucracies and to the organisations 
which created them.38 As we have seen, the end to which the apparatus of bureaucracy 
works is its own maintenance on an increasingly efficient scale;39 therefore, every individual 
within the apparatus has an incentive to work toward this end. In Marcuse’s words, ‘morale 
has become a part of technology.’40
36 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, pp. 57-58. Marcuse draws a value-distinction between private 
bureaucracy, and effectively democratic public bureaucracy which the argument of this chapter would challenge; 
however, his insights into the functions of private bureaucracy may be generalised.
37 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, p. 57.
38 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, pp. 75-76.
39 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, p. 78.
40 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, p. 161.
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As well as this, in the mass group which is a bureaucracy (a group which is large enough 
that the individual is not personalised or known to all other members, but is small enough to 
maintain the characteristic of being a group), the moral obligation of individuals comes to be 
owed to the organisation to which they belong, and to individuals within that organisation, 
not to the objects on which they act.41 That is, moral concerns do not relate to the action 
one performs, but rather to how well one lives up to the expectations of authority, and/or 
to those of one’s (organisational) peers.42 This, furthermore, is a self-reinforcing process: 
individual bureaucrats, observes Weber, have ‘a common interest in seeing that the 
mechanism continues its functions and that the societally exercised authority carries on. ’43 
In the bureaucratic situation, that is, a group identification occurs on the part of the 
individual which ‘carries with it a repression of conscience where “ outside values” are excluded 
and locally generated values dominate.’44
IV . B u reau cracy and Individual M orality
What are these ‘locally generated values,’ exactly? Bureaucratic language charts the 
progress of work, best expressed in statistics, which ‘say nothing about the nature of the 
operation or its objects. ’45 In other words, bureaucratic discourse diverts any question of 
morality from the object, while concealing its human nature. What occurs as a result of 
these processes is, in Bauman’s words, a state in which every action is multifinal: it ‘can be
41 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 99, 195; Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of 
Inhumanities’, p. 196.
42 Milgram, pp. 10, 147-8; this phenomenon has also been documented in detail by Zygmunt Bauman (Modernity 
and the Holocaust, pp. 159-166), by Hannah Arendt in her study of Adolf Eichmann (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil [revised and enlarged edn], Penguin, New York, 1983, pp. 22, 92), and, in regard to 
the expectations and judgements of one’s equals rather than one’s superiors, by Christopher Browning (Ordinary 
Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland, Penguin, London, 2001, pp. 174-175).
43 Weber, From Max Weber, pp. 228-9.
44 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 243, original italics; see also Milgram, pp. 10-1 I.
45 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 99.
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combined and integrated into more than one meaning-determining totality. By itself, the 
function is devoid of meaning, and the meaning which will be eventually bestowed on it is in 
no way pre-empted by the actions of its perpetrators.’46 In other words, ‘technical 
responsibility ... forgets that the action is a means to something other than itself.’47 It is only 
the performance of the act which is in question: Milgram calls this process a ‘narrowing of 
moral concern.’48 Furthermore, the euphemistic language of modern bureaucracy, which 
over time seeps increasingly into everyday language, in itself distorts meaning regarding 
action. Marcuse identifies this as ‘functional language,’ ‘the language of one-dimensional 
thought,’ which identifies things and their functions (we may more specifically state here that, 
in terms of people, the individual is identified, firstly, with the collective, and secondly, with 
the effect that collective is said to have on ‘society’). Such language, by its internally 
constructed terms of reference, validates itself and grants itself immunity against 
contradiction, and denies possibilities of distinction and complexity.49 This characterisation 
holds even (or perhaps particularly) when language ‘does not transmit orders but 
information.’50
In itself, this aspect of bureaucracy may not seem directly related to dehumanisation. 
However, it is the dehumanising discursive strategy which constructs humans as objects that 
allows calculation to take place with the least possibility of ‘moral calculus’ (regarding ends) 
intruding: ‘the language in which things that happen to [humans] (or are done to them) are 
[sic] narrated, safeguards its referents from ethical evaluation.’51 This discourse of technical 
expertise assures the psychological distance of both ‘desk-murders’ and ‘hands-on’
46 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 100.
47 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 101.
48 Milgram, p. 9.
49 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, pp. 80-88.
50 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, p. 91.
51 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 103.
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perpetrators from their victims.52 Bauman gives the example of W illy Just, a German 
technical expert who gave advice on improvements to Nazi gas vans so that ‘fluids’ would 
flow to the middle, allowing ‘thin fluids’ to exit the van and ‘thicker fluids’ to be hosed out 
afterwards.53 The ‘personality type of the technical expert,’ writes Weber, is strongly 
furthered by the bureaucratisation of all domination.54 The fact that feelings of moral 
responsibility continue to exist (oriented toward fulfilling a technical role, rather than 
toward the ends or consequences of action) means that, in perpetrators’ own eyes, their 
essential goodness is endorsed, allowing them to feel more ‘human’ and to return to society 
after the commission of their deeds.55 Indeed, this situation, in which a perpetrator has 
entered into the realm of authority of their own free will, and recognises the justifying 
ideology of the actions demanded, secures not only obedience, but willing obedience, 
‘accompanied by a strong sense of doing the right thing.’56 Finally, a bureaucratic structure 
which rewards loyalty and performance creates a situation in which professional self-interest 
can play a role in perpetrator attitudes to the task to which they have been assigned;57 this 
includes their understanding of the meaning of victims’ existence and of their actions toward 
victims.
Numerous examples of the way in which the system outlined above binds willing 
perpetrators to systems of mass killing can be found. Hannah Arendt argues that the 
‘horribly painstaking thoroughness’ of Nazi genocide could be traced to the notion (very 
common in Germany, she adds) that to be law-abiding is not only to obey laws, but to
52 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 196.
53 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 197. See also E. Katz, ‘On the neutrality of technology: the Holocaust 
death camps as a counter-example’, Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 7, no. 3, 2005, pp. 4 14 -4 1 7, fo r further 
examples of the role of technicians.
54 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 240.
55 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 250.
56 Milgram, pp. 143-144.
57 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 253-254; see also Milgram, pp. I 39-140.
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identify one’s own will with the principle behind the laws.58 In pre-colonial Rwanda, there 
was a well-developed system of hierarchical organisation and structure of authority, a fact 
that the Belgian colonisers considered ‘a major factor for progress.’59 Also well-developed 
were institutions of labour mobilisation and requisition, a practice which would continue in 
colonial, and postcolonial, systems such as the umuganda (obligatory communal work).60 It is 
worth nothing here that Rwandan genocide was often characterised as ‘community work’ - 
that is, both as familiar and morally unambiguous ‘work’ rather than ‘killing’ as such, and as 
an activity authorised by, ordered by, and for the good of the community - meaning that 
rejecting such work was to betray the community.61 Indeed, Philip Verwimp proposes as a 
representative example of this narrative the similarity between a 1979 exhortation of 
President Juvenal Habyarimana’s to communal work in order to ‘attack’ the problem and 
‘destroy the forces of evil,’ and the language used in 1994 to refer to the killing of Tutsi.62 
Many perpetrators explained their actions (after the genocide) by reference to the 
importance of obeying ‘the law’ (igeteko) or ‘the authorities.’63
58 Arendt, pp. I 36-1 37; it should be noted, however, that characterisations of cultures as more or less inherently 
‘law-abiding’ are highly problematic, and are often self-comforting rationalisations on the part of external 
bystanders, rather than theoretically-considered explanations.
59 S. Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and W ar in Rwanda, Cornell University Press, Ithaca & London, 
2006, p. 209-21 I.
60 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 2 1 I -214, 2 17-218. The literal meaning of umuganda is the wood used to 
construct a house (P. Verwimp, ‘Development ideology, the peasantry and genocide: Rwanda represented in 
Habyarimana’s speeches', Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, p. 344); an interesting connection may 
be seen here with the genocidal exhortation, mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, to ‘cut the tall trees’ (kill 
Tutsi).
61 Philip Verwimp suggests (in a controversial and somewhat eccentric article) that the ideology of development, 
combined with a valorisation of agricultural work (which was discursively constructed as excluding Tutsi) was the 
chief ideological motivating factor in the Rwandan genocide; an argument concerning the importance of this 
factor in discourse is put in D. Li, ‘Echoes of violence: considerations on radio and genocide in Rwanda 'Journal of 
Genocide Research, vol. 6, no. 1,2004, p. 15. Li suggests that as well as umuganda, ‘[t]he value of work was also 
tied to the virtues espoused by the Catholic Church (Prunier, 1995, p 77; Verwimp, 2000, p 338) and to the 
dignity of being associated with the activities of the state (Taylor, 1999, p 141).’
62 Verwimp, p. 350.
63 Straus, The Order of Genocide, pp. I 37, I 59-160, 173, 219-221.
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W e can conclude with Marcuse, then, that in the modern society, domination and 
administration have ceased to be separate and independent functions.64 The system is 
designed such that the individual comes to self-identify with that system; if not on all levels, 
certainly to the extent that the incentive to perform binds her/him to the system and 
seriously obstructs not only possibilities, but also the conceivability, of meaningful resistance.
In speaking of tendencies which support oppressive domination, two other properties of 
modern bureaucracy must also be noted. Firstly, W eber argues that the chief influence on 
‘the bureaucratic tendency’ was the need created by standing armies and by the connection 
of public finance with the military establishment, developments of the modern era; 65 this 
should also tell us something about the nature of bureaucracy. Indeed, as we have seen 
previously, the military metaphor is frequently seen in genocide (all the more so given that 
genocide is often carried out in periods of warfare). In Rwanda, for example, Tutsi were 
often depicted in an essentialised fashion as ‘accomplices’ of the rebel RPF, or as the 
generalised Tutsi enemy’ or Inkotanyi: Scott Straus concludes that ‘killing Tutsis was 
inseparable from the language of war.’66 Secondly, bureaucracy innately lends itself to 
concealment and (public) euphemism. As Weber notes, for those within the system 
superiority is enhanced by keeping secret their knowledge and intentions, meaning that this 
tendency is built into the system: ‘[t]he concept of the “official secret” is the specific 
invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the bureaucracy as this 
attitude, which cannot be substantially justified beyond these specifically qualified areas.’67
The fact that some of the psychological states mentioned above are not innovations of the 
modern age (for example, the displacement of moral responsibility of those ‘acting on
64 Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, p. 92.
65 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 212.
66 Straus, The Order of Genocide, pp. 29, 50, 58.
67 Weber, From Max Weber, p. 233.
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orders’) should not blind us to the fact that in the modern system these common 
psychological processes were employed in the creation of a new model of governance, and a 
new society, in which physical, psychological, emotional and moral distance was created 
between those who enacted or supported power, and the objects of such action. Modern 
bureaucratic management was not and is not a neutral tool which can be put to any ends; it 
contains various propensities and tendencies, outlined above, which in some circumstances 
may be considered to be offset by other benefits, but in other contexts contribute 
immeasurably to the existence and operation of systems of destruction.68
V . G enocidal and N o n -G e n o cid a l B u reau cracy
W e have seen the way in which the rise of the modern, bureaucratic state allowed the 
removal of ‘moral calculus’ from the enactment of violence, and the way in which this 
process takes place both on the level of executive or collective decision-making, and at the 
individual level. From this premise, however, it may be objected that there is nothing 
uncommon about the fact that genocidal states use this kind of language about their subjects; 
that this fact has nothing specific to tell us about genocide, and that bureaucratic 
centralisation and its impact on society has already been exhaustively explored. Bauman 
acknowledges this objection when he writes that ‘the adverse impact of dehumanisation is 
much more common than the habit to identify it almost totally with its genocidal effects 
would suggest.’69 Taking this train of thought a step further, Donald Bloxham critiques 
Bauman’s reading thus:
68 As mentioned in the introduction, we may consider ‘bureaucracy’ in itself to be a technology; in this sense, Eric 
Katz’s argument regarding the misconception of a perception of technology as ‘value-neutral’ is highly relevant.
As Katz observes, ‘technologies determine the forms of human life, and thus the values that humans live by’ (p. 
413).
69 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 103.
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To some degree genocidal structures inevitably will resemble the political systems in which 
they are embedded, and so Zygmunt Bauman, who locates the character of the Holocaust 
within the bureaucratic mindset that he sees as central to its perpetration, may be saying 
only
that Nazi Germany was a modern state, which is self-evident.70
Bauman has indeed located the murderous social reorganisation of the Holocaust (and, by 
extension, other genocides) within the realm of the massive, rational, ordering process of 
modernity in which ‘everyone will be transported from their present, contingent site to the 
place where reason orders them to be’ (including nowhere).71 And it is, of course, true that 
a bureaucratic system is the practice of the modern capitalist nation-state, no matter what 
substance it is dealing in (oil, sugar or people) and, furthermore, that it always deals with 
people in this way. An example can be found in the fact that every modern, Western human 
society already, on a massive scale, treats biological beings (namely, animals and plants) in 
exactly this fashion: as interchangeable items representing a class, and as units of production. 
Far from being a counter-example, this demonstrates that the fact that this is the standard 
system of organisation in such societies is intimately involved in the expression of dominance 
over particular groups, and that one aspect of the enactment of such dominance upon 
humans is that it is discursively related to other forms of the enactment of dominance which 
are conceived as less morally problematic. As Bauman writes, ‘the civilizing process is, 
among other things, a process of divesting the use and deployment of violence from moral 
calculus, and of emancipating the desiderata of rationality from interference of [sic] ethical
70 Bloxham, p. 206. Bloxham makes more detailed criticisms of Bauman’s argument regarding modernity, but, 
given that they relate to the specificities of the German situation, they will not be addressed here. In a 
comparative sense, Bloxham’s argument is directed not at the conditions of modernity in toto, but at the 
argument that genocide is normatively carried out by modern methods. Indeed, Bloxham’s argument for a 
comparative approach, for the importance of ideology as a motivating factor, and for an understanding of 
bureaucracy as a common modern characteristic rather than a specific aspect of the Holocaust, can be read as 
supporting the argument that I present here.
71 Z. Bauman, The Duty To Remember, -  But What?’, in James Kaye and Bo Strath (eds), Enlightenment and 
Genocide, Contradictions of Modernity (Series philosophy & politics: No. 5), P.I.E. -  Peter Lang, Brussels, 2000, p. 50.
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norms or moral inhibitions.’72 The infliction of genocide involves prejudice (in the sense of 
an emotional feeling of the lesser worth or danger of another collective), but also ‘the 
routine and unemotional function of modern society.’73 And both of these practices involve 
dehumanisation.
Given that genocide and mass killing are the extremes of the expression of violent 
dominance, it becomes clear that the fact that such discourse functions at a lower-key 
register constantly on an everyday level (to allow one not to think about the rise in levels of 
domestic violence or homelessness, the treatment of refugees and minority groups, or the 
fate of the dead animal on one’s plate) means that it can be used as a model to create similar 
psychological-emotional states toward other circumstances, ones to which there has been 
less time to become habituated, which have not yet socialised as norms, or which are 
periodical or circumstantial rather than ongoing. That is, the very fact that decisions 
regarding action in mass society are, at least in principle, always made on the basis of 
statistical research and demography (whether they involve cuts in tax or cuts in welfare) 
means that the use of such language can normalise the activity of mass murder (which, 
although it should not be considered societally dysfunctional within a benign normative 
model, tends to be periodical, taking place, as it does in the vast majority of cases, in periods 
of instability); it makes genocidal action into just another task among many in the running of 
a well-ordered society, rather than an unprecedented, extraordinary or qualitatively different 
event from the perspective of the perpetrator and his or her universe of meaning and 
morality. As Bauman puts it, ‘[t]his mode can be put to the service of a genocidal objective 
without major revision of its structure, mechanisms and behavioural norms.’74 In Rwanda, 
according to Alison Des Forges,
72 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 28.
73 Bauman, The Duty To Remember’, p. 52.
74 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 104.
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[administrators broke the genocide down into a series of discrete tasks which they 
executed without consideration of the ultimate objective of the work. Cultivators turned 
out for the long-standing practice of communal labor although they knew that they were to 
cut down people as well as the brush in which they found them. Priests announced public 
meetings without consideration of the message to be delivered there. Businessmen 
contributed money to the ‘self-defense’ fund established by the government as they had 
contributed to similar collections in the past, even though the money was to buy 
‘refreshments’ for the militia and fuel to transport them to their places of ‘work.’75
Such a process is self-sustaining, and contains its own momentum. Once individuals have 
been transformed into units, their very humanity ‘slows down the smooth flow of 
bureaucratic routine,’ creating a ‘nuisance factor which means that individuals are 
considered not only with indifference, but with disapprobation and censure.76 Indeed, 
Bauman maintains that bureaucracy is not merely a tool, which can be used for good or bad 
ends; rather, ‘the dice are loaded,’ inasmuch as bureaucracy ‘has a logic and momentum of 
its own’; it is ‘programmed to seek the optimal solution’, and to measure that solution in a 
way which does ‘not distinguish between one human object and another, or between human 
and inhuman objects.’77 In genocide and genocidal killing, the rational sequence of the 
destruction of victims (as outlined by Raul Hilberg), beginning with definition and ending with 
annihilation, is arranged, according to the logic of bureaucratic discourse, precisely to evict 
the object from the realm of moral obligation, with each step putting further distance 
between the victim, and perpetrators and bystanders.78 We may also consider Wolfgang 
Sofsky’s comment on categorisation in the Nazi camps: in itself, the system of categorisation 
‘created distances, intensified antagonisms and drew lines of social demarcation that none
75 Des Forges, p. 12.
76 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 103-4.
77 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 104.
78 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 190-192.
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could cross ... [it] guided social judgement by intensifying the perception of differences.’79 In 
the following section, I outline the way in which such categorisation dehumanises its objects 
and legitimises mistreatment and killing.
V I. B ureacracy, Catego risatio n and D o m inance
In the introduction to this chapter, I mentioned the way in which, in the modern age, 
individuals are categorised as representative of an ideal type. This type is chosen from 
among a pre-constructed taxonomy of types which is itself in turn chosen from other 
taxonomies as relevant to the situation at hand:80 that is, a situational ideological framework 
is created through which circumstance is comprehended and action taken. Paul Chilton, 
drawing on research in the cognitive sciences, argues that language which categorises in this 
way blends the cognitive domains or ‘modes’ of social intelligence, with those of intuitive 
essentialism and technicality (tool-making). A naturalisation of the categories which are used 
takes place (categories which, though they may belong only to humans, do not in themselves 
remind one of the humanity of their objects), and humans thus come to be classified as non­
human things which can be instrumentally manipulated.81 In the discursive terms of modern 
technologies of population, in any given situation, one property is taken to be the defining 
characteristic of the individual (as a woman, Jew, Communist, et cetera), and that individual as 
such is synecdochal, is only a representative of the group of people who (and who are a
79 W . Sofsky, The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp (trans. W . Templer), Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, I 999, p. 123.
80 On categorisation in the context of arguments regarding genocidal and non-genocidal prejudice, see M. Billig, 
‘Henri Tajfel's “ Cognitive aspects of prejudice” and psychology of bigotry’, The British Journal of Social Psychology, 
vol. 41,2002, p. 175.
81 P. Chilton, ‘Manipulation, memes and metaphors: The case of Mein Kampf in L. de Saussure & P. Schulz (eds), 
Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century: Discourse, language, mind, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 2005, p. 40.
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group only because they) have that property.82 Bauman suggests that this kind of categorical 
abstraction ‘is one of modernity’s principal powers ... genocide differs from other murders 
in having a category for its object.’83 Finally, in a possible endgame, the individual becomes 
representative only of that property itself (as we have seen, Jews come to be understood not 
just as likely to bear or spread disease, not just as a metaphorical disease which makes up 
part of a figure of speech, but as ‘disease incarnate’). In Rwanda, Straus notes the way in 
which ‘over and over again’ Tutsis were spoken of by perpetrators as a unit, ‘a single entity 
with identical - and permanent - intentions’: the category ‘the Tutsi’ came to substitute for 
the individual.’84 For many perpetrators, the central phrase of the genocide was recalled as 
Vmwanzi ni umwe ni umututsi' (The enemy is one; it is the Tutsi).85
Many scholars have noted the paradoxical nature of modernity, the way in which it 
contains its own contradictions. Thus, often-claimed dehumanising characteristics of 
modern society have been associated both with the group (mass culture, bureaucracy, 
centralisation, standardisation, homogenisation) and with the individual (in the claim that 
social groups and the moral and social benefits they create, whatever they may be claimed to
82 See C. F. Graumann, ‘Verbal Discrimination: a Neglected Chapter in the Social Psychology of Aggression’, 
Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, vol. 28, no. I, 1998, p. 48. On ‘the Jew ’ as ‘one political actor in Nazi 
propaganda see J. Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World W ar II and the Holocaust, The Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, 2006, pp. 37-38. Herf also provides numerous 
examples of the way in which the singular term Juda was used to characterise the alleged actions of Jews. On the 
way in which the process of quantifiable efficiency removes the possibility of ‘the intangibles of life’ and of lives, 
see Betton & Hench, pp. 538-539. W e  might also consider such characterisation to be a particular aspect of 
metonym, ‘the part for the whole’; George Lakoff and Mark Johnson argue that, like metaphor, metonymy is 
deeply grounded in human thought and action, to the point that we are not necessarily conscious that it occurs 
(G. Lakoff & M. Johnson, Metaphors W e Live By, University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 1980, pp. 35-40). 
Finally, Victor Klemperer has noted the way in which, under the Third Reich, categorical identity came to be a 
defining characteristic, such that he was always referred to officially as ‘Jud Klemperer’ ([the] jew Klemperer) (V. 
Klemperer, The Language of the Third Reich: LTI - Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist’s Notebook [trans. M. Brady, 3rd 
edn], The Athlone Press, London & New Brunswick [New  Jersey], 2000 [original German date of publication 
1957], p. 78; and see also pp. 176-177 on the universe of meaning contained within the adjective jüdisch [Jewish]).
83 Bauman, T he  Duty To Remember’, p. 36.
84 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. I 73.
85 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 225.
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be, are being destroyed due to capitalist-consumerist individualism). But these positions are 
not necessarily as contradictory as they might seem, and the contradiction may be resolved 
by asking to what use a process is put: what is this process of production in fact producing, 
and at whose behest? The human individual must be conceptualised by the State both as a 
demographic, and as a (single) unit of production (this concept can be seen as similar to 
Foucault’s definition of the two poles of development of modern bio-power: the anatomo- 
politics of the human body, and that of the ‘species body’86). Therefore, the fact of the 
individual’s existence as an individual is the locus of a process which, in conception, 
execution and aim, determines that the individual remain within the relevant category, and 
represent that category through her/his actions (and this applies to all modern citizens, not 
only to victims but to their persecutors -  though it should be affirmed that these categories 
are highly malleable according to time and circumstance: they are determined and produced 
by the question which is asked). In Bauman’s words, ‘[djehumanization starts at the point 
when, thanks to the distantiation, the objects at which the bureaucratic action is aimed can 
[sic], and are, reduced to a set of quantitative measures.’87 The definition of victims in this 
way ‘sets them apart as a different category, so that whatever applies to it does not apply to 
all the rest’ -  individuals become exemplars of a type, and that type *seep[s] into their 
individualized image.’88
Groups of people may often be divided, on paper, into various categories; but this is not 
usually done (that is, openly, in most societies, most of the time) in order to physically 
destroy one group. The fact that, as we have seen, language already exists in which is 
inherent a certain categorisation of the object (to be dealt with as inanimate), accompanied 
by a certain moral-emotional state (apathy) with regard to that object, together with the fact
86 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume I: An Introduction (trans. R. Hurley), Pantheon Books, New York, 
1978, p. 139
87 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 102.
88 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 19 1 ; original italics.
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that the use of such language is standard practice in mass situations, allows the employer of 
such language to deny the fact of the victims as living individual humans who, under previous 
normativities, would be owed at least some consideration and/or obligation as to the way in 
which they were treated. This language, then, is also a self-fulfilling prophecy of genocide, 
one in which victims are named as inanimate matter before they are transformed into that 
state.
The example of the genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda in the mid-1990s casts some light on these 
processes. At first glance, discussion of this case in terms of modernity and the nation-state 
may seem counter-intuitive. The genocide took place during a period of civil war and 
administrative chaos, in which the official Rwandan government had collapsed after the 
assassinations of the President, Juvénal Habyarimana, and the Prime Minister, Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana.89 Furthermore, Rwandan society was anything but highly modernised or 
industrialised; Rwanda was chiefly a subsistence agriculture economy, and the genocide itself 
can be characterised as ‘low-tech’ (in comparison to, for example, Nazi genocide). Given 
this, what role can bureaucracy and bureaucratic discourse have played? In the first instance, 
Rwanda is a prime example of the way in which bureaucratic techniques of demography and 
population management create the preconditions for genocide by creating and shaping 
identity categories. While ‘Hutu’ and Tutsi’ were certainly identity categories in pre­
colonial Rwandan society, they were categories which were both flexible and permeable. 
Between 1927 and 1936, however, the colonising Belgians - employing a divide-and-rule 
strategy typical of colonialism - (re)organised administration in the areas of education, state 
administration, taxation, and Church around these identities, took a census classifying every
89 The history of the lead-up to the genocide, the connection between the assassinations of Habyarimana and the 
commission and outbreak of genocide, and the role of politicians in the genocide, are complex topics which are 
not relevant to the subject at hand. See Chap. 6, n99.
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Rwandan as Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa, and issued identity cards bearing this information.90 
Identity cards continued to be used in the postcolonial period, and were employed during 
the genocide as a primary (though by no means the sole) marker of identity, and hence as a 
method of identifying victims.
As Mahmood Mamdani has observed, colonial rule (and the transition from direct to 
indirect colonial rule) came to be premised upon the necessity for hierarchical structures of 
domination, not only between colonisers and colonised, but also between different colonised 
collectivities. Legally- and politically-constructed hierarchies were organised by essentialised 
identity categorisation.91 The centralised and hierarchical system of domination which the 
Belgians instituted in Rwanda was premised upon rule through the Tutsi, who, according to 
racial-religious ‘Hamitic’ theories current at the time, were racially superior, considered to 
be taller, lighter-skinned, and more fine-featured than the Hutu.92 Indeed, in 1902 the 
Church described Tutsis as ‘supreme humans’ (leaving an obvious inference to be drawn as 
to the ‘human nature’ of Hutus).93 In the postcolonial period, however, the power dynamic 
was reversed, leaving the Tutsi a minority subject to institutionalised oppression, massacre, 
and (ultimately) genocide in the context of civil war. This demography played itself out in 
the periodic massacres of Tutsi which took place in the period between independence and 
the genocide: in the 1973 violence, which began with purges of Tutsi, ‘officials and 
government supporters called the actions [purges] “ ethnic rebalancing,” “ clearing off’
(déguerpir) and removing a Tutsi “ surplus.” The issue to which they referred was “ ethnic 
proportionality.’”94 ‘Ethnic balancing’ was carried out by ‘Public Safety Committees.’95 The
90 M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2002, p. 88.
91 Mamdani, pp. 24-28.
92 The ‘Hamitic’ thesis is the Biblically-based concept that Tutsis originated in Northern Africa and were 
therefore, firstly, not ‘black’ in the same way as the ‘Bantu’ Hutu, and secondly, not indigenous to Rwanda.
93 Mamdani, p. 88.
94 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 190.
95 Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 191.
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role of bureaucratic discourse in genocide, mass killing and mass violence in Rwanda, then, is 
evident both in general terms, and in the specific use of language by perpetrators.
I do not claim that we can draw a straight line between bureaucratic colonial governance in 
Rwanda, and genocide. However, we may say that this governance, and in particular the 
characteristically bureaucratic features which it imposed on Rwandan society in terms of 
hierarchy and the categorisation of essentialised identity, were necessary conditions for the 
genocide which occurred there. Mamdani argues that the origin of violence in Rwanda is 
found not in the realms of biology and culture, but rather, in state constructions of political 
identity.96 It was not only the creation of a race-mythology regarding Rwandan peoples 
which led to violent ongoing conflict; similar mythologies were applied elsewhere without 
this consequence. Rather, in Rwanda this notion became a rationale for a set of institutions 
inspired by, embedded in, and reproduced by this ideology.97 That is, the ideology was 
incorporated into a system organised along bureaucratic lines: an institutional construct.98 
Ultimately, the bureaucratic dehumanisation of Hutu (under the colonial regime) and Tutsi 
(in the postcolonial period) was a vital factor in the Rwandan genocide. The role of 
bureaucracy and bureaucratic discourse in this and other genocides, then, goes beyond the 
fact that bureaucratic organisation is necessary to attempt genocide in the age of the mass 
society; although present in varying degrees in different cases, this discursive strategy is 
intimately involved with dehumanisation in general, and, specifically, genocidal 
dehumanisation.
In bureaucracies, however, it is not only victims, but also perpetrators, who undergo a 
process of de-individuation: in a group situation, there is a decreased focus on personal 
identity, which becomes submerged in the nature of the group, and general social norms
96 Mamdani, p. 34.
97 Mamdani, p. 87.
98 Mamdani, p. 87.
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have their place taken by situation-specific group norm s." This process also takes place in 
‘hands-on’ situations, in which a perpetrator group (for example, a particular military unit or 
militia group) who identify as such (a process which generally involves some kind of visual 
signifier, such as a uniform) are more likely to behave cruelly and aggressively. 100 This brings 
us to the question of the different psychological states of those indirectly and directly 
involved in killing, and the different psychological desires and needs which euphemistic and 
bureaucratic language fulfils in each case.
VII. Schreibtischtäter and D ire ct P erpetrators:
B u reau cratic and N on -bu reau cratic Euphem ism
W hile some have spoken of ‘primeval moral drives’ against killing, I have argued that this is 
an overstatement of the case. 101 It should not be assumed that individuals have an innate 
propensity not to act violently, which must be overcome by external influences. Milgram 
writes that, ‘[tjhough such prescriptions as “Thou shalt not kill” occupy a pre-eminent place 
in the moral order, they do not occupy a correspondingly intractable position in the human 
psychic structure .’ 102 However, as Milgram’s experiments have demonstrated, the 
commonsense understanding that it is more difficult to harm someone directly, than to 
order harm done -  that the closer the victim, the harder it is to act against them -  is borne 
out in fact. 103
The literal distance between bureaucratic perpetrators and victims, as we have seen, plays 
a part in legitimising their actions; but how does bureaucratic discourse relate to direct or
99 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 251.
100 Waller, Becoming Evil, pp. 25 I -252.
101 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 188.
102 Milgram, p. 8.
103 Milgram, pp. 33-44.
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‘hands-on’ perpetrators, the men and women ‘on the ground,’ who cannot ignore the 
physical consequences of their actions? The answer is that, for the direct perpetrator, 
killing, when constructed as the processing of objects, can be understood as a (generally) 
unpleasant task, but one identical in kind to other unpleasant tasks which must be carried 
out for the functioning (or even the survival) of society. Their actions, just like those of the 
‘desk-murderer,’ are ‘nothing personal,’ and hence may be disconnected or 
compartmentalized from their self-conception.104 Furthermore, the language, discourses and 
practice of industrialisation, or, in less modernised societies, of everyday work, can be 
applied to the killing process.105 In each case, euphemistic language provides a discursive 
strategy in which, despite the fact that terminology is not literally believed to be factual, the 
meaning of acts can be altered to produce less cognitive dissonance: ‘as they live within their 
euphemistic labels, and use them with each other, perpetrators become bound to a 
psychologically safe realm of dissociation, disavowal, and emotional distance.’106 Albert 
Bandura, whose work has consistently provided empirical demonstrations of the 
disinhibitory power of euphemistic language, comments that:
[ejuphemistic language ... provides a convenient tool fo r masking reprehensible activities or 
even conferring a respectable status upon them (Bolinger, 1982; Lutz, 1987). Through 
sanitized and convoluted verbiage, destructive conduct is made benign and those who engage 
in it are relieved of a sense of personal agency.107
104 Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros & Zimbardo, pp. 59-60.
105 Betton and Hench draw a connection between the Enlightenment discourse of ‘value-neutrality,’ adopted by 
business from the realm of science, with the ‘physical manifestations of Taylorism’ such as the assembly-line (pp. 
537-538). A similar argument regarding discourse around technology, made with regard to Nazi death camps, 
can be found in Katz, p. 4 1 I .
106 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 212.
107 Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara & Pastorelli, p. 365; see also Bandura, ‘Selective Activation and Disengagement’, 
pp. 31-32. In relation to our last chapter, we might note here the telling term ‘sanitized’ language; on this subject 
see also Bandura, ‘Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities’, p. 195; ‘Selective Activation and 
Disengagement’, p. 32.
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Furthermore, the bureaucratic routinization of actions, their division into separate tasks 
which are performed identically each time they occur, desensitises the direct perpetrator to 
her or his own actions, and, ‘[o]nce habituated, the prevailing mind-set becomes how to do 
it better, not whether to do it at all.’108 It may seem on the surface that an important 
difference is that strictly bureaucratic euphemism does not deal directly with motivatory 
questions of morality, with the issue of ‘should,’ while non-bureaucratic euphemistic language 
often does so in regard to the terms with which it creates meaning, inasmuch as the terms 
used themselves imply and thus call for the ‘correct’ action in response. Nonetheless, this 
difference may be considered superficial, as, in each case, action is premised on similar 
discursive thinking; in bureaucratic discourse, action is premised on (moral) responsibility to 
the bureaucracy and one’s fellows, while in the case of non-bureaucratic discourse action is 
determined both by the previous factors, by direct exhortation, and by the way in which 
‘reality’ is thus constructed. According to Bandura, euphemistic language, either as 
‘sanitisation’ or as the ‘agentless passive voice’ (both of which are in evidence in 
documentary material presented here and elsewhere in this thesis), can be seen as an 
‘injurious weapon’ (indeed, Bandura cites evidence that ‘people behave much more cruelly 
when assaultive actions are given a sanitised label than when they are called aggression’).109 
The following examples provide elucidating evidence of the existence and function of 
euphemism at bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic registers.
The paradigmatic case of bureaucratic euphemistic language is, of course, the Nazi 
destruction of the Jews. To take a few examples from a list which could be multiplied 
virtually ad infnitum: in terms of euphemistic language, we see such phrases as the prefix 
Sonder-, that is, ‘special’, which was widely used to indicate killing, as, for example, in 
Sonderbehandlung (‘special treatment’, that is, killing), or Sonderkommando (the Jewish units 
which disposed of corpses); strictly-maintained linguistic reference to camp inmates as
108 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 244-245, 248.
109 Bandura, ‘Selective Moral Disengagement’, p. 104.
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Häftlinge (prisoners);110 the listing by statisticians and public health authorities of corpses as 
Figuren (figures or pieces); and memo references to victims as ‘the load,’ ‘number of pieces,’ 
and ‘merchandise.’* 111 Another notorious example is found in the tattooing of numbers on 
camp prisoners. This highly bureaucratic and centralised genocide provides perhaps the 
most extensive use of such discourse, and the clearest demonstration of its purposes; in the 
fact, for example, that victims in the camps were identified (if they had not been selected for 
immediate killing) both by a number, and by a coloured symbol indicating to which group 
they belonged (and hence their place in a hierarchy of power and value defined by the 
perpetrators, a place which defined the way in which the individual would be treated within 
the camps). As Sofsky puts it,
absolute power is the absolute power to label ... defining a taxonomy of categories into 
which every prisoner was pigeonholed ... the use of the class hierarchy was a strategy of 
graded discrimination, persecution, and annihilation. The ultimate value in this pecking order 
was the worth a person’s life was accorded. This value sign was sewn to an individual’s 
clothing, visible for all to see, a stigmatic patch ... [w]ith the aid of categories, power 
implemented its model of society.112
However, as well as the German case, euphemistic utterance, and language which 
transforms victims into objects without subjectivity can be found in many other episodes of 
genocide and mass killing; the resemblance to the better-known Nazi language is often 
striking. In planning the Srebrenica massacre, ‘Bosnian Serb political and military leaders 
used a code to communicate among themselves, referring to the groups of men to be 
executed as “parcels’” to be ‘delivered.’113 In occupied China, Japanese army personnel 
conducting cruel and lethal medical experiments referred to the civilian Chinese who were
110 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 208.
111 Waller, Becoming Evil, p. 208.
112 Sofsky, The Order of Terror, p. 19.
113 In Semelin, Purify and Destroy, p. 254.
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their victims as maruta (‘logs’).114 These prisoners were identified only by a number and a 
card describing their biomedical particulars:115 as one perpetrator recalled, ‘[although, when 
[prisoners] arrived, they each had cards with their name, birthplace, reason for arrest and 
age, we simply gave them a number. A maruta was just a number, a piece of experimental 
material.’116 Biomedical records gave a prisoner’s case number only, along with textbook- 
style, identical full-body illustrations.117 People to be shipped to Pingfan, headquarters of the 
notorious Japanese Biological Warfare Unit 731, were called ‘special consignments’ (Tokui- 
Atsukai), while Japanese forces responsible for rounding up Chinese victims were known as 
the ‘Special Handling Forces’ (we might compare the aforementioned Nazi term 
Sonderbehandlung), and the activity of spreading disease among the populace in person 
(generally through the distribution of contaminated food) was called ‘field strategy’ (here we 
might think of another common vegetable metaphor in the concept of ‘root and branch’ 
extermination, where the killing of civilians, or genocide as opposed to oppression, is 
justified by the need to remove the ‘roots’ of the ‘problem’118).119
As we see from these examples, euphemistic (but not always strictly bureaucratic) 
utterances employing the language of officialdom and production, and containing the moral 
and ideological imperatives of these domains, are available for use by both direct and indirect 
perpetrators of mass killing. The non-bureaucratic naming of victims as inanimate objects is 
not as common as either bureaucratic discourse which de-biologises victims, or utterances 
which name them as threatening animals and disease organisms; however, it should not be 
ignored. Non-bureaucratic objectifying language could be seen as a kind of halfway point 
between these two (or, more strictly, three) types (debiologisation, and biologisation); in
114 D. Barenblatt, A Plague Upon Humanity: The Hidden History of Japan’s Biological Warfare Program, HarperCollins 
Perennial, New York, 2004, p. 49, 126.
115 Barenblatt, p. xix.
116 Barenblatt, p. 63.
117 Barenblatt, p. 118.
118 See for example Straus, The Order of Genocide, p. 193.
119 Barenblatt, p. 58, 62-3, 146.
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this case, while victims are named as metaphors for other things, rather than completely 
written out of existence except as units, they nonetheless continue to be placed within the 
framework of units of production, as in the case of maruta, or of the Hutu Power call to ‘cut 
down the tall trees,’ that is, to kill Tutsi (it is also interesting that the two chief examples 
here both relate victims to plant life -  that is, to an object envisaged as somewhere between 
animals and inanimate objects). Such a discursive strategy is not intimately related to 
modernity in itself in the same way that bureaucratic discourse is, though the systematic 
logic of production is undoubtedly a modern innovation. However, it is related to episodes 
which could only have taken place under the auspices of modernity.
In Rwanda, a highly agriculturalised economy where the machete was a near-ubiquitous 
tool, the naming of Tutsi as ‘tall trees’ to be ‘chopped down’ performed a number of 
functions. Firstly, as with all dehumanisation, it functioned strategically to remove the 
sanctions otherwise attaching to the killing of fellow human beings, and to remove empathy 
which might otherwise be felt, by naming victims as non-human. Secondly, this language 
equated the killing of Tutsis with communal agricultural work, thereby framing genocide 
both as a familiar and morally impeccable activity and as a duty to the community. Thirdly, it 
made physical reference to the supposed height of Tutsis in comparison to Hutus, pointing 
out and stigmatising their difference from the ingroup (and, in a metaphor within a 
metaphor, referring to the ‘high’ roles of power and prestige they were alleged to unfairly 
occupy within Rwandan society). Fourthly and finally, it referred to the manner in which 
they could or should be killed, that is, with machetes.
Euphemistic language which names victims as inanimate objects and units of production, 
then, is not solely the confine of bureaucrats who do not ‘get their hands dirty’ in the actual 
business of torture, theft and killing; it is also used by those who are personally involved with 
such actions on a day-to-day basis, and is not limited to killing in highly modernised,
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bureaucratised and industrialised societies such as Nazi Germany. While a distinction should 
be drawn between, for example, Nazi paperwork in which Jews are considered ‘units,’ and 
Hutu Power radio announcers calling for Hutu to ‘chop down the tall trees,’ in each case this 
language objectifies victims, categorises them in a way which denies them individuality, 
defines their inclusion in the victim group as their only salient characteristic, and allows the 
invisible-ising of the human consequences of action taken toward them, thus allowing in turn 
the full or attempted suppression of any moral or emotional response on the part of 
perpetrators -  that is, in Hannah Arendt’s (perhaps over-universal) phrase, the overcoming 
of ‘the animal pity by which all normal men are affected in the presence of physical 
suffering.’120
In his analysis of National Socialism, Marcuse provides a further insight into the connection 
between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic discourse in violent oppression, and, indeed, 
into the subject at the core of this thesis, the practical instrumentality of dehumanising 
discourse. It may seem from outward appearances that the ‘irrational’ or ‘idealistic’ language 
embodied in philosophy, ideology and propaganda is opposed to technical-rational discourse 
‘pertaining to the realm of administration organization and daily communication’; however, 
Marcuse argues, each type is technical, that is, ‘its concepts aim at a definite pragmatic goal, 
and fixate all things, relations and institutions in their operational function within the 
National Socialist system.’121 In genocide, the value of supra-technical mythological and 
metaphysical language becomes exclusively operational, as they are made parts of the 
technique of domination.122
120 Quoted in Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 20. See also Chap. 4, n68. As elsewhere, my quotation of 
this phrase is not intended to imply that a normative human position is to refuse to participate, directly or 
indirectly, in killing.
121 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, pp. 148-149.
122 Marcuse, Technology, War and Fascism, p. 149. More recent socio-cultural analysis has focussed on the fact 
that all political forms of domination employ these ‘supra-technical’ discourses for their own purposes; but this 
does not detract from Marcuse’s valuable insight into the workings of the genocidal state.
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Having demonstrated both the role played by bureaucratic, and euphemistic, language in 
genocide, and the intimate connection between these two forms, in concluding we must 
return to a final question relating to the individual psyche -  and to the argument of this 
thesis -  that is, a determination as to whether the role played by this discourse is 
legitimatory, motivatory, or both. Answering this question will enable us to locate this 
particular discourse within the overall typology and functionality of dehumanising discourses 
posited in this thesis.
V III. Conclusion
W hile the biological determinism of modern racism is rooted in Enlightenment rationalism, 
the logistics of modern genocide and mass killing are no less the fruit of the huge modern 
projects of population, reliant on centralised, bureaucratic technologies of surveillance and 
action; and both legitimise the mass killing of individual human beings. Unlike 
characterisation of victims as diseases or as threatening animals, however, the bureaucratic- 
euphemistic strategic discursive type is purely legitimatory. It does not provide a motivation 
for killing, except inasmuch as the bureaucratic process creates its own objects and is self- 
perpetuating, as every individual is motivated to excel at their assigned task;123 in overall 
terms, however, we may consider this a secondary motivation. But this language functions 
to conceal the human nature of the objects of power, and the human consequences of 
action, as well as displacing responsibility from the individual perpetrator, whether a 
bureaucratic functionary or a ‘hands-on’ killer. Thus, as a discursive strategy, it helps to 
achieve what Bauman argues was necessary for the perpetration of the Holocaust (and, we 
might add, many other genocides); not the mobilisation of attitudes toward victim peoples,
123 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, pp. 10 1 - 102.
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but merely their neutralisation.124 Language itself enacts ‘a transformation of personal 
relations into impersonal things and events.’125 Further, the more such language 
depersonalises victims, the more possible it becomes to construct motivatory 
characterisations around violence toward the victim.126
The language of bureaucratic euphemism and production, then, is intimately related to the 
other types of dehumanisation examined in this thesis, in that it allows the depersonalisation 
of victims, the distancing of the victim from perpetrators and bystanders, and an erasure of 
individuality which makes of the victim a ‘blank slate’ onto which can be written motivatory 
characterisations. In itself, however, it dehumanises victims by presenting them as non­
human objects in a process of production -  or rather, destruction -  in which (moral) 
responsibility lies with the process (the means), rather than the ends. As the different 
examples presented in this chapter demonstrate, this set of utterances appears in extremely 
diverse episodes, from those in which both the other types of dehumanisation are present 
(Nazi genocide of the Jews), to cases of genocidal killing in which there is no intent for the 
complete disappearance of the entire victim people (Japanese mass killing in China), as well 
as episodes in which the most extreme and overtly hostile form of dehumanisation, the 
biologised representation of victims as disease organisms, is not in evidence (genocide in 
Rwanda).
In terms of a model, then, bureaucratic and euphemistic discourse may be considered, 
firstly, to be chiefly legitimatory. Secondly -  particularly given the permeability with which it 
is applied to both non-genocidal and genocidal situations, and the fact that it seems 
universally to appear in concert with other, more overt and overtly hostile forms of 
dehumanisation -  it may be considered a ‘constant’ which is necessary for the legitimisation
124 Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 185.
125 Marcuse, Technology, W ar and Fascism, p. 150.
126 Kershaw quoted in Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, p. 189.
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of modern genocide and mass killing, but is not sufficient, either as a motivation (for, as I 
have argued, dehumanisation or demonisation in itself is never a sufficient or sole source of 
motivation for genocide), or as a form of dehumanisation in itself. Both in its relationship to 
non-genocidal practice, and in the lack of any motivatory aspect, it can be considered the 
least extreme of the three genocidal types of dehumanisation presented in this thesis. 
However, given that legitimisation is a universal function of genocidal dehumanisation, 
despite these qualifiers this type has a vitally important role to play in the commission and 
enactment of genocide in the modern social context.
Chapter 8.
Conclusion
In recent decades, certain fields of inquiry have opened up concerning the study of 
genocide. At the same time, controversies over the causation of genocide, and specific 
problematics around perpetrator narratives and perpetrator psychology, have thrown these 
issues into the spotlight.1 Collective cultural and psychological insights about genocide have 
emerged from outside of the field of macro-level traditional historiography, and these 
insights have problematised earlier conceptions which would treat genocide as an irrational 
aberration from the ‘normal’ course of the ‘progress of civilisation.’ In contrast to this 
earlier view, scholarship from Zygmunt Bauman to Christopher Browning, as well as 
evidence emerging from non-Western genocidal episodes, has demonstrated that processes 
of genocide draw deeply upon pre-existing socio-cultural narratives and their relationship to 
methods of social organization and paths of practice.
This thesis has built upon insights taken, on the one hand, from scholarly developments 
which see genocide as intimately linked to the socio-cultural conditions of the modern age, 
rather than as atavism; and, on the other, from research into the way in which psychological 
knowledge can be applied to genocide even though it is, practically, impossible to produce 
during genocidal episodes the kind of micro-managed empirical data on which psychology is 
traditionally reliant. The work which has been produced in both these fields suggests that 
the analysis of texts and utterances produced by genocidal perpetrators, or within their 
societies, has something vital to tell us about the nature of genocide and genocidal killing.
1 See n3.
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Such texts are narratives which we can read to understand the way in which individuals 
conceive their own acts, in contrast to a reading in which it is the role of the scholar to 
impose her or his understanding upon the object of inquiry. But a further necessary insight, 
in this process, is that neither individual nor collective narratives are produced in a void. 
Cultural conditions make available the materials from which they are constructed, and these 
conditions in turn both produce, and are a product of, non-verbal practice. Given this, my 
own analysis has taken place both at the psychological level of the individual, with the 
understanding that individual utterances are shaped by cultural conditions and resources; and 
at the collective register, in terms of cultural narratives, institutions and practices.
New possibilities for inquiry have been opened up by the emergence of the type of 
approach I have aimed to employ -  an approach which develops the complexity of our 
understanding of the way in which ‘human nature’ (both individual and collective) plays itself 
out in genocidal events. Such readings have thrown a stark relief upon aspects of genocide 
which were previously taken for granted or considered to be relatively unimportant. 
Dehumanisation is one of these. In this thesis I have aimed to use the avenues provided by 
this approach -  including social, cultural, historical and psychological analysis, as well as 
application of the insights of the ‘cultural turn’ in the humanities -  not only to explain the 
importance of dehumanisation in genocide, or to throw light upon problematics in previous 
work treating the issue, but to employ frameworks recognising the relevance of cultural- 
discursive factors in order to expose the way in which genocidal dehumanisation works, and 
to demonstrate this through empirical documentation. In doing so, I have identified a lacuna 
in the field of genocide studies, the very existence of which has gone for the most part 
unnoticed. In addressing this lacuna in terms of a subject, and in employing the methods 
which, I have argued, are necessary to do so, I have created an original conceptual model of 
genocidal dehumanisation. This model provides a framework within which to use the
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concept of ‘dehumanisation’ as one revealing something new about the way in which 
genocide and genocidal killing can occur.
At the outset of this thesis, I posed the question: ‘what role does dehumanising discourse 
which names an outgroup as lesser humans, less than human or nonhuman play in the 
elimination of that outgroup?’ It is in the process of answering this question that I have 
developed a new model of the role of genocidal dehumanisation -  a model which emphasises 
dehumanisation as a functional process. Employing this model in historical and contemporary 
genocidal situations provides precise information about the specific part being played by 
dehumanising discourse.
Genocidal dehumanisation has become necessary in the modern era because it functions to 
address the psychological dissonance which occurs for the perpetrator when involvement in 
genocidal action is combined with modern moral normativities around the mass destruction 
of civilians. Because it is functional, and because it operates both on and through meaning- 
creating bodies of text and utterance, such dehumanisation is best conceived as a discursive 
strategy. My analysis reveals that this strategy has two functions, three types, and manifests 
across a specific range of extremity on a broader continuum of general dehumanisation.
In terms of function, dehumanisation may legitimise genocide, or it may motivate genocide 
(where motivation is inherently legitimatory). The distinction between these two types 
consists in the presence or absence of the element of threat in characterisations of a 
collectivity: if the collectivity is constructed as threatening, dehumanisation is motivatory, 
whereas without this element it is solely legitimatory. There is a stable relationship between 
the two functions and the three types of genocidal dehumanisation (médicalisation, 
animalisation, and bureaucratic-euphemistic reification). Médicalisation is always motivatory, 
animalisation is sometimes motivatory and sometimes solely legitimatory, and bureaucratic
Chapter 8 362
and euphemistic discourse is always solely legitimatory. At least one of these types (and 
often more) seems to be present in all episodes of modern genocide. Finally, 
dehumanisation can (at least provisionally) be considered to be a continuum. While 
legitimisation may exist throughout this continuum, motivatory genocidal dehumanisation 
represents the range of greatest extremity (a range which would then descend through 
dehumanisation encountered in episodes such as slavery and apartheid, and conclude at the 
level of ‘everyday’ dehumanisation at the pole of least extremity).
This, then, is the anatomy of genocidal dehumanisation which I have revealed in answering 
the question as to the role of dehumanising discourse in the elimination of outgroups.2 In 
light of these findings, dehumanisation can no longer be considered, as it has often been, as 
nothing more than an accompaniment to genocide (or, alternatively, as the sole motivating 
factor). In any given episode, the function and type of dehumanisation -  and therefore its 
role in the commission and enactment of genocide -  can be identified. In the contemporary 
setting, the purposiveness of particular types of rhetoric (types which might otherwise 
conceal their true nature) may be revealed as indicative of a genocidal mentality, and 
responses to such statements formulated in terms of likely developments. Fruitful avenues 
of inquiry are also revealed concerning the nature of dehumanisation in a more general 
sense, pursuit of which may produce insight into the vital importance of dehumanisation in 
creating conditions for discrimination and repression in many different kinds of society.
All of this gives some idea as to why this question was worth asking. How have I gone 
about arriving at these conclusions, and how has the material which I have used to do so 
demonstrated the validity of the model outlined above?
2 On the use of the term ‘anatomy’ in this context see Chap. 2, n I .
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Firstly, I examined what other scholars have had to say on the topic of ‘dehumanisation.’3 I 
found that in the field of comparative genocide studies, although ‘dehumanisation’ was 
frequently mentioned as an important aspect of genocide and mass killing, this concept was 
significantly undertheorised, in that it had not been addressed as a primary subject of inquiry 
in a way which gave a thorough and detailed analysis to the role, or, more precisely, the 
function, it played in such events. Thus, scholars such as Helen Fein, James Waller and 
others had both clearly recognised the importance of dehumanisation as a subject of inquiry, 
and produced some important work on some of its features considered in isolation; 
however, in the absence of a general analysis, it had and has been difficult to use the concept 
as a precise tool to tell us something about the way in which genocide and genocidal killing 
occurs. As I have already mentioned, then, this issue presented as a significant lacuna in this 
field, particularly as more recent scholarship has seen the question of how it is possible for 
genocide to occur, in regard to the attitude of perpetrators to victims, come to be a subject 
of widespread and heated debate.4 I therefore set myself the task of researching this subject 
as a primary area of inquiry, in order to provide both a dissection of what genocidal 
dehumanisation is, and to show how it functions in the practice of genocide and genocidal 
killing.
In speaking of functionality, the issue of causation is of primary importance. The causation 
of genocide, however, is a subject which has caused considerable controversy. While I have 
not argued that dehumanisation is necessarily causatory per se, it has been my argument that
3 In particular, the work of Leo Kuper, Helen Fein, James Waller, Daniel Bar-Tal, Israel Charny, and Philip 
Zimbardo.
4 In particular, in the widespread academic and popular controversy aroused by Daniel Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners, and the most well-known alternative position, that put by Christopher Browning. Academic papers 
which have been written on this controversy are numerous: for edited book-length discussions of the subject see 
D. J. Goldhagen et al, The ‘Willing executioners’TOrdinary men’ debate: Selections From The Symposium (April 8, 1996), 
United States Holocaust Research Institute, Washington D.C., 1996; G. Eley (ed), The ‘Goldhagen Effect’: History, 
Memory, Nazism: Facing the German Past, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbour, 2000; R. R. Shandley, Unwilling 
Germans? The Goldhagen Debate (trans. J. Riemer), University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1998; F. H. Littell 
(ed), Hyping the Holocaust Scholars Answer Goldhagen, Cummings & Hathaway, New York, 1997.
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dehumanisation is a vital aspect of a larger, multifaceted process which allows genocidal 
killing to occur. In order to explain how the analysis of dehumanisation could provide a new 
perspective within a broader field of questions regarding causation and motivation, in 
Chapter Two I examined the various different existing models dealing with these aspects of 
genocide.5
Dehumanisation is a phenomenon which occurs both on the level of the individual, as a 
psychological process, the existence of which is manifest in texts and utterances produced 
by individuals; and at the level of the collective, where it is manifest in texts and utterances 
which are oriented toward public reception and which indicate acceptable public opinion. 
The common factor between the realms in which dehumanisation manifests -  that is, 
between its existence as an object of analysis at the levels of individual psychology, the 
individual utterance, and the public and political narrative -  is that it is a discursive process. 
Given that dehumanisation may be thus considered, in Chapter Three I outlined the 
methods through which a research object of this kind might best be approached -  
specifically, the employment of interdisciplinary methods to trace the history and 
confluences of clusters of ideas and utterances considered as discourses, in the context of 
comparative textuality. In the field of comparative genocide studies, one which is still in its 
infancy, there has not yet developed any programmatic approach to the employment of the 
insights of the ‘cultural turn’ to the subject; and indeed, if the field itself is in its infancy, the 
employment of these insights is even more so. In light of this, rather than following an 
accepted methodology for employing a ‘discourse’ approach to the subject of the 
comparative study of genocide, I examined the general practices of methodologies around 
‘discourse’ in order to develop my own approach to the subject. In so doing, I have
5 Regarding causation, theorists of particular importance for my analysis are Adam Jones, Michael Mann, Albert 
Bandura, Philip Zimbardo, James Waller, Ervin Staub, Israel W . Charny, Zygmunt Bauman, Leo Kuper, and Irving 
L. Horowitz; in terms of motivation, as well as the aforementioned I consider the work of Stanley Cohen and 
Peter Du Preez.
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emphasised the concepts of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideology,’ and methodologies which have 
emerged around these two terms, with a particular emphasis on the work of Michel Foucault 
and Norman Fairclough.6 This examination also explained how it was possible to use this 
methodology to make demonstrable claims about my subject matter based on documentary 
evidence, revealing the way in which the analysis of such documentation in context could 
substantiate an argument concerning both the nature and the function of genocidal 
dehumanisation.
The nature of dehumanisation, and the relationship between the perpetrator and genocidal 
action as constituted through text and language, were the subject of Chapter Four. Here it 
was necessary to formulate a definition of dehumanisation -  as occurring when a collectivity 
as a collectivity is defined as unworthy of the moral consideration afforded to members of 
the ingroup. In examining situations in which this dehumanisation co-existed with genocidal 
action, I rejected the previous normative theoretical model which would see participation in 
genocide as an aberrant act which is somehow induced by overcoming a previous ‘goodness’ 
or ‘ordinariness.’ In looking at the question of the psychology of perpetration, two issues 
have emerged as vitally important: the application of psychological analysis, and that of the 
conditions of the modern era. These must be addressed in concert: certain psychological 
necessities are created by the nature of the modern construction of moral legitimacy in the 
enactment of mass killing.
At this point, the major features of the model of dehumanisation outlined above had been 
established. The remaining task was to apply this model, employing the appropriate
6 M. Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (trans. A. M. S. Smith), Routledge, London & New York, 2002; The 
Order of Discourse’ (trans. I. McLeod), in R. Young (ed.), Untying the Text A Post-Structuralist Reader. Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, Boston/London/Henley, 1981, pp. 48-78.
N. Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992; Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical 
Study of Language, Longman, London & New  York, 1995; Language and Power (2nd edn), Longman, Essex, 2001; 
Analysing Discourse: Textual analysis for social research, Routledge, London & New York, 2003.
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theoretical tools, to analyse the three major types of genocidal dehumanisation. Thus, 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven examined médicalisation, animalisation and reification, 
respectively. In each case, the historical context which gave rise to this form of 
dehumanisation as genocidal dehumanisation was demonstrated, along with documentation 
giving evidence of its widespread existence and attesting to the functions performed by the 
specific type in question.
In developing this model over the course of the thesis, a number of problematics have been 
dealt with. Here, I return to some of the most important. In doing so, it is my intent not 
only to emphasise the inapplicability of certain possible objections, but to take this task 
merely as a point of departure in fulfilling the more important goal of giving a final 
clarification of the nature of my project in terms of the insights that it provides, as well as 
suggesting productive future uses for those insights. At the risk of repetition, then, I re­
emphasise that dehumanisation allows genocide to occur. It is by no means the only factor 
which does so, but in my research I have found no cases of genocide without 
dehumanisation (even when we put aside the consideration, alluded to in Chapter Four, that 
on certain interpretations mass killing in itself inevitably involves dehumanisation). If, then, 
we are interested in the question of how genocide can occur -  which is the fundamental 
question of genocide studies -  we need to take dehumanisation into account, and to take it 
into account as a mechanism with a function.
From here, we may ask whether dehumanisation has anything special to tell us about 
genocide, given that it also occurs in non-genocidal situations. There are, however, 
important differences between genocidal and non-genocidal dehumanisation. Firstly, 
‘genocidal’ dehumanisation is a particular type of dehumanisation which not only 
characterises its object in a certain way, but constructs the types of action which may be 
legitimately taken against that object, and in some cases implicitly or explicitly names a need
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for exterminatory action to be taken against that object. This is by no means the case in all 
forms of dehumanisation. Genocidal dehumanisation is particular in three ways: firstly, in 
that it legitimises destruction, rather than more generally legitimising some harmful or 
exclusive action against an outgroup; secondly, in that it occurs in the specific types which I 
have outlined; and, thirdly, in that in order to play its role, it must occur at a certain societal 
register, that is, it must be an acceptable public narrative (not, I emphasise, the only possible 
narrative) in order to be available both at a collective and an individual level as a functional 
legitimating strategy in the overall enactment of genocide. It is not enough for this discourse 
to be found in the words of ‘fringe’ individuals or collectivities (although it may have 
precursors in such locations). It must be a collectivised public discourse which is available to 
legitimise and/or to motivate the obliteration of its collective object.
There are many motivations for genocide, many ideologies which contribute, and many 
factors which allow genocide to occur. Given the subject -  that is, the nature and function 
of dehumanisation in genocide -  it is enough to acknowledge that these motivations and 
factors exist, and exist in multiplicity. I have been concerned with examining the functional 
role of one particular aspect of the multifaceted process of causation, an examination which 
includes not only strictly narrative questions of the direct historical causes for a particular 
event, but also the conditions in which it was possible that it could occur.
To take ‘genocide’ and its causes as a subject of research is necessarily a comparative 
endeavour. Serious problems may arise if an attempt is made to generalise from only a few 
specific cases. I have therefore drawn upon, rather than created, detailed unidisciplinary 
analyses of the cases which I have examined. For each of these, it would be possible (and in 
some cases, such work has informed my own analysis) to trace in detail the various pre­
existing discursive strands which gave genocidal dehumanisation purchase and to explain why 
it took the forms that it did. Where such work has not yet been undertaken, my model
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provides both a rationale to do so, and a method to be employed. The conception I have 
provided here thus opens up avenues of inquiry which can be explored further within other 
disciplinary frameworks.
Finally, we may recognise that the ‘cultural turn,’ in the context of postmodernism and 
post-structuralism, is an approach which has come under heavy criticism. It has been my aim 
in this thesis to demonstrate that, far from divorcing inquiry from more ‘realist’ concerns, 
there are pragmatic questions about the occurrence of particular historical episodes which 
can only be answered by applying insights drawn from this mode of analysis. The approach 
that I have taken to my subject is one which concerns itself with discourse, and hence with 
the reading of texts as a method of inquiry. My purpose has been to understand discursive 
constructions -  which occur both on individual and collective levels -  and the way in which they 
inform the nature of action. I have therefore applied a discursive approach to a discursive 
target. In doing so, I have suggested how interdisciplinary methodologies may be applied, 
and indeed, are necessary for certain objects of inquiry within the broader question of 
explanations for genocide.
I have given above an overview of my model, the way in which it was developed, and the 
presentation of evidentiary material for my claims. I have also mentioned the means by 
which the addressing of initial and conceivable problematics allowed the creation of a 
targeted model, one which in turn can provide methods and uncover material which enables 
the development of these lines of inquiry in fruitful directions. We may now ask: what, in 
fact, has thereby been established which can be of use for the scholar of genocide, or of 
dehumanisation as a broader subject? How can we now employ a theory of dehumanisation 
as a precise tool of analysis? In answering these questions, we will return to a more detailed 
description of my earlier account of genocidal dehumanisation as a model, one which takes 
into consideration the complexities and nuances which have been provided not only by the
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model itself, but by the analysis of its development through an evolutionary process of 
investigation and problematisation of the initial question.
Firstly, genocidal dehumanisation is a vital aspect of modern genocidal killing, in that it addresses 
the problem -  peculiar to the conditions of the modern age and the nation-state as a 
normative model of governance -  of the perceived moral legitimacy of involvement in 
genocidal action. Given the ambiguous relationship between any proposed normative 
position regarding genocidal action, and individual involvement in such action, as well as the 
existence of many motivations for many kinds of action against an outgroup conceived as a 
problem, there is a need not only for the legitimisation of action of any kind, but the specific 
need for the legitimisation of genocide or genocidal killing as a solution to the existence of 
the outgroup. Hence, legitimisation of action to achieve the biological disappearance of the group 
in question is a universal aspect of genocide, and it can only be obtained through a particular 
characterisation of that group qua group. This legitimisation is achieved through the use of 
available discursive resources to reframe the nature of interpersonal and intergroup 
genocidal action, creating both distance between the perpetrator and the victim, and the 
suppression and denial of any inhibitive moral understanding of the genocidal act as such.
Secondly, as well as having a universal function as a legitimising factor in genocide, 
dehumanisation may also be a motivating factor. Motivation is present when narratives of 
dehumanisation construct the object in a way which refers to a threat which that object is 
seen to pose to the subject. Therefore, by determining whether an element of threat is 
present in a given dehumanising narrative, we can understand the work which this narrative 
is doing as a factor in the causation of genocide.
Thirdly, there are three major types of genocidal dehumanisation, and in genocide and 
genocidal killing they have a stable relationship with function either as motivation and
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legitimisation, or solely legitimisation. In establishing the existence of these types and 
presenting their features in the apposite chapters, I have traced their historical development 
into genocidal strategies, and the reasons why they have purchase in particular situations; 
and I have demonstrated their different functions with regard to the provision of motivation 
and/or legitimisation. I have used examples from various cases to demonstrate the common 
existence of a specific type of dehumanisation in different episodes, and the way in which 
type is related to both (non-verbal) perpetrator practice, and to perpetrator construction of 
the meaning of practice. In any given episode, this typology may be employed in order to 
understand both the development of genocidal rhetoric, and the function of genocidal 
discourse.
Finally, I have argued that dehumanisation is best conceptualised as a continuum, rather than 
through a binary framework which seeks to ascertain only whether it is present or absent, 
and which, if it is present, takes its presence for granted without the need for further 
investigation. In this thesis I have described the extreme range of that continuum, and I have 
denoted differentiations of type and function within that range; I have also pointed to 
conceptual possibilities outside of this range, opening up a field of investigation within which 
the model presented here could be employed, and extended. In other words, we now know 
that, in genocide and genocidal killing, dehumanisation may either legitimise and motivate, or 
it may solely legitimise. As a legitimating strategy, dehumanisation, I suggest, would be 
present, at the least, in all forms of institutional oppression of essentialised groups, 
particularly in more extreme cases such as slavery and apartheid. However, in these cases, 
at least initially, the motivating element, the element of essentialised threat, is generally 
absent. Research in these areas, involving the application of this model, presents as a 
productive possibility for further inquiry.
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What I have introduced here is a new conception of the genocidal form of dehumanisation, 
one which emerges, and which can only emerge, from the comparative analysis of many 
cases, and from the application of culturally-based analysis to textual utterances. I have 
provided substantial documentary material which demonstrates both the existence of this 
phenomenon, its manifestation in different forms, and the relationship between the particular 
form in which it manifests and its function in the commission of genocide and genocidal 
killing.
How is this model to be applied in analysing actual episodes of genocidal killing? In any 
given case, the use of this model of analysis will reveal something about the way in which 
language actually functions in the enactment of genocide and genocidal killing. It is no longer 
enough merely to note the presence of such language or to see it as a relatively unimportant 
cultural accompaniment to genocidal action. In any episode, the arena of public discourse, 
and also that of perpetrator testimony (whether public or private) must be examined in 
order to ascertain the nature and functionality of acceptable language, or ‘thinkable’ constructions, 
about the outgroup. If, for example, a medical metaphor is present we can see that 
dehumanisation was either functioning as, or representing, a motivation, and is thus located 
on the most extreme end of the continuum. If we only find evidence of bureaucratic 
euphemisms, we might look elsewhere with regard to motivations for genocide. In all cases, 
a further question is why a particular type of dehumanisation had ‘purchase’ in a particular 
context; that is, from whence it emerged, in a cultural-discursive sense, and how it thus 
came to be available for use as a factor in genocide. Finally, when analysing contemporary 
utterances, their form will tell us something about the way in which the situation is 
conceptualised by those in positions of power and influence, what actions such individuals 
and groups might be likely to take based on those conceptualisations, and where those 
actions might possibly lead (for example, in the case of violence by Robert Mugabe 
mentioned in the chapter on biopolitical discourse).
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In this way, the model presented here can be used as a precise tool of analysis in examining 
episodes of genocide and genocidal killing. However, the research undertaken in this thesis 
also has a more general application. Two recent theoretical innovations, the employment of 
a comparative approach to the study of genocide, and that of the approach of the ‘cultural 
turn,’ allow the development of a general model of the nature and function of 
dehumanisation. In presenting this model, the critical importance o f the construction o f language 
and the analysis o f cultural forms, which has often been downplayed as having minor 
significance, is re-emphasised: these are shown to have a direct connection to genocidal 
action in that they make such action ‘allowable,’ legitimate (as well as sometimes making an 
important contribution to motivation). In this sense, this thesis can be seen not only as an 
examination of genocidal dehumanisation, but also as a contribution to an emerging 
discussion as to the methods by which cultural theory can be applied to the study of 
genocide, enriching older models and allowing the development of new paradigms.7
A final use of these findings, given that dehumanisation may be conceived as a continuum 
which is not only implicated in genocide but in other forms of asymmetrical power 
relationships between collectives, is to point to specific aspects o f the nature o f oppression in 
non-genocidal societies and individual practices. The framework I have provided here opens up 
productive avenues of inquiry regarding dehumanisation in non-genocidal cases. W e  see in 
these findings that the use of language, and, in particular, metaphor and other types of
7 See for example T. Barta, ‘Discourses of Genocide in Germany and Australia: a linked history’, Aboriginal History, 
vol. 25, 2001, pp. 37-56; N. Finzsch, ‘“ It is scarcely possible to conceive that human beings could be so hideous 
and loathsome” : discourses of genocide in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century America and Australia’, in A. D. 
Moses & D. Stone (eds), Colonialism and Genocide. Routledge, London & New York, 2007, pp. 1-19; J. Semelin, 
Toward a vocabulary of massacre and genocide\ Journal of Genocide Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2003, pp. 193-210; J. 
Semelin, Purify and Destroy: The Political Uses of Massacre and Genocide (trans. C. Schoch), Columbia University 
Press, New York, 2007; P. Smith, Why War?: The Cultural Logic of Iraq, The Gulf War, and Suez, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 2005; D. Stone, ‘W hite men with low moral standards? German anthropology 
and the Herero Genocide’, Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 35, no. 2, 2001, pp. 33-45; D. Stone, ‘Biopower and Modern 
Genocide’ in A. Dirk Moses (ed.). Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World 
History, Berghahn Books, New York & Oxford, 2008, pp. 162-179.
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‘naming’ or ‘labelling’ discourse, is not harmless even when (as is often argued) everyone 
knows what is ‘really meant,’ or knows that there is no literal negative implication. 
Furthermore, pre-existing structures of power embodied in text and practice, structures 
which we find unobjectionable, relatively unobjectionable, or a ‘necessary evil,’ make 
available discursive forms which can then be applied to forms of oppression and violence 
which we find more harmful. The literal meaning of words is vitally important, and necessary 
evils snowball. Every time we are complicit in the construction of animals as lesser than 
humans, we employ a discourse of unequal worth which makes it more possible to enslave 
and kill not only animals, but also other humans. The same applies to practices from the 
casual application of military terminology to medical procedures, to participation in the 
centralised demographic projects of the nation-state. It is in the nature of modern society 
that not all acts of complicity are avoidable (though many are) and that in numerous cases 
we may consider that the benefits outweigh the risks; but it is possible to identify the nature 
of those risks, and the consequences of their manifestation, in a clear-eyed fashion. While 
dehumanisation of the other may be ‘human nature,’ this does not imply that we must 
remain powerless to recognise its consequences. The act of recognition not only provides 
insight into the historical workings of genocide and genocidal killing; it is in itself a challenge 
to the catastrophic consequences of the abuse of language in the service of harmfulness and
destruction.
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